



THE EXPOSITOR.






Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024

The Staff.

THE VERY REV. THE DEAN OF CANTERBURY.
THE VERY REV. THE DEAN OF PETERBOROUGH.
REV. CANON FARRAR, D.D., F.R.S.
R. H. HUTTON, ESQ., M.A.
REV. PROFESSOR PLUMPTRE, D.D.
REV. W. SANDAY, D.D.
REV. HENRY WACE, M.A.
REV. J. RAWSON LUMBY, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR T. K. CHEYNE, M.A.
REV. R. E. BARTLETT, M.A.
REV. PRINCIPAL TULLOCH, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR A. B. DAVIDSON, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR W. ROBERTSON SMITH, M.A.
REV. GEORGE MATHESON, D.D.
REV. JAMES MORISON, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR W. MILLIGAN, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR A. B. BRUCE, D.D.
REV. J. OSWALD DYKES, D.D.
REV. PRINCIPAL A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR H. R. REYNOLDS, D.D.
REV. PROFESSOR D. W. SIMON, PH.D.
PROFESSOR JOHN MASSIE, M.A.
REV. JOSEPH AGAR BEET.
REV. GEORGE FINDLAY, B.A.
REV. A. MACLAREN, D.D.
REV. HENRY ALLON, D.D.
REV. S. A. TIPPLE.
MR. R. W. DALE, M.A.



THE
EXPOSITOR.

EDITED BY THE REV.
SAMUEL COX.

VOLUME XII.

London:
HODDER & STOUGHTON,
27, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MDCCCLXXX.

507

v.12
1880:2

The Gresham Press:

UNWIN BROTHERS, CHILWORTH AND LONDON.

14182-14203

PREFACE.

THE EXPOSITOR stole quietly into the world, without any blare of advertising trumpet or roll of drum. Nevertheless it has had the good fortune to meet with a large and wide acceptance, not in Great Britain alone, but also in America and in most of our colonies and dependencies; while even by the keen and erudite critics of Germany it has been received with approval or respect. No doubt it met a public want. Doubtless, too, it owes its success mainly to the fact that it numbers among its Contributors many of the ablest exponents of every school of thought. Here, at least, High Churchman, Low Churchman, Broad Churchman, Wesleyan, Presbyterian, Independent, Baptist, dwell together in unity, and bear pleasant witness to the fact that, under all our differences, doctrinal or ecclesiastical—differences which are very real, and which run very deep—there is a truth, a life, in which we are all one, a Word to which we all defer, a Spirit by whom we are all animated. But I need not frame any apology for THE EXPOSITOR, or task myself to account for a success which has outrun the modest expectations of those who

6122

started it. A Magazine to which most of the best recent Commentaries confess they owe much, and which, if I may trust my correspondents, is read in well-nigh every country under heaven, may be left to speak for itself and to justify its own existence.

For two reasons, either of which would seem to be sufficient, it has been determined to bring the *First Series* of this Magazine to a close. The one is that, during the last two years, I have received sheaves of letters from its subscribers begging that they might be furnished with a complete Index to the Volumes already published, and so be spared the trouble of hunting through many volumes for papers to which they wished to refer. The other is that I have received another and equally numerous series of letters from non-subscribers, asking that some good opportunity should be provided for commencing to subscribe to those who, not foreseeing that the Magazine would meet their wants, had failed to take it in from the first. To meet this twofold demand I have for some time past earnestly endeavoured to bring all the serial works contained in the Magazine to completion, and so to prepare the way for a new start. And in this endeavour I have at last succeeded, with only one exception. In the Preface to Volume i. I expressed the hope that the Magazine might "possess a permanent value, and live as a *book* long after its work as a periodical had come to an end." That hope has been abundantly fulfilled; for, in preparing the Index which has been so urgently demanded—and which will be issued in January, with the first number of the New Series—

I have found that the twelve Volumes already published contain no less than *twelve* completed works, four of which have already been given to the world in a separate form. But I grieve to add that one work must be left incomplete. Two years since the Dean of Peterborough commenced a Commentary on Ecclesiastes which, owing to the exhausting claims of his office and the interruptions of ill-health, he has been unable to finish—to his great regret, and mine, and doubtless to that also of as many as have read his opening chapters. All the other serials have been completed in Volume xii., if not before; but this must be left for completion in the New Series.

During the six years of its existence the Staff of THE EXPOSITOR has been doubled; and I have still to announce two most welcome additions to it. R. H. Hutton, Esq. (Editor of *The Spectator*), one of the first of living Biblical critics, and the Rev. Henry Wace, whose Boyle and Bampton Lectures have placed him in the front rank of the expositors and defenders of the Christian Faith, have both promised early contributions to the New Series: in which the Dean of Peterborough will continue his exposition of the Book Ecclesiastes; while Dr. George Matheson will contribute a work on “The Historical Christ of St. Paul,” Professor Robertson Smith will write on “Christ and the Angels”—virtually a commentary on Hebrews i. and ii.—and Professor Plumptre will give a series of papers on “The Assyrian and the Babylonian Writings as they bear on the Old Testament Scriptures.” In addition to these four important works,

articles for next year's issue have been promised by the Dean of Canterbury, Canon Farrar, Dr. Sanday, Professor Milligan, Dr. Bruce, Dr. Rawson Lumby, Mr. Beet, and Professor Godwin.

As for the Editor I am afraid to promise much on his behalf, though I am not without hope that even he may do his work better in the Second Series than in the First. For the fact is that, being ignorant of editorial duty till I began to edit this Magazine, I have had to learn my work while doing it. And I am afraid that at times, though always with good intention, it has been done very badly ; that single articles, for example, have been allowed to run to too great a length, or to assume a too scholastic tone for at least some of our readers. Perhaps, with the experience I have gained, I may be able to do better in the time to come. And if I can, I will. And there is one respect in which I can do better, if only the Staff will be good enough to assist me. "I am ashamed and blush" for myself as I see — and in compiling the Index I have been compelled to see it—how much I have written, and, for lack of other contributions, have been compelled to write, in this First Series. And "I am ashamed and blush" for *them* when I see how very seldom some of our ablest Contributors have favoured us with work that is always welcome, and that two or three of those who have long been on the List have even yet given us nothing but their names. *That*, they will confess, is not for any want of urgency on the Editor's part. And I cannot but hope that they will take a thought and mend, and so enable

me to shrink into the comparative retirement which becomes an Editor. In any case, I pray that we may all be taught of God, and enjoy the constant inspiration of that divine and gracious Spirit without whom none of our work can be wise, none good.

In the Second Series, as in the First, the leading aims of *THE EXPOSITOR* will be (1) so to expound and illustrate the Holy Scriptures as to render them intelligible and attractive to men of ordinary ability and culture; to as many, in short, as will bring an open and attentive mind to their perusal: and (2) so to grapple with current forms of Scepticism and Unbelief as to furnish the doubtful and hesitating with solid and reasonable grounds for holding fast the truths most commonly and most surely believed by the holy Catholic Church throughout the world.

S. COX.



THE EXPOSITOR.

THE BOOK OF JOB.

VIII.—THE THEOPHANY. (CHAPTERS XXXVIII.—XLII. 6.)

At last the invisible Opponent who stood behind Job's visible antagonists,¹ and who had remained obstinately dumb to challenge, invective, expostulation, entreaty, opens his mouth and answers him out of the tempest which Elihu has so graphically described. *And what does he say?* The answer to that question has astonished and perplexed every candid and thoughtful student of this great Poem. For when *God* deigns to speak, we expect to be satisfied, if not convinced; when *He* replies, we expect his answer to be final, conclusive, complete. And yet his reply to Job is no reply. He does not answer one of the questions Job has asked, nor solve one of the problems he has started. So far as logic is concerned, or a real penetrative insight into the mysteries of Providence and of human life, we learn far more from Elihu, from Job himself, and even from the very Friends, than from the Maker and Teacher of them all.²

Driven from the peace of faith by the stings and

¹ See *Introduction* to Chapters iv.—xiv., EXPOSITOR, vol. iv. pp. 321–323.

² See EXPOSITOR, vol. xi. pp. 293–296.

scourges of calamity, Job passes through all the agonies of doubt and fear, of wounded trust and love. In his agony he gives the most varied and impressive expression to the fluctuating passions of a heart torn from its rest, to the questions which we all ask in our turn but cannot answer, to the great moral problems which we all start but cannot solve, when we are brought face to face with the mysteries which at once darken and ennoble our lives. His friends give him no help, but simply aggravate the burden of his grief by "darkening counsel with words devoid of wisdom." Even Elihu has only a little help to give, although to him it is a most wonderful and healing thought that the afflictions of men are not necessarily punitive, but may be disciplinary and remedial. Yet even he has no adequate reply to the deep and awful problems in which the spirit of Job is entangled, and against which it beats and bruises itself in vain. *He* is not the Light, but has only come to bear witness to the Light; ¹ *he* cannot justify the ways of God with men: he can only prepare the way for the Lord who, Himself, is coming to end and crown the argument.

As Elihu's eloquent Discourse draws to a close, our hearts grow full of expectation and hope. The mighty tempest in which Jehovah shrouds Himself sweeps up through the darkened heaven; it draws nearer and nearer; we are blinded by the "flash which He flings to the ends of the earth:" our hearts "throb and leap out of their place,"² and we say, "God is about to speak,

¹ More than one of the best Commentators suggest this relation of Elihu to Jehovah, and hold that he was but the *Baptist* to that great Redeemer, the Messenger sent before to announce his advent and to prepare his way.

² Chapter xxxvii. Verses 1-5.

and there will be light." But God speaks, and, lo, there is no light. He does not so much as touch the intellectual problems over which we have been brooding so long, much less, as we hoped, sweep them beyond the farthest horizon of our thoughts. He simply overwhelms us with his Majesty. He causes his "glory" to pass before us, and though, after he has seen this great sight, Job's face shines with a reflected lustre which has to be veiled from us under the mere forms of a recovered and augmented prosperity, we are none the brighter for it. He claims to have all power in heaven and in earth, to be Lord of all the wonders of the day and of the night, of tempest and of calm. He simply asserts what no one has denied, that all the processes of Nature and all the changes of Providence are his handiwork; that it is He who calleth forth the stars and determines their influence on the earth, He who sendeth rain and fruitful seasons, He who provides food for bird and beast, arms them with strength, clothes them with beauty, and quickens in them the manifold wise instincts by which they are preserved and multiplied. He does not utter a single word to relieve the mysteries of his rule, to explain why the good suffer and the wicked flourish, why He permits our hearts to be so often and so cruelly torn by agonies of bereavement, of misgiving, of doubt. When the majestic Voice ceases we are no nearer than before to a solution of the haunting problems of life. We can only wonder that Job should sink in utter love and self-abasement before Him; we can only ask, in accents of unfeigned surprise—and it is well with us if some tone of contempt do not blend with our surprise: "*What* is there in all this to shed calm, and order, and

an invincible faith into his perturbed and doubting spirit?" We say: "This pathetic Poem is a logical failure after all; it does not carry its theme to any satisfactory conclusion, nor to *any* conclusion: it suggests doubts to which it furnishes no reply, problems which it does not even attempt to solve: charmed with its beauty we may be, but we are none the wiser for our patient study of its argument."

Now that would be a sorry conclusion of our labour. And before we resign ourselves to it, let us at least ask:—

1. Is it so certain as we sometimes assume it to be that this Poem was *intended* to explain the mystery of human life? Is it even certain that a logical explanation of that mystery is either *possible* or *desirable* to creatures such as we are in such a world as this?

It is surely a significant fact that *all* the books which handle the theme of "Job," even now that the true Light has come into the world, are equally unsatisfactory and disappointing to the logical intellect. From the *Confessions* of St. Augustine down to Dr. Newman's *History of My Religious Opinions*, there have been hundreds of books which have professed to give the history of an inquisitive human spirit, sounding its dim and perilous way across dark seas of Doubt to the clear rest and haven of Faith; but read which of these books we may, we observe in it two singular phenomena. First, so long as the author sets forth the doubts and perplexities by which he has been exercised, we find his words instinct with life, and passion, and power: they commend themselves to our understanding and excite our sympathy; we feel that he is happily expressing thoughts and emotions which have

often stirred within our own souls. But—and this is the second and more striking phenomenon—no sooner does he begin to tell us what it was that solved and conquered his doubts, to describe the several steps by which he climbed back to faith, to explain how much wider, and purer, and firmer his faith is for the trial through which it has passed ; no sooner does he enter on this climax of his work than—unless indeed we have gone through an experience similar to his—a thick bewildering haze settles down on his words ; we read them, but they are no longer instinct with life and force ; they neither commend themselves to our sympathies nor convince our judgment. We cry in disappointment : “ Is that *all* ? ” What was there *in that* to induce faith ? The man has not fairly met one of his doubts, nor solved one of his problems ; he has simply evaded them, and crept, by an illogical by-path, to a most lame and impotent conclusion.”

No man who, “ perplexed in faith,” has read books of this kind, hoping to find in them aids to faith and answers to doubt, can be an entire stranger to this feeling of disappointment and defeated hope. Written, as such books often are, by men as able as they are good, there is no one of them which, if I may judge from a wide experience of them, does not disappoint the reader just as the Book of Job disappoints him. They may command our admiration ; they may touch our hearts ; but they do not satisfy our reason or refute our doubts : they fail at the very point at which we are most anxious for their success.

And this fact should surely teach us that the path of logic is not commonly the path to faith. It should lead us to ask whether it may not be impossible to

solve, in human words and for the human intellect, the deep mysteries over which, nevertheless, our minds and hearts *will* brood and fret ; nay, whether, if it were possible, it would not be undesirable. Logic can do much, but it cannot do all. It may convince the reason, but it cannot bend the will or change the heart. "*With the heart* man believeth unto righteousness ;" and logic does not address itself to the heart. It is doubtful whether the human intellect, at least while it has no ampler and more flexible organ than the brain, can so comprehend the ways of Him who is infinite as to demonstrate their equity and kindness, or even comprehend the proof, if proof were to be had ; but it is very certain that, were such a demonstration well within our reach, we might still distrust his goodness, or even hate it when it thwarted or pained us.

If proof were possible, if God could inspire or man could indite an argument which should once for all interpret our life to us, solve all its problems, dispel all its mystery, it is still open to doubt whether it would be well that we should have it. For the mystery which encompasses us on every side is an educational force of the utmost value. We fret against it, indeed, and strive to be quit of it ; and it is well that we do ; for it is this very strife and fret by which we are strengthened, by which our character is developed, and we are compelled to look up to Heaven in trust and hope. If we no longer had any questions to ask, any problems to solve, if we saw the full meaning and final purpose of God's dealings with us, we should lose more than we should gain. With certainty we might be content ; and we might *rust* in our content. But with mystery within us and on every side of us, compelling us to

ask, "What does this mean? and that? and, above all, what does God mean by it all?" we lose the rest of content to gain a strife of thought which trains and educates us, which impels us onward and upward, and for which, in the end, we shall be all the wiser and better and happier. It may be, it surely is, inevitable that, with an infinite God above us and around us and within us, we should be encompassed by mysteries we cannot fathom; that, if the mysteries which now perplex us were removed, they would only give place to mysteries still more profound. Even logic suggests so much as that. But, quite apart from speculation, here stands the fact—that it is obviously part of the Divine scheme of training for us that evil and pain should be in the world, that they should excite in us questions we should not otherwise have asked, and endeavours after knowledge and holiness and freedom we should not otherwise have made. And God is wise. His scheme for us is likely to be better than any we could frame for ourselves. But if it be, as it would seem to be, his scheme to educate us by the mysteries around us, and the questions and endeavours these mysteries excite, He can give us no book, no argument, no revelation which would dispel these mysteries; the craving intellect *must* be left unsatisfied in order that faith and inquiry may have free scope and do their work of discipline upon us.

What is it that kindles and trains the intelligence of children, that chastens their will and develops their moral qualities and powers? Is it not that a mysterious world lies all around them—a world in which things seem to be different from what they are and hold out another promise to that which they fulfil? is it not *this*

which for ever sets them on asking questions which we can very hardly answer, and wondering over marvels which we perhaps have ceased to admire? Is it not the uncertainty as to what the next moment may bring, or teach, which makes their eyes bright with expectation and with hope? Is it not because *we* often say and do that which they cannot comprehend, and even that which pains and disappoints and perplexes them, is it not this which braces and enlarges their character and makes room in them for faith and trust and love? If we could condense all the wisdom of the world and of life into a tiny manual which they could master in their earliest years, should we venture to place it in their hands? If we did, we should simply rob them of their youth, of their keen enjoyment of the mysteries, the changes and surprises, of life; imperfectly and by rote they would acquire what they now learn so much more truly and thoroughly and happily by experience and by efforts which strengthen and develop them.

God teaches us—Jehovah taught Job—as we teach children—by the mystery of life, by its illusions and contradictions, by its intermixtures of evil with good, of sorrow with joy; by the questions we are compelled to ask even though we cannot answer them, by the problems we are compelled to study although we cannot solve them. And is not his way the best way?

2. But, if the “answer” of Jehovah disappoints us, it satisfied Job; and not only satisfied him, but swept away all his doubts and fears in a transport of gratitude and renewed love: and we must now endeavour to see how and why it was that an answer which answered nothing produced what seems to us so astonishing and disproportionate an effect on him.

In our study of Holy Writ we often *make* the difficulties by which we are perplexed, and look for solutions of them everywhere but straight before our eyes. When, for example, we read that "Jehovah answered Job out of the tempest," we forthwith ask, "And what did he say?" expecting to hear some conclusive argument that will pour the light of an eternal Wisdom on the mysteries of human life; and thus we overlook the immense force and pathos of the fact *that Jehovah spake to Job at all*. And yet, so soon as we open our eyes on this simple and obvious fact, it is easy to believe that, even if Job had not understood a single word of the Divine remonstrance, the mere assurance that Jehovah was speaking to him would excite a rush of sacred emotion, before which all recollection of his misgivings and miseries would be carried away as with a flood. For it was *this* which he had craved throughout. Again and again, in an endless variety of forms, he had cried, "O that God would meet me! O that He would speak to me! O that He would fix a day, however distant, in which I might come before Him and plead my cause! O that He would even appear to question and to judge me!"^{*} The pain at the very heart of his pain was not that he had to suffer; but that, in his sufferings, God had forgotten or abandoned him. He could bear that God should "take" the children He had given. He could bear to receive "evil" at the Hand from which he had received such various stores of good. He could even bear that his "friends" should turn upon him and rend him with their cruel assumptions

* Chap. ix. 32-35; Chap. xiii. 3, 22-28; Chap. xiv. 13-15; Chap. xvi. 19-22; Chap. xix. 23-27; Chap. xxiii. 2-9; Chap. xxix. 2-5; Chap. xxx. 20-26.

and baseless suspicions. What he could not bear was that *God* should abandon him, *abandon* as well as afflict him; that when he cried for pity or redress there should be none in heaven itself to answer or regard him. In vain did Elihu affirm¹ that God was not alienated or indifferent, though He had not yet appeared to deliver his verdict on the strife, so much more bitter and terrible than that outward controversy with his Friends, which was making havoc in Job's heart. Until it was proclaimed by a voice which he felt to be from Heaven, how, indeed, could Job believe that even when he sighed out, "I shall never see Him!" his cause was before God, that God was only waiting to pronounce his sentence until He could make it a favourable sentence and Job was fully prepared to hear it? His heart was breaking under the cruel pang of *desertion*: and his cry, like that of One greater than he, was "My God, my God, why hast *thou* forsaken me?"

And if now, through the tempest and the darkness, there should sound a Voice from heaven; if, however it came, the conviction should come to him that the God he could not find had found him, and was speaking to him, would it very much matter what God said? Would it not be enough that it was *God* who was speaking, that his Divine Friend had come back to him, and come back to assure him that He had never forgotten or abandoned him? Would it not be enough to feel that *He* was in the very tempest which had struck him to the earth, that He had listened to him even when He did not answer him, loved him even when He smote him, and had even been afflicted in all

¹ Chap. xxxv. 14-16.

his afflictions? It was this—O, it was *this*—which dropped like balm into his torn and wounded heart. It was the resurrection of faith and hope and love in the rekindled sense of the Divine Presence and favour which raised Job into a life in which doubt and fear had no place, into a joy on which even repentance was no stain. Not what God said, but that God spoke to him and had come to him—it was this which cast him into the dust, which liberated in him the humility which is man's truest exaltation, and which constrained from him the happiest words he utters, although they sound so sad—

I had heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear,
But now mine eye hath seen Thee :
Wherefore I retract and repent
In dust and ashes.

And, surely, it is this same sense of an auspicious Divine Presence, that comes we know not how, though by happy experience we do know both “whence it cometh and whither it goeth,” before which *all* the darkneses of doubt flee away. It is an experience which lies beyond the scope of language. No man who has passed through it can explain it, or even adequately express it in words, since words are incapable of fully rendering any of our deepest emotions. All we can say of it is, that it is not produced by logic, by argument, by answers nicely adapted to questions we have asked, or to the doubts over which we have brooded—as, indeed, what master passion of the soul is thus produced? and that, as it did not spring from logic, so neither can it be expressed in logical forms. It is too deep for words to reach, too subtle and spiritual for words to hold. When any man can tell

what love is, and what it is that kindles a supreme human affection in his soul, he may with some reason demand that we should tell him what faith is, and how we gain or recover our faith in God : but not till then. "Love laughs at logic:" and if love for man or woman, why not love for God? And hence our Poet is never more true to human experience than when he makes the answer of Jehovah no answer to the logical and inquisitive intellect.

3. Still the question recurs : *What* was it that recovered Job to faith and trust and peace? Was there absolutely *nothing* in the answer of Jehovah out of the tempest to meet the inquest of his beseeching doubts?

Well, yes, there was something, but not much, I think. There *is* an argument in the Divine Answer which may be reproduced in logical forms, though it is only an argument of hints and suggestions. It does not touch the profounder questions which Job had raised, nor would it be difficult to pick holes in it were we to take it simply as addressed to the sceptical intellect. It does not go very deep at the best. It is addressed to the heart rather than to the brain, to the faith which lived in Job's doubts rather than to the doubts which clouded his faith. It would not convince a sceptic, however reasonable and honest he might be. Nothing would convince him except that sense of a Divine Presence and Goodness which, as we have seen, swept all Job's misgivings clean out of his heart; and this no argument can convey.

Nevertheless we must mark and accentuate the lines of argument which, as all critics are agreed, are involved in this Answer, though they are not very

apparent.¹ Viewed simply as an argument, then, it met that painful sense of mystery which oppressed Job as he sat solitary and alone among his Friends, all the more alone because they were with him. One and a chief element in his pain was that he could not make out what God was driving at, that he could see no good reason why a good man should be saddened by loss and misery, and a bad man live out all his days in mirth and affluence. And this is a pain we have all felt in our turn, and of which we should all be very gladly rid. The injustice, the inequalities, the pains and degradations which enter into the human lot perplex and affect us ; we can see no good reason for them ; we cannot vindicate them, whether to ourselves or to others.

Does Jehovah, then, when He answers Job, answer the questions which this spectacle of human misery suggests ? Does He furnish us with a good and adequate reason for the inequalities of the human lot ? He does nothing of the kind. He does not lift an iota from that painful mystery. He simply assures Job, and us, that we should not let that mystery pain and perplex

¹ Reuss states this Divine Argument not without some insight, yet surely in a very hard and brusque way. As he takes it, it comes to this. In the First Remonstrance (Chap. xxxviii. 2—Chap. xxxix. 30) Jehovah virtually demands : “Thou who assumest to judge me, the invisible Ruler of the universe, canst thou so much as solve the problems and mysteries of the visible world ?” and seeks to draw from Job a confession of ignorance in the presence of fathomless Wisdom. In the Second Remonstrance (Chap. xl. 7—Chap. xli. 34) He demands : “Wilt *thou* take the reins, thou who art crushed by the first strokes of my rod, and govern the world in my stead ?” and seeks to draw from Job an avowal of powerlessness in the presence of boundless Might—powerless even in the presence of mere brutes, such as Behemoth and Leviathan, *which is infinitely more humiliating*. I do not apprehend that to *humiliate* Job was even part of the Divine aim ; but, rather, that that aim was to *elevate* him by quickening in him humility and trust. And hence, in the text, while seeking to preserve all that is of worth in Reuss’s statement of the Divine Argument, I have tried to give it a truer and more gracious turn.

us, and hints that it may have both a nobler motive and a higher end than as yet we can conceive. In short, the argument of the Divine Answer is Butler's argument — the argument *from analogy*. To the perplexed and stricken Patriarch, who sits brooding sorrowfully over the dark problems of human life and fate, Jehovah points out that equally insoluble mysteries are over his head and under his feet; that he lives, and moves, and has his being among them; that, turn where he may, look where he will, he cannot escape them; and that, as he finds them everywhere else, he should expect to find them in his own being and in the destiny of man. Briefly put, put simply as an argument, the Divine Answer runs thus: "You fret and despair over the single mystery which has been forced home upon you by pangs of sorrow and loss; you are perturbed, shaken to the very heart, because you cannot master and interpret it. But, see, there are mysteries everywhere; the whole universe stands thick with them. Can you interpret *these*, you who assume that you ought to be able to interpret *that*? Can you explain the creation of the world, the separation of sky and earth, land and sea, and the interwoven influences of the one on the other?¹ Have you mastered the secrets of the light and the darkness, of wind and rain, of snow and ice, of the migrations of the birds of the air, of the structure and instincts of the beasts of the river and the field?² Yet, instead of fretting against these mysteries, you accept and profit by them. You *use* sea and land, day and night, wind and rain, birds and beasts, and make them serve your turn.

¹ Chap. xxxviii. 2-18, 31-36.

² Chap. xxxviii. 19-30, 39-41; Chap. xxxix. 1-30; Chaps. xl. 15-xli. 34.

You live content amid a thousand other problems you cannot solve, and even turn them to account. Should you not look, then, to find mysteries in the creature whom I have set over all the works of my hands—in man, and in his lot? Will it not be wise of you to use your life rather than to brood over it, to turn your lot, with all its changes and surprises, to the best account, rather than to fret over the problems it suggests?"

A second argument may be hinted at, implied rather than stated, meant for us perhaps rather than Job, in the Divine Answer. By his sublime description of the heavens, and the earth, and all that in them is, Jehovah may have meant to suggest to Job: "*Consider* these mysteries and parables of Nature, and what they reveal of the character and purpose of Him by whom they were created and made. You cannot adequately interpret any one of them; but you can see that they all work together for good. You cannot tell how the world was made, how the firm earth and flowing seas were formed; but you can see that the earth yields you her fruits, and that the sea carries your ships and brings you the wealth of distant lands. You cannot command the wind or the clouds that bring rain; but you can see that the winds carry health and the rains fertility wherever they go. You cannot explain the migratory instinct of the travelling birds; but you can see that God feeds and fosters them by the instinct which drives them from shore to shore. The world around you is full of mysteries which you cannot solve; but, so far as you can judge, is not the end they subserve a beneficent end? And if the world within you also has mysteries which you cannot fathom, cannot you trust that somehow, here or hereafter, these too

will reach a final goal of good? The mystery of human life, the mystery of human pain—may not these be at least as beneficent as you admit the marvels and mysteries of the natural world to be?"

This, I take it, is the argument of the Divine Answer in so far as it was an argument; and even this is only suggested, not explicitly stated. It does not go very deep. It does not solve the problems over which we brood; it only points us to other problems equally difficult, equally insoluble. It does not even affirm, it does but hint, that the end of all these mysteries may be a good end, an end of mercy and grace. We are not told—much as we long to know it—why God permits evil to exist, or why He permits it to take so many painful and apparently injurious forms even for the righteous. We are simply invited to *trust* the God whom we have found to be good so far as we can understand his ways, and to believe that out of evil itself He will educe a larger and more abiding good.

God does not argue with us, nor seek to force our trust; for no man was ever yet *argued* into love, or could ever compel his own child to love and confide in Him. Trust and love are not to be forced, but won. All we can do even for the child that we love best is to surround him with a large, pure atmosphere of kindness, to shew him that we are worthy of his confidence and affection. When we have done our utmost, he may abuse our confidence, and repay our kindness with a thoughtless ingratitude. It may be necessary that he should leave even the happiest home and go out into a cold and selfish world before he will learn to value our tenderness and respond with love to

the love that has so long been seeking him. And God may have to deal with us as we with our children. In his wisdom and kindness He may send us out to meet the cold blasts of adversity, or suffer us to serve the passions which, while promising liberty and enjoyment, fetter and degrade the soul. And when we have spent all and are in want, the "famine" comes, or the "tempest" sweeps through our darkened heavens, through our darkened hearts, strewing them with wrecks. And *now*, if the kind, tender Voice speak to us out of the tempest with unaltered and unalterable affection, or its music be heard through the harsh discords of famine and want; if the conviction comes to us that there is a Friend, a Father in heaven who loves us despite our manifold offences, our love springs up to meet his love. We wait for no arguments; we ask for no proofs. It is enough that our Father speaks to us once more, that He loves us still, that He rejoices over us as we bow in shame and penitence before Him. Not by logical arguments which convince our reason, but by tender appeals which touch and break our hearts, our Father conquers us at last, and wins our love and trust for ever.

4. There are, of course, many other forces at work in this Answer, all conspiring to the same end of grace—Job's redemption from the perplexities and misgivings by which he was enthralled. Most of these the student must be left to discover and formulate for himself; but there are two of them which, since they meet wants and answer to convictions of our own time, may be briefly pointed out.

(a) The first is that the Hebrew Poet forestalled the secret of Wordsworth—anticipated the very invitation

which our own poet has addressed to the men of the present century. I have sometimes thought that all that was special and peculiar to Wordsworth might be gathered from one of his shortest pieces, "The Tables Turned." For it seems to have been his great task to bear an invitation to men vexed with the strife of thought and weary with the "toil and trouble" of anxious speculation to "leave their books" and come forth into "the light of things," "let Nature be their teacher," and to bring to "her world of ready wealth" "a heart that watches and receives." He would have them find, as he himself had found, in "the sweet music of the woodland linnet," or in the clear full tones of "the blithe throstle," more of wisdom, more of that "sweet lore which Nature brings" than in all the "barren leaves" of cloistral study and speculation. He held, and would have them hold, that

One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach us more of man,
Of moral evil and of good,
Than all the sages can.

And it is precisely in this spirit that the Hebrew Poet represents Jehovah as calling Job forth from the dreary waste of brooding speculation, where he was wandering "in endless mazes lost," into the wholesome world of Nature; as summoning him to watch the ways of the lion and the raven, the rock-goat and the wild ass, the bison and the ostrich: and "'mid all the mighty sum of things for ever speaking" to learn a higher and a more healthy wisdom than he can gain by brooding over his own heart and its wounds. In short, he would have him find in the serenity of Nature a rebuke to his own perturbation of spirit,

and in its majesty a keener sense of his own feebleness and of the close restrictions under which it worked.

(β) The other is that Jehovah is represented as calling Job away from the personal to the impersonal—another most healthy transition—from an eternal brooding over the narrow circle of his own sorrowful experience into the broad world of universal experience and life. Job had been painfully awakened, as men commonly are awakened, to the force of certain facts with which he was quite familiar before the “fence round all that he had” was broken down, but which in his untroubled prosperity he had forgotten, or overlooked, or had at least failed to bring into vital contact with his beliefs; these he could no longer ignore, or glide over without any real sense of their bearing, when once they had invaded his own life and laid it waste. Many a good man, as he knew very well, had suffered the most cruel losses, or endured utterly unprovoked agonies of want and shame, before he himself was struck down from the top of happy days; and he had seen, as he confesses, many a wicked man happy in a prosperous and honoured life, happy too in a sudden, painless death, while he still held, or professed to hold, that under the righteous rule of God only the good could prosper, and all who did wickedly were put to the ban.¹ With the strange self-convicting inconsistency which we may see in good men every day, he had been content to hold a creed daily contradicted by the most patent facts, and which, as we have heard him acknowledge again and again, he felt to be contradicted by these facts the very moment he was compelled to reflect on them.

¹ Chap. xii. 4-6; xxi. 5-21; xxiv. 1-25.

It was well for him, then, that he should be awakened from his easy self-complacent dream, however rudely; that he should be shaken from his narrow inadequate creed and compelled to wider truer thoughts of God and of the moral complexities of his rule even by being touched, and touched to the very quick, first in all that he had, and then in his own "bone and flesh:" just as it is well that we should be compelled, even by shocks of loss and change and pain, to leave squaring our guess by the mere shows of things, or by facts carefully selected to fit our theory, and to bring our thoughts into accord with the hard but beneficent realities of life, and with as many of them as we can grasp. But it would not have been well that Job, when once he was thoroughly awakened, should have been left to brood for ever over the new set of facts, the meaning and force of which he had been constrained to recognize: to brood over any one set of facts, however carefully they have been selected, however keenly pressed home, can only lead man astray, and confirm him in his habit of dropping from his thoughts whatever he cannot conveniently carry. God's aim for Job would not have been reached if, having learned from his own sufferings how much and how keenly even the righteous may suffer, he had continued to dwell exclusively on the facts of suffering and the problems they suggest, going round and round in the same dreary circle of meditation, and finding no outlet from it, instead of being quickened to a larger sense of the mystery of life and truer wider thoughts of the Providence which was leading him through suffering to a purer and more enduring joy. God had cast him down only to raise him up, to establish him

on a higher ground of vantage, from which he might contemplate his own life and the life of man with other, larger, and sincerer eyes. And hence He who had called him to reflect by the penetrating ministry of suffering and loss, now calls him away from the narrow weary round of his personal experience toward the large and high conclusions of faith and trust and charity on which it was his purpose from the first to establish him.

This, indeed, is one and a chief end for which God afflicts us all. Every affliction brings us a message from Him, a summons to wider and less inadequate thoughts of Him and of our relation to Him, and of the great end of mercy which He has in view both for the individual man and for the world at large. And it is only as we listen to this message, and respond to it, that we get the real good and reach the real end of the things which we suffer, and find our winter change to spring.

5. There is still one point raised by the Theophany on which, for the sake of certain prosaic readers of this Poem, it may be necessary to touch. For it is only too certain that in some minds the question will be raised: "But did God speak all these words, *in an audible voice*, out of a tempestuous sky, to Job and his Friends as they sat, drenched with tropical rain, on the *mezbele*?" And to such a question how can one reply except with a gentle reminder that it is a poem we are studying, not a chronicle? A big voice out of a black sky is not, therefore, a necessary assumption. The poem is probably founded on historical facts, indeed; and there may be some veritable fact in the experience of the historic Job behind the sentence, "Then

Jehovah answered Job out of the tempest." When his mind was prepared for a Divine intervention by the wise and friendly words of Elihu, a great tempest may have forced it away from his personal interests and from the fierce polemic with the Friends—and these great convulsions of Nature are very potent in suddenly dwarfing all personal interests and hushing all strifes—to thoughts of the unfathomable power and majesty of God, and the folly of striving with Him. A storm may have set him thinking, and thinking in a new and healthier direction. Or the "tempest" in his own soul may have sufficed to prepare him for thoughts such as those to which the Poet here gives expression.

But what, after all, have we to do with all this? Nothing is more futile, in dealing with any great work of imagination, than the endeavour to separate the real from the ideal, to look through the flowing outlines and rich tender colours to the dry bones of fact which lie beyond and within them? It is enough, or should be enough, for us to know that, in his heart at least, Job heard a Divine Voice remonstrating with him, appealing to him. However he may have reached it, we may at least be quite sure that the Poet did reach the conviction that in this Answer there are truths of a force and potency to end and crown the long strife of thought through which he has conducted us; and that he received these truths, since they were high beyond his unassisted reach, by direct inspiration from Heaven. And what need we know, or ask, beyond this?

6. In point of form the Theophany divides itself into a First Divine Remonstrance, extending from Chapter xxxviii. Verse 2, to Chapter xxxix. Verse 30,

or to Chapter xl. Verse 5, if we include Job's response to it ; and a Second Divine Remonstrance, conducted on the same lines as the First, extending from Chapter xl. Verse 7, to Chapter xli. Verse 34, or, including Job's response, to Chapter xlii. Verse 6.

S. COX.

WRESTING THE SCRIPTURES.

It would be difficult for me fully to express my sense of the perils which have been caused to religion, and of the evils which have been inflicted upon humanity, by the misuse and misinterpretation of the words of Scripture. The subject is a very large one, and its due treatment would require one or two volumes. The composition of such a work would occupy a lifetime ; but, if written from a full and accurate knowledge, it would not only be of inestimable value to the Church, but would, I believe, exercise a deep influence on the development of religious thought. It would tend to remove from the system of Christianity those unauthorized accretions which are a needless source of difficulty to thousands ; and it would save the most fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith from many of the bitter and dangerous assaults to which, perhaps, they would never have been subjected if theologians had not demanded a simultaneously and equally loyal assent to hundreds of exegetical conclusions which ought never to have been mixed up with them, and with which they are in no wise concerned.

It would necessarily enter into the scope of such a work to shew that, in consequence of the inherent tendencies of human nature, the sacred books of *every*

religion have been liable to be overlaid with such masses of commentary and inference as to lose no little of their original simplicity and to become like rivers which are lost in morass and sand from the very wealth of their own sedimentary deposits. The monstrous developments of modern Brahminism are utterly alien from the spirit of the Vedas on which they profess to rest; and when European scholars taught the Hindoos to read their own ancient books with fresh eyes, they revealed to them at once how antagonistic were Sutteeism and many other practices to the simpler and nobler spirit of their early religious hymns. Similarly Buddhism, entangled in masses of speculation and ritual, seems to have lost no little of what it might have derived from the high and pure morality of Gautama's teaching. Even a Christian may read with interest the moral aphorisms and exhortations of Confucius, yet nothing can exceed the emptiness, superstition, and aridity of Confucianism as it nominally prevails in modern China. We cannot say very much in favour of the Koran, yet the Koran is at least far superior in tone to the religion which professes to refer every practice and principle to the arbitrament of its asserted inspiration. The peculiarity of the process which has taken place in these and other religions has been that their sacred books have been first of all exalted by "incredible praises,"¹

¹ "As incredible praises given to men do often abate and impair the credit of their deserved commendation, so we must likewise take great heed lest by attributing to Scripture more than it can have, the incredibility of that do cause even those things which indeed it hath abundantly, to be less reverently esteemed" (Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*). In one of the most striking passages ever written on the beauty of the English version, F. S. Faber says that "It is worshipped with a positive idolatry, in extenuation of whose grotesque fanaticism its intrinsic beauty pleads availingly with the man of letters and the scholar" (*The Interest and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints*, p. 116). The passage is usually, but erroneously, attributed to Cardinal Newman.

then covered by mountain-heaps of exegesis, then interpreted by second-hand inferences, often doubly erroneous, because they have been deduced from an exegesis which has from the first followed mistaken methods—until at last persistent misinterpretation has been stereotyped into a system, and the sacred books themselves have been left out of sight and treated as of secondary importance, or even absolutely superseded by the systems which professed to derive from them **their paramount authority.**

Such an inquiry would throw great light on the history of human progress and human retrogression; nor would it be difficult to illustrate the part played in the evolution of the drama by indolence and ignorance, by speculative restlessness and careless acquiescence, by designing priestcraft and theological ambition, by fear and jealousy and self-interest, by the reticence of the many and the terrorism of the few.

And every step of the progress would find ample illustration as we saw unfolded before us the steps by which among the ancient Jews the Bible also was gradually subordinated to the Mishnah, and the Mishnah set aside in favour of the Gemara; the long sad progress by which the work of Ezra gradually lost itself in the work of Rabbi Akibha—until at last they to whom had been entrusted the living oracles of God thought it more conducive to their happiness and their salvation to prefer the “miserable micrology” of the Talmud to the burning inspiration of the Prophets and the Psalms. Some fragmentary illustrations of this part of the subject I have ventured to furnish to readers of *THE EXPOSITOR* in previous papers on Talmudic Exegesis and the Oral Law; but fully to develop it would

require a leisure which I have never enjoyed, and a learning to which I cannot for a moment pretend.

Then again it would be necessary to shew—and this could only be a work of intense labour founded on a life-long study—the reason why the disastrous methods and assumptions of the Rabbis have been a fatal legacy to all future ages, and have been handed on, in unbroken continuity, to the present day. It may seem a strange, it may seem a boastful thing to say, but it is, I believe, strictly true, that we are in a better position than any previous generation for learning the meaning of the Bible as a whole. The immense widening of the horizon of science, the spread of education to an extent unknown to former ages, the division of labour, the concentration of knowledge derived from every land and every age, the study of the original languages and of the earliest manuscripts, the better understanding of the laws of criticism, the study of the philosophy of history and of the science of comparative religion—even the disastrous upheaval of old landmarks in many minds, which has compelled so many earnest seekers after God to devote their whole endeavours to giving a reason for the faith that is in them—all these have tended to a better knowledge of the Bible than was possible to our forefathers since the days of the Apostles. Nor must any Christian lose sight of that doctrine on which all our hopes of enlightenment are founded—I mean the continual presence and guidance of the Holy Spirit of God in the Church and in the individual heart. That inward enlightenment, which always comes to the individual before it penetrates the mass, may enable a man without arrogance to stand alone without mistaking isolation for error or confound-

ing popularity with wisdom. When great truths are in the process of development, the best and wisest men have often been hated and persecuted only because they were a little before their age; and under such circumstances any man may be proud, like Athanasius of old, to take "the part which has no friend but God and death, the one a defender of his innocency, the other a finisher of his troubles." We do not for a moment suppose that we are better or more gifted than our predecessors in the field of Scriptural interpretation. Many of the conditions of our age—its cares, its distractions, its hurry, its restlessness—are eminently unfavourable to the possibility of our "contemplating the bright countenance of truth in the mild and dewy air of delightful studies." But these disadvantages are more than counterbalanced by other blessings. We stand as it were upon the shoulders of our ancestors, and therefore in some directions see farther than they. We are inheritors of all their learning and of all their gains. The long results of time have diminished the extraordinary vitality of error. God has long been shewing all things in the slow history of their ripening.

It would then, as I have said, be the difficult and interesting task of the historian of exegesis to shew how it was that the Rabbis handed on the fuming torch of their mistaken methods to the Fathers; how from the Fathers they were inherited by the Schoolmen; how the revolt of the Reformers from all formal allegiance to the Schoolmen did not emancipate them from many of the premisses and methods by which the Schoolmen had been led into their interminable speculations; how the doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture acquired in the hands of the later Reformers a still

greater rigidity, because they had thrown aside the doctrine of the infallible decisions of the Romish Church ; how divines in this day speak about Scripture in an accent of timid conventionalism entirely unknown to Calvin in his day and to Gregory of Nyssa in his ; how, in consequence of these facts, mistaken methods and interpretations reign triumphant in the goodly folios of the Puritan and Anglican divines ; how—though greatly shaken and discredited—they still exercise a dimming influence, and are still reproduced to the wresting and darkening of Scripture in hundreds of popular sermons and current commentaries.

It would be necessary of course, and it would be easy, to shew in such a history of exegesis that the assumptions on which the whole system has rested find no support in the Scriptures themselves—that they have mainly arisen from the mistake of regarding the Bible as “a talisman sent down from heaven, equipollent in all its parts,” instead of regarding it as that which it is and claims to be, the sacred library and literature of a people passing through many stages of Divine education, of which the earlier stages were confessedly transitory and imperfect. It would be further necessary to shew that the principle of a *progressive* illumination is throughout the Scriptures constantly assumed, and that the manner in which the Prophets and the Apostles and our Lord Himself speak of the Mosaic legislation proves how far they were from treating every utterance of Scripture as a final and irrevocable decision of the revealed will of God. If, indeed, we were to quote the text so often adduced in treating of this subject, that “the letter killeth,” we should be guilty of one of the misapplications which

have been the source of so much evil. For, although there is infinite value in the distinction between "the letter" and "the spirit,"¹ and although it is most true that the letter may be so used as to kill both the spirit of the Bible and the spiritual life of the inquirer, yet that particular phrase has another meaning in the verse from which it is quoted.² But, on the other hand, we do find in the canonical Scriptures a grave and solemn warning that it is possible to wrest (στρεβλῶναι)—literally, "to wrench," "to torture," to stretch as it were upon the rack, to strain as it were with a windlass—the meaning of Scripture, so as to get out of it, not *its* meaning, but a meaning which it does not render, and which tends to the perdition not only of those who thus treat the Holy Book, but to the perdition of the progress and welfare of mankind.

That this warning has been fatally neglected no one can deny who has even the most elementary knowledge of European history. But few are, perhaps, aware of the awful *extent* to which Scripture has been distorted to evil purposes, and of the terrible and agelong injuries which these misapplications of Scripture by human ignorance and perversity have inflicted upon generation after generation of unhappy sufferers. The full record of those injuries would be the record of "untold agonies, and blood shed in rivers;" it would be the record of the lives of millions darkened and blighted by intolerable superstitions; it would be the record of the deadliest violations of the eternal laws of morality

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 6; Rom. vii. 6.

² In 2 Cor. iii. 6, τὸ γράμμα ἀποκτείνει means that the Law, regarded as an outward ordinance, pronounces only the sentence of death (Gal. iii. 10), and could not give life (Gal. iii. 21), and gave strength to sin, which is the sting of death (1 Cor. xv. 56; Rom. v. 12; vii. 9), and was generally a "law of death" (Rom. viii. 1, 2).

committed in the name of religion by those who claimed to be its infallible defenders. For these gross misapplications the Holy Scriptures are in no wise responsible. Those Scriptures are among the most blessed boons which God has ever vouchsafed to man ; they are, in comparison with all other sources of knowledge, as waters in the desert, as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land. They are holy, just, and good. Their lessons are lessons of holiness ; their message is a message of peace. " They speak to the ear like music, to the heart like a voice that can never be forgotten." The misguided ingenuity of man has turned into sources of deadly misery many of God's most precious blessings ; but never has a falsely-directed learning, and an arrogant theology, and a designing ambition inflicted upon the world a more shameful injury than when it has perverted the words of truth into defences of error, and the means of enlightenment into the deadliest enginery of superstition. It is only through the sin of man that the Book of Light has been used to perpetuate the darkness ; the Book of Mercy and of Freedom to kindle the faggot of the Inquisitor, to buttress the throne of the tyrant, and to rivet the fetters of the slave.

It would, then, be the duty of the historian of exegesis to shew, by way of warning to the Church, how unparalleled was the mischief, how multitudinous were the evil consequences of this wresting of Scripture. If he were but to take a few conspicuous instances, the evidence might be made to come home to the world with almost overwhelming force.

Take, for instance, the unhallowed antagonism between theology and the progress of knowledge which

caused the many martyrdoms of science. How much shame and anguish, and how long a delay of invaluable blessings, have been caused to mankind by this negative misuse of Scripture ; yet on that wide branch of the subject I shall not even touch, because the evils which have resulted from the abuse of Scripture to retard progress have been as nothing compared with those which have been caused by its positive misuse for the infliction of actual wrongs upon the well-being of men. Thus on misapplications of "*Honour the king*" have been built the ruinous opposition to national freedom ; on misapplications of "*Tu es Petrus*" the colossal usurpations of Papal tyranny ; on misapplications of "*Cursed be Canaan*" the shameful iniquities of the slave trade ; on misapplications of "*Compel them to come in*" the hideous crimes of the Inquisition ; on misapplications of "*Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live*" the infuriated butchery of thousands of wretched women. These are but casual and obvious illustrations. When Ravaillac stabbed Henri IV. the Jesuits were ready to applaud and defend him by the example of Ehud ; and the so-called Popish plot was a not unnatural Nemesis on the sanction which from time to time had been accorded in the name of Scripture to an Anthony Babington, a Jacques Clement, and an Everard Digby. When Innocent III. was giving to the Abbot of Citeaux his infamous advice to entrap the Count of Toulouse to his ruin, he wrote, "We advise you, according to the precepts of the Apostle, to use cunning in your dealings with the Count of Toulouse, treating him with a wise dissimulation, in order that the other heretics may be more easily destroyed." "According to the precepts of the Apostle !"—and indeed says the historian, "it

is remarkable that when the Roman Pontiffs, especially Gregory VII. and Innocent III., had any pernicious design to recommend, they were lavish in their appeals to Scripture, as if they had studied the Bible merely to find an excuse for sacrilege." I say—I cannot say too strongly—that such methods are totally false; they are to enter a holier sanctuary only to commit a deadlier sacrilege, to stand in the sunlight only to cast a blacker and chiller shadow. I say further that all such methods are fatal to Scripture; that if anything at all resembling them is persisted in, they will be utterly fatal to the nation's religious life. I say further still that though men have grown more wary to avoid the most grievous applications of this false method, they still theoretically cling to it, and that in consequence thereof to this day—and that in thousands of instances—the Scriptures are abused, as they were in the days of the Fathers, to support false reasoning in morals and bad inferences in matters of faith.

It would be the duty, then, of one who wrote the story of Scripture interpretation to shew what has been the reason why

The devil can quote Scripture for his purpose;

why it is that

in religion
What damned error but some sober brow
Will bless it and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?

But I am neither writing, nor even presuming to sketch, what would be the proper mode of dealing with a subject so important. My only object is to group together under separate heads, or lines of error, a few specimens of misinterpretation, with the humble object

of urging the duty of reading the Scriptures with more open and earnest minds; of studying them with deeper carefulness; of employing them—especially when we are endeavouring to refute the opinions of others—with a more conscientious accuracy, and a stronger sense of the possibility that we may have neither the knowledge nor the wisdom in uncertain matters to interpret them aright.

I. Need I first of all utter a warning against the rash confidence of sheer ignorance?

No doubt the spread of education will save us from very gross and palpable errors. We shall not be guilty of such blunders as that of the English Archbishop before the Reformation, who argued that the authority of St. Peter and his successors was implied by the name Kephas, because “we all know,” he observed, “that Kephas means a head;” or as that of the Book of Mormon, which makes that mythical personage use a compass I know not how many hundred years before its invention, on the strength of “We fetched a compass and came to Rhegium;” or as that of the unlettered Roman Catholics who supposed that “*Mundum super maria posuisti*” (Psalm xxiv. 2) means that God has founded the world “*super Mariâ*”—on the Virgin Mary; or as that of the ignorant Calvinists, who argue that their conversion requires no repentance for past sins, because “the gifts and calling of God are *without repentance*.” Nor are we likely to make such a use of Scripture as that of the friar who preached at the martyrdom of Cranmer and Ridley on the text, “Though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing;” or as that of the preacher who, at the condemnation of Galileo Galilei, is said to have selected

as his text, "*Viri Galilaei, cur statis in coelum respicientes?*" Yet it must, I think, be admitted that, from want of care and study, many of us sometimes, and some of us habitually, use Scripture in a way that makes our quotations rise but little above a playon words.

1. First, Christian writers are too often careless even as regards the text.

(a) Is it not most undesirable to defend certain doctrines by texts of very dubious authenticity? Who has not heard sermons on Trinity Sunday preached from 1 John v. 7—"the Three Heavenly Witnesses"—although the genuineness of that Verse is no longer defended by a single competent critic?

(β) Is it not still more unwise to insist on dubious passages as though the belief of them was essential? I remember many years ago to have heard with some pain a sermon on the angel troubling the pool at Bethesda. It contained strong reprobation of any who did not accept the narrative with absolute literalness. It attributed any doubts or difficulties upon the subject, or attempts to give any other colour to it than that of an actual angel literally descending to stir the pool, to an impious and dangerous rationalism. With what feelings must any hearer have listened, how little could any one have profited, who was aware of the extreme doubt which must rest upon the genuineness of that passage! It is omitted by the four great Uncials, α, B, C, D; is only inserted in the margin of A; is omitted in some of the earlier versions; is marked as spurious in many MSS.; is full of various readings even in the MSS. which retain it; contains no less than *seven* isolated usages of word or meaning

in the space of three lines ;¹ is quoted by no writer earlier than the fourth century, except Tertullian ; and is rejected by Tregelles, Tischendorf, Meyer, Alford, Lightfoot, and Westcott. A preacher may, after due study, still suppose that the passage is genuine ; but is he acting fairly towards his hearers if he presses that conclusion upon them as an infallible conclusion, to be enforced with acrimonious denunciations, and if (which is the common case), without any knowledge or any study whatever, he assumes an accent of ignorant infallibility in condemning the opposite conclusion ? We ask the question ; but we are well aware that, as St. Jerome complains was the case in his day, so now no rustic is so ignorant, no old woman so insane, as not to claim a right, in matters of theology, to reprove even canonized saints whose opinions—and that too in the merest non-essentials—happen to differ from their own. Few spectacles are more saddening than to see the way in which men and women of the feeblest intellect and the most absolute want of culture are prepared, at a moment's notice, to lay down the law on all religious questions as though they were oracles and all wisdom should die with them—"imposing the senses of men upon the words of God, the special senses of men upon the general words of God, and laying them upon men's consciences together under the equal penalty of death and damnation."

(γ) Again, there can be no doubt that fasting is recognized, though nowhere expressly enjoined, in the New Testament ; but is it wise for any one to insist upon it from the verses Matthew xvii. 21, or Mark

¹ Mr. McClellan, in his *Four Gospels*, never seems to realize the force of such a fact as this.

ix. 29 : " This kind goeth not out but by prayer and *fasting* " ? Ought not any one who relies on those verses at least to call attention to the fact that the words " and fasting " are omitted by \aleph , B, and many of the ancient versions, and that they cannot be relied on ? It would be still more unwise to rely on 1 Corinthians vii. 5, because there not only are the words " and fasting " undoubtedly spurious, but there has also been a deliberate ascetic tampering with the verbs and tenses.¹

(8) Once more, how often has an exultant hope been founded on Revelation v. 10 : " And hast made us unto our God kings and priests, and we shall reign upon the earth " ? That hope is justifiable to the utmost, but the bearing of this Verse upon it is much less direct than is supposed. For the true reading is, " And madest *them* (*i.e.*, the four and twenty elders) a kingdom and priests, and *they* shall reign upon the earth."

2. I need not touch further on the positive duty of considering the text, because, in former numbers of THE EXPOSITOR, an opportunity has been granted me of shewing that it has a bearing on many passages of the extremest importance. But it is of even more importance—for it affects our view of a far larger number of passages—to be wary against founding our conclusions, even when those conclusions are in themselves just, upon texts of which the *translation* is either positively erroneous or highly uncertain.

Let me throw together a few illustrations, appending to them only the briefest possible comment. Some of

¹ The *καὶ νηστεία* are omitted by \aleph , A, B, C, D, E, F, G, which also read *σχολάσῃτε* for *συχλάζῃτε*, and *ἦτε* for *συνίρχησθε*.

these texts have no bearing on Christian faith, but it will be seen at once how sacred are the doctrines which many of them are used to prove; how important therefore it is that we should be on our guard, lest we deduce from any erroneous translation a doctrine which is not true, or rest any indisputable doctrine upon some weak or uncertain base.¹

(a) Isaiah ix. 1-5: "Nevertheless the dimness shall not be such as was in her vexation, when at the first he lightly afflicted the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali, and *afterwards did more grievously afflict her* by way of the sea, beyond Jordan, in Galilee of the nations. . . . Thou hast multiplied the nation, *and not increased the joy.* . . . For every battle of the warrior is with confused noise, and garments rolled in blood; *but this shall be with burning and fuel of fire.*" The Verses occur in the passage so dear and so familiar to us as the first lesson for Christmas day. What meaning many hearers attach to the words which I have italicized it would be hard to say; but meanwhile the true version is more like this: "For though the land was distressed, it is not now in gloom. Of old he brought shame on the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali; but *in the latter days he hath brought it to honour* unto the way of the sea," &c. Thou hast multiplied the nation, *and increased its joy*² for every boot of trampling warrior, and the garment rolled in blood, shall even be for burning, for fuel of fire."

¹ It need hardly be said that these are only a *few* instances out of many scores which might be adduced.

² The *lō* is not the negative but the dative of the personal pronoun. A great orator quoted this Verse in the House of Commons during the last session of Parliament, and I ventured to tell him that when the new version appeared the text in all probability would stand very differently.

(β) Isaiah xxviii. 10: "*For precept must be upon precept; line upon line; precept upon precept; line upon line; here a little, and there a little.*" This phrase is generally used to illustrate the gradual method of the Divine teaching. The lesson is a perfectly true one; but these words, so far from being an inspired description of it, are a quotation from the taunting bitter language of the drunken priests and prophets, who wish to hold up Isaiah's teaching to ridicule. In the original they are a striking paronomasia—*tsav la-tsav kav la-kav*—adopted to imitate the stammering words of these drunken deriders.¹

(γ) Psalm ii. 12: "*Kiss the Son, lest he be angry.*" The application of these words to enforce the sacred duty of making our peace with Christ while yet there is time is perhaps defensible; but it should not be insisted on without the free admission that the Chaldee, Septuagint, Vulgate, Aquila, Symmachus, and all the ancient versions except the Syriac adopt the renderings "*Receive instruction*" and "*worship purely*," or some similar paraphrase; and that it is at least an unexpected phenomenon to find the Chaldee *Bar* used for "Son" in a Psalm of early date.

(δ) Job xix. 25: "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth: and though after my skin worms shall destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God. . . ." Perhaps few passages are more frequently quoted than this to express at once a faith in Christ and a hope of the resurrection; and for this reason it may be found carved on innumerable tombs. It is even made

¹ An explanation of this passage by the Editor will be found in an early number of THE EXPOSITOR.

to prove in the strictest sense a resurrection of the body. If such views be maintained from this passage, warning should at least be given that the meaning is highly ambiguous, and that no certain conclusions can be built on the English Version until it has been carefully vindicated from the difficulties with which it is surrounded.¹ That in these words Job does rise above all the doubts which have been haunting him, to express a profound conviction in the vindication which, if not in this world, will be granted to him in some form or other by the justice of God, is undeniable; but to see in this Verse the Christian doctrine of the Atonement and the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the body, is to maintain by most dubious arguments truths far too sacred and far too undeniable to be supported by any but the fairest and strongest demonstrations.

It would be endless to multiply instances from the Old Testament. I will proceed to furnish a few examples from the New.

(ε) John x. 16: "And there shall be *one fold* and one shepherd." What our Blessed Lord said was that He had other sheep not of this *fold* (*αἰλή*), and that these also He must bring, and they would hear his voice; "and they shall become ONE FLOCK (*μία ποίμνη*), one shepherd." Christ never promised that his sheep, even when they were gathered into one flock, should all be penned in one fold. It may be a far more blessed thing that, though forming one flock, their unity should be unity in Him, and not in one corporate re-union. I agree with Canon Westcott that this mistranslation "has been most disastrous in idea

¹ The passage is carefully examined in the Editor's paper on Job, EXPOSITOR, vol. vii. pp. 326-336.

and influence." "The obliteration," he adds, "of this essential distinction between 'fold' and 'flock' in many of the later Western versions of this passage indicates, as it appears, a tendency of Roman Christianity, and has served in no small degree to confirm and extend the false claims of the Roman See. . . . It would perhaps be *impossible for any correction now to do away with the effects which a translation undeniably false has produced on popular ecclesiastical ideas.*"

(ξ) John xx. 17 : "*Touch me not.*" This rendering must surely create difficulties in the minds of multitudes of readers ; for our Blessed Lord did not reprove the other women who "held him by the feet and worshipped him" (Matt. xxviii. 9), and He actually invited Thomas to handle Him and see. The words really mean, "Cling not to me" (μὴ μου ἅπτου). He meant that the days were now past for the lingering grasp of human tenderness, and that He was no longer only the human Friend and Saviour, but the risen and glorified Son of God—something more than eye could see or hand could grasp.

(η) Acts ii. 47 : "And the Lord added to the Church daily *such as should be saved.*" Any reader with a Calvinistic bias would at once infer that this Verse lends strong support to the doctrines of election and reprobation. It has even been supposed that the rendering is due to a Calvinistic leaning in our translators. The surmise is indeed erroneous, for a similar misrepresentation is found in many other versions (*e.g.*, the Vulgate and the Rheinish). But undoubtedly it should be rendered "those who were in the way of salvation" (literally, those being saved, τοὺς σωζομένους). The same word occurs in

Luke xiii. 23, "are there few that be saved?" (εἰ ὀλίγοι οἱ σωζόμενοι); 1 Corinthians i. 18, "unto them which perish . . . unto us which are saved" (τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις . . . ἡμῖν τοῖς σωζομένοις); 2 Corinthians ii. 15, "in them that are saved and in them that perish." Again in Acts xiii. 48, "as many as were ordained to eternal life believed," the highly Calvinistic aspect of the rendering is indeed excusable, but it is certain that the ἦσαν τεταγμένοι (as in Chap. xx. 13, οὕτως γὰρ ἦν διατεταγμένος, "for so had he appointed," and often in Josephus) has a quasi-middle sense, and means "as many as were *disposed* for eternal life," as it is rendered in the Syriac version. But in two other passages it may be feared that the turn given to the translation is really due to theological preconceptions: one is Matthew xix. 11, where "all men *cannot* receive this saying" ought to be rendered, "all men *do not* receive (οὐ χωροῦσιν) this saying;" the other is Galatians i. 18, where "I went up to Jerusalem to *see* Peter" ought in all *fairness* to be, "I went up to Jerusalem to *visit* (ἱστορησαι) Kephas," even if we do not admit a stronger word.

(θ) The instances in which our great and good translators have thus been unable to resist dogmatic bias are very few; but 1 Corinthians xi. 27, "Whosoever shall eat this bread, *and* drink this cup," is probably one of them. There can hardly be the shadow of a doubt that in using "*and*" they were influenced by an unfortunate and unfaithful timidity, "because they were anxious about the use made of the verse by the Romanists in the argument against communion in both kinds." But the first requirement in translators is absolute faithfulness, and ἢ can never mean anything but "*or*." In the verses which follow, the saddest and most untenable

conclusions have arisen, both from the wholly unauthorized rendering "damnation" for "judgment," and from the total obliteration of the distinction between the three words, κρίμα, διακρίνειν, and κατακρίνειν. Thus the true and deep lesson of the passage is lost; for that lesson briefly is, that if a man does not "test" himself (δοκιμαζέτω) before eating the bread and drinking of the cup, he eats and drinks *judgment* (κρίμα) upon himself by not *discerning* (διακρίνων) the Lord's body, "for if we had *discerned* ourselves we should not have been *judged*, but in being judged we are being educated (παιδευόμεθα) by the Lord that we may not be *condemned* (κατακριθώμεν) with the world."

(ι) John i. 51: "*Hereafter* ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man." This is one of the instances in which a careless reader may be misled by an English archaism to miss the entire force of the passage. "*Hereafter*" does not mean "at some future time," e.g., on the last day, but it means "*from this time forth*," as in our prayer "that we may hereafter live a righteous, sober, and godly life." Further, the ἀπ' ἄρτι is not certainly genuine, for it is omitted by κ, B, L, by many of the ancient versions, and by some of the early Fathers.

Another instance of misleading archaism is—

(κ) Matthew vi. 34: "*Take no thought* for the morrow." The translation here is perfectly correct, because in older English "thought" was used in the sense of "anxiety," as when Lord Bacon says that Hawis, an alderman of London, "dyed with *thought* and anguish." But this usage has long become obsolete, and hence the verse is now constantly used to support an in-

difference to the commonest laws of prudence, which, except so far as it is excusable from ignorance, would be positively immoral. To take thought for the morrow is a clear duty ; what is forbidden is want of faith and over-anxiety (μὴ μεριμνήσητε) respecting it.

(λ) Matthew xxv. 8 : "Our lamps are gone out." The words might be quoted to prove that it is possible for a man even in this life to fall into a state of *hopeless* reprobation. But the tense of the original is the present, and the meaning is, "our lamps are burning low (σβέννυνται), are being quenched."

(μ) 2 Corinthians v. 11 : "Knowing therefore the *terror* of the Lord we *persuade men*." Perhaps no text is more frequently used than this as the prelude to, and excuse for, I know not what lurid and apocalyptic menaces of wrath. It needs but a study of the context to shew that the meaning of the passage simply is that St. Paul is appealing against human charges of insincerity to the judgment of God, and saying, that while he attempts in the fear of God to persuade men of his own integrity, he has no need to persuade God of it, because to God his heart is already manifest.

(ν) Philippians ii. 10 : "That *at the name of Jesus* every knee should bow." This verse is commonly urged in defence of the practice of bowing the head whenever the name of Jesus is mentioned. But the rendering is wholly untenable. It is not "*at*," but "*in*" the name of Jesus, and St. Paul is speaking of the exaltation of Jesus in order that *all* prayer may be offered *in his name*.

(ε) Philippians iv. 5 : "Let your *moderation* be known unto all men." This verse is constantly ad-

duced, and was recently adduced in an elaborate paper, as an argument against total abstinence, and in favour of what is called "moderate drinking." It is needless to point out that the Greek word for "moderation" is τὸ ἐπιεικές, and means reasonable dealing or *consideration for one another*.

(ο) Ephesians iv. 32: "Even as God *for Christ's sake* hath forgiven you." It would perhaps be hard to overestimate the effect which has been produced by this verse upon popular theology. It has probably had more effect than any passage in stereotyping the dangerous forensic aspect which has been thrust upon the divine mystery of the Atonement. And considering the immense dissemination of the phrase, it is little short of startling to find that such a phrase as God forgiving us "for Christ's sake" does not once occur in the New Testament, and that indeed the words "for Christ's sake" in this sense are not found. No doubt such a use of words, duly and reverently explained, may be supported by inference from other passages of Scripture, but it is undesirable to put in the very forefront of our theology expressions which are not directly Scriptural, and I need not pause to tell the reader that the true translation, "even as God *in Christ* forgave you," conveys in itself a very different range of thoughts.

(π) Hebrews ii. 16: "*He took on him the seed of Abraham.*" The true rendering of course is, "For it is not angels that he helpeth, but he helpeth the seed of Abraham."

(ρ) Hebrews vi. 6: "[It is impossible] . . . if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance." Here again the English translators have been sus-

pected, and happily without justice, of bending their version in favour of Calvinistic views. The translation is nevertheless wrong. It is not "*if* they shall fall away," but "on their falling away" (παρπεσόντας).

(σ) Hebrews x. 34: "*Knowing in yourselves* that ye have in heaven a better and an enduring substance." Although no erroneous doctrine is drawn from these words, how much do we lose by their rendering! The words refer not to the *future* hope, but to the *present fruition* of heavenly and permanent happiness. The *ἐν οὐρανοῖς* is omitted by some good MSS. and versions, but whether omitted or received, the lesson of the verse is that God's saints recognize even now and here "*that they have for themselves* a better possession and an abiding."

(τ) Hebrews xii. 17: "He *found no place of repentance*, though he sought it carefully with tears." This verse was, we are told, to John Bunyan during his early struggles "like a flaming sword, barring to him the way of the tree of life." Now if the verse had the meaning which he gave to it—if, that is, it implied that it is possible for a man earnestly to seek (ἐκζητήσας) with tears for repentance, and yet not find it—it would not only be the most powerful inducement to despair, but would run counter to the whole meaning of the Gospel message. But no such meaning necessarily attaches to the verse, and indeed Christendom in general has been united in setting it aside. St. Chrysostom and many eminent commentators make it mean, "found no room for repentance," *i.e.*, for change of purpose, in his father Isaac; others, like Zwingli and Beza, refer it to the vain attempt to change the mind of Jacob. Others again, making the clause "for he found no room for

a change of purpose" parenthetical, refer it (*αὐτὴν*) to the *blessing* (*εὐλογίαν*) which he could not regain though he was passionately desirous to do so. Whatever view be adopted, it is certain in any case that the "repentance" which he did not find is *not* (as Theodore of Mopsuestia said more than a thousand years ago) the repentance which leads to the forgiveness of sins, but such a repentance as might have led to the restoration of the theocratic blessing. Earthly consequences are indeed often irrevocable; but so far from closing the gate of repentance and remission of sins to any penitent sinner, it is the very object of Christ's life and death to fling it wide to all who would enter it.

These instances are, I think, more than sufficient to serve as specimens of the manner in which, and of the extent to which, many have been led astray by the neglect even of textual and grammatical considerations. In some of these instances—*e.g.*, in the case of John x. 16; 1 Corinthians xi. 27–29; Ephesians iv. 32—the correction of the translation has had scarcely any effect in modifying the views to which by way of inference the erroneous renderings have led. But even in the other instances which a student may multiply for himself to almost any extent, have we not seen enough to shew us how possible it is to use in a careless and conventional manner the Book which we profess to regard as containing the oracles of God? It is a very grievous thing to build mistaken inferences in theology upon the inaccuracies of an authorized version. Even this has been done to a very large extent; but what I have especially desired to illustrate is the evil of illustrating and supporting even true and sacred conclusions by untenable translations. A church which is built

upon a rock can only be disfigured and weakened when the buttresses with which men have thought to strengthen it are built of spurious material and daubed with untempered mortar.

In one more paper I hope to return to this subject, and to shew that Scriptural interpretation may be endangered by far subtler enemies than those very obvious ones on which I now have touched.

F. W. FARRAR.

STUDIES IN THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

XV.—THE BETRAYER.

THERE is nothing more remarkable in the history of the Passion than its moral truthfulness, the extraordinary realism with which the varied and most dissimilar characters are painted. The men live and act before us obedient to their respective natures and ends. Each has his own character, and the history but exhibits it in action, articulated in speech and conduct. There is everywhere the finest consistency between the doer and the deed ; new events but make us the more conscious of the harmony. And this harmony is exhibited and preserved under the most extraordinary conditions and in what seems most violent combinations. The central figure is the holiest Person of history, but round Him stand or strive the most opposed and contrasted moral types, every one related to Him and more or less concerned in the tragic action of which He is at once object and victim. The characters and catastrophe are alike beyond and above all the conventional ideals, whether of history or tragedy. The Christ Himself is a wonderful picture. Jesus appears in

every moment and circumstance equal to Himself. To paint Him as He lives before us in his final agony was a feat possible only to the sweet simplicity that copies Nature, unconscious of its own high art. It was a work beyond not only the Galilean imagination, but any of the imaginations that had as yet created the ideals of the world. Physical weakness and suffering do not readily lend themselves to the expression of moral dignity and power. The Victim of the scourge and the cross, fated to endure the contemptuous pity of his judge and the merciless mockery of his foes, is hardly the kind of subject imagination would choose as the vehicle or embodiment of a spiritual sublimity so transcendent as to demand our worship and command our awe. Creative art would find it almost, perhaps altogether, impossible to keep the weakness from depraving and so destroying the dignity—the scornful hate that kills the person from casting its shadow over the character. It is only when we compare this simple historical presentation with the highest human art that we see how perfect it is. The splendid imagination of Plato has done its utmost to invest the death of Sokrates with high philosophical meaning, with the deepest ethical and tragic interest. Yet when the closing scenes in the *Phaedo* are compared with the closing scenes in the Gospels, how utterly the finest genius of Greece is seen to have failed in his picture of the good man in death. Sokrates is the philosopher, not the man. In his very serenity there is something selfish. His speculations calm and exalt him, but at the expense of his humanity. Affection, passion does not trouble him, and he does not feel how sorely it may trouble other and lower spirits. Death, so far as an

evil to himself, he has conquered ; but he has not even imagined that his death may be an evil to others, all the greater that he suffers it so unjustly and meets it so serenely. The guilt of Athens in causing his death does not touch so as to awe or overwhelm him ; he feels the guilt almost as little as Athens herself. Then the sorrows of Xanthippe do not move him. He remains sublimely discoursing with his friends, while she, face to face with woman's greatest sorrow, is introduced only to be made ridiculous in her grief. Xanthippe indeed has been one of the most ill-used of women. Neglected by her husband in life, she is not comforted by him in death. He has lofty principles and wise speeches for philosophers, but only scornful pity of the woman whose sorrow ought to have touched his spirit and made him feel that death is more terrible to the living than to the dying, and the sorrows of affection have a greater claim on our comfort and sympathy than the serene souls of philosophers. How infinitely does Christ in his dying passion transcend the most virtuous of the Greeks ! Death to Him has no terrors, save those made by the guilt of man. He fears death for the sake of the men that work it ; because of their sin it is to Him an agony He cannot bear. The man who followed and betrayed Him, the men who loved and forsook Him, the women who loved and forsook Him not, He pitied, He comforted as far as they would receive the comfort He had to give. The sorrow of Christ in death was diviner than the serenity of Sokrates, and the historians of his sorrow could have made Him so seem only by painting Him as He was. They were without the imagination that could create an ideal so strange yet so beautiful, and only possessed the

love that is quick to understand and sure and true of speech. And thus, by their very openness and simplicity of soul, which keeps them remote from invention and near to reality, they so represent Christ in his passion as to make the passion exalt and glorify the Christ. But the transfiguring power is in the person, not in the suffering. It is made sublime through Him; He remains glorious in spite of it. The case is without a parallel. There are no sufferings in the world that awaken the same emotions as Christ's; but the emotions they awaken are due not to them as sufferings, but to the Sufferer. Their transcendent significance only expresses his; and the degree of their significance for the world is the measure of the wonderful unlearned art that had the wisdom to read their meaning and tell their story.

And as Christ remains Himself, true to his ideal character, the other actors in the tragedy no less faithfully and consistently unfold in action and conduct their respective moral natures. While He rises above his sorrow, and commands it, even in the very moment when it works his death, his disciples behave like simple men surprised in the midst of fond illusions, suddenly and fiercely shaken out of them, and too completely bewildered by the shock to know what to think or to do. Judas, perhaps the man of strongest character and will in the band, foresees the catastrophe, contributes to it, but only to be so appalled by the issue as to be hurried to a deed of terrible atonement. And this evolution of moral nature and principle stands in radical relation to the presence and action of the Christ. The men who touch Him in this supreme hour of his history do so only to have their essential characters

disclosed. In Him judgment so lived that it acted as by nature and without ceasing. The men who thought to try Him were themselves tried, stood in his presence with their inmost secrets turned out. The stars that look down on us like the radiant eyes of heaven shine out of a darkness their light but deepens. The sunshine makes the plant unfold its leaves, the flower declare its colour, the tree exhibit its fruit. So from Christ there came the light as of a solitary star, deepening the darkness round Him, a heat and radiance that made the characters about Him effloresce and bear fruit, each after its kind. The high Priest is made all unconsciously to himself to shew himself, not as he is thought or would like to be thought to be, but as he is before the eye of God and measured by the eternal law of righteousness—crafty, devoted to expediency, using his high office for private ends, turning the forms of justice into the instruments of injustice; scrupulous as to ceremonial purity, but heedless as to moral rectitude; able red-handed but calm-hearted to keep the Pass-over, feeling in no way disqualified by his part in the trial and crucifixion for celebrating the great religious festival of his people. The Procurator, a Roman, imperious, haughty, scornful of the people he ruled, contemptuous of their religion, impatient of their ceaseless disputes, stands, from his brief connection with Jesus, before all time morally unveiled—a man vacillating, cruel, as a judge in the heart of him unjust, surrendering to a popular clamour he proudly despised the very person he had declared innocent. The Priests, fearful of pollution, hating a Gentile as if he were organized sin, are seen, as it were, spiritually unclothed, sacrificing their hitherto greatest to a still greater hate,

stimulating in the crowd their thirst for blood, preferring Cæsar to Christ, standing mocking and spiteful before painful yet sacred death. The People, thoughtless, impulsive, are shewn, the ready tools of the cunning, demanding the life of a murderer, the death of the righteous; as a multitude, where men, de-individualized, are almost de-humanized, capable of atrocities which each man apart and by himself would abhor himself for thinking either he or any other man could perpetrate. The inner nature in each determines the action, but the contact with Christ shews the quality of the nature, and forces it into appropriate action and speech. As the Passion reveals in Jesus the Christ, its history is but the translation, under the impulse He supplies, into word and deed of the spirit of the men who surrounded, tried, and crucified Him.

Now this indicates the point of view from which we wish to apprehend the last events in the life of Christ. They are the revelation of very varied moral natures, and they possess a singular unity and significance when studied in relation to the natures they reveal. The standpoint is critical, but psychological rather than historical, the criticism being concerned not so much with the probable order and outer conditions of the events as with their moral source and spiritual sequence. If we can find their subtler inner relations—can, as it were, interpret the drama through the actors, or the plot through the characters, especially in their attitude to Him whose presence gives unity and movement to the whole—it may help us the better not only to understand its truth but believe its reality.

The first man who meets us is the one who led the band of captors to Gethsemane. Judas is one of the

standing moral problems of the gospel history. What was the character of the man? What motives induced him first to seek and then to forsake the society of Jesus? Why did he turn traitor? Why was he so little penetrated by the Spirit and awed by the authority of Christ as to be able to do as he did? And why, having done it, did he so swiftly and tragically avenge on himself his deliberately planned and executed crime? These questions invest the man with a fascination now of horror and again of pity; of horror at the crime, of pity for the man. If his deed stands alone among the evil deeds of the world, so does his remorse among the acts and atonements of conscience; and the remorse is more expressive of the man than even the deed. Lavater said, "Judas acted like Satan, but like a Satan who had it in him to be an apostle." And it is this evolution of a possible apostle into an actual Satan that is at once so touching and so tragic.

There is an instructive contrast between what we know of the man and how we conceive him. There is, perhaps, no person in history of whom we at once know so little and have so distinct an image. The lines that sketch him are few, but they are lines of living fire. He is too real a person to be, as Strauss argued,¹ a mythical creation, made after Ahithophel, and draped in a history suggested by verses in the very Psalms Peter quoted in his address to his brother Apostles.² The man and his part are so interwoven with the history of Christ's last days as to be inseparable from it; the picture of the man is too defined, concrete, characteristic to be a product of the mythical

¹ *Leben Jesu*, § 130; *Neues Leben*, § 90.

² Acts i. 15 ff.; Pss. cix., lxix.

imagination which, always exaggerative, never works but on a stupendous scale. The objects loom as through the mist—do not look like Judas, clear and sharp cut as if fresh from the sculptor's chisel. Still less can we allow Volkmar¹ to resolve him into a creation of the Pauline tendency, framed expressly to make a place in the apostolic circle for Paul. His reasons are as violent as his conjecture. Judas is no bestial phenomenon, lying outside the pale of humanity. On the contrary, the human nature of him is terribly real and distinct; and Paul's own reference to the betrayal² is, notwithstanding Volkmar's specious exegesis and strained rendering, clear and conclusive. But if the critic is required to spare his historical reality, it is not simply in order to allow the speculative theologian to destroy his humanity. Daub,³ in one of the strongest

¹ *Die Religion Jesu u. ihre erste Entwicklung nach dem gegenwärtigen Stande der Wissenschaft*, pp. 260, ff.

² 1 Cor. xi. 23. Volkmar proposes to translate *παρεδίδετο*, *überliefert wurde* (was delivered, given up), instead of *verrathen ward* (was betrayed). But the change does not mend the matter. If He was delivered, some one delivered Him to somebody, which to the Apostles could only appear as a betrayal. This whole theory as to Judas is an example of how a scholar, possessed by an hypothesis, may in its interest do violence to all the probabilities of history and laws of grammar.

³ *Judas Ischariot, oder Betrachtungen über das Böse im Verhältniss zum Guten* (Heidelberg, 1816, 1818). There is no more remarkable figure in modern theology than Daub, and no more gruesome book than his *Judas Ischariot*. He might be said to be the mirror of German Transcendentalism in its successive phases. He began life a Kantian, he ended it an Hegelian, but was throughout distinguished by the most heroic loyalty to the speculative reason, addressing an audience always few, though not so constantly fit. When he wrote *Judas* he was under the influence of Schelling's first transcendental theosophy, bent on discovering in God and Nature the dark ground which the eternal Reason had to conquer, and against which it had to establish light and order. To him Jesus and Judas were the universal in miniature—their history veiled the universal truth. "As Jesus Christ had no equal among men, neither had his betrayer. While to the Christian mind the first man was the first sinner, yet among his descendants Judas is the only one in whom sin reached the highest point" (vol. i. p. 2). "In him was personified and concentrated all the wickedness of all the enemies of Jesus and evil identified with its instrument; and so for him, as an incarnation of the

works of his massive but hardly modern mind, has conceived Judas as the embodied evil who stands in antithesis to Christ as the embodied good. The one was the power of Satan in human form as the other was the power of God, and without the devilish the Divine agent could not have accomplished his work in the world. Hence Judas was chosen to be a disciple expressly that he might betray the Christ, and so, by enabling Jesus to fulfil his mission, fulfilling his own. But this theory is without historical warrant, its reason is entirely *a priori*, its significance purely speculative. The man is to us simply an historical person, and must be interpreted as one, on principles and by standards applicable to human nature throughout the world.

If Daub is unjust to Judas, sacrificing his historical and moral significance to a speculative theory as to the relation of evil to good, there are two current yet opposite interpretations that are, though for different reasons, no less unjust. According to the one of these, Judas is moved by avarice ; according to the other, by mistaken enthusiasm, by an exalted notion of Christ's mission and power. There is nothing that can so little explain the act and conduct of Judas as greed, the love of money. There is, perhaps, no passion more intense, but there is certainly none so narrow, so selfish, so blind or indifferent to the miseries or misfortunes it may inflict on others. To avarice money is the greatest good, the want of it the greatest evil, and the means that can obtain the good and obviate the evil are ever justified by the end. The miser who

devil, mercy and blessedness are alike impossible" (vol. i. p. 22). With the way in which Daub works out the universal problem given in this moment of the evangelical history, we are not here concerned. It is enough that we see to what extraordinary uses Judas has been turned.

can indulge his master passion minds his own miseries too little to care for the miseries it may cause either to persons or States. The remorse of Judas disproves his greed; the man who could feel it had too much latent nobility of soul to be an abject slave of avarice. The "thirty pieces of silver" had no power to comfort him; they were the signs of his guilt, the witnesses of his shame that in his despair he cast from him in mingled rage and pain. The fact, too, that he was the bearer of the bag¹ proves that he was no lover of money. However his co-disciples may have judged him, Jesus would never have so led him into temptation, fostered avarice in the heart of the avaricious by making him the custodian of the purse. Christ, we may be certain, did not elect him to this office in order that He might cause the offence to come.²

And Judas was as little a mistaken enthusiast, a man weary of his master's delay in declaring Himself, seeking by a fond though foolish expedient to force Him to stand forth the confessed and conquering Messiah.³ This theory has nothing in the history to support it, is indeed, in every respect, violently opposed to the evidence. If he had been an enthusiast, why had his enthusiasm slumbered so long, and never been expressed till now, and why now in a form so extraordinary and fantastic? And how, if he had so great an idea of Christ's power, had he so mean an idea of Christ's wisdom? If, too, he had meant to compel Jesus to shew Himself, would he have chosen the silent night as the time for the

¹ John xii. 6.

² Matt. xviii. 7.

³ Cf. the article "Judas" by Paulus, in Ersch und Gruber's *Encyclopädie*; Whately's *Essays on Dangers to the Christian Faith*, Discourse iii.; and De Quincey's celebrated *Essay on Judas*, which throws the same theory into more literary but also more paradoxical form.

capture and still Gethsemane as the place? If, too, while his means were so foolish, his motive had been so good, would Jesus have received and spoken of and to him as He did? The theory is too unreal and violent to deserve grave discussion, and would never have been gravely proposed for belief save as offering a welcome alternative to the commoner and less generous interpretation. There are men who but see in the remorse of Judas the evidence of his sin and condemnation; and there are men who see in it the proof of a sorrow for his act too deep to allow the man to forgive himself. The former are contented to say: "Judas is the one man of whom we know with certainty that he is eternally damned;"¹ but the latter are anxious to find some means of softening the fate of one who died from unspeakable horror at his own crime. Apart from this reason no man would ever have seen in Judas a mistaken enthusiast.

Let us look then at the man as he stands before us in history. It is not easy indeed to get face to face with him. His early life lies under the shadow cast by his later; the man is interpreted through his end. And the men who interpret him for us looked at him in a light wonderfully unlike the light in which he had seen and been seen in the flesh. To their eyes, enlightened by Divine events, everything assumed a new meaning. Jesus became another person than He had been—of diviner nature, higher authority, immenser significance. His kingdom ceased to be Israel's and became God's—spiritual, universal, eternal; his death was changed from a last disaster into a sacrifice "offered once for all," abolishing all need of further

¹ *Die Evangelische Zeitung*, No. 30, 1863; Hase, *Geschichte Jesu*, p. 549.

sacrifices, and creating a new and living way by which men might draw near to God ; the life of humiliation and suffering He had lived to their senses was transfigured and sublimed by the life of exaltation and glory He now lived to their faith. And this change in their notion of Christ changed the proportions and meaning of everything that related to Him or his history. In the presence of the Divine in Christ, acts of the simplest devotion were touched with sublimity, while words of distrust or deeds of disobedience became charged with a darker guilt. And the new light which had risen on their spirits cast a shadow which fell deepest on Judas, stretching along the whole course of his life. The man was to them ever a traitor ; in the hour of his discipleship he had still the soul of an alien,¹ and in his last act he was not so much a man as the agent and organ of the devil.² But we may be certain that, whatever the man was towards the end, he could not have been bad at the beginning. As Jesus would never have selected a man to be a disciple for the express purpose of making him a traitor, Judas must have had promise in him, possibilities of good, capabilities of apostleship. Christ's act is more significant than the Evangelist's words ; and it permits us to infer that in Judas when he was called there was a possible Peter or John, as, perhaps, in these there was a possible Judas. There is no question that he was one of the twelve,³ nor that he occupied a position of trust.⁴ The man Christ so trusted must have seemed to Him a trusty man, not likely to be corrupted by his office or its opportunities.

¹ Matt. x. 4 ; Mark iii. 19 ; Luke vi. 16.

² John xiii. 2, 27 ; Luke xxii. 3.

³ Matt. xxvi. 14 ; Mark xiv. 10 ; Luke xxii. 3.

⁴ John xii. 6 ; xiii. 29.

But the unlikely was the realized. He who carried the purse betrayed the Master; and the well trusted became the traitor.

The position, then, from which our constructive interpretation must start is this: Judas the disciple was a possible apostle, chosen to the discipleship that the possible might be realized. It was with him as with the others—they, too, were possibilities; their souls, like his, the battle-ground of evil and good, where the worse often came dangerously near to victory. The struggle was due to the good in Christ and the evil in themselves. The evil was the fruit of ignorance or prejudice or passion, of the Judaism in which they had been nursed, with the false ideas it had created, and the false hopes it had inspired. Their ideas of God, of the Messiah, of the kingdom, of righteousness, of worship, of man, were the very antitheses and contradiction of Christ's. His aim was to lead them from their ideas to his, to expel the Jewish and plant in them the Christian mind. At first they loved Him because they believed He was the one who could realize their ideals; at last they loved Him because they had made his ideals theirs, and had by faith and fellowship been qualified to become agents for their realization throughout the world. But the way between the first and the last was long and hard to traverse, marked here and there by struggles fierce in proportion to the strength of the old convictions and the new love. Where the convictions had the deepest root the struggle was sternest; where the love was most intense victory came earliest and was most complete. But in no case was it easy. Peter, the man forward in speech and action, could rebuke his Master,

even after months of closest fellowship.¹ The sons of Zebedee could not trust Him, but must urge that He fulfil their ambitions in their own form and way.² They had not learned to trust his wisdom because they had not learned to know his mind; and his mind was hard to know because it was so utterly unlike their own.

Now of Judas it may certainly be said he was at once the most Jewish and the least attached of the disciples, the man most pronounced in his Judaism and least bound by his affections—the feelings of personal love and social loyalty that could alone have steadied him in the process of violent and distressful change. He was known as Iscariot³—the man from Kerioth—the only Judean in the band. The others were men of Galilee, kindred in blood and akin in faith. Galilee was the circle of the Gentiles; in it the people were more mixed, were freer, more open to new or strange ideas, less fierce and fanatical in their Judaism than the people of Judea. In the man from Kerioth there lived the hotter temper, the haughtier spirit, the more intolerant faith of the South. The air round his home was full of the oldest traditions of his race; its scenes, consecrated by the wanderings and history of Abraham, by the struggles and early victories of David, may well have coloured the dreams of his youth and the hopes of his manhood. Conscious purity of blood involves austerity of faith, and so his ideals would be national in a degree quite unknown to the Galileans. Learning Christ would be a much harder thing to him than to them, for it implied a more radical revolution. They

¹ Matt. xvi. 22; Mark viii. 32.

² Mark x. 35-37.

³ Matt. x. 4; xxvi. 14; Luke xxii. 3.

were alike in this—they followed Jesus at first because they believed his word and mission to be not hostile to Judaism, but complementary of it—its vital outcome and fulfilment. But they were unlike in their relation both to Judaism and Jesus. Of all it may be said that the light as it began to break was not altogether loved, was not always welcome, but even now and then positively hateful. When the new order stood disclosed, it was found so to cross and contradict the inherited prejudices of generations, that only supreme love to Christ's person could create and maintain loyalty to his aims. And Judas was precisely the man who would feel the contradiction most and the love least. He had no friend or brother in the band; neighbourliness had not drawn him into it, and family affection could not help to hold him there. The solitary Judean in a Galilean society, he would be, as the least known, the least loved, with fewest personal associations and interests and least community of thought and feeling. Where friendship, with the confidences it brings, is not spontaneous or natural, the soul is easily forced into the silence that creates misconception and distrust.

Let us imagine, then, the unwritten history of Judas. He is a man of strong convictions, a zealot who has in his south-Judean home brooded over the problems of his race, the splendid spiritual promise of Israel, but its miserable historical failure. He believes in the destiny of his people, dares to confess to himself that, though he pays tribute to Cæsar, the Messiah is his king. Full of these thoughts, he meets Jesus at Jerusalem. The one has come south from Nazareth, the other north from Kerioth. It is in the Holy City that Judas most feels the desolation of Israel; but there,

too, he is most conscious of the consolation of hope. In a moment of moody hopefulness he hears Jesus, sees Him drive the money-changers out of the temple¹ and do works that seem to prove Him a teacher come from God.² He follows Him, goes with Him into Galilee; but while he believes that Jesus is the Messiah, the Messianic ideal is his own, not Christ's. He is chosen a disciple for what he may be rather than what he is; his spirit is the possibility of an apostle or an apostate. The early ministry in Galilee pleases him. In presence of the miracles, the multitudes, the words of power, his faith lives. One who can so speak and act may well be the Messiah, and patience is easy when hope is strong. He is zealous in his own way, has a genius for what, in modern phrase, is termed organization, and becomes purser of the little band. He hears and, like the others, dimly understands the Master, but interprets Him through his own desires and expectations. While the bright morning of the ministry endures all rejoice in the fresh sunshine; but as clouds prophetic of storm gathered over its noonday they did not all alike feel the better radiance that came from the serene soul of the Christ. They were like men slowly awaking to a real world, unintelligible because so unlike their ideal—men bewildered by the consciousness that their fondest dreams were illusions destined never to be realized. And now came the conflict in which love to Christ and loyalty to the ancient convictions, which they had hoped to see fulfilled through Him, wrestled for the mastery. They had to believe before they could see, and belief in a moment so trying could only live by love. The

¹ John ii. 15.

² John ii. 23; iii. 2.

alternatives were, assimilation to Him or recoil from Him, and for a while the rival forces, the centripetal and the centrifugal, might be so balanced as only the more to compel the man to continue moving in the path he had chosen. But they could not remain for ever in equilibrium; one or other must prevail. The consequent struggle was felt by all; no man escaped it. Jesus was early conscious of it, knew that there was an evil spirit among the twelve,¹ one who should betray the Son of man into the hands of men.² The prophecies of the Passion were a bewilderment to the disciples. Mark, in his picturesque way, shews them walking behind Jesus stunned (*ἐθαμβοῦντο*), stupified by wonder, communing among themselves, terrified at his words and the tragedy they foretell.³ The men were all differently affected. Thomas, faithful in his very despair, was ready to die with Him.⁴ Peter, more courageous in speech than action, foretold his fall by boasting that, while all men might be offended, yet would not he.⁵ Judas shewed his fiercer and more dissatisfied spirit in open and ungenerous criticism,⁶ though the mind that prompted it was shared by all.⁷

In those dark days, then, we see the conflict of the rival forces—the transforming love attracting the one way, the ancient convictions drawing the other. The man from Kerioth could not get near Jesus because of his own ideas as to what the Christ ought to be, and so the love that is the best creator of truthful loyalty could not exercise over him its holy and beneficent influence. The fellowship that does not beget affinity

¹ John vi. 70.² Matt. xvii. 22.³ Mark x. 32.⁴ John xi. 16.⁵ Matt. xxvi. 33, 34; Mark xiv. 29.⁶ John xii. 4-6.⁷ Matt. xxvi. 8, 9.

evokes antipathy, the mind that has not learned to love is dangerously near to hate. While Christ's spirit had been growing readier for sacrifice, Judas's had been getting more selfish, waxing bitter over its vanishing ideals. The fuller Christ's speech became of suffering and death the more offensive it grew to Judas—the more like a mockery of his ancient hopes. Such a conflict of mind and thought between Master and disciple could not continue for ever; and it could have but one end. The longer it endured and the more it was repressed, the wider grew the breach and the more bitter the feeling. The moment when Christ's words and acts were most significant of death and sacrifice was also the moment when discipleship became impossible to Judas, and apostasy inevitable. While the Master remained to institute the Supper of everlasting remembrance, the disciple went forth to betray Him.

No one hates like an apostate. The cause he deserts is an offence to him. It is the monument of a happier past, of hopes that deluded, of conflicts that have ended in the defeat of conscience and the loss of honour. The more honest the apostate the deeper will be his hate, for his apostasy will imply a more violent distress and disturbance of nature. The man who is not in earnest is incapable of any strong aversion, powerful feelings being everywhere at once the expression and measure of sincerity. And he who forsakes a cause, believing it has deceived and wronged him, feels that he cannot spare it, can only be its remorseless foe. Revenge becomes a passion which must be gratified before the man can be happy. And Judas acts like an apostate to whom revenge is dear.

Hate like his is a sure diviner, as quick to recognize hate in all its varying degrees and capabilities as love is to discern love. And so with the unerring instinct of his kind he seeks the chief priests. "And they were glad, and covenanted to give him money;"¹ but the sweet thing was the revenge, not the money. Yet why did they need him? Jesus was defenceless, was in their city, on their streets, teaching openly—what need then of a covenant with the traitor? It was not enough to capture, it was necessary to condemn Him, and so condemn Him that the Roman would execute the judgment. Only the most delicate handling could insure the death that had been deemed "expedient."² The conditions were dangerous; the millions then gathered in and about Jerusalem formed a most explosive mass. The Jews were a proud and fanatical race, believing themselves the chosen of God, the Jacob He loved, the Israel in whom his soul delighted. They despised the Roman as a Gentile while hating him as a conqueror. He might be allowed for a little to chastise them for their sins; but once it pleased God to have mercy upon Zion and restore her freedom, the Roman would have to go forth weeping, while they had their mouths filled with laughter and their tongues with singing. And the hope in the return of the Divine favour was just then at its intensest, insensible to discouragement, sensitive to every propitious sign, ready to anticipate or respond to it in deeds of fierce fanaticism. This hope so possessed the people then within and about Jerusalem that it glowed in them like a passion. The sight of the Roman was an insult to their pride and their faith. The millions were conscious of their

¹ Luke xxii. 5.² John xi. 50.

multitude, of their strength, of ideals of authority and empire that far transcended the Roman. Were the belief to seize them that their Messiah had come, it would raise them into an army of fanatics, inspired by an awful hate to Rome and a sublime enthusiasm for their city and their hopes. The priests knew the possibilities that slumbered in the multitudes, but they knew not the resources of Jesus. The people's action they could forecast, but not Christ's. And with them not to know was to suspect. The bad can never understand the good, fear that their good is only disguised evil, the worse and more mischievous for being so skilfully concealed. And so the priests feared Jesus, believed that He would do what they would have done had they been in his place. They thought that to take Him in public would be to court disaster. The people believed in Him, and to threaten Him might be to force their belief into irrevocable deeds. For to see Him taken captive by the Roman would be to their hot imagination proof of his Messiahship, evidence that Cæsar feared the Christ. So the thing must be done secretly. If there was power in Him, He must not be allowed to exercise it over the people, or the people to see it. If there was faith in Him, it must not be provoked by a public arrest, but be shamed into silence and out of existence by the sight of a broken and humiliated and smitten captive. And so the coming of the traitor was like the descent of wisdom into their counsels; it made the difficult possible and the dark light.

What help the traitor needed he received, and, familiar with the haunts of Jesus, he led forth the band to Gethsemane. There they met the Saviour fresh from his agony and his prayer; and hate, that it might

the better gratify itself, tried to use the language and the symbols of love. Over the scene we may not linger, though it is in its tragic contrasts one of the moments the imagination has most loved to picture. There, under the silent stars, in the glare of the red torchlight, two faces that were as heaven and hell meeting joined in what was at once the holiest and most profane kiss ever given by human lips. But the deed was soon done, and Jesus, in the cold dark midnight, encircled by flaming torches and coarse cruel men, returned to Jerusalem. "Peter followed afar off," and so did another disciple, made bold by a love many waters could not quench. But deep as was their anguish, in another spirit there was a deeper. There is a hate that dies by indulgence—a revenge that, gratified, begets remorse. A mean and miserly nature, incapable of commanding emotions, had been able to sell Jesus and feel only the happier for being free of his presence and possessed of the "thirty pieces of silver," which was his price. But with an earnest and intense nature, whose hate was born of disappointed hope and baffled ambition, it was altogether different. The apostasy of Judas came from the feeling that he had been deceived, but the despair of Judas from the consciousness that he had deceived himself, and so become the author of a stupendous crime. Evil premeditated is evil at its best—attractive, desirable, full of promises which the senses can understand and the passions love; but evil perpetrated is evil at its worst—hideous, hateful, stripped of its illusions and clothed in its native misery. In his anger at finding Jesus not to be the Christ he had hoped for and desired, Judas deserted and betrayed Him; in the terrible calm that

succeeded indulgence he awoke to the realities within and about him, saw how blindly he had lived and hated, how far the Messianic ideal of Jesus transcended his own. There are moments that are big with eternities, when the walls self has built round the spirit fall, and the infinite realities of God stand clear before the soul. Such was the moment after the betrayal to the betrayer. In it he knew at once himself and Jesus, saw his lost opportunity and his awful crime. Above the lurid torchlight gleamed the silent beautiful stars; to the eye of Jesus they were full of pity, but to the eye of Judas they were full of blame. Calm magnanimous Nature in heaven and on earth made the one peaceful and strong, but the other remorseful and weak. Sorrow subdued into resignation is holy happiness; but revenge gluttoned is remorse roused.

The suddenly awakened conscience is a terrible power; compared with it justice is gentle and law is mild. The man in whom it lives feels neither inclined nor able to forgive himself, sees only where and in what he is blameworthy. In its burning light whatever can deepen guilt is made to stand out clear, sharp, and distinct; while every apology or extenuating circumstance is consumed. So Judas judges himself with awful severity, and hastens to execute judgment. The moments move swiftly, but with sure consequence. He does not wait for the issue of his act, but anticipates it. He knows the men, watches the trial, hears Jesus condemned, and then abandons himself to his horror and remorse. With the judges, the men whose hireling he had been, he had no part or lot. He was in earnest, they were not; it was a matter of life and death to him, of "expediency" and craft with them.

When they had compassed their end they were satisfied ; but he had by the betrayal defeated, as he now understood, his own purpose, given One holy, harmless, and beautiful over into the hands of sinners. Christ before his judges became intelligible to the man with the awakened conscience ; his spiritual meaning, aims, Messiahship all stood clear before his eye, while the men that were trying Him, with their hollow and selfish worldliness, turned, as it were, into living transparencies. And so the trial was enough ; he could not live to see the end. He would hide himself in the grave ; seek the blindness of death. The scene with the chief priests is most characteristic. They calm, cynical, satisfied ; he agitated, reproachful, remorseful. He cries, " I have sinned in that I have betrayed innocent blood." They answer, " That is thy own concern. What is it to us ? " The " thirty pieces of silver " he cannot keep, each accuses him so. He casts them down in his agony, turns and flees from the temple a fugitive from conscience, from self, yet only the more pursued by the remorseful self, the reproachful conscience, unable to face life followed by a so awful Nemesis, able only to seek quiet in death and a refuge in the grave.

The end of the traitor became him. It was the way in which he confessed his crime and made atonement for it to his conscience. We ought to think of Judas, if not the better, the more kindly for his end. It proved him not altogether bad — that the actual apostate had been a possible apostle. Imagine how much worse a calmer end had shewn him. If he had lived a man without passion or pain ; if he had lifted to heaven a serene brow and looked out on man like a

consciously excellent soul; if he had enlarged his phylactery, lengthened his robe, and extended his prayers at the corners of the streets and in the temple; if he had gone daily to the house of his friend, the chief Rabbi, and been often in good fellowship with his honoured and dignified neighbour, the high priest; if he had lived in the exercise of his religion, died in the odour of respectability, and been buried amid the regrets and eulogies of his sect and city—would he not have been a man of lower nature and baser spirit than he seems now as, seeking to escape his sin and his conscience, he flees out of time into eternity? Judas despairful is a better man than Judas respectable had been; and if his remorse has touched the heart of man into pity, who shall say that it found or made severe and pitiless the heart of God?

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

ECCLESIASTES.

CHAPTER II. VERSES 12-26.

12. *Then I turned myself to behold wisdom and madness and folly. For what can the man do that cometh after the king? Even that which hath been already done.* 13. *And I saw that wisdom excelleth folly even as light excelleth darkness.* 14. *The wise man's eyes are in his head, and the fool walketh in darkness, yet I know that one fate happeneth to them all.* 15. *And I said in my heart, As is the fate of the fool, such will be my fate also; to what purpose is it then that I have had more wisdom? So I said in my heart that this also is vanity.*

16. *For there is no remembrance of the wise man more than of the fool for ever; seeing that in the days to come all will long have been forgotten. Alas, the wise man dieth even as the fool!* 17. *Then I hated life; because the work which is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me; for all is vanity and a chasing of the wind.*

18. *Moreover I hated all my labour wherein I had laboured under the sun: seeing that I must leave (lit., give) it to the man who should be after me.* 19. *And who knoweth whether he shall be a wise man or a fool? yet¹ shall he have rule over all my labour wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have been wise under the sun. This also is vanity.*

20. *So I turned about to despair in my heart concerning all the labour wherewith I had laboured under the sun.* 21. *For there is a man who laboureth with wisdom, and with knowledge, and with success; yet to a man that hath not laboured therein must he leave (lit., give) it as his portion. This also is vanity and a great evil.*

22. *For what hath man of all his labour, and of the struggle of his heart, wherein he laboureth under the sun?* 23. *For all his days are sufferings, and his business is vexation; even in the night his heart taketh no rest. This also is vanity.*

24. *There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink and let his soul enjoy (lit., look upon) good in his labour. This also I saw that it was from the hand of God.* 25. *For who can eat, and who can enjoy himself without His permission (lit., apart from Him)?* 26. *For to the man that is good in his sight He giveth wisdom and knowledge and joy; but to a sinner He giveth the travail to gather and to heap up, that he may leave (lit., give it) to him that is good in the sight of God. This also is vanity and a chasing of the wind.*

IN the previous section of this Book Qoheleth has described the various experiments by which he had tried to find satisfaction in earthly things. He has insisted, too, upon the fact that, whether engaged in the pursuit of pleasure or in more serious occupations, he had not acted from blind impulse or passionate caprice, but that his "wisdom remained with him." Yet after all, when he "turns" to reflect upon his wisdom and his labours, is there any real advantage in wisdom, or is labour of any lasting benefit? These two things, which might have seemed to ensure some permanence,—the wisdom which devises and the labour which executes grand schemes—have the same end as the

¹ Or, "That he should have rule over all my travail," &c.

heedless folly which pursues pleasure, and the pleasure which is itself so fleeting and so poor.

These are the two principal reflections of the section on which we are now entering. The first is, What is the worth of human wisdom? (Verses 12-17.) The second is, What is the worth of human labour? (Verses 18-23.) (1) Is that wisdom, he asks, of which I have been boasting, after all so precious? What does it do for its possessor? Is he the happier or the better for it? No doubt there is a difference between wisdom and folly great as the difference between light and darkness. He who possesses wisdom would be the last to deny it; but test it by the practical result. In the first place, wisdom does not save a man from "the changes and chances of this mortal life." He is swept from the scene, his purposes unmatured, his hopes never fulfilled, his whole life passed under the shadow of disappointment. What satisfaction will it *then* be, when he comes to the end of life, that his wisdom has been greater than that of other men? Is not rather the mockery more bitter? "So I said in my heart that this also is vanity." In the next place (Verse 16) he cannot have even the poor satisfaction of thinking that his memory will be cherished when he is gone. Here too he has no advantage over the fool. In the days to come all will be forgotten. Alas, the wise man and the fool must both die, and their memory will perish with them. This thought made life hateful to him.

(2) The other reflection was one suggested by the great works in which Qoheleth tells us he had been engaged. What was the use of all that outlay and all that effort? His splendid palaces, his parks and

gardens, the works of art with which they were embellished, the treasures he had accumulated, must pass into other hands. He must leave them to a successor who had not toiled for them, and who might be "a fool," and squander in a few days what it had cost him years of thought and labour to acquire. Therefore he hated all his labour (Verse 18), looked upon it with disgust, turned himself about (Verse 20) with a sense of despair, came to the conclusion that life was only a series of vexations and of restlessness leading to nothing (Verse 23): "This also is vanity." This is the end of his reflections. He hated life because there seemed to be no difference in the long run between the wise man and the fool; he hated all that magnificence with which he had surrounded himself, and in which, whilst he was employed in creating it, he had found so much satisfaction (Verse 10), because he could not tell what would become of it after he was gone.

How does he escape from this bitter mood? Verses 24-26 tell us. The best thing, seeing the impotency of all human effort, is to cease useless toil, to take the enjoyments that God gives us, remembering that they are *his gifts*. After all, God's providence orders all things wisely and righteously: men have according to their deserts; the good man receives at the hand of God not only wisdom and knowledge, but joy and happiness; and the sinner, even if prosperous for a time, leaves his wealth to the good man. This is the old faith, and, for a time at least, the Preacher can fall back upon it.

Such is a general view of the verses before us. I come now to examine the passage more in detail.

Verse 12.—The first clause of this verse is a repetition of Chapter i. Verse 17. Qoheleth had made this comparison before he began the experiments upon life recorded in the early verses of Chapter ii. He had found then that in much wisdom there was much grief (Chap. i. 18); he found now that, with all its excellence, wisdom was not more permanent than folly. How can any man in time to come have larger opportunities or better means of forming a judgment than I have on the relative worth of wisdom and folly? This is merely added parenthetically to give weight to the judgment which Qoheleth expresses. The first clause of Verse 12 is closely connected with Verse 13: "Then I turned to behold wisdom and folly, and I saw that wisdom excelleth folly," &c. ; literally, "hath the advantage of folly." (It is the word rendered "profit" in Chap. i. 3.)

I turned. The phrase occurs frequently, and indicates a new reflection, a new point of view. The parenthetic clause is capable of a different rendering, viz., "For what is the man (what kind of a man is he) who shall come after the king whom they made so long ago?" This is the rendering of Delitzsch, who says, "The king whom they made so long ago is Solomon, who has a richer experience, a more comprehensive knowledge the longer the time (viz., from the present time backwards) that he occupied the throne." But this addition, "whom they made so long ago," adds nothing to the force or point of the question, and it is far better to take the former clause as containing the question, and the latter as supplying the answer: "Even that which men have done long ago," and intimating that the course of the world is not

likely to furnish any new materials for a judgment on this question.

Verse 15.—"To what purpose is it, *then?*" *i.e.*, when death comes, and the grave closes upon us. This interpretation preserves the usual temporal meaning of the particle *ס*. On the other hand, Elster gives a logical force to it: "Then, *sc.* if notwithstanding the same event happeneth to the wise man and the fool." But the position of the particle in the sentence is against this view, as well as the fact that the logical conclusion is already introduced by the copula prefixed to the interrogative.

Verse 16.—As in Verse 12 there is a repetition of the thought in the first section (Chap. i. 17) respecting the comparative worth of wisdom and folly, so here there is a repetition of the complaint (Chap. i. 11) that the remembrance of men perishes with them, with this new circumstance of bitterness however, that wisdom is here as powerless as folly. Of course this is exaggeration. But a man in the mood of Qoheleth does not avoid exaggeration. The sentiment of the moment dominates him, and finds its expression accordingly. With a sigh he exclaims that the wise and the fool die alike, and are alike forgotten. The words are not a question and answer, as in the Authorized Version: "How dieth the wise man? Even as the fool." But rather, "How is it, how can it possibly be, that the wise man shall die as well as the fool," that the one no more than the other can escape the doom, the fate, "the inevitable hour"? It is a cry of sorrow, of expostulation wrung from him by a sense of the intolerable mystery of the world. If this is all, life is not worth living (Verse 17).

Verse 19.—*Wherein I have laboured and wherein I*

have been wise. This is not merely equivalent to "wherein I have laboured with wisdom" (as Elster). The repetition of the relative before the second verb shews that this is not one of those cases in which the two verbs are employed where we should employ one with the adverb. There lies an emphasis in the second. It is the fact of the "wisdom" which gives so much point to the miserable failure of the "labour."

Verse 20.—I turned about. This is a different verb from that in Verse 12, but it is doubtful whether they were used by the writer with any essential difference of meaning. The verb in that verse perhaps denotes rather the turning *to look at* an object, and hence it is frequently used in the sense of *looking* only. The verb in this verse expresses more generally the turning round, or the turning about, here, as is evident from what follows, with a sense of restlessness and dissatisfaction.

*Verse 21.—*It is no longer a question with Qoheleth whether his heir shall be a wise man or a fool: the mere fact that, with all his labour and all his wisdom and success, he must leave what it has cost him so much to acquire for another to enjoy, is "vanity and a great evil." It is the sense of the incompleteness of human life that weighs upon him. The word I have rendered "success" may mean either (1) diligence, activity; or (2) success as the result of these.

*Verses 22, 23.—*And then there is the old feeling how profitless it all is. Suffering and vexation are the sum of human existence; man knows no peace nor rest; "even in the night his heart taketh no rest;" and all for what?

Why are we weighed upon with heaviness
And utterly consumed with sharp distress ;
And make perpetual moan ;
Still from one sorrow to another thrown :
Nor ever fold our wings
And cease from wanderings,
Nor steep our brows in slumber's holy balm ?

The change of feeling in Verse 24 is remarkable. The old simple faith for a brief space reasserts its power. The conviction forces itself upon the dissatisfied *blasé* man of the world that the effort to shape and hew one's own destiny is futile ; that a cheerful resignation, a willingness to take what God gives and to conform to the rule of his Providence, which does in the main manifest itself in blessing the righteous and punishing the sinner, is after all the surest wisdom. This is the first indication in the Book of any belief in a moral government ; a belief, however, which from this point onward reasserts itself in the Book at various stages in the Writer's experience (*c.g.*, Chap. iii. 12, 13), till it finally vanquishes his doubts. In the earlier part of the Book we have a view of the world very much like that with which modern speculation is familiar—a world of laws and sequences, but with no direct recognition of a moral Governor. Here, on the contrary, a scheme of retribution according to human desert is acknowledged. It may be crude and imperfect, but it is at least more healthy than the pessimism which looks upon the world as a system of necessary evil, or the blind sensual resignation of men like Goethe and Heine, who say in effect, The scheme of things is a mystery that can neither be explained nor altered ; let us submit to the inevitable, and snatch all the enjoyment within our reach.

As this passage stands in the present Hebrew text, it is almost impossible to extract from it any consistent sense. Two alterations are necessary.

In *Verse* 24, according to the present text, we should have to render, "It is not good for a man that he should eat and drink," &c. [or, "It is not good among men that they should eat," &c.] This clearly is not what the writer intends to say. Hence the Vulgate reads the passage interrogatively, "Nonne melius est," &c., and this is defended by Hengstenberg, who refers to the use of the cognate form of the negative לֹא in 1 Samuel xxi. 9. But a question is very awkward here, especially in connection with the last clause of the Verse, "This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God." Another explanation of the existing text is, "It is no good (or, the good is not) *in the power of man* that he should eat and drink," &c. "Moreover this I saw was the gift of God." ¹

But both the Syriac and the Chaldee ² Versions insert "unless" before the verb, "unless that he should eat," &c.; and so Jerome: "Non est bonum homini *nisi quod* comedat," &c.; and this certainly gives the simplest and most satisfactory sense.

The other alteration, which is even more certainly necessary, is in *Verse* 25. Here the present text has :

¹ This is the rendering of Junius, M. Geier, Rosenmüller, Herzfeld, Philippsohn, &c.

² Prof. Taylor Lewis, indeed (in a Note to the American translation of Zöckler's Commentary), remarks that "this Version is of no authority, on account of its later date, and the paraphrastic absurdity of its Midrashin." This last circumstance, however, does not affect its testimony to a matter of fact like the reading of the text. The reading is referred to by Ibn Ezra and Rashi, though their own explanations are based on the existing text : it is also mentioned by Abul Walid, and involves only the dropping out of the letter נ , the previous word ending with the same letter.

"Who can eat, and who can enjoy himself *besides me*," or, "*apart from me?*" The sense which is sometimes given—as, for instance, in the Authorized Version, "Who can eat . . . *more than I?*"—cannot be extracted from the Hebrew,¹ nor, if it could be justified, would it cohere very well with the context. The words must then be connected with the former half of Verse 24: "There is nothing better than to eat and to drink . . . for who can thus enjoy himself more than I have done?" the appeal being thus made to his own experience as evidence that the power of enjoyment is God's gift. But it is more natural surely to connect this question, introduced as it is by the particle "for," with the latter clause of the verse which immediately precedes. Qoheleth had just said that the power to enjoy life comes from the hands of God. He now emphasizes that statement by asking, Who can enjoy life *apart from Him?* And then he goes on in the next verse to remark that God in his providence assigns to men their lot in accordance with their conduct, this being the received traditional theology which he does not now venture to question. Falling back on the old faith, he accepts it implicitly. The change involved here is the very slightest conceivable, being the substitution of a *for* for a *by*, such as is found in other cases, and which a few MSS. have here. This reading has the support of the LXX. (*παρὲξ αὐτοῦ*), the Syriac, and

¹ Ginsburg avoids this error. He keeps to the rendering "Except me," and follows Ibn Ezra, Rashi, and Rushbaur in explaining the passage thus: "Nothing is better for man than to enjoy his labours, for who except the labourer (lit., except me) has the first claim to do so?" This however, whilst it does no violence to Hebrew idiom, introduces a thought alien from the context.

The preposition *מִן* occurs only here in Biblical Hebrew, but is very common in Rabbinical writers. It is one of the missing links in this book connecting the earlier with the later Hebrew.

Jerome, and there can be little doubt that it is to be preferred. The verb which I have rendered "enjoy himself" means elsewhere "to hasten," and we might render here, "who can eat and who can hasten (there-to)?" But this the common sense of the verb is transferred to very eager violent emotion, as in Job xx. 2, "because of my eagerness," &c., the impulse that hurries me along. So here it is used of the animal passions, pleasures, &c. So Gesenius (*Thes.* s. v.): "Quis epulatus est, et quis *genio indulisit*?" The Vulgate, "quis *deliciis affluit*," gives the same interpretation.

Verse 26.—Qoheleth had complained bitterly of that scheme of things which ensured no permanence to human wisdom or human effort. Not only did the wise man and the fool perish together and leave their riches to others, but the chances were that the labours of the wise man would pass into the hands of the fool, who would squander all his treasures. Now he recognizes a principle of moral government. Wisdom and knowledge and joy are God's gifts to the good man. Might he not hope that he himself was acceptable to God, who had bestowed these gifts upon him? More than this, the treasures of the wicked were, in the order of God's providence, given to the righteous, and this at least was some consolation. But why does he still close his reflections, which have just taken a more cheerful cast, with the same melancholy refrain, "This also is vanity and a chasing after the wind?" *What* is vanity? Is it the order of things which he has just described (Verse 26)? Does he turn away even from the thought of a moral government as unsatisfactory? That is not perhaps an impossible application of the

refrain ; for the old difficulties return in the next chapter. Still, the belief in God's government is never wholly discarded ; and therefore it is more probable that vanity and a chasing after the wind are predicated even of that tranquil cheerful enjoyment of which he had spoken in Verse 24, as the best to which a rational creature could hope to attain. It was the *best* ; it was a comfort to feel that it was God's gift ; and yet even this best was, like everything else, unsatisfactory.

It is interesting to compare the tone of thought in the above passage with the tone of two other passages of the Old Testament, where the writers are dealing with the same facts of human experience. In the 49th Psalm the writer accepts the fact that wise men die as well as the fools and the brutish, and leave their riches to others ; but it does not weigh upon him as a thought of trouble or perplexity. He escapes from the sadness of such a spectacle into the joyful atmosphere of a personal hope : "God shall redeem my soul from the power of Sheol, for he shall take me to himself."

In the 127th Psalm the vanity of effort and toil to secure prosperity is as distinctly acknowledged as it is here, but in how different a spirit ! It is in the glad sense of a Divine protection resting upon and blessing those who dwell under its shadow. This Psalm, too, is ascribed to Solomon. Its moral, like the moral of the last verses of this chapter, is that human happiness does not depend on human efforts, but is God's gift ; but there is no dash of querulous humour, no complaint that the world is out of joint, no reaching resignation through conflict and weariness, no wail over

“the vanity” of human life, nothing but the serene expression of faith :—

It is vain for you, ye that rise up early, ye that late take rest,
That ye eat the bread of toil :
So He giveth his beloved sleep.

J. J. STEWART PEROWNE.

BEFORE THE FEAST OF THE PASSOVER:
A REPLY.

A WRITER in the June number of this Magazine proposes to reconcile John xiii. 1 ff. with the opinion that the Lord's Supper was instituted on the night following the 14th Nisan, *i.e.*, at the time when the Jews ate the Paschal Lamb, by supposing that “‘*before the feast of the Passover*’” means ‘before the seven days’ feast’ which succeeds to the Paschal sacrifice and supper.”

This supposition requires us to believe that the Paschal Supper was no part of the *Feast of the Passover*. For “*Before the feast of the passover*” in John xiii. 1 certainly means, Before the feast began. But is any one prepared to believe this? Certainly not until proof is given that the seven days’ feast is called, even in distinction from the Paschal Supper, *the feast of the passover*. But of this no shadow of proof is given in the paper before us. Indeed, in one passage quoted there from Josephus (*Ant.* iii. 10. 5), “The feast of unleavened bread succeeds that of the Passover,” we find the very words of John xiii. 1 used to distinguish the Paschal Supper from the days following.

On page 476 the writer admits that the night of the Supper “belonged to the 15th Nisan, the first day of the feast.” But immediately afterwards he writes as though the Supper belonged to the preceding day, the

14th Nisan : and then gives proofs that the 15th Nisan and following days were called, in distinction to the day before, "the feast." To give weight to these proofs he says (p. 480) that "on the 15th, in the morning, the seven days' feast began."

This last statement is not only given without proof, but is in direct contradiction to Exodus xii. 18, "*On the fourteenth day of the month at even ye shall eat unleavened bread, until the one and twentieth day of the month at even.*" This passage teaches plainly that the Paschal Supper was eaten during the seven days of unleavened bread. From it we also infer that the reckoning of days, at least for sacred purposes, began in the evening. And, if so, the lamb was slain at the close of the 14th Nisan, and was eaten at the beginning of the 15th Nisan. Hence the sacrifice of the Passover was on the former, the feast of the Passover was on the latter, of these days. And of the feast of the Passover, strictly so called, the seven days' feast of unleavened bread was an expansion. And this is all that is implied in the many quotations of the paper before us.

Mr. Lewin's suggestion (*Festi Sacri*, xxxiii.) that *Before the feast* refers to the time when the Supper was set on the table, rests upon the very doubtful reading, γενομένου, rejected by Dr. Westcott in the *Speaker's Commentary*, and a very doubtful rendering of it. The better reading and rendering is, *While supper was going on.*

I may point out in passing that the word "commencement" in Dr. Westcott's note on John xiii. 1 is either a misprint or an oversight. He means the evening following the 13th Nisan, twenty-four hours before the Jews' Paschal Supper.

In spite of Mr. Lewin's explanation of John xiii. 29,

Buy the things of which we have need for the feast, I must say that it is much more easy to reconcile these words with the supposition that the chief event of the feast had not yet begun, than to suppose that our Lord would request Judas to make purchases during the sacred festal hours of the great festal sabbath.

The writer of the paper I am venturing to discuss does not mention John xviii. 28, "*Might eat the pass-over.*" Had these words referred to the seven days' feast, of which the most important part had already taken place, I think that the present subjunctive rather than the aorist would have been used.

Nor does our writer refer to John xix. 14, 31, 42, where we learn that the bodies were removed from the cross because the day was *the preparation, the preparation of the passover*. This emphatic repetition implies clearly that to the Jews the day which followed was holier than that on which Christ was put to death. But the 15th Nisan was the holiest day in the year, the anniversary of the nation's miraculous birth. On whatsoever day of the week it fell, it was kept as, and was called, a sabbath. So Exodus xii. 16; Leviticus xxiii. 11, 15. Throughout Leviticus xxiii. the festal days of rest are called sabbaths. These festal sabbaths we, who are so familiar with the weekly sabbath, are apt to overlook. Now if Christ died on the 14th Nisan, and if, as all tradition asserts, the day following was a weekly sabbath, that sabbath would be indeed *great*, as being also the greatest festal sabbath. But if Christ died on the 15th Nisan, the day following, even if it were a weekly sabbath, would be a less solemn day than the day before it. Surely the greatest day in the Jewish calendar would not be spoken of, as in all the gospels, merely as a *preparation day*.

This argument is not weakened by Matthew xxvii. 62, where the great sabbath is spoken of as the day *after the preparation*. For this was written from a Christian point of view, in which the famous preparation day on which Christ died had far more importance than the great sabbath which followed it.

If now we put together the emphatic, because unexpected, specification of time in John xiii. 1, the desire of Christ's enemies to avoid defilement in order to eat the Passover, the mention three times of the day of Christ's death as a preparation day—and this as a reason for the removal of his body—and the remark that the day following was a great day, we cannot doubt that the writer of the fourth gospel, whom I firmly believe to be the beloved Apostle, meant to say that the Last Supper was eaten on the night (Exodus xii. 8) preceding the day (14th Nisan) on which the Paschal Lamb was slain. In this case *our passover was sacrificed, even Christ* (1 Corinthians v. 7), at the time when the Jews were offering the symbolic but now needless victim.

The custom of the early Church, referred to in the paper before us, supports this view. For it was admitted almost unanimously by the early Churches that Christ died on the 14th Nisan. But it was disputed whether the day of commemoration should be reckoned according to the day of the week or of the month.

I must acknowledge that in this short paper I have done nothing to solve the great difficulty connected with the question I have discussed. But I think that I have shewn that the solution is not to be found in the direction in which the writer before us seeks it.

JOSEPH AGAR BEET.

GRACE, PHILOLOGICALLY VIEWED.

THE word *grace* we got from the French. The French got it from the old Romans. And the Romans, along with all who spoke the Latin tongue, got it under the old, old parental roof, at that exceedingly remote period which preceded the migration both of Latins and Greeks from their common Oriental home north-east of the Holy Land.

The Greek form of the word is *χάρις*, connected with *χαίρω*, *I rejoice*. So that the word, in its etymology, means *that which gives joy and pleasure, that which is delightful*.¹

Hence it was, at a very early period of its career as a word, applied to *that which was beautiful*. Beauty is delightful. It gives delight. It is *grace*. A beautiful movement of the body is *graceful*. If a dress is beautiful in its fabric, and if it fits beautifully, it is *graceful*. The fertile Greek imagination constructed three distinct personifications of beauty, which obtained a prominent and interesting place in the mythology of the people. They were called *the Graces*. The echo of their idea continues, and we still speak of the *three Christian Graces*—faith, hope, charity, the greatest or most graceful of which is charity.

When our Queen or the Princess of Wales visits some private home, we sometimes say that the royal lady *graces* the home with her presence. She lends charm and beauty to it; and the charm and beauty occasion delight.

But both Greeks and Latins, as also the people who speak French and the people who speak English, were not slow to perceive that there is an inner as really as an outer beauty. There is beauty of character. There is beauty of moral deportment. There is beauty of moral feeling and acting; and this beauty is fitted to give great delight and joy. Hence the Greeks, Latins, French, and English were united in calling it *grace*. Kindness and loving-kindness is *grace*. It is really most *graceful*. It is the most beautiful possible ornament. Justice is admirable. It cannot be dispensed with. There would be an ineffaceable blemish in character were it erased or curtailed. Its presence lends dignity to character; and dignity is a species of grandeur; and grandeur is a species of beauty. Thus there is beauty in justice. But it is by a circuitous logical process that we find out "*the beauty of holiness*," and the corresponding

¹ The root-syllable in *χάρις* and *gratia* is identical. Had not *χαίρω* been preserved, the fundamental idea of the nouns would have been latent.

beauty that is inherent in the hatred of sin. But not so is it with kindness or loving-kindness. We instantaneously recognize the beauty of that peculiar manifestation of mind and heart. It charms us at once. It inspires us, on the spur of the moment, with delight and joy, especially when we find ourselves the objects of the loving-kindness. That loving-kindness is called *grace* just because it is peculiarly beautiful and delightful. It is the *grace* that belongs peculiarly to God; and its presence, as a prominent feature in his character, constitutes Him "the Lord ever *gracious*." It is the *grace* of which St. Paul speaks when he says, "The *grace* of God, that bringeth salvation to all men, hath appeared, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and devoutly in this present age of the world." God's favour is *grace*.

But man, too, as well as God, can be *gracious*. Our Queen is *gracious*. The Princess of Wales is *gracious*. It is their pleasure to be kind, lovingly kind; and their loving-kindness is delightful, and, because delightful, is *grace*: so that they are *gracious*. Even a very humble man can be *gracious*, or shew favour to his fellow-man. If his fellow-man has injured him so as to expose himself to punishment, the injured may show *grace* to the injurious, and thus be *gracious*. Such graciousness is most *graceful*, most delightful to contemplate. It is the reflection in man of the peculiar glory which is inherent in the character of God.

There is still another application of the word *grace*. We speak of *grace* before and after meals: at all events our fathers spoke freely in that manner. They said *grace* before and after taking food. It seems a somewhat strange application of the term. What is the meaning? It is this: *they said thanks*. They uttered *thanks* or *gratitude* to God, the great bountiful Provider and Benefactor. This *gratitude* was *grace*. How significant! With what charm it invests the idea of *gratitude*! Gratitude is *graceful*. Gratitude for loving-kindness manifested, or for favour received, as a token of loving-kindness, is as truly and really *graceful*, and *grace*, as is loving-kindness itself. In nothing is there greater deformity and unloveliness than in ingratitude. Hence both Greeks and Romans freely combined in calling gratitude *grace*. And thus, in the New Testament use of the word, we light upon a somewhat singular phenomenon. The word cannot always be rendered *grace* or *favour* when it is transferred to our English tongue, for it sometimes means *thanks*; and thus, as in *grace* before and after food, it denotes not what we now,

in our present English idiom, call *grace*, but that other manifestation of character which consists in a thankful appreciation of favour or benefit received. Remarkable as it may at first sight appear, it is nevertheless the case that the term which in the Bible is so often and so appropriately rendered *grace*, and which denotes *loving-kindness* or *favour*, is sometimes rendered *thank* or *thanks*. We read, for instance, "For if ye love them who love you, what *thank* have ye? for sinners also love those that love them. And if ye do good to them who do good to you, what *thank* have ye? for sinners also do even the same. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what *thank* have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners to receive as much again." We read in another part of the New Testament those glorious and glowing words of the Apostle St. Paul, "*Thanks* be unto God for his unspeakable gift." In these passages the term employed in the original is the identical term that is generally translated *grace*. In the sayings of our Saviour, as is evidenced by the parallel expression in St. Matthew, the word is tantamount in import to *reward*. What *thank* or *reward* do ye deserve? In the saying of the Apostle it simply means *thanks*; and *thanks* is expressed by this term *grace*, just because *thankfulness* is always, as a manifestation of character, a *grace*, *delightful* to God and to all other beings who are God-like.

JAMES MORISON.

NOTE TO "THE AUTHOR OF ECCLESIASTES."

IT is right that I should acknowledge my indebtedness for one of the main thoughts in the above article, the influence of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy traceable in the confessions of the Preacher, to one of the ablest of my predecessors in the treatment of the problems presented by that book. When the Commentary of which the article forms a part appears, it will be found that I have fully recognized my obligations in the sections which precede the Ideal Biography; but I feel that it is an act of justice to Mr. Thomas Tyler, the writer of whom I speak, that I should make this acknowledgment also in THE EXPOSITOR. If by so doing I lead any of the readers of my article to study his work on *Ecclesiastes* (Williams and Norgate, 1874), they will, I am sure, thank me for introducing them to a volume marked at once by original thought and by accurate scholarship.

E. H. PLUMPTRE.

THE OUTER AND THE INNER GLORY.

PSALM XIX. 7-9.

THERE is one respect in which the Jewish mind may be regarded as an union of the Eastern and Western intellect : it joins the depth of reflective thought with the enthusiasm of outward vision. The intelligence of the East is naturally introvertive ; it is more impressed with the problems of life than with the glories of the visible universe. The intelligence of the West is naturally perceptive ; where it is not affected by Orientalism it is more impressed with the glories of the visible universe than with the problems of human life. In Judaism we see the rare phenomenon of a well-adjusted balance between the external and the internal. On the one side, we behold an admiration of outward nature equalling in its intense enthusiasm the most ardent raptures of the Grecian mind ; on the other side, we are confronted by an intensity of moral scrutiny which even the Buddhist never attained. In Psalm xix. we have one of the most striking examples of this union of Eastern and Western proclivities. The Psalmist feels himself to be in the presence of two revelations—a glory of God coming from without and a glory of God radiating from within. He is first attracted by the external glory. He opens his eyes upon the world of Nature, and beholds it with a gaze of childlike joy. To him it is, at a first glance, the

personification of gladness. All things are messengers of the Divine glory. The heavens are telling the glory of the Lord; day communicates the message to day, and night to night. The sun is like a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man rejoices to run his course. The message of joy is widespread and catholic, presenting a striking contrast to the limited scope of Judaism; its voice has gone forth unto all the earth, and its words unto the end of the world. And yet, with all its catholicity and with all its widespread power, the eloquence of Nature is a silent eloquence: "There is no speech, and there is no language; their voice is not heard." The aspect of the outer universe, as it appears to the eye of the Psalmist, is that of an all-pervading, joyous, yet silently working power, uniting the lives of men in a common brotherhood; and, as we read his opening expressions of enthusiasm, we are fully prepared to find the keynote of his strain prolonged through the entire meditation.

But suddenly there is a hiatus in the song. The Singer seems to interrupt himself in the midst of his enthusiastic melody, as if a string of the harp were broken. At the very moment when he seems lost in the admiration of the world of Nature, he all at once breaks out into a strain which sounds like a revolt from the external: "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple; the statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes; the fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever; the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." Can we account for this seeming break in the harmony? Can we explain

the apparent abruptness in the transition of thought, and restore unity to the Psalmist's theme? If we call in the aid of something more than the canons of criticism, if we fall back upon the standpoint of intellectual sympathy, we shall find no difficulty in seeing that the unity has never been broken. For is it not evident that the seeming abruptness of the transition is in reality the result of a close continuity of thought? The Psalmist has been expatiating on the wonders of Nature; he has been revelling in the declaration of God's visible glory and in the traces of his creative power. Yet in the very midst of his exultation he feels that his mind is not filled. This calm beautiful Nature, where is "no speech and no language," is too silent to satisfy his soul. He feels somehow that its voice is not for him, that its sympathy is not for him, that he is receiving no answer to the communings of his heart. In the momentary reaction he turns his eye inward, and there opens to his sight a new world—the world of Conscience. He finds himself in the presence of another glory of God, another manifestation of the Infinite. All at once there breaks upon his mind the conviction that the second glory is strong just where the first glory seemed weak; that the world of Conscience supplies to a human soul the very elements which it lacks in the world of Nature, and that in supplying these elements it becomes the other side of the Divine revelation, the second half of the twofold Majesty. In the Divine revelation of Conscience he recognizes six points which he had failed to perceive in the Divine revelation of Nature; it is complete, definite, moral, unmixed, unchangeable, and ethically discriminative. Let us glance at each of these.

The first of the great silences which the Psalmist experiences in the world of Nature is its absence of all provision for *the conversion of the soul*. Its imperfection consists in the very majesty of its perfection; it is so perfect that it makes no provision for deficiency. In the rhythmic music of the starry firmament he hears no voice for man, no voice for any creature who is *outside* the rhythmic music. The possibility of an apostate world, the possibility of a disturbance in the order of things, seems to have found no expression in the plan of the physical creation. Everything is order, regularity, law—everything except the soul of the beholder. But the soul of the beholder is conscious in its profoundest depths of disorder, irregularity, lawlessness. It wants from the world of Nature a recognition of itself as a fallen being; and it would accept such a recognition in any form. It would hail even a rebuke, an expression of displeasure, a demonstration of physical anger; for it knows by experience that in the expression of anger there is at least an indication of interest. If the cloud would gather at the moment of moral delinquency, if the thunderstorm would burst above the head of the offender, if wind and tempest and hurricane would shake the spot where the evil deed was done, the soul would feel that there was a certain adaptation between its fallen self and the unfallen universe; it would experience in the roughness of rebuke a greater sense of sympathy than in the cold apathy of silent indifference. But for such recognition the soul looks in vain to the world of Nature: "There is no speech and there is no language; its voice is not heard." It neither praises nor blames; it neither weeps nor laughs; it neither applauds nor condemns the acts of struggling

humanity ; and, amidst all the speech which day utters unto day and night to night, there is no evidence that one word is spoken of interest in a fallen spirit.

But when the Psalmist turns his eye inward, he finds in the revelation of Conscience that which in Nature he sought in vain : " The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul." The perfection which he sees is the adaptation to a world of imperfection. He hears a voice speaking to his humility, to his nothingness, to his abasement. He is in communion with a revelation which recognizes him in his ruin, which speaks to him in his fallen majesty. True it is a rough voice uttering a stern command, speaking in an accent of strong rebuke ; but it is precisely this which endears it to his soul. It is not the placid tone of the indifferent universe, which seems to pass him by on the other side ; it is the stern speech of a wounded parent who, in the depth of offended love, cannot pass him by. We know that even while we write these words we are breathing into the passage before us something of a Christian atmosphere. We are conscious that we are reading the meditation of the Psalmist by a stronger light than he himself possessed—the light of the Son of Man. Yet if the Psalmist was not in a position to know the intense truth of his own words, he was under the influence of that Schoolmaster whose stern and rigorous training was the preparation for such knowledge. The law of Mount Sinai thundered in the ear of his conscience, " Thou shalt ; Thou shalt not ; This do and live ; The soul that sinneth it shall die ;" but the thunder was as dear to him as a still small voice. It was dear to him because it said to him in miniature what Christianity said in full—that the human soul is an object of interest

to the Life at the heart of the universe ; that the sin of the human soul is a wound to the heart of God ; that the redemption of a human soul is precious to the infinite Heart. Nature had no voice for imperfection ; the voice of Conscience was expressly designed for the fallen : " The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul."

2. The second great silence of Nature is that which arises out of its boundlessness ; it has no testimony for "the simple." There is a certain class of minds to whom the thought of an infinite universe is itself a source of Divine communion ; but these are not *simple* minds ; they belong for the most part to the speculative or mystical type. To the unlettered peasant the religion of Nature centres very much in the belief that it exists for the sake of man ; that the sun has no other object than to light him by day, and the moon no other mission than to guide him by night. And when Science breaks the spell, and shews him the incalculable periods of the past, he falls back in dismay. Such knowledge is too great for him, he cannot understand it. He wanders in the contemplation of infinite space and worlds without end. He trembles at the insignificance of his child-life, at the darkness of his own ignorance ; and his cry goes forth into the limitless expanse, " Is there no testimony for the simple ? " Judaism had reached a consciousness of Nature which might be called religiously scientific—the consciousness of a force whose manifestation was everywhere, but whose presence was everywhere inscrutable ; and the space which served as a veil to the Infinite Presence contributed powerfully to suggest the question : " What is man that thou art mindful of him ? "

But when the Psalmist turns his eye inward, he finds again in Conscience the desideratum of the physical universe. He hears a voice expressly addressed to that child-life which the scientific knowledge of the universe repels, and he indicates his newly found treasure in the joyful utterance: "The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple." It is a definite voice, a voice addressed to the child in the man, and therefore capable of being understood by all men. It speaks to the conscience in the prohibitory form in which law speaks to the child: "Thou shalt; Thou shalt not." It gives no reason for its command beyond the fact that it has commanded; it is what Kant grandly calls "the categorical imperative;" it speaks as the ultimate authority from which there can be no appeal. It is this which makes its testimony so sure, and which renders it so powerful in "making wise the simple." It realizes the fine image of the poet Cowper when he says that the words "Believe and live" are legible only by the light which radiates from them. The child-life is not perplexed by an effort to find the reason of the thing; this thing is itself the reason; it shines by its own light. And here, again, Christianity has simply intensified the Judaic sense of the child-like character of Conscience. It demands as a preliminary requisite that the soul shall go back to its primitive instinct of obedience. It declares that the very essence of conversion is the regress towards spiritual childhood, that the very entrance to the kingdom of heaven is the door of childlike faith. It points us back to the earliest testimonies of our nature, to the authority of those primitive intuitions whose voice was ever clear, whose arguments were ever unanswerable;

and it maintains that the only road to a certain knowledge of God is to follow the guidance of those Divine precepts which constituted the first revelation to the conscience of the child. The latest voice of Christianity prolongs the early voice of Judaism : " The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple."

3. The third silence of Nature which meets the ear of the Psalmist is the absence of the command, " You ought." If the physical universe stood alone, it would not constitute a *moral* revelation. Let a moral revelation once be given and it will find suggestions of itself in everything ; but if it be not already in the soul, physical nature will not put it there. Nature is a revelation of many things which are very nearly allied to morality : it is a revelation of the beautiful ; it is a revelation of the useful ; it is, in some sense, a revelation of the true. But while beauty, utility, and truth are all included in the conception of the moral consciousness, neither any of them singly nor all of them united would suffice to give that consciousness. A moral action is more than beautiful, more than useful, more than intellectually true ; it is *right*. The difference between right and wrong is fundamentally distinct from the difference between beauty and deformity, expediency and in expediency, intellectual truth and intellectual error. It cannot be described to any other sense than the moral consciousness, just as light cannot be described to any other sense than the eye. The physical universe cannot implant the moral idea in one who is not already in possession of that idea. Therefore it is that, according to the implication of the Psalmist, the physical universe cannot "rejoice the heart." If a heart is already joyful it can minister

to that joy ; but it cannot put joy into a sad heart ; it has no power to *make* glad. And it has no power for this reason, that it cannot say to the soul of its own sadness, " It is right ; " it cannot tell a man in the season of his calamity that his calamity is a moral ordinance designed to make him spiritually strong. It can tell him that the calamities of life are forces of Nature ; it may even promise him that they will be found to be in harmony with the symmetry of the universe : but it cannot say to him the one thing which alone can give him peace, that they are the will of God for his salvation.

But here, again, when the Psalmist turns his eye inwards, he finds the very object he desiderated in the physical universe---the sense of a moral Lawgiver who does all things wisely and well ; and he expresses his discovery in the words, " The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart." He finds in the voice of Conscience that personal comfort in calamity which he lacked in the voice of Nature---something which tells him to be still and know that the Judge of all the earth is right. It is not the mere testimony to a future symmetry of all things ; it is not the mere prophecy of a completed harmony which shall vindicate the minor chords of the universe : such testimonies speak beautifully in favour of the universe, but they say little in favour of man. If my individual life is to be begun, continued, and ended in sorrow, it is small comfort to me that the completed harmony of creation will make use of my discord. But when in the hour of my calamity I hear a voice saying, " This is right for *you* ; this is good for you as an individual man," I hear something which can *rejoice the heart*. I am no longer

forced to come out of my private sorrow to contemplate the eternal harmonies to which my groans are an unconscious and an unwilling contribution. I am allowed to look into my private sorrow itself and to see in it a Divine statute given to my soul, a species of sacramental bread administered to my spiritual being which is bitter in its appropriation, but certain in its promise of nourishment; and I am able with some appreciation to echo the Psalmist's words, "The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart."

4. The fourth silence which the Psalmist meets in Nature is implied in the words, "The commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes." The metaphor is perhaps that of pure water, in whose uninterrupted medium he can see himself reflected. He suggests that the revealing medium of Nature is not uninterrupted. It does not convey the impression of an unmixed revelation of love. It has its storms as well as its calms, its clouds as well as its sunshine, its thunders and earthquakes and fires as well as its still small voices. To-day it is all gentle, serene, placid; to-morrow its brow may be furrowed with wrath and its accents hoarse with anger. The Psalmist cannot see in Nature a pure reflection of his human wants. It adapts itself to his wants chiefly in those points in which he is allied to the beast of the field; meets him rather as a creature than as a human creature; fails to supply his needs the moment his needs rise above the level of the irrational creation. But when he enters the secret places of his own soul, he looks upon a pure water of life in which he sees himself reflected at full length. It is true there are

storms here also; nay, we are not sure that Schenkel is not right when he says that the very idea of Conscience implies a disturbance in the moral nature. But here lies the difference between the storms of Nature and the storms of Conscience: in the former my destiny is obscured, in the latter it is made manifest. In the moral tempest of the heart I see myself more clearly. I recognize in the very sense of struggle an adaptation to my deepest wants as a human being; for I find in the sense of struggle the prophetic intimation that this is not my rest, and I hear the ever-repeated command which was heard by the ancient patriarch, "Get thee out of thy country and from thy kindred." The struggles of Conscience are the soul's premonitions of an unfulfilled destiny; and the human portraiture bulks larger when reflected through the troubled waters: "The commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes."

5. The fifth silence of Nature is implied by the Psalmist in the words, "The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever." The metaphor here is probably that of the unblemished offering. Nothing which was unclean was allowed to have part in the life of the nation; nothing which had a blemish in it was suffered to ascend in sacrifice to the Fountain of Life. The unblemished sacrifice, whatever else it symbolized, was a symbol of immortality; it marked, as Keil says, the transition of the soul into a higher life; and it implied that such a transition could only be made by a soul emancipated from its uncleanness. What, then, is the bearing of this metaphor on the Psalmist's meditation? What does he mean by the implication that the revelation of God in physical Nature is a less

clean manifestation than the revelation of God in Conscience? He clearly means to suggest that the revelation of Nature does not convey to the mind the notion of immortality. It is not that the eye, as it looks upon the face of Nature, is impressed with its frailty and its perishableness; its silence on the subject of immortality would be equally profound although we knew, as a matter of fact, that Nature would endure for ever. For the silence lies here: even if the universe were everlasting, it would still be a contingent universe; it does not convey the impression of something which *must* be. We can imagine that it might have been created otherwise; we can conceive a time when it was not; we can think of a state of the human soul to whose consciousness it shall cease to appeal. It is always conceivable that a time might come when other systems might circle other suns, when the facts gathered by the astronomer might require to be rolled away like useless lumber, when the laws of gravitation and cohesion might be reversed by other laws. Such a transformation would be conceivable although Nature were known to be eternal; it would always be felt that its eternity lay in some force external to its own. What the spirit of man wants is something whose death is inconceivable, which not only *will* be, but *must* be, which cannot even in thought be associated with the idea of annihilation. It seeks what the Egyptians are supposed to have sought when they built those colossal pyramids—a sign of immortality, an emblem of eternity, an image of life that cannot die.

This is what the Egyptians failed to find in the pyramids; this is what the Psalmist failed to find in Nature. We do not say he expressed the want even to

his own mind in the precise form here indicated ; but he expresses the same want after the manner of his age and nation. Nature did not convey to him the idea of *divinity*, did not suggest to him the thought of a necessary existence, of a life whose very essence was incorruptible, of a world which must live in the very nature of things ; he missed in it the sign of immortality. But when he turned his eye inward, he was once more arrested by the very thing he wanted. In the commandment of Conscience he was confronted by the sign of immortality, and found that which even in thought he could not imagine not to be. It is impossible not to feel the force of what the Psalmist felt. The great German philosopher, at the distance of three millenniums, has not been ashamed to reproduce the same experience. We can, as we have said, imagine a time when other systems shall circle other suns, and other physical forces shall obey other laws. But we can never imagine a time, go where this spirit may, when the forces of the moral universe shall cease to be what they are. We can never conceive a period when right shall be anything but right, or wrong anything but wrong. We can never figure to ourselves a world where " malice and hatred and envy and all uncharitableness " shall be other than loathsome and repulsive, where integrity, uprightness, purity of heart, benevolence, " the love of love, the scorn of scorn, and the hate of hate " shall be other than things of beauty and joys for ever. In this world of Conscience the Psalmist finds the sign of immortality ; for he meets with that whose negation is inconceivable. Heaven and earth *might* pass away ; their existence hung upon a thread of contingency ; there was no reason in the nature



of things why they should not cease to be : but this Divine word of Conscience, this word spoken in the inner chamber of the soul, could not pass away ; once spoken, it must reverberate through all time. It was inconceivable that it should sink again into silence, impossible that it should give place to a contrary utterance ; for it carried the very stamp of an absolute morality : " The fear of the Lord was clean, enduring for ever."

6. We come now to the last of those silences which the Psalmist perceived in Nature ; it is implied in the words, " The judgments of the Lord are true, and righteous altogether." He means to suggest that in the contemplation of the physical universe he misses the idea of moral discrimination, of a judgment which rewards the soul according to its virtue or its sin. It is true there is ample evidence of judgment even here ; no law of Nature can be violated without exacting retribution, or served without repaying the service. But then the retribution and the payment take no account of moral character ; they are given simply for the special work omitted, and for the special work accomplished. The missionary may be the most pious of men, but if he goes to sea in a bad ship he will probably go to the bottom. The judgment is righteous so far as it goes ; Nature exacts respect to its laws of cohesion, and if a man disregards these, she punishes him. But what of the missionary zeal, what of the fervent piety, what of the enthusiasm for humanity, which has prompted the enterprise ? Has the judgment of Nature been in congruity with that ? We feel instinctively that it has not ; we feel that the judgment is only physically true, that the violated elements in

avenging their infringement have failed to appreciate the moral grandeur of the man's character. As long as we fix our eye exclusively on the physical universe, we are perpetually confronted by the same experience: "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good." Nature is morally impartial. No special sun-beam follows the upright; no special cloud tracks the course of the ungodly. The lightning does not dart from the sky to paralyze the hand of the murderer, nor does the thunder roll displeasure on the deed of crime. Yet our moral nature craves recognition; and recognition in some form it must have. It expects in its early stages to find it in the physical universe, and tries to see in life's sunshine and cloud the respective evidences of Divine favour and Divine aversion. But experience corrects the illusion, and shews that physical sunshine may illuminate the wicked at the very moment when physical clouds are hovering round the righteous. Baffled by external nature, the heart of man turns inward to seek a new source of recognition; and it finds it, with the Psalmist, in the voice of Conscience. Here it is confronted by a direct and immediate judgment upon its right and wrong—a judgment which speaks to it only as a moral being, and refuses to deal with any other sphere than that of actions. It is a judgment invisible to every eye save that of him for whom it is intended, a sentence inaudible to every ear save that of him to whom it speaks. A man basking in the outward sunshine may be under its cloud; a man wrapt in the outward cloud may be under its illumination. But however silent and however invisible is its operation, its force to him who experiences it is terribly real. The judgment of Conscience upon goodness is

the gift bequeathed by the Divine Founder of Christianity : "Peace I leave with you ; my peace I give unto you." The judgment of Conscience upon sin is the great unsatisfied longing, the perpetual unrest. Christianity alone can interpret the full meaning of the Psalmist's words : he gave utterance to a truth the deepest significance of which he did not and could not see. His peace of conscience was after all only so much less unrest ; it never attained to the positive calm. But, read in the light of Christianity, his words grow luminous with truth. Christianity has brought into the world a joy which the world knows not, a peace which, like its illustrious Giver, shines in an uncomprehending darkness. Into this invisible joy, into this uncomprehended peace, the pure soul enters and finds repose. He passes noiselessly into the paradise of God, and receives in the midst of the world that crown of which the world is unconscious. He obtains from the silent testimony of a reconciled Conscience that recognition of moral purity which the many voices of Nature fail to yield ; and in that recognition he reaches the supply of the last remaining want in the physical revelation : "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

GEORGE MATHESON.

NEW TESTAMENT WORDS DENOTING
"CARE."

I SHALL not, I think, be far wrong in assuming that the majority of commentators on the Sixth Chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel have sought to interpret the startling command, "Take no thought for the morrow," by confining the scope of *μεριμνάω* to anxious and

fretting care. Alford, for instance, attributes to the Authorized Version an exaggeration of the command; Professor Plumptre suggests the substitution of *over-careful* or *over-anxious*; Canon Farrar speaks of the *toilsome anxiety* which must not mar the earnestness of our service; Dr. Geikie makes *anxious thought* the burden of his paraphrase; and Dr. Morison contrasts the *curling*, "*left-hand*" care which the phrase forbids, with the *legitimate*, "*right-hand*" care which it allows. The range of the English rendering is usually limited in like manner, and its restriction is justified by parallels drawn from the literature of the time when our translation was made. We are reminded, for example, how Bishop Ridley said, "No person of any honesty, without *thinking*, could abide to hear the lie spoken by a most vile varlet;" or how Shakespeare summed up the powerlessness of Antony to foil the conspiracy for the assassination of Cæsar—

If he love Cæsar, all that he can do
Is to himself, *take thought*, and die for Cæsar.

Or, again, the phrase of Bacon is recalled, wherein he speaks of a man as "*dying of thought and anguish*" before his case was heard. All this is undeniably true, so far as it goes; but whether it be the whole truth—whether it be all that is pertinent to the passage under consideration—whether the original word and its English rendering be justifiably narrowed—are questions which cannot be decided without a study of *μεριμνάω* and the kindred New Testament words denoting "care."

First of all, then, does the history of *μεριμνάω* place the customary interpretation beyond the sphere of

doubt? The derivation of *μέριμνα* from *μερίζειν*, "to divide," and the consequent definition of it as "care that rends the mind asunder," are theories now, as a rule, surrendered. Like the *-mor* in the Latin *memoria*, it is, in modern philology, traced to an Indo-European root, *smar*, signifying *to remember*, and the parent of a family of words whose bond of union is *earnest thoughtfulness*. The power of reduplication to intensify the original notion of the simple root is retained (though already shewing signs of deterioration) in the Homeric *μερμηρίζειν*, which implies, not *memory*, but *carefulness*. When, however, Homer designs to express strongly, by means of this verb, any racking of the mind, he subjoins the adverb *δίχα* or *διάνδιχα*. Thus of Achilles, doubtful what to do in his wrath with the scornful Agamemnon, it is said : ¹

Achilles, stung in his shaggy breast,
This way and that inclined in doubt, considering which were best :²
 To draw the trenchant falchion, against his side that lay,
 And rout the warriors all around, and Atreïdes' self to slay ;
 Or calm his angry temper, and curb his own fierce mood.

And when, in the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, Xanthias, tired of watching his half-crazed master Philocleon, desires "to throw off his cares awhile" with a wink of sleep, the expression *σμικρὸν ἀπομερμηρίσαι* has the air of a popular phrase, and seems, like *μερμηρίζειν* in Homer, to call for a strengthening context before it can be safely referred to harassing anxiety. *Μέριμνα* is not a reduplicated, and therefore not a strengthened derivative from the original root ; and, in consequence, we must all the more carefully look to its setting before

¹ Homer, *Iliad* i. 188, foll.

² Merivale's somewhat diffuse rendering of *διάνδιχα μερμήριζεν*.

we can declare for the intensive signification. Guidance of this sort we continually light upon in the shape of surroundings that make the sense of *trouble* in the particular passage incontrovertible. Take, for instance, the saying of Menander: "To have a wife and to be the father of children brings to life *a multitude of cares* (μερίνας πόλλας)." Or take the ἀλγεινοτάτας μερίνας, the *passing bitter cares*, of which Antigone complains: ¹ or the ἀνήκεστα μεριμνήματα, the *cares incurable*, of Philoctetes.² Elsewhere similar tokens enable us to discern when this sense attaches to the verb. Apollodorus has a couplet to this effect: "To those who are *full of care* (μεριμνῶσι) and sore vexed (λυπομένοις), every night seems long." On the other hand, there are many passages in which the connotation of anxiety appears to be out of place. In Euripides' *Children of Heracles* (line 344), Demophon promises protection, in his absence, to the aged leader of the chorus: "There are those who shall *take thought* for thee (ἐξουσι μέριμναν), even if I be far away." In Sophocles' *Edipus the King* (line 1124), Oedipus asks the shepherd what his employment under King Laius had been—

ἔργον μεριμνῶν ποῖον ἢ βίον τίνα;

literally, "Caring for," *i.e.*, following, "what work or what manner of life?" Pindar describes the enthusiasm for athletic renown as κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν—"a care better than the care for riches;" and uses μέριμνα in more than one passage to denote "a pursuit after honourable things in general; the thought of glory, coupled with the wish to obtain it;" ³ award-

¹ Sophocles, *Antigone*, 858.

² Ibid. *Philoctetes*, 187.

³ Compare Donaldson's notes on *Olympian Odes*, i. 108, and ii. 54.

ing, in one of his odes, a "burst of song to conquering Aristocleides for having wedded his island to the renown of story by his glorious pursuit of honour (ἀγλααῖσι μερίμναις) in the games."¹ And Menander, in a fragment from the poem *Περὶ φιλοπονίας* ("On the Love of Labour"), says, "The wise declare that all things which men seek (τὰ ζητούμενα) call for care (μερίμνης) : " where the setting of the passage altogether precludes the notion of *carking* care.

While, then, there is no doubt that *μέριμνα* and *μεριμνάω* do frequently express anxious fretting, it is equally clear that though this may be the main, it is not the constant, sense ; and that the context alone can determine the exact force of the words. Our next business shall be to ascertain whether in the Septuagint and the New Testament we are in the same way thrown back upon the context as our court of appeal.

In the Septuagint Version the words are but seldom found ; and, strangely enough (if Trommius is to be trusted), in the three places where *μέριμνα* occurs, it appears to be either a mistranslation or the rendering of some reading now unknown. For instance, the original version of Proverbs xvii. 12, rendered in our Bibles, "Let a bear robbed of her whelps meet a man, rather than a fool in his folly," the Septuagint translates, "Care shall fall upon a prudent man, and fools shall imagine evil things." Again, in Psalm lv. 22, "Cast thy *burden* upon the Lord" (where the true translation, according to Gesenius, runs, "Cast upon the Lord *what he allots thee*"), the LXX. rendering is ἐπίρριψον τὴν μερίμνάν σου—"Cast thy *care* [upon the Lord]." But in the midst of these misconceptions, if

¹ Pindar, *Nemean Odes*, iii. 66.

misconceptions they were, the intention of the LXX. themselves is clear enough from the context; as when, in Job xi. 18, they translate the Hebrew for "Thou shalt look round and lie down in safety" by—"After care and thought (ἐκ μερίμνης καὶ φροντίδος), peace shall dawn upon thee." Here, as well as in the other passages above quoted, the connection of the LXX. suggests *anxiety* as the chief sense of *μέριμνα*. The substantive occurs six times in the Apocrypha, the meaning being now and then, quite unmistakably, *anxious* thought. When Antiochus "laid him down upon his bed and fell sick for grief," he said to his friends: "Sleep is gone from mine eyes, and my heart faileth" (literally, "I am fallen in at my heart") "for very *care*." ¹ With this we may compare the saying of the Son of Sirach: "Watching for riches consumeth the flesh, and the *care* thereof driveth away sleep," ² though possibly Meyer is right in declining to admit that *anxious* care is here the only care implied. But the *μέριμνα* of the potter at his work, alluded to in the same book (Chap. xxxviii. 29), is surely nothing more than industrious occupation—" [He] is alway carefully (ἐν μερίμνῃ) set at his work." The verb also is used, in the LXX. and in the Apocrypha, with a like dependence upon the context for the interpretation. Thus, while the thought of *apprehension* is obvious, both in the Hebrew and in the Greek (though hardly in the English), when the Psalmist says (Psa. xxxviii. 18), "I will be sorry" (according to the Hebrew, "solicitous about;" LXX., μεριμνήσω) "for my sin;" and while μεριμνάω is possibly a designed intensification of the Hebrew *asah* and *shaah* at Exodus v. 9—"Let

¹ 1 Maccabees vi. 10.

² Ecclesiasticus xxxiv. (xxxv.) 1.

the work be heavy upon the men" (LXX., *μεριμνάωσαν*, perhaps equivalent to "Let them be anxiously troubled about" it), "and let them not regard" (Hebrew, "glance at;" LXX., again, *μεριμνάωσαν*) "vain words"—yet, on the other hand, the care to which Baruch alludes (Chap. iii. 18), the care of those that "wrought in silver and were careful," is not at all of necessity *harassing*, any more than the care in thinking of God's goodness (*ἵνα σου τὴν ἀγαθότητα μεριμνῶμεν*), the fostering of which the *Wisdom of Solomon* (Chap. xii. 22) declares to have been Jehovah's object in scourging the enemies of Israel.

As to the New Testament, it cannot be with certainty affirmed that the substantive *μέριμνα* is used, in any place, exclusively or mainly of over-anxiety. The "care concerning this world,"¹ "the cares of this life,"² and other like expressions, do not call for more than ordinary worldly carefulness as a satisfactory interpretation. The notion of *anxiety* is no doubt present to the sensitive and sympathetic Paul when he appends to his catalogue of sufferings and labours "the *care* of all the churches." But the "rush of business" (*ἐπίστας*) of which the Apostle here speaks is something differing in kind as well as in degree³ from the perils recorded in the previous verses; and though the *μέριμνα* it entailed was naturally *trying*, it could not be fairly defined to be fretting, distracting over-carefulness.

What is true of the substantive is true likewise of the verb, though there are perhaps one or two places where *anxious thought* appears to be suggested, by the connection, as the *prominent* feature. In the passage,

¹ Matt. xiii. 22.

² Luke xxi. 34.

³ See Professor Plumptre's Note on 2 Cor. xi. 26, foll.

"Martha, Martha, thou art careful (μεριμνᾷς) and troubled (τυρβάζῃ) about many things," μεριμνᾷς may be explained, or it may only be supplemented, by τυρβάζῃ: by itself it may mean simply *busy*, or it may mean *anxiously* busy. On the whole, the probability is that τυρβάζῃ is a comment on μεριμνᾷς, and therefore decides the interpretation. When St. Luke, however (Chap. xii. 29), casts our Lord's command into the form, "And seek not (μὴ ζητεῖτε) what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, neither be ye of doubtful mind (μετεωρίζεσθε)," he does not place *anxiety* clearly before us; for μετεωρίζεσθε refers merely to the instability of the double-minded. More definite, in this direction, is the use found in the words, "He that is unmarried *careth* for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord,"¹ words which hardly allow us to set over-carefulness in the foreground. Throughout this paragraph there is no thought of contrast between care and excessive care, between providence and anxiety. The Apostle states distinctly (Verse 35) that he speaks this that they may attend upon the Lord "without distraction" (ἀπερισπάστως), that is, without attending upon the things of the world, without *any worldly care whatever*. Anxiety is, of course, *included* here, just as it is at Philippians iv. 6: "Be careful for *nothing*; but *in everything* by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God." Care of any kind is made the antithesis of confidence in Him; and this care includes anxiety, and more. Such distracting anxiety, however, seems to be scarcely even an undercurrent at 1 Corinthians xii. 25: "That the members should

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 32.

have the same care for one another ;” and at Philippians ii. 20, where Timothy is regarded as the only one who shall “care like a true son [of Paul]” for the state of the Philippian Church. And is it quite certain that the *προμεριμνᾶν* of Mark xiii. 11, and the *μεριμνᾶν* of two parallel passages, are intended to express more *anxiety* in “Take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak,” than the *προμελετᾶν* of the third parallel passage (Luke xxi. 14), “Settle it therefore in your hearts, not to meditate” (literally, “practise,” “rehearse”) “beforehand what ye shall answer ?”

This investigation into the classical and Hellenistic use of *μέριμνα* and *μεριμνάω* will, I am inclined to think, suggest the conclusion that, while the thought of carefulness and earnestness is always present, that of anxiety and “worry” is often overlaid ; and we may consequently affirm that the words are capable of expressing both ideas ; sometimes the one, sometimes the other, being in the foreground.

Let us next ascertain whether any of the New Testament words denoting *care* would have been as comprehensive for the Evangelist’s purpose, in “Take no thought for the morrow,” as *μεριμνάω*.

Φροντίζειν is rendered *to be careful* at Titus iii. 8, where alone it occurs in the New Testament : “This is a faithful saying, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in God might *be careful* to maintain good works.” Now, this is an intensive form of *φρονέω*, a verb likewise translated *to be careful* at Philippians iv. 10 : “At the last your care of me (*τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ φρονεῖν*) hath flourished again ; wherein ye were also careful (*ἐφρονεῖτε*), but ye lacked opportunity.” And there is an interesting

parallel to Philippians ii. 20—*γνησίως μεριμνήσει*, "shall care by instinct," or "as a true son"—at 2 Maccabees xiv. 8, where the ex-high priest Alcimus assures King Demetrius that he has an *instinctive care* (*γνησίως φρονῶν*) for the things touching the king. But *φρονέω* (derived from *φρήν*, usually *the seat of the mental faculties, the wits*) is, strictly speaking, *to use the mind*, and so *to think* or *feel* this or that, without any immediate notion of anxiety or providence. Thus Plato joins it with *εἰδέναι*, *to know*,¹ and with *νοεῖν*, *to perceive*;² and Demosthenes (319. 28) speaks of a man who says "what he does not think" (*ἃ μὴ φρονεῖ*). And the Biblical usage is akin to this. The *care* for which the Apostle thanks the Philippians was rather an *interest*, a "mindedness" towards him—not exactly a *care* either anxious or provident. Again, the *φρονεῖν τὰ ἡμῶν* of 1 Maccabees x. 20, "To take our part," runs side by side with the *οὐ φρονεῖς τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* ("Thou savourest not"—rather, *thou mindest not*—"the things that be of God") of Matthew xvi. 23. The "regardeth" of Romans xiv. 6—*ὁ φρονῶν τὴν ἡμέραν*, "He that regardeth the day,"—requires the same interpretation: "He that is *minded* about, hath a *thought* or *feeling* about the day." "Set your affections on things above" (Col. iii. 2) is *φρονεῖτε τὰ ἄνω*: that is, as Bishop Lightfoot explains it, "You must not only *seek* heaven, but *think* heaven"—you must be *heavenly-minded*. *Φρονέω* may, of course, slide into *μεριμνῶ*—the thinking may become, or may result from, the seeking and the caring—but there is a real line of demarcation. As for *φροντίζω*, it is a stronger form of this mental activity. It stands for the Hebrew which, at 1 Samuel ix. 5, is rendered into English by

¹ *Alcibiades*, i. 133 C.² *Philebus*, 11 B.

the same phrase as is used for *μεριμνάω* in the Authorized Version of St. Matthew and St. Luke: "Lest my father leave caring for the asses and *take thought* for us." To the same Hebrew word the LXX. assigned *μεριμνάω* in the verse, "I will be sorry for my sin:" and the substantive *φροντὶς* is (in a free translation, perhaps) joined with *μέριμνα* at Job xi. 18—a passage already referred to: "After care and *thought* (*φροντίδος*) peace shall dawn upon thee." In classical Greek also we have such conjunctions as *λυπῇ* with *φροντὶς*; as when, for example, Isocrates¹ laments the inglorious and impracticable wars which steep the statesman's fellow-countrymen in griefs and cares (*λύπας καὶ φροντίδας*). But this is distinctly the less usual meaning of the word; and when Pindar² urges his Muse to "wake the tuneful lyre and *take thought* for the contests [of athletes]," the context shows that the idea in *φροντὶς* is that of mental activity only. This sense appears to furnish the most intelligible translation of a line in Æschylus,³ where *φροντὶς* and *μέριμνα* are found together: "I am at a loss, bereft of thought (*φροντίδος*)," i.e., device, "whither to turn my resourceful care (*ἐνπάλαιμον μεριμναν*) when all is going to ruin." Here *φροντὶς* represents the conscious *mental operation* which suggests means whereby care (outward, in this place, rather than inward) may be taken to ward off danger and distress. The caricatures of Aristophanes founded on this word and its derivatives—his philosophic *φροντὶς*,⁴ his *φροντιστής* (the "subtle, hard-thinking student" of whom he made such fun that the poet Euripides was

¹ Ep. ii. 11.

² *Nemean Odes*, x. 22.

³ *Agamemnon* 1530, quoted in Schmidt's *Synonymik*, § 86.

⁴ *Ecclusiazusæ*, 572.

fain to avoid the unsavoury appellation and adopt *μεριμνητής* in its stead), his *φροτιστήριον*, or "students' thinking-shop"—all these have a bearing upon *mental activity* as distinguished from *care*. Accordingly the *φροτίζωσι* at Titus iii. 8 will be best referred to the mental process mainly, and not to any condition of anxious solicitude: indeed, as Calvin suggests, the Apostle may be delicately alluding to the empty fruitless speculations of philosophy "falsely so called." It is as if he said, "Let the practice of good works be the food of their mind's activity." The *μεριμνᾶν* of St. Matthew and St. Luke is more than this.

Passing by *σπουδή*, which, though here and there in the New Testament rendered by *care* and *carefulness*,¹ more properly denotes *urgent zeal, unslackened effort*; and also *προνοία*, which is translated *providence* and *provision*, and, as its derivation implies, is the mere application of the *perceptive faculty* to the future—a future often scarcely distinguishable from the present, as in Romans xii. 17, "*Provide* things honest in the sight of all men," and again in 1 Timothy v. 8, "If any *provide* not for his own . . . he hath denied the faith"—we come to a family of words whose root is connected, and not remotely, with that of *μέριμνα*; the group comprising *μέλει*, *ἐπιμελέομαι*, and *μελετάω*. These verbs betoken not the region of inward anxiety, as *μέριμνα*, or inward mental activity, as *φροντίς*, but the outward act of *attention* or *oversight*—possibly preceded by *μέριμνα* or *φροντίς*, or both, but not consciously associated with either. Thus we find both *ἐπιμελέομαι* and *φροντίζω* in Socrates' exhortation to his typical Athenian: "You are not ashamed to give attention (*ἐπιμελού-*

¹ 2 Cor. vii. 11, 12; viii. 16.

μηνος) to money, . . . but to good sense and truth and the soul . . . you give no attention (οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ), nor do you think about it (φροντίζεις)." Again, the providential care of the gods for good men is described by Menander as ἐπιμέλεια τῶν χρηστῶν—a phrase which reminds us how excellent is the choice of words at 1 Peter v. 7—a choice ignored by the Authorized Version—"Casting all your care (μέριμναν) upon him, for he careth (αὐτῷ μέλει) for you." Ἐπιμέλεια is used by Antiphanes of the farmer's attention to his crops; by Plato, of the husbandman's attention to the young plants; by Æschines, of the archon's care for orphans, which was much like that of our Lord Chancellor for wards in chancery. Hence it is chiefly the *outward expression* of care, taking the form of oversight, and often referring to special and definite duties. We meet with the same usage in the Bible. Among the acts of Simon Maccabæus, recorded on tables of brass, it is mentioned that "the Jews and priests were well pleased . . . that he should *take charge* (μέλοι αὐτῷ) of the sanctuary;"¹ moreover, that he visited the cities which were in the country—φροντίζων τῆς ἐπιμελείας αὐτῶν, "taking thought for the good-ordering of them."² King Antiochus also writes as follows concerning the Jews: "Our will is that they that are in our realm live quietly, that every one may *attend upon* (ἐπιμέλειαν γένεσθαι) his own affairs."³ "See that ye make a copy of these things," has for its opening word ἐπιμελεῖσθε.⁴ And the adjective ἐπιμελής, with its adverb ἐπιμελῶς, can be regarded only as milder forms of σπουδαῖος and σπουδαίως, and as implying external diligence in the

¹ 1 Maccabees xiv. 42.

² Ibid. xvi. 14.

³ 2 Maccabees xi. 23.

⁴ 1 Maccabees xi. 37.

performance of any task or duty. So the woman who had lost one piece of silver is said to have sought diligently (ἐπιμελῶς) till she found it.¹

Such passages in the New Testament as "Carest thou not that we perish?"² "Neither carest thou for any man;"³ "Dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to serve alone?"⁴ "The hireling careth not for the sheep;"⁵ "Not that he cared for the poor;"⁶ "Gallio cared for none of these things;"⁷ "Art thou called being a slave? care not for it;"⁸ "Doth God care for oxen?"⁹—all contain translations of the impersonal μέλει with the dative; the sense of which may perhaps be perceived by the help of the double meaning of our word *concern*; for example, if we translate, "Is it no concern of thine, dost thou hold it no business of thine, that we perish?" "The hireling regards the sheep as no concern of his;" "Not that he held the poor to be any concern of his,"—we shall see that the expression refers to *oversight*, the *outward* side of care. So also the compound ἐπιμελέομαι is employed to represent to us how the Good Samaritan enjoined upon the inn-keeper to *take care of* the outraged traveller;¹⁰ and how the presbyter who cannot rule his own house is declared unfit to *take care of* the Church of God.¹¹

Hence the substantive ἐπιμέλεια is justifiably rendered "refreshment," that is, the *result of attention*, in Acts xxvii. 3. "[Julius] gave [Paul] liberty to go unto his friends to obtain refreshment (ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν):" a usage which finds a parallel at Proverbs

¹ Luke xv. 8.

² Mark iv. 38.

³ Matt. xvii. 16.

⁴ Luke x. 40.

⁵ John x. 13.

⁶ Ibid. xii. 6.

⁷ Acts xviii. 17.

⁸ I Cor. vii. 21.

⁹ I Cor. ix. 9.

¹⁰ Luke x. 35.

¹¹ I Tim. iii. 5.

iii. 8 (LXX.): "Then shall there be health to thy body, and *refreshment* (ἐπιμέλεια) to thy bones:" and again at Chapter xxviii. 25: "He that trusteth in the Lord shall be *in good keeping* (ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ)." Μελετάω, the intensive or frequentative form from the same root, has already been referred to: it is never translated *care* in the New Testament, but is correctly confined to that *continuous attention* which takes the form of study, meditation, or practice. This, it is unnecessary to observe, is its classical signification; and Xenophon¹ exhibits most clearly the distinction between ἐπιμελέομαι and μελετάω when he relates how the King of Persia *took care* (ἐπιμελεῖται) that his subjects should have every opportunity of hunting, because he held hunting to be the best *practice* (μελέτη) for war. Akin to this "practice" is the Psalmist's *meditation* in the law of the Lord (Psa. i. 2)—that continual attention to and study of it which leads to perfect knowledge and obedience. In the verse, "My tongue shall speak of thy righteousness" (Psa. xxxv. 28), the Seventy have given us μελετήσει, "shall rehearse;" and by the same word they render the *mourning of the dove*, Isaiah xxxviii. 14—a rendering reproduced in the Vulgate by the corresponding Latin word *meditabor*—"meditabor ut columba." The application and repetition which μελετάω denotes will shew the inexpediency of the translation given by De Wette, Alford, and Conybeare for the first clause of 1 Timothy iv. 15: "Let these things *be thy care*." Rather is the ταῦτα μελέτα intended to convey the exhortation, "Practise, exercise thyself in, these things;" the Apostle continuing—"Be occupied in these things, that thy *progress* may be manifest to all."

¹ *Cyropædia*, i. 2, 10.

The net result of the preceding investigation is to suggest that while, of the whole family of these words, *μεριμνάω* is the only member that can present *anxiety* as the prominent idea, this idea is not always obvious, and not unfrequently appears to be forgotten. Accordingly, the context alone can determine whether *μεριμνάω* can claim only the narrower sense of the *inward smart* or of mere *intentness*, or whether we must assign to it the comprehensive sense which includes both. Let us now return to our Lord's command, "Take no thought for the morrow," and apply our conclusions. The whole atmosphere seems to give scope for the widest acceptation of *μεριμνάω*. The pervading thought of the Divine Fatherhood; the model prayer for the bread of the on-coming day; the injunction, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth;" the exhortation to singleness of eye, clenched by the illustration of the impossibility of serving two masters, of putting confidence in money and in God; the analogy from the gift of life, which comes to us apart from all thought or care,—from the fowls of the air, which in perfect resignation labour not for their livelihood,—and from the lilies of the field, which "toil not, neither do they spin;" the warning not to walk in the ways of the faithless heathen; the use of the neutral word *ζητοῦσι* ("seek") to describe their attitude of mind; and, finally (not to press the inference from the use of the same *μεριμνάω* with the personified *morrow*, "The morrow will take thought for itself"), the promise that, if our whole nature be preoccupied with *moral* effort, material supplies shall not be wanting—all these hints appear to furnish cumulative evidence in favour of the broadest conception of

"care," as not only *anxious* care, but *providence of every kind*.

Did Jesus, then, inculcate improvidence and sheer thoughtlessness in regard to earthly matters? In one sense He did, *at the time*. Jesus was, just now, the embodiment of "the kingdom of God and his righteousness;" and the search after the kingdom was, at this stage, identical with the following of Jesus. His aim, just now, was to form a body not of believers but of evangelists;¹ and, in the case of these, absolute disengagement was a prime necessity. Jesus, the first Evangelist, had forsaken his worldly work; his disciple evangelists, as they mustered round Him, forsook, one his nets, another his receipt of custom, to join Him who had "nowhere to lay his head." Earthly entanglement would have brought with it that *looking back* which would have unfitted them for putting their hands to the plough. In this sense the command, "Care not," was literal then, and in the same sense it is often literal still. "Doth God take care for oxen?"

But such an explanation is not enough: this word of Jesus was not for evangelists alone. Here also He might have added, as once He added elsewhere, "What I say unto you, I say unto all;" only He says it after his manner. He taught not as the scribes, with hesitating modifications and balancing inferences; but, with sweeping width, and bold startling paradox, He "placarded"² the truth before the eyes of his listeners. He who said, "Take no thought for the morrow," said likewise, "Judge not;" "Ask, and ye shall receive;" "Swear not at all;" "Resist not evil."

¹ See Godet on Luke xii. 22 foll.

² See Bishop Lightfoot's translation of *πρεγράφη* at Gal. iii. 1.

These are the penetrating "goads" of the orator and the poet, not the external exact demonstrations of the scientific man and the mathematician. Their gnomic form fits them to drive home a moral impression rather than to win an intellectual acceptance; it tends, at all events, to make the listener think—perhaps, after all, not the most insignificant among the effects produced by that Spirit which "giveth life," while "the letter killeth." Jesus is here, once more, the spokesman of the ideal. "You cannot work," says He, "both for the earthly and the heavenly; cast away then even the thought of things that perish in the using, and reach forward only to that which abideth for ever." And the principle is true still.

But I shall be told that I am accepting a principle altogether inapplicable to such men as we are; and that to "take no thought for the morrow," in any real sense, means the reduction of our complicated civilization to hopeless chaos. Put as I have put it, "it is a hard saying; who can hear it?" So, no doubt, thought the disciples themselves when first the word reached their ears; and so, no doubt, thought they, in still greater perplexity, afterwards, as churches of work-a-day people grouped round about them. But holding, as they did, their Master's sayings in loving reverence, and being withal earnest seekers after the truth of things, they, sooner or later, amid such mistakes as educate all serious learners, came to see that there was one way, and one only, whereby to bring the words of their Master into tune with the facts of that experience which it is not God's method to forestall; and this was, to gather all their aims, their occupations, their possessions, within the sphere of the kingdom of God and his

righteousness. Towards this issue did Jesus Himself lead them, partly by taking from what was earthly the drapery of his parables about the kingdom, partly by transfiguring the earthly with a ray of glory from the God who did not disdain to make Himself the surety thereof.¹ And this issue was followed up by teachers such as Paul, who chid the men of Thessalonica for leaving their daily labour, calling to their minds how he had told them aforetime that "if any would not work, neither should he eat;" who wrote to the slaves of Colosse, "Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men;" and who impressed upon the merchants of Corinth to be "buyers as though they possessed not." The evil spirit which lurks in the separation of sacred and secular, which for so many centuries possessed Christendom, and which is, even yet, far from wholly cast out, finds no authority in the teaching of the Apostle Paul. And though this *sacredness of work* is not expressly taught in these words of Christ, and had perhaps attained but a confined acceptance in the apostolic age, it is one of the beams of light which God has made to break forth in later days from his Holy Word, and, in these our times, to spread its brightness wider and wider. This is, without controversy, the message which Christ's command has to carry to our modern life: what was merely of time has passed away; what was essential and eternal has remained. Still is it the duty of the holy man to be *right at the moment*, and to leave the rest; for only by way of such holy recklessness can his foresight be redeemed. Human care, like humanity itself, must first lose itself that it may find itself. Only after an

¹ Compare Keim's *Jesus of Nazara*, vol. iii. p. 34.

ascent to the heaven of perfect confidence in God can care safely tread the earth once more. And as the world has grown older and the scope of work has widened, the disciples of Jesus have learned, in greater and greater fulness, to gather all their common life within the sphere of "the kingdom;" and so near as each has come to "bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ," so far has he progressed towards the goal at which even care for the things of the morrow becomes care for the "things of the Lord."¹

JOHN MASSIE.

*THE VALUE OF THE PATRISTIC WRITINGS FOR
THE CRITICISM AND EXEGESIS OF THE BIBLE.*

III.—EXEGESIS (*continued*).

So far as the definition of principles is concerned the story of patristic exegesis may be said to be now told. There were but two main streams of tendency in the early Church—the study of the letter in the school of Antioch, and allegory, of which the chief representative was Origen. Of each of these we have spoken, and to pursue them further in connection with every name which may be mentioned on the one side or on the other does not lie within the scope of these papers.² But three great personalities tower above the rest—

¹ Matt. vi. 34 (μεριμνᾷν εἰς τὴν αὔριον), and 1 Cor. vii. 32 (μεριμνᾷν τὰ τοῦ κυρίου).

² As the Antiochene school numbered in all but few members, it may be worth while to mention in passing the one who with Theodore, Chrysostom, and Theodoret seems to have possessed the characteristic merits of the school in the greatest measure. Severianus, bishop of Gabala, comes out in anything but an amiable light in the life of Chrysostom, whose friend at one time he was. Delitzsch, however (*Genesis*, p. 63), speaks of his Homilies on the Creation as "striking out bold ideas, often very happy, and throughout interesting and suggestive." Many fragments of his commentaries upon the New Testament have been preserved in Cramer's *Catena*. See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 225.

Chrysostom, Jerome, and Augustine. And though no one of the three gives such distinct and logical expression to a single principle as Origen and Theodore of Mopsuestia, their reputation stands, and has always stood, so high, and their merits are in different ways so conspicuous, that some account will be expected of them.

Chrysostom was a contemporary—indeed, a somewhat older contemporary—of Theodore. They both sate together as disciples at the feet of Diodorus of Tarsus, and the earliest works that we have from Chrysostom's pen are two touching letters addressed to his friend Theodore, who had fallen passionately in love with a girl named Hermione, and was tempted to renounce the ascetic life which he had begun to take up. With such a teacher and in such companionship Chrysostom could not fail to imbibe the Antiochene principles of interpretation, more especially as his own natural clear-sightedness and good sense predisposed him to them. He did not, however, carry them as far as his fellow pupil. Though Theodore, like Chrysostom, had for a great part of his life the cares of a diocese, and though he too not seldom introduces practical matter in his commentaries, still the practical element did not predominate as it did with Chrysostom. The purely intellectual bent in Theodore was more pronounced; his boldness and tenacity of character were greater; and it is therefore not to be wondered at if his logic was more rigorous and his views more uncompromising.

Naturally it is in dealing with the Old Testament that the divergence between the two friends is most perceptible. There is, indeed, a general agreement. Chrysostom too lays the main stress on the literal and

historical sense of the Old Testament as well as of the New. He does not altogether exclude allegory, but he admits it only sparingly, and as a rule more with the license of the preacher than as strict exegesis. The following, for instance, clearly expresses his own standpoint. Speaking of the words (Isa. i. 22) "thy silver is become dross, thy wine mixed with water," "some," he says, "understanding the marvellous wisdom of God have taken this passage anagogically. For it is urged that the great and sublime Isaiah would not have spoken of usurers of villany and traders of destruction. But it is said that silver here means the 'oracles of God,' and that wine means 'teaching.' . . . For my part I do not disparage (ἀτιμάζω) this explanation, but at the same time I should say that the other is nearer the truth" (ἀληθεστέραν).¹ Types Chrysostom admits more freely; but the doctrine of types, as we saw, is peculiarly Antiochene. It is, however, doubtful whether Theodore would have gone quite so far as this: "The Church is the ark, Noah is Christ, the door is the Holy Ghost, the olive leaf is the kindness of God towards men" (ἡ φιλανθρωπία τοῦ θεοῦ).² But it is in the more characteristic tenets of Theodore—as to the distinction between the two Testaments and as to the nature of prophecy—that the Antiochene system received the greatest modification at the hands of Chrysostom. Here again there is a certain approximation. Chrysostom allows that there was a "condescension" (συγκατάβασις) to human infirmity in the language used under the older dispensation. To this were to be set down anthropopathic expressions such

¹ Foerster, *Chrysostomus in seinem Verhältniss zur antiochenischen Schule*, p. 21.

² Ibid. p. 23, n.

as "the anger," or "the wrath," of God. They were adapted to the dulness of the hearer's understanding—"just as in conversing with barbarians we make use of their own tongue."¹ Chrysostom has also caught the principle which underlies the Sermon on the Mount. He sees that the precept, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," &c., cuts at the root of the vice of which the sixth commandment prohibits the overt expression. In such points there is a recognition of development in the New Testament as compared with the Old. But Chrysostom is much less careful than Theodore in admitting allusions to the Trinity and to detailed facts in the New Testament history. In the Homilies against the Jews, for instance, "such passages as *Their sound is gone out unto all lands, That thou mayest make princes in all lands*, are cited as if exclusively predictive of the propagation of Christianity. In such words as *The virgins that be her fellows shall bear her company*, he sees a distinct foreshadowing of the honour to be paid to virginity under Christianity. In other passages, again, he is misled by ignorance of the Hebrew, and a too literal adherence to the Septuagint translation. In the passage, *I will make thy officers peace*, thine 'extractors' being rendered in the Septuagint bishops or overseers, he extracts from this word a direct reference to the Christian priesthood. *He shall descend like rain into a fleece of wool* is interpreted as significant of the extreme secrecy of Christ's birth, and the noiseless gentleness with which his kingdom was founded."² The prophecies are pressed even into the prediction of minute details. "So great was the accuracy of the

¹ Foerster, *Chrysostomus*, &c., p. 36.

² Stephens, *Life of Saint Chrysostom*, p. 125.

Prophets that they omit none of these things, but foretell his very journeyings and changes of place, and the intent with which he acted therein ; that thou mightest learn how they spake all by the Spirit." The Trinitarian dogma is found in such passages as Genesis i. 26, " Let us make man in our image ;" Genesis xi. 7, " Let us go down and there confound their language ;" Genesis xix. 24, " Then the Lord rained . . . brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven ;" Isaiah vi. 3, " Holy, holy, holy," &c ;¹ in this doing no more than many a modern divine, and with more excuse.

It is not in the direction of a scientific apprehension of principles that the chief excellence of Chrysostom as a commentator on the Old Testament scriptures is to be sought, but rather in his power of giving to them a practical application. His commentaries were at the same time sermons, and sermons of the most telling kind. " No other of the Fathers is at all comparable to him in the skill with which, while keeping as closely as possible to the literal sense of the Old Testament, he yet extracts from it a wealth of real edification. It is the combination of these two sides which secures for him a permanent importance in the history of Old Testament interpretation. This is, however, rather the result of feeling and of the school to which he belonged than of deliberate choice and conscious penetration. He cared less ' to understand all mysteries ' than to produce holiness of life, and so he came to conceive of the Scriptures rather as the supreme guide of conduct than as the source of knowledge, and was content to take the Old Testament as he found it." ² As to the worth of the particular

¹ See Foerster, *Chrysostomus*, &c., p. 27. ² Diestel, *Gesch. d. A. T.* p. 135.

commentaries critics do not seem to be quite agreed. The principal are sixty-seven Homilies upon Genesis, Homilies on fifty-eight of the Psalms, and Homilies on Isaiah, of which eight chapters have come down to us. The first of these Diestel¹ describes as excellent (*ausgezeichneten*); whereas to Delitzsch² they contributed little of value. Of the Homilies on the Psalms the latter says that "Photius and Suidas placed it in the highest rank among the works of Chrysostom: they are composed in the form of sermons, the style brilliant, the matter ethical rather than dogmatic; sometimes the Hebrew text is quoted from Origen's Hexapla, the divergent Greek translations are frequently compared, but unfortunately without names. Of the grammatical and historical method for which the school of Antioch was famous there is here little trace." ³

However it may have been in ancient times, in modern Chrysostom is no doubt known best by his works on the New Testament. Here all his powers had full play, and the combination just noticed of close literal exegesis with pointed and eloquent exhortation is especially remarkable. It was from Chrysostom and Augustine that the Dean of St. Paul's drew most of the features in that sketch of the characteristics of patristic exposition with which this section of our subject was prefaced. We do not need to turn over many pages to see how true those features are. Here is the opening of the Homilies upon Romans: "As I keep hearing the Epistles of the blessed Paul read, and that twice every week, and often three or four times, whenever we are celebrating the memorials of the holy

¹ Diestel. *Gesch. d. A. T.* p. 135.

² *Genesis*, p. 63.

³ *Psalmen*, p. 38.

martyrs, gladly do I enjoy the spiritual trumpet, and get roused and warmed with desire at recognizing the voice so dear to me, and seem to fancy him all but present to my sight, and to behold him conversing with me. But I grieve and am pained that all people do not know the man as much as they ought to know him; but some are so far ignorant of him as not even to know for certainty the number of his Epistles. And this comes not of incapacity, but of their not having the will to be continually conversing with this blessed man. For it is not through any natural readiness and sharpness of wit that even I am acquainted with as much as I do know, if I do know anything, but owing to a continual cleaving to the man, and an earnest affection towards him. For what belongs to men beloved, they who love them know above all others; inasmuch as they have them in their thoughts. And thus also the blessed Apostle shews in what he said to the Philippians: *Even as it is meet for me to think this of you all, because I have you in my heart, in my bonds and in the defence and confirmation of the gospel.* And so ye also, if ye be willing to apply to the reading of him with a ready mind will need no other aid. For the word of Christ is true which saith, *Seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you.*"¹

A passage like this clearly contains the key to Chrysostom's greatness as a commentator. What Wordsworth says about the way to understand a poet applies to the understanding of other writers as well—

. . . you must love him, ere to you
He will seem worthy of your love.

¹ The quotations from the Homilies in this paper are for the most part taken, with some slight alterations, from the Oxford *Library of the Fathers*.

It was in this spirit that Chrysostom approached the New Testament scriptures—not merely with reverence and a profound sense of their importance and value, but with ardent personal affection and admiration. In some respects the very divinity which “hedges” in the Bible, and shuts it off from common books, has acted prejudicially to it. It is regarded as a code of laws, a repository of dogmas, which, though divine, still are remote and cold. The intense and tingling life which runs through every fibre in the organism of Scripture, its close and constant contact with humanity, is lost sight of. And where an effort is made to break through the trammels of conventionality and penetrate to this, it is too often by way of reaction, and the ark of the Lord is touched by rash and irreverent hands. Chrysostom lived at a time when there was much less danger of falling into either of these two extremes. His attitude is reverent and yet perfectly simple and unaffected. It may truly be said of him that he regards “passages of Scripture as we do the language that meets us with power and interest from real and present life.” After such an introduction as that which has just been quoted to the writings of St. Paul, we see that he could not do otherwise. He approaches them not coldly, but

. . . ingenti perculsus amore,

and the flame of this enthusiasm burns in him while he speaks.

And yet Chrysostom had a large share of the critical faculty. His quick intelligence, his clearness of apprehension, his unfailing good sense and sobriety of judgment, are not unworthy of the name. We have an example of Chrysostom’s treatment of critical topics

in the passage which forms the continuation of that just quoted. After a few more words of preface, he goes on to take a rapid survey of St. Paul's Epistles, assigning to each its proper place. It is a mistake, he says, to suppose that the Epistle to the Romans was written first. The two Epistles to the Corinthians were written before it, for in them the Apostle speaks of a possibility that he may go up to Jerusalem with money collected for the poor Christians of the mother Church. When he wrote to the Corinthians this intention was still uncertain; when he wrote to the Romans it was decided and apparently near at hand. A similar allusion to the collection of alms shews that the Epistles to the Corinthians come after those to the Thessalonians. Galatians, Chrysostom thinks, also preceded Romans. But the latter is before the Epistles that were written from Rome, such as the Philippians, which contains a salutation "from Cæsar's household," and the Hebrews, in which greeting is sent from "them of Italy." The latest of all the Epistles, the Second to Timothy, was also written from Rome. In this the Apostle speaks of his approaching end. In like manner in the letter to Philemon he describes himself as "Paul the aged." The mention of Onesimus along with Archippus is proof that Colossians and Philemon were written about the same time. The order in which the Epistles usually came determined no more than it did in the case of the Minor Prophets, where considerable intervals of time were disregarded.

Nor was it to be thought that an inquiry such as this into the dates and succession of the Epistles was a piece of superfluous curiosity. On the contrary, it often served to throw light upon the subject of the

Epistle. Thus in the Romans and the Colossians the Apostle touched upon a similar topic, the distinction of meats ; but in the one case mildly (Rom. xiv. 1), in the other with greater boldness of speech (Col. ii. 16-23). The cause of this was to be sought in the different date at which the two Epistles were written, just as a physician treats the first stages of a disease differently from advanced convalescence, or as a teacher treats young children differently from those who are older.

In observing this difference in tone between the Epistles to the Romans and the Colossians, Chrysostom makes a point which had escaped the attention of Theodore. In his general views as to the sequence and date of the Pauline Epistles he and Theodore resemble each other, and Chrysostom is the less faulty of the two. He is not only for the most part right in his conclusions, but the indications on which he relies are well selected. It is, however, curious that the phrase "they of Italy" (οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας) should be singled out as proof that the Epistle to the Hebrews was written from Rome. Some modern scholars (notably Bleek) have maintained the direct opposite of this, arguing that the phrase denotes persons who, though once inhabitants of Italy, were so no longer, *i.e.*, an Italian colony in some city such as Alexandria or Ephesus. And this is at least the *primâ facie* view of the case. Greek usage will indeed defend Chrysostom's interpretation—and we have in this an instance of the value of the Greek Fathers from the knowledge which they possessed of their own mother tongue—but at the same time it certainly cannot be pressed to the exclusion of the other possibility.

Of the historical and critical questions which fill so

large a place in modern commentaries Chrysostom does not say much, and what little he does say is of no great value. He sees—or at least notices—no difficulty in the mention of Theudas and Judas of Galilee (Acts v. 36, 37). The names of Felix and Festus lead him into no historical digression. In regard to the Egyptian of Acts xxi. 38 he is content to say that he was “a cheat and impostor.” The hearing of St. Paul before King Agrippa only draws from him the remark that this is a “different Agrippa, after him of James’s time, so that this is the fourth Herod.” In the Homilies on St. Matthew he mentions three different accounts that were given of “Zacharias the son of Barachias,” who was slain between the temple and the altar: “Some say” [*e.g.*, Origen, Basil, and other Fathers] “that he was the father of John; some the prophet; some a priest with two different names, whom the Scripture also called the son of Jehoiada.” He will not admit that the “true yokefellow” of Philippians iv. 3 means the wife of St. Paul—an ancient fancy revived in modern times by M. Renan.¹ He leaves it an open question whether the word translated “yokefellow” (*syzygus*) may not be a proper name. It is not surprising if, with Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret, Chrysostom also took the word “prætorium” in Philippians i. 13 in the sense of palace, asserting that this was the older usage, though no clear example of this sense of the word can be adduced.² The argument for the identity of “bishops” with “presbyters,” in the opening salutation of the same Epistle, Chrysostom states with even more fulness and

¹ *Saint Paul*, p. 148.

² See Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 98.

vivacity than the two Antiochene commentators just named.

There is, however, one instance where Chrysostom has fallen into an extraordinary blunder. The Homilies on the Acts are said to be among his "feeblest works,"¹ and, whether or not this verdict is justified as a whole, in one place at least his good genius certainly forsook him. The allusion of St. James to the previous speech of St. Peter in the debates at the Council of Jerusalem, "Symeon hath declared how God at the first did visit the Gentiles," &c., Chrysostom takes as if it referred to the prophetic language of the aged Symeon in Luke ii. 25, 32, "A light to lighten the Gentiles!"² The substitution of "Symeon" for the more ordinary "Simon" has quite bewildered him.

It is not, however, in this department of exegesis that the excellence of Chrysostom would naturally be

¹ "The fifty-five homilies on the Acts are among Chrysostom's feeblest works. The style is inelegant, the language unrefined, and the line of interpretation jejune' (Photius, cod. 174). 'Multa plumbea' is Savile's verdict, while that of Erasmus is harsher still, 'Ebrius et stertens scriberem meliora'" (Canon Venables, in *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, i. p. 533). Against this, however, should be set a very different estimate by the editor of the *Speaker's Commentary*: "Among the ancients Chrysostom stands predominant in this as in all other departments of Biblical exegesis. The Homilies on the Acts belong to the later part of his life; they were delivered in the third year of his episcopate at Constantinople, and, like other productions of that period, are less distinguished for vigour and eloquence than those of earlier years; but they present the same combination of a devout and reverential spirit with keen discernment, sound judgment, and a genuine historical instinct, which preserves him from grave errors into which some considerable scholars of our own time have been betrayed" (*N. T.* ii. p. 347).

² I have followed here the carefully revised text used by the Oxford editors. In the Benedictine text (which is based for the most part on a single MS. of the tenth century, and does not agree with the early quotations) the passage reads quite differently: "Some say that this is he who is mentioned by St. Luke; others that he is some other person of the same name. But whether it be the one person or the other is a point about which there is no need to be particular; but only to receive as necessary the things which the person declared." If this were the true text (which it pretty certainly is not, though there may be a doubt as to the alternative for it), it would only bring out still more clearly the indifference of the commentator to historical precision.

sought. He is too late to contribute traditions of much value, and the age to which he belonged cared little for historical or antiquarian illustration. Chrysostom probably represents the best type of grammatical scholarship among the Fathers. Bishop Ellicott entertains for him "often as a scholar, always as an exegete, the greatest respect and admiration."¹ Bishop Lightfoot describes his Homilies on Galatians as "an eloquent popular exposition, based on fine scholarship."² The modern reader will be surprised to find how carefully and frequently the rules with which he is himself familiar are applied by this ancient writer, whose habitual use of the language in which the New Testament was written might be supposed to be a drawback rather than an advantage to the conscious analysis of its structure. Thus on John xii. 39 ("They could not believe, because Isaiah said," &c.) he notes that the use of ὅτι is "not causal but ecbatic" (οὐχὶ αἰτιολογίας ἀλλ' ἐκβάσεως): "it was not because Isaiah spake that they believed not, but because they were not about to believe that he spake." On 2 Corinthians iii. 17, Chrysostom has an elaborate argument turning on the presence or the absence of the article with the predicate: "Since some maintain that the expression *when one shall have turned to the Lord* is spoken of the Son, in contradiction to what is quite acknowledged, let us examine the point more accurately, having first stated the ground on which they think to establish this. What, then, is this? Like, saith one, as it is said, *God is a Spirit*; so also here, 'The Lord is a Spirit.' But he did not say, 'The Lord is a Spirit,' but *The Spirit is that (the) Lord*. And there is a great dif-

¹ *Galatians*, p. xxvii.

² *Ibid.* p. 225.

ference between this construction and that. For when he is desirous of speaking so as you say, he does not join the article to the predicate (τῷ ἐπιθέτῳ ἄρθρον οὐ ποστίθουσιν)." Chrysostom can hardly be right in making τὸ πνεῦμα the subject here, but he is perfectly justified in the distinction which he draws as to the use of the article. The Apostle says not "The Lord is *a* Spirit," but "The Lord is *the* Spirit;" in other words, the relation of union or fellowship into which the believer enters with Christ is at the same time a relation of fellowship with the Holy Ghost. These two passages are especially interesting because of the technical terms of grammar introduced into them, showing that Chrysostom had made a definite study of this subject. Less direct indications of his accuracy as a grammarian meet us constantly.

In his definitions and explanations of words Chrysostom is always clear, often happy, and generally sound. Thus on Galatians i. 18 he remarks that the word ἱστορῆσαι ("to see Peter") is the word specially used by those who "make acquaintance with great and illustrious cities;" on Galatians iv. 5, "that we might receive the adoption of sons," he notes that ἀπολάβωμεν means to receive that which is destined for one, or "which is one's due;" on the combined phrase "bite and devour" in Galatians v. 15 he has a good comment: "he does not say merely, *ye bite*, which one might do in a passion, but also *ye devour*, which implies persistent malice; to bite is to satisfy the feeling of anger, but to devour is a proof of the most savage ferocity." Here again is his note on ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι in Ephesians i. 10: "What is the meaning of this word *brought under one head*? It is *to knit together*."

Let us, however, endeavour to get near the exact import. With ourselves, then, in common conversation, the word means the summing into a brief compass things spoken at length, the concise account of matters described in detail. And it has this meaning. For Christ hath gathered up in Himself the dispensations carried on through a lengthened period, that is to say, He hath cut them short." In commenting on Ephesians ii. 18 he emphasizes an important distinction which is lost sight of in the Authorized Version: "On this account it is that when he speaks of our having access, he does not use the word which means our coming to God (*πρόσϋδον*), but which implies God's bringing us to Himself (*προσαγωγὴν*), for we came not of ourselves, but it was He that brought us."

Examples like these might very readily be multiplied. Here Chrysostom is upon his strong ground. His mind is eminently clear, intelligent, highly-trained. He is quick in seizing an idea, apt in giving it expression, bright and vivid in impressing it upon his hearers. His own intense desire of personal holiness gives him a never failing eloquence on this theme. It is upon the profound doctrinal side of Christian teaching that he is most disappointing. Dr. Westcott remarks¹ upon his Homilies on St. John that "the reader will probably miss the signs of a spontaneous sympathy with the more mysterious aspects of the Gospel." Instances of this may be found not only in the deeper parts of St. John's Gospel, but also in passages like

¹ *Speaker's Commentary*, N. T. ii. p. xcv. It may be noted in reference to this that Neander (*Der heilige Johannes Chrysostomus*, p. 6), speaks of Chrysostom as possessing in large measure "a Johannean element," while Augustine rather represents the spirit of St. Paul. I suspect that the affinity is more clearly marked in the latter case than in the former.

Romans iii. 21-26, the keystone of St. Paul's teaching, where Chrysostom's exposition is thin and superficial. Chrysostom was strictly orthodox; and yet though even Augustine himself defended him from the charge of Pelagianism, he had certainly leanings in that direction. His continual exhortations to holiness of life assumed in man a power of self-reformation. He believed that the Fall had only weakened the impulse towards good in human nature, not that it was radically infected with evil. And hence he was hopeful as to the result of efforts after a higher life, even though those efforts did not claim to rest entirely upon the Divine aid and prompting. In fact, it may be said that Chrysostom's conception of the relation of the human soul to the work of grace represented a simple *primâ facie* view in which the brighter lights and darker shadows of the Augustinian theory were wanting, but which along with the sombre tones of that theology lost also something of its tragic grandeur. It is not to be wondered at that Chrysostom, like most of the writers of his time, should use materialistic language respecting both the sacraments, but he also brings out vividly the moral and spiritual side of the teaching expressed in each. These are the terms in which he speaks of the sacrament of baptism: "In baptism are fulfilled the pledges of our covenant with God—burial and death, resurrection and life; and these take place all at once. For when we immerse our heads in the water, the old man is buried as in a tomb below, and wholly sunk for ever; then as we raise them again the new man rises in its stead. As it is easy for us to dip and to lift our heads again, so is it easy for God to bury the old man and to shew forth

the new. And this is done thrice that you may learn that the power of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost fulfilleth all this."¹ And this is what he says in regard to the Eucharist: "On this account He hath mixed up Himself with us; He hath kneaded up His body with ours, that we might be a certain One Thing, like a body joined to a head. For this belongs to those who love strongly; this for instance Job implied, speaking of his servants, by whom he was beloved so exceedingly that they desired to cleave unto his flesh. For they said, to shew the strong love which they felt, *Who would give us to be satisfied with his flesh?*"² Wherefore this also Christ hath done, to lead us to a closer friendship, and to shew His love for us; He hath given to those who desire Him not only to see Him, but even to touch and eat Him, and to fix their teeth in His flesh, and to embrace Him and satisfy all their love."³ There is certainly a strong materializing element here, but it is capable of being separated from the idea which it encloses, and that idea is presented with Chrysostom's usual vividness and force.

The field in which such a commentator will be seen at his best is the borderland between faith and practice, the point at which doctrine is translated from the abstract into the concrete, where theoretic statement ends and the inculcation of Christian duty begins. And the present paper shall close with selections from a passage of this kind, chosen rather with the double object of at once exhibiting the characteristics of Chrysostom's mind, his lucid exposition, his accurate scholarship, his vivacity of style, and his earnestness

¹ *Hom. in Joh.* iii. 5.

² The meaning of the original (Job xxxi. 31) is "to be satisfied with meat from his table."

³ *Hom. in Joh.* vi. 52.

of appeal ; and also at the same time of shewing what his opinion was upon several points which have been somewhat debated amongst modern scholars. The quotations are taken from the Homilies upon Romans xii. "*Present your bodies a living sacrifice. And how is the body, it may be said, to become a sacrifice ? Let the eye look upon no evil thing, and it hath become a sacrifice ; let thy tongue speak nothing filthy, and it hath become an offering ; let thine hand do no lawless deed, and it hath become a whole burnt-offering. Or rather this is not enough, but we must have good works also : let the hand do alms, the mouth bless them that revile, and the hearing find leisure evermore for lections of Scripture. . . . Such a sacrifice is well-pleasing, as that of the Jews was even unclean ; for *their sacrifices*, it says, *are unto them as the bread of mourning*. Not so ours. That presented the thing sacrificed dead : this maketh the thing sacrificed to be living. . . . And be not fashioned after this world ; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind*. For the fashion of this world is grovelling and worthless, and but for a time ; neither hath ought of loftiness, or lastingness, or straightforwardness, but is wholly perverted. If, then, thou wouldest walk upright, figure not thyself after the fashion of this life present. For in it there is nought abiding or stable. And this is why he calls it a fashion (*σχῆμα*) ; and so in another passage, *for the fashion of this world passeth away*. For it hath no durability or fixedness, but all in it is but for a season ; and so he calls it this age (*αἰῶνι*), hereby to indicate its liableness to misfortune, and by the word *fashion* its unsubstantialness. For speak of riches, or of glory or beauty of person, or of luxury, or of whatever other of its seem-

ingly great things you will, it is a fashion only, not reality : a show and a mask, not any abiding substance. But *be not thou fashioned after this, but be transformed*, he says, *by the renewing of your mind*. He says not change the fashion, but *be transformed*, to shew that the world's ways are a fashion, but virtue's not a fashion, but a kind of real *form* with a natural beauty of its own, needing not the trickeries and fashions of outward things, which no sooner appear than they go to nought. For all these things, even before they come to light, are dissolving. If, then, thou throwest the fashion aside, thou wilt speedily come to the *form*." [It will be observed how fully and accurately Chrysostom brings out the difference between σχῆμα and μορφή, on which Trench and Lightfoot insist.]¹ . . . "Whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith. For though it is a grace, yet it is not poured forth at random, but, framing its measure according to the recipients, it letteth as much flow as it may find the vessel that is brought to be capable of." [A happy paraphrase of κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως, excluding the mistaken notion, held, e.g., by Wordsworth, that by "faith" is meant here, "the body of Christian doctrine."] . . . "In honour preferring one another. . . . There is nothing which makes friends so much as the earnest endeavour to overcome one's neighbour in honouring him." [προηγείσθαι = νικᾶν.] . . . "Mind not high things, but condescend to men of low estate. That is, bring thyself down to their humble condition ; ride or walk with them ; do not be humbled in mind only, but help them also, and reach forth thy

¹ See Trench, *New Testament Synonyms*, pp. 252-257 ; Lightfoot, *Philippians*, pp. 125-131.

hand to them, not by means of others, but in thine own person, as a father taking care of a child, as the head taking care of the body. As he says in another place, *being bound with them that are in bonds*. But here he means by those of low estate, not merely the lowly-minded, but those of a low rank, and which one is apt to think scorn of." [Chrysostom clearly takes τοῖς ταπεινοῖς to mean "lowly persons," not as Meyer, De Wette, and others, "lowly things."] . . . "*Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath*. Unto what wrath? To the wrath of God. Now, since what the injured man desires to see is himself having the pleasure of revenge, this very thing he gives him in full measure, that if thou dost not avenge thyself, God will be thy avenger. Leave it then, he means, to Him to follow up thy wrongs. For this is the force of *give place unto wrath*." ¹ [So Lightfoot, Meyer, Beet, and a majority of the best authorities.]

I will add just one more passage to shew how eagerly Chrysostom catches a suggestion of poetry, and how finely he works it out. "*The night is far spent, the day is at hand*. This, then, is upon ending, and the latter is drawing near. Let us henceforth do what belongs to the latter, not to the former. For this is what is done in the things of this life. And when we see the night pressing on towards the morning, and hear the swallow twittering, we each of us awake our neighbour, although it be night still. But, so soon as it is actually departing, we hasten one another, and say, It is day now! And we all set about the works of the day, dressing and leaving our dreams, and

¹ *Hom. in Rom.* xii. 1, 2, 6, 10, 16, 19.

shaking our sleep thoroughly off, that the day may find us ready, and we may not have to begin getting up, and stretching ourselves, when the sunlight is up. What, then, we do in that case let us do here also. Let us put off imaginings; let us get clear of the dreams of this life present; let us lay aside deep slumber, and be clad in virtue for garments. For it is to point out all this that he says, *Let us, therefore, cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armour of light.* Yes, for the day is calling us to battle-array, and to the fight. Yet fear not at hearing of array and arms. For in the case of the visible suit of armour, to put it on is a heavy and abhorred task. But here it is desirable, and worth being prayed for; for it is of Light the arms are! Hence they will set thee forth brighter than the sunbeam, and giving out a great glistening: and they place thee in security; for they are arms: and glittering do they make thee; for arms of light are they! What then? Is there no necessity for thee to fight? Yea, needful is it to fight, yet not to be distressed, and toil. For it is not, in fact, war, but a solemn dance and feast-day.”¹

W. SANDAY.

THE BOOK OF JOB.

VIII. THE THEOPHANY.

I. FIRST DIVINE REMONSTRANCE (CH. XXXVIII. 11—XL. 5).

WHEN the Majesty of Heaven appears to his afflicted servant, He is very far from doing that which Job had demanded and expected of Him; but, if He does other,

¹ *Hom. in Rom. xiii. 12.*

He does better than it had entered the heart of Job to conceive. He transcends, instead of following, the anticipated lines of action. In asserting his own righteousness Job had impeached the righteousness of God. He had challenged his Judge to try him, to put him to the proof. And he had expected, as we learn from Chapter xiii. Verse 22,¹ that, if God responded to his challenge, He would accuse and question him, or that He would suffer Job to question *Him*, and to set Him on justifying his ways. In the blindness of his grief and passion, in short, Job was wholly occupied with himself, as in similar conditions we are all apt to be, and conceived of God as having nothing else to do than to vindicate Himself to him, and to solve the problems by which he was oppressed. But when Jehovah appears and speaks, He makes no attempt to vindicate Himself; He offers no solution of the problems with which Job had wearied himself in vain. He is Himself the solution of them. Not by what He says, but by manifesting Himself as He is, He reaches and satisfies the heart of Job—as indeed He satisfies us all, if only we can see Him when He appears and hear Him when He speaks to us.

He opens his First Remonstrance with a single upbraiding sentence (Chap. xxxviii. 2), in which He affirms Job to be altogether on the wrong tack; and then proceeds at once to cause “all his glory”—which means all his goodness—to pass before his face. And as Job listens to the sublime descant in which the Maker of all things discloses the splendours of his loving-kindness no less than of his power as manifested in earth and sky, in land and sea, in calm and

¹ See also Chap. xxiv. 1, *et seq.*

storm, in light and darkness, in the grass of the field, in bird and beast (Chaps. xxxviii. 4—xxxix. 30), he *sees* Him; *i.e.*, he comes to know both God and himself far more truly and deeply than he had ever done before. He is amazed at his own temerity in having challenged a Power and a Righteousness beyond the reach of his thought; in place of any longer insisting on his own unimpeachable integrity, he confesses that he is "vile:" and he casts from him the doubts, born of ignorance and wounded self-love, over which he had brooded so long, although they are still unresolved; or, rather, he lets them drop as no longer worth a moment's thought now that he sees God face to face (Chap. xl. 1-5).

At no point is our Poet truer to experience and the facts of human life than here. For, in our hours of pain and doubt and misgiving, the apparent difficulties round which our thoughts circle in endless flight are seldom our real difficulties. When we most earnestly crave a solution for the questions which baffle our intellect, what we really need after all is not so much an answer to these questions as a new and larger experience, a gracious and sacred emotion, which will carry us clean out of the intellectual arena, all choked with dust of our own making, into the pure upper air which is all suffused with a Divine Love, and which will quicken in us, or intensify, a sense of the Love which watches over us, a Love that does not "alter where it alteration finds," but shines on for ever, and is "the star to every wandering bark." And very often we, like Job, are led to the assurance that "the good God loveth us" through the conviction that "He made and loveth all."

CHAPTERS XXXVIII.—XL. 5.

CHAP. XXXVIII. *Then Jehovah answered Job out of the tempest and said :*

2. *Who is this that darkeneth counsel*
 By words devoid of knowledge ?
3. *Gird up thy loins, now, like a man ;*
 I will question thee, and answer thou me.
4. *Where wast thou when I founded the earth ?*
 Say, if thou art of skill in understanding !
5. *Who fixed its measures—if thou knowest,*
 Or who stretched out a line upon it ?
6. *On what were its foundations sunk,*
 Or who laid its corner-stone,
7. *When the stars of morning sang in concert,*
 And all the Sons of God shouted for joy ?
8. *Or who shut in the sea with doors*
 When it burst forth from the womb ;
9. *When I made the clouds the garments thereof,*
 And thick mists its swaddling clothes ;
10. *When I measured my bound for it,*
 And set bars and gates,
11. *And said, “ Thus far shalt thou come, but no farther,*
 And here shall the pride of thy waves be stayed ? ”
12. *Hast thou ever commanded that it be morning,*
 And caused the dawn to know its place,
13. *That it should seize hold upon the skirts of the earth,*
 And shake the wicked out of it ?
14. *She is changed like clay under a signet,*
 And [all things] stand out as in gay attire ;
15. *But the light is withholden from the wicked,*
 And the uplifted arm is broken.
16. *Hast thou gone down to the fountains of the sea,*
 Or traversed the recesses of the deep ?
17. *Have the gates of death been opened unto thee,*
 Or hast thou seen the portals of the realm of shades ?
18. *Hast thou surveyed the breadths of the earth ?*
 Say, if thou knowest it all !
19. *Which is the path to the abode of light,*
 And the darkness—where is its dwelling ?
20. *For [doubtless] thou didst lead it to its place,*
 And art acquainted with the path to its abode !

21. *Thou knowest it, for thou wast then born,
 And vast is the number of thy days !*
22. *Hast thou entered the storehouse of the snow,
 And seen the arsenals of the hail,*
23. *Which I reserve for the time of trouble,
 For the day of conflict and of war ?*
24. *How is the light distributed,
 And the Eastwind scattered over the earth ?*
25. *Who hath cleft a channel for the rain-torrent,
 Or a track for the flash of thunder,*
26. *That it may rain on an unpeopled land,
 On a desert where no man is,*
27. *To saturate the wilds and wastes,
 And to make the pastures put forth their herbage ?*
28. *Hath the rain a father ?
 Or who begat the dewdrops ?*
29. *From whose womb came forth the ice,
 And the hoarfrost of heaven—who hath engendered it,*
30. *That the waters should be hardened as into stone,
 And the surface of the deep cohere ?*
31. *Canst thou fasten the links of the Cluster ;
 Canst thou unloose the fetters of the Giant ?*
32. *Canst thou bring forth the Constellations in their season ?
 The Bear and her offspring—canst thou guide them ?*
33. *Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven ?
 Canst thou determine their influence upon the earth ?*
34. *Canst thou lift thy voice to the clouds,
 That an abundance of waters may overhang thee ?*
35. *Canst thou send forth the lightnings so that they go,
 Or will they say to thee, “ We are here ! ”*
36. *Who hath put [this] wisdom into thy reins,
 Or who hath given [such] understanding to thine heart ?*
37. *Who by wisdom can count the clouds,
 Or slant the bottles of heaven,*
38. *As when the dust cakes into mire,
 And clod cleaveth fast to clod ?*
39. *Wilt thou hunt prey for the Lion,
 Or still the craving of his whelps,*
40. *When they crouch in their dens,
 And lie in ambush under the covert ?*

41. *Who provideth his prey for the Raven,
When his young cry unto God
And wander for lack of food?*

CHAP. XXXIX. *Knowest thou the time when the Rock-Goats bear?
Hast thou marked the travailing of the roes?*

2. *Canst thou number the months which they fulfil?
And knowest thou the time when they bring forth,*
3. *When they bow them down and give birth to their young
And cast out their throes?*
4. *Their young grow big and hale in the plain,
They go forth and do not return.*
5. *Who sent out the Wild-Ass free,
And who loosed the Wanderer's bands,*
6. *Whose home I have made in the wilderness,
And in the salt waste his haunt?*
7. *He scorneth the din of the city,
And heeds no driver's cry;*
8. *The range of the mountains is his pasture:
And he searcheth after all that is green.*
9. *Will the Bison be willing to serve thee?
Will he lodge by night in thy stall?*
10. *Canst thou tether the Bison to the furrow by a trace?
Will he harrow the valleys, following after thee?*
11. *Will thou trust him because his strength is great?
Or wilt thou leave thy labour to him?*
12. *Wilt thou trust him to bring home thy grain,
And gather it into thy garner?*
13. *The wing of the Ostrich waveth proudly;
But hath she the pinion and plumage of the pious stork?*
14. *Nay, for she abandoneth her eggs to the earth,
And hatcheth them in the sand,*
15. *Forgetting that the foot may trample them,
Or that the beast of the field may crush them;*
16. *Harsh is she to her young, as though they were not her own,
Careless that her travail should be in vain:*
17. *For God hath denied her wisdom,
And hath not meted out understanding to her;*

18. *But what time she lasheth herself to flight
She laughs at the horse and his rider.*
19. *Dost thou give strength to the Horse?
Dost thou clothe his neck with the waving mane?*
20. *Dost thou make him charge like a locust?
The snort of his nostrils is terrible!*
21. *He paweth in the plain, and rejoiceth in his strength,
He rusheth forth to confront the weapons;*
22. *He laugheth at fear and is never dismayed,
And he recoileth not from the sword;*
23. *The arrows rattle against him,
The glittering spear and the javelin;*
24. *With a bound, and a rush, he drinketh up the ground;
He cannot contain himself at the blast of the trumpet;*
25. *At every blast he crieth, "Ha, ha!"
He scenteth the battle from afar,
The thunder of the captains and the shouting.*
26. *Doth the Hawk fly by thy cunning,
And stretch its wings towards the south?*
27. *Doth the Eagle soar aloft at thy command
And build his eyrie on high?*
28. *He alighteth on the crag,
And lodgeth on the tooth and keep of the cliff;*
29. *Thence he espieth the prey,
His eyes behold it from afar:*
30. *Even his young ones gorge the blood,
And where the slain are there is he.*

CHAP. XL. *Moreover Jehovah answered Job and said:*
2. *Is he who contended with the Almighty corrected?
Let him who disputed with God reply.*

3. *Then Job answered Jehovah and said:*
4. *Lo, I am weak! What can I reply to Thee?
I lay my hand on my mouth.*
5. *Once have I spoken . . . but I will not speak again;
Twice . . . but I will add no more.*

Chapter xxxviii. Verse 2.—"O, that the Almighty would answer me!" Job had exclaimed (Chap. xxxi. 35); and now the Almighty does answer him, but not with an "indictment." Instead of "telling God the very number of his steps," he is called to forget himself and his own petty claims in a close, sincere, and admiring study of those "ways" which all "men do sing" even when they "contemplate them from afar." The reproach of this opening sentence is instantly followed by a self-manifestation of the God whom he had so long desired to behold, in the light of which he sees how utterly he had misjudged his Maker, and obscured the Divine "counsel," purpose, scheme, by his inadequate conceptions of it.

Verse 3.—When challenging the Divine Justice Job had said (Chap. xiii. 22): "Do Thou accuse me, and I will answer; or let me speak, and do Thou respond." And now that God challenges *him*, He bids him gird up his loins like a man and answer, not an accusation, but a series of interrogations which feelingly persuade him of the labyrinth of interwoven mysteries amid which man gropes his way; interrogations which, as Humboldt has said, "the natural philosophy of the present day may frame more scientifically, but cannot satisfactorily solve."

In Verses 4-15, verses constructed according to the strictest laws of Hebrew poetry, the mysteries of *earth, sea, and light* are set forth in strophes each consisting of four sentences and eight members.

Verses 4-7 deal with the mysterious origin of the Earth. And, here, Jehovah is represented as taking very much the line and tone of thought with which Eliphaz had opened the Second Colloquy (Chap. xv. 7).

There is an obvious similarity between his demand of Job—

Wast thou born first, O man,
And wast thou brought forth before the hills?

and Jehovah's—

Where wast thou when I founded the Earth?

There is the same irony in both, the same intention of reducing Job to silence by convicting him of ignorance and presumption, although the one demand simply irritates him, while the other, which yet is not another, melts and subdues him. It is not difficult, however, to account for this difference of effect; for who does not know that it is the Speaker who stands behind the words that gives our words their several and varying force, and that the same vein of irony must produce very different effects on different lips? Eliphaz had sarcastically rebuked Job for assuming that the secret of the universe was with him, as though he had played the spy on the Divine Cabinet at which the creation of the world was mooted and had thus “engrossed wisdom to himself,” quite unconscious that in thus rebuking Job *he* was assuming a superior wisdom—assuming that he himself was really familiar with the secret of which Job, despite his exclusive pretensions, was wholly ignorant. And how could such an assumption fail to irritate one who was fully aware that what the Friends knew that he knew also? But the same rebuke from the mouth of the Creator of the universe, of the only wise God who had presided over the Cabinet, and said: “Let us create the heavens and the earth, and let us make man in our own image, after our likeness,”—how should this irritate even the wisest of men or fail to humble his pride of knowledge?

In *Verse* 5 the prevalence of order, rule, law in the creation of the world is emphatically recognized by the words "measures" and "line;" while the architectural figure implied in these words also serves to introduce the more pronounced image of *Verse* 6, in which the metaphor of the Builder becomes explicit, and the Maker of all is portrayed as an Architect, bearing line and measure, who, having sunk the foundations of the earth, proceeds to lay its corner-stone.

It is a curious instance of the perverse inconsistency of traditional habits of thought that one of our ablest Commentators, after a frank recognition of the metaphor of these Verses, goes on to take them literally, sees in "the foundations" of *Verse* 6 "the lower strata on which the Earth's surface rests," and finds in the expression a singularly accurate anticipation "of facts but lately disclosed by science;" while in *Verse* 7 he discovers, in like manner, a proof that "the stars were in existence before the earth assumed its actual shape." When shall we learn that to treat a Sacred Poem as if it were a scientific treatise, and to extract an accurate cosmogony from the very metaphors of the Bible, is a perilous and fatal course, if we do not learn it when studying a Poem which probably contains as many metaphors at variance with the scientific conceptions of the present age as of those which are in harmony with it?

What the Poet is thinking of in *Verse* 7 is not scientific facts but the mystic connection everywhere assumed in Holy Writ between "stars" and "angels," and of that strange sympathy between heaven and earth in virtue of which we are affected by all the motions of the celestial sphere, while they in heaven are tremu-

lously sensitive to all that passes on earth. As we meditate on the Verse we are far more suitably engaged in drinking in its beauty than in pressing it into the service of a science which is not in any of its thoughts ; in illustrating it from other literatures which shew that the mystical conceptions it embalms are not peculiar to any race or time ; as, for example, the familiar passage from Shakespeare¹ which no repetition can stale :

Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold :
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim :

and in which, not only the connection of stars with angels is reproduced, and the music which heaven pipes to the dancing earth, but even that metaphor of a building which dominates Verses 5 and 6. Nor should we fail to note the exquisite propriety of the epithet which sets "the stars of the *morning*" to sing in the morning of the new-made world. What the Poet would have us find in his words is beyond the reach of mere Science—the Divine Builder of the universe rearing this mighty and beautiful home for the children whom He was about to call into being, and the angelic hosts, the armies of the skies, rushing forth from heaven so soon as its corner stone was laid to gaze, admire, and hymn his praise with songs and choral symphonies and shouts of joy.

Verses 8–11 deal with the no less mysterious origin of the Sea, and are but a magnificent paraphrase of the creative fiat (Genesis i. 9) : " Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place." Breaking forth from the chaotic earth, like some gigantic and

¹ *Merchant of Venice*, Act V., Scene 1.

portentous birth, swaddled in mists and with clouds for its garments, the mighty ocean, which no man hath tamed or can tame, was shut in and confined within its rocky barriers by the hand of God. Lawless as it seems, it is under law to Him. In its wildest and most furious moods it does but execute his decree ; nor in its maddest rage can it overstep the bounds He has appointed for it. In language which has deeply impressed itself on the imagination of man, we are taught to recognize even in the heaving and irresistible sea the reign of order and of law. Job's fine descant on the works and wonders of God (Chap. xxvi.), in which he trampled on Bildad's musty proverbs and shallow assumptions of superior wisdom, seems to have been much in the Poet's thoughts throughout the present Chapter ; and in these Verses, especially in Verse 11—a Verse as often quoted perhaps as any in the whole Book—we have an echo of Job's saying (Chap. xxvi. 12):

By his power He agitates the sea,
And He is of skill to smite its pride.

The transition from the Sea to the origin of Light (Verses 12-15) is very natural, since to the ancients it seemed, as indeed it still *seems* to us, that the sun rose out of the lap of the deep : and here, in images still more striking though less familiar, the Poet sets forth the moral and physical effects of the Dawn : (1) the discomfiture of the wicked ; and (2) the revelation of form and colour. How deeply and habitually he had been moved by the first of these effects we may infer, as from his frequent allusions to it, so also from the detailed description elaborated in Chapter xxiv. 13-17. Now, as he once more recurs to it, his imagination stirs

and works, and he sees (*Verse* 13) the bright Dawn gradually extending its strong arms till it can seize the great earth-carpet by its extremities, and "shake the wicked out of it"—the light, which they hate and fear, and in which these bats of darkness cannot see, driving them to their dens. The physical effects of the dawn of day are set forth, under two different figures, in *Verse* 14; the Poet here, as elsewhere, preferring a broken metaphor to a maimed and crippled thought. First, he compares the revelation of *form* on the dark or shapeless earth, which we owe to the light of returning day, to the clear-cut impress made by a signet on the fine prepared clay which the ancients used in lieu of wax. And then he compares the revelation of *colour*, the rich embroidery of various hues which we owe to the same source, to the clothing of its naked body with bright and gay attire. Even in *Verse* 15, in which he endeavours to state the moral of these fine metaphors in plain unvarnished terms, his quickened and raised imagination still works in and through his words, and he cannot tell us that the darkness, which is the light in which the wicked walk and labour and rejoice, is withdrawn from them by the pure increasing splendours of the day, without painting this defeat of bold and insolent depravity in a figure of quite classical beauty, and shewing us how the uplifted arm of Violence is broken by the swift stroke of Dawn.

In Verses 16-21 the mysteries which encompass all our knowledge, and which we sometimes foolishly permit to poison all our knowledge, still engage the Poet's mind. His thoughts still circle round "the cosmical phenomena"—round sea and land, light and darkness; and still he maintains the tone of ironical challenge

which he has taken throughout. "Hast thou"—it is demanded of Job, the implication being of course that he has *not*—"descended to the springs of the sea, or traversed the recesses of the deep?" And, again (*Verses* 17): "Hast thou entered into the gates of death, or so much as seen the very portals of Hades?" And here, doubtless, Job would be reminded of his own confession (Chap. xxvi. 5, 6) that the Shades tremble so often as the Divine glance penetrates the waters that roll above their gloomy habitation, and that to Jehovah Hades itself lies bare, and there is no covering to Abaddon; while we cannot fail to be reminded of the immense labour and straining effort by which Job had risen to and grasped the hope that, beyond the sea of death, there might be a land of light in which he would find a vindication and a home (*Cf.* Chap. xvii.) And still the inexorable demand goes on (*Verses* 18 and 19): "Hast thou comprehended the whole breadth of the earth, so that thou altogether knowest it and all that it contains? Or may there not be even in the province of Divine activity with which thou art most familiar that which lies beyond thy reach? Thou hast spoken learnedly (Chap. xxvi. 10) of the 'bound where light toucheth darkness,' and hast loftily rebuked (Chap. xxiv. 13) those who rebel against the light, who know nothing of its ways, and will not abide in its paths; but dost thou thyself know the path whether to the abode of light or to the crypt of darkness?"

In *Verses* 20 and 21 the irony which pervades the whole of this Remonstrance mounts to a climax and breaks through all disguise of metaphor, all bounds of reserve, that it may pierce Job to the heart, cutting sheer through all his assumptions of wisdom, and feel-

ingly persuade him of his ignorance and of his weakness. The Verses need no comment ; it is enough to cite them : for who can listen to such words as these and not catch the laugh in them, the mocking deference, the kindly but penetrating scorn ?

Doubtless thou didst lead it [the light] to its place,
And art acquainted with the path to its abode !
Thou knowest it, for thou wast then born,
And vast is the number of thy days !

Dull men are to be met who resent the attribution of irony to the Maker of us all, very mainly, I suspect, because it is the weapon which wounds them most keenly, because it cuts their solemn assumptions of wisdom and dignity and self-approval to the very quick, because they have, and feel that they have, no defence against it ; and there are good men who shrink from it as irreverent or over bold. But surely no honest man, however dull, however reverent he may be, can deny that here, in the Bible itself, irony is attributed to Jehovah ; and that He is even represented as turning it against the just man in whose integrity He took a pride—wounding him with it indeed, but wounding only that He might heal.

From this point onward, though the Poet still busies himself with "cosmical phenomena," he gives his thoughts a wider range, his main thesis still being, however, that in their ultimate causes, as in many of their uses and effects, these phenomena are inscrutable to man ; and this is a position which the more we know we are the less likely to impugn. Modern Philosophy, indeed, maintains, as if it were a discovery of its own, that only phenomena are or can be known to man, *noumena* being beyond his apprehension ; while modern

Science, at least in the persons of some of its representatives, goes a long step farther, and insists that, since final causes are beyond our grasp, there can be none; thus making "man the measure of all things" in a sense very strange and grotesque.

In Verses 22-30 there is little to detain us. The secrets of snow and hail, of the distribution of light and wind, of rain and lightning, dew and ice, are demanded of the man who had assumed to judge and censure the ways of God mainly because he could not comprehend them, and demanded with an overwhelming rapidity and force which leaves but little scope for touches whether of graphic description or of moral reflection. Yet such touches are to be found, although the questions which convince Job of his ignorance and presumption move with a swiftness and a heat which are well-nigh bewildering. The inimical, or apparently inimical, functions of many of the great forces of Nature are glanced at in *Verses* 22 and 23. Their teleological aspects are touched upon in *Verses* 26 and 27, where the beneficent action of rain-storms on the unpeopled desert and the tenantless steppe is indicated, no less than its more obviously benignant ministry on the farms and pastures to which men owe their bread. While in *Verses* 25 and 30 we have graphic descriptive touches not unworthy of our Poet in "the channel cleft for the rain torrent" as it streams down through the riven atmosphere, and the "track" laid down by the Divine Wisdom and Care for the fierce lightning flash; and, again, in the "waters hardened into stone" by the cold irresistible hand of the frost, which compels even the fluid and heaving surface of the deep to "cohere."

There is more to detain us in Verses 31-38, though even here I may economize time and space by referring the reader to the brief dissertation given under Chapter iii. Verse 8, for an account of the occult astrological "influences" attributed by the ancients—as also indeed by a vast majority of the moderns¹—to the stars; and of the physical and spiritual truths imbedded in that inveterate superstition. These influences are doubtless glanced at by the Poet in the Verses before us, though it is not these mainly which are now in his thoughts. The context, both before and after, shews that it was rather the stars regarded as part of the inscrutable order of Nature which now occupied his mind, and their obvious physical action on the earth rather than their occult and supernatural influence.

"The Cluster" of *Verse 31* is, of course, the constellation known to us as the Pleiades, and "the Giant," Orion. And if the first meaning of the question be: "Canst thou bind together the several jewels of the celestial Cluster, so that the Pleiads shall be grouped or strung together as in a girdle or a brooch; or canst thou unbind and displace the stars which compose the belt or chain of Orion, so that the Giant shall be freed from his bands?" yet we can hardly doubt that, in its second and deeper meaning, it refers to that happy change, or ascent, from winter into spring, on the recurrence of which the beauty and fruitfulness of the

¹ The most remarkable modern instance of the inveteracy of this superstition is perhaps to be found in the fact, that Professor Stanley Jevons is capable of arguing, and of pressing the most recent discoveries of astronomical and statistical science into an argument, for "a close and intimate connection between commercial crises and the spots upon the sun;" as if the great lord of day were but an omnipotent Bear upon the Stock Exchange! May we not soon hope to hear, from some other gifted scientist, that the sun is making "a good thing" out of his speculations, and getting very "warm"?

earth depend. To the Arabs the bright cluster of the Pleiads, rising before the Sun in the East, announced the approach of the vernal season ; while Orion, the most conspicuous object in their winter sky, sank out of sight. The full and main import of the question probably is, therefore : "Canst thou bring back the gracious fruitful warmth of Spring, and release the frozen earth from Winter's sterile bands ?"

"The Constellations" of *Verse* 32 seem to be the signs of the Zodiac—this at least is the interpretation put on "Mazzaroth" by many of our best Commentators¹—which indicate and announce all the changes in "the sweet procession of the year." And the three stars in the Bear, known to us as the "horses" of Charles's Wain, were called in the Orient "the daughters of the Bier," or funeral Wain, and were said to be following the corpse of their father, slain by *Gedi*, the pole-star. The succession of the celestial signs, "led forth each in its season," would mark the entire circuit of the year, as would also the varying positions of the Wain in its annual revolution round the Pole. The former would be the recognized index of the seasons, while the latter would also mark, as on a dial, the progress of the night. So that the full force of the question

¹ But Canon Cook makes a suggestion which deserves the consideration of those who are able to appreciate it. According to the authorities which he quotes in a Note to this Verse, *Mas-ra-ti*, "the course or march of the Sun-god," is the Egyptian name for "the Milky Way;" and *al-majarah* the Arabian name; while there prevailed among the ancients a tradition that the Milky Way was a former path of the Sun, its light being but a trace of the glory which the Sun had left behind it; and hence he proposes to render *mazzaroth* by "the Milky Way." The arguments in favour of this interpretation are (1) the correspondence between the Egyptian *masrati* and the Hebrew *mazzaroth*; (2) that many traces of the Egyptian language, habits, and traditions are undoubtedly to be found in this Poem; and (3) that it would be remarkable if no reference were made to a celestial phenomenon so striking as the Milky Way by a Poet who was evidently an attentive watcher of the skies, while yet there is none if we may not find it here.

would be : "Canst thou command the changeful seasons of the year, leading them in each in its turn, with their rich and several blessings for mankind?"

Verse 33.—On the supposed and real "influences" of the heavenly bodies on the world and on the affairs of men—an allusion to which we here meet once more—and the strange persistence of astrological superstitions as illustrated by our own great poet, I have already spoken in the comment on Chapter iii. 8.

In *Verses 34-38* the Poet recurs to the agencies of rain and storm in order still more deeply to impress upon us the feebleness of man and the inscrutable mysteries involved even in the forces with which he is most familiar. The Verses are full of graphic and picturesque touches which, while they shew the most careful and imaginative observation of the facts of Nature, owe much of their power to the naïve and childlike spirit with which he regarded them. As the centurion in the Gospels conceived of Jesus, so he conceives of Jehovah, as holding all the forces of Nature and all the ministries of Life in his immediate control; as bidding them go and they go, come and they come, do this or that and they do it. Of this ministerial function of the most dazzling and tremendous natural forces we have a splendid example in *Verse 35*, where we are taught to think of Jehovah as saying "Go" to the very lightnings, and they go; "Come," and they reply, "We are here!" While we have a capital instance of his terse graphic rendering of an imaginative conception of natural phenomena in his inquiry (*Verse 37*) : "Who can *slant* the bottles of heaven?"—*i.e.*, tip up the clouds so that they discharge their contents on the earth; and of his careful

observation of them in his description (*Verse 38*) of "the dust caking into mire," and of "clod being glued to clod," when an abundance of water falls upon them.

It is profoundly interesting and instructive to compare with the graphic and sublime utterances of our Poet in this Chapter a passage from the sacred book of the Persians (*Yasna* xlv. 3) in which, from the same position, precisely the same line of thought is pursued, though it is pitched in a much lower key :—

"I ask Thee, tell me the truth, O Ahura! who was from the beginning the Father of the pure creatures? Who has made a path for the sun, and for the stars? Who (but Thou) makest the moon to increase and to decrease? That, O Mazda, and other things I wish to know!

I ask Thee, tell me the truth, O Ahura! who holds up the earth, and the clouds, that they do not fall? Who holds the sea, and the trees? Who has given swiftness to the winds, and the clouds? Who is the Creator of the good spirit?

I ask Thee, tell me the truth, O Ahura! who has made the kindly light, and the darkness? Who has made the kindly sleep, and the awaking? And who has made him who ponders on the measures of thy laws?"

With the closing Verses of Chapter xxxviii. there begins a graphic series of individual portraits, which has long attracted and held the admiration of the most competent judges of art in this kind. From the great inanimate forces of Nature and their elementary play the Poet descends, or "condescends"—if it be not rather an ascent—to the various species of the ani-

mal world, lovingly touching on their characteristic "points," instincts, habits, their beauty and grace and strength; and shewing us, as it were, God once more reviewing the creatures He had made and finding them "very good." It was while referring to this series of graphic and picturesque portraits that Carlyle said of this poem: "*So true every way; true eyesight and vision for all things; material things no less than spiritual. Such living likenesses were never since drawn.*" And I well remember the profound and kindling emotion of a sculptor and a painter to whom, many years ago, I read the splendid idealizations of the Wild Ass and the Horse given in Chapter xxxix., and the way in which they raged at themselves for their "idiotic ignorance and neglect" of a fount of inspiration so pure and stimulating.

Yet, it must be confessed, that these "likenesses" are ideal rather than actual—as ideal as Shakespeare's delineation of the horse of Adonis, though immeasurably superior even to that admired masterpiece precisely because they are not so real and so technical; it must even be confessed that, at least in the case of the Hippopotamus and the Crocodile, they so far excel any incarnate example of these species as to look well-nigh fabulous. But we must remember both that it is the very function of the Poet to see, and to help us to see, the ideal in the actual, to give us forms freed from their accidental limitations; and that, as Ruskin insists, the ideal, so far from being opposed to or different from the true, is in fact the perfection of it; that, in short, to cite his very words, "The ideal is the utmost degree of beauty of which the species is capable." Just as he argues that "the Apollo is not a *false* representation of

man, but the most perfect representation of all that is essential and constant in man, free from the accidents and evils which corrupt the truth of his nature ; " so we may argue that in these noble delineations of Bison and Ostrich, Horse and Eagle, Behemoth and Leviathan, our Poet is but giving us that which is essential to these several creatures in its most perfect form, apart from the limitations and defects to be found in every individual embodiment of them ; that by his very calling of Poet he was bound to give us these ideals ; and that in these he has given us the very truest likenesses that could possibly be painted.

This noble gallery opens, very modestly, with mere sketches of the Lion and the Raven (*Verses* 39-41) ; and probably these sketches are placed in the forefront of the series for the very reason for which the Psalmist (Psalms civ. 21, 22 ; cxlvii. 9), and our Lord Himself (St. Luke xii. 24), afterwards alluded to the ravens and the lions ; viz., to convey the hint that man is of more value than beasts of prey and carrion birds ; and that He who feeds them, " yea, providently caters for the sparrow," is not likely to forget *him* or fail to be " comfort to his age."

In *Chapter xxxix.* we have more elaborate studies, are permitted indeed to gaze on some of the inspired Artist's most finished masterpieces : I shall not be so foolish, however, or so presumptuous, as to make any attempt to reproduce them in words ; they are best seen in their own light : and all that the Commentator can do for them, unless indeed he be as true and great a Poet as the Artist himself, is to explain obscure terms or to put his readers in remembrance, so far as may be necessary, of the facts on which these descriptions are based.

In *Verses* 1-4 we have a picture of the wild Rock-Goat — *Ibices* as naturalists call them, *yeelin*, or "climbers," they are called here. They are very shy, and inhabit "exclusively the more desolate and rocky parts of the country." But as a full description of them, and of most of the "pure creatures" mentioned in this Chapter, is to be found in so accessible and reliable a book as Canon Tristram's "Natural History of the Bible," let me once for all refer the student to its pages. The only points which call for notice here are, I think, these. In *Verse* 2 the verb "number" is used in the sense of "fixing the number," and might be translated "Canst thou *determine*," &c. And in *Verse* 3 the striking phrase, "And cast out their *throes*," strange as it looks, has many parallels: Euripides (*Ion*, 45) uses precisely the same phrase; and in a similar connection infants are called "pangs" by Arab poets.

Verses 5-8 contain the famous description of the Wild-Ass, and breathe the very spirit of freedom. In *Verse* 5 the Hebrew gives two names for it; the first denoting speed, and the second—which I have rendered "the Wanderer"—its roving and unbreakable spirit. All wild animals who "feed on that which is green" love to lick salt. Hence the allusion in *Verse* 6 to "the *salt* waste:" the wild ass would naturally seek those gorges and plateaus of the desert, or the steppe, where salt was to be found. The main emphasis of the Poet is laid on the most characteristic features of this beautiful creature; its intractable temper, its disdain of man, its wide and incessant quest of the food it loves. Tristram says that he saw "a wild ass in the oasis of Souf, which had been snared when a colt; but though it had been kept for three years in confinement, it was

as untractable as when first caught, biting and kicking furiously at every one who approached it." As he does *not* give any description of its appearance, I may add that it is reported to have an arched neck, slender and graceful legs, a silver coat with broad patches of bay on thigh and shoulder, a dark-crested mane prolonged in a dark stripe to the tuft of the tail; and to possess a speed beyond that of the fleetest horse.

The *Rêêm* of *Verses* 9-12 has occasioned no little speculation and controversy. "Our translators have unfortunately adopted the rendering of the Septuagint, 'the one-horned' for *rêêm*, which is no fabled monster, but a two-horned reality, a beast which once roamed freely through the forests of Palestine, but is now extinct." Of this "ox of yore," the Aueroch—corrupted into *urus* by the Romans—an ox "scarcely less than an elephant in size" and of prodigious strength, with immense horns, and of an untameable ferocity and pride, a full description will be found in Tristram. Cæsar saw and hunted it. Its nearest extant representative is the bison (*Bos urus*), which still lingers in the forests of Lithuania and the Caucasus, though the fate of the Aueroch (*Bos primigenius*) is fast overtaking it, and in all probability it will soon be no more seen. The tone of irony, which is often laid aside in these graphic sketches—the Poet being too much occupied with the beauty and strength of the creatures he depicts to maintain it—is very pronounced in these Verses; and once more we hear the laugh of Jehovah as He challenges Job to harness the *rêêm* to his wains, and set it to draw home the produce of his fields.

Verses 13-18.—The Ostrich resembles the stork in its stilt-like structure, in the colours of its plumage—

both have black and white feathers in pinion and tail—and in its gregarious habit; but lacks its pious, maternal *storgé*. In virtue of this *storgé*, from which indeed it is said to have derived its name, the Greeks and the Romans used the stork as a symbol of parental love. For its lack, or supposed lack, of care for its eggs and young, the Arabs call the Ostrich, "Wicked Bird." They have many proverbs built on their close observation of the Ostrich, and in three of these we may find our best illustrations of the Verses before us. The first runs, "More stupid than an ostrich;" the second, "Swifter than an ostrich;" while a third compares the man who is harsh at home but compliant with strangers to the bird "who abandons her own eggs, but hatches strange ones." The immense speed of the ostrich may be inferred from the fact that, when fully "extended," she covers twenty-four feet at a stride. But see Tristram.

Verses 19-25.—As might have been expected in an Arabian poem, the description of the Horse, with its heroic beauty and its impetuous lust of battle, is by far the grandest of all these animal "pieces." Probably there is no finer description of this noble creature in the whole range of literature, nor even any worthy to be compared with it as a whole, although in other ancient authors we meet with occasional touches resembling those employed here. *Æschylus* (*Septem*, 375), for example, describes the horse as "impatiently awaiting the blast of the trumpet" (Comp. *Verses* 24, 25); *Pliny* (viii. 42) has "presagiunt pugnam;" and *Virgil* (*Æn.* v. 316), "corripiunt spatia," and (*Georg.* iii. 83):

. . . Tum, si qua sonum procul arma dedere,
Stare loco nescit, micat auribus, et tremit artus.

Verse 26.—The Hebrew *Netz* includes, besides the Hawk proper, all the smaller raptorial birds ; and among them *Tinnunculus alaudarius*, our own familiar Kestrel, which is very common throughout Syria. As this is “the only bird which the eagles appear to permit to live in close proximity to them,” it may be that it is the Kestrel which is here intended, since here, as in Nature, we find it “in close proximity” to the *Nesher*, or Eagle.

Verse 27–30.—As this first gallery opens with a sketch of the king of beasts, so, appropriately enough, it closes with a picture of the king of birds, which is not unworthy of a place beside any, even the chief, of the masterpieces which have gone before it.

Suddenly the vessel let down to Job, “like a great sheet lowered by ropes at its four corners, wherein were all manner of four-footed beasts and fowls of the air,” is withdrawn, and from the cloud of the Divine Presence there issues the challenge (*Chapter xl., Verses 1 and 2*): “Is he who contended with the Almighty corrected? Let him who disputed with God reply.” The challenge might be even more severely, and not less faithfully, rendered: “Is the *censurer* of the Almighty corrected? Let him that *criticised* God reply.” And Job, who already sees in part what the Divine intention is, responds with an exclamation (*Verses 3 and 4*) of which it is difficult to give a satisfactory translation. “Behold, I am *vile !* ” conveys too much, and, “Lo, I am *weak !* ” too little. What he means is that he is too *small* , too *light* , too insignificant and feeble to contend with God, too unwise and unready to answer Him adequately, or even to put into words all that he has in his heart to say. Therefore he “lays

his hand on his mouth " to keep it closed, forces and compels himself to silence, though he has still somewhat to urge " an if he would," could he but give his thoughts words and run the hazard of speaking amiss. But that he no longer dares to do. Once, twice, an impulse had risen within him, prompting him to suggest some plea in his own defence or to indicate difficulties which, to his mind, were still unresolved. But he will no longer venture to criticise, much less censure, ways which he feels to be too wonderful for him, dark only through their very excess of light. Long since he had begged (Chap. xiii. 20-22) that, should God deign to enter into controversy with him, He would lay aside his majesty, lest, terrified and overwhelmed, he should be unable to answer Him a word. But so far from conceding that request, Jehovah has appeared to him arrayed in the full panoply of his glory, with pitiless and yet most pitiful severity abating no jot of his state, thus making Job more and more deeply conscious of his own insignificance and temerity, and of his inability to answer his Divine Adversary " one in a thousand." Hence all that he can do is to confess that, as compared with his Antagonist, he is but as dust on a balance, and to hint that he is being surprised, dazzled, overwhelmed, rather than answered and convinced.

He has yet to learn—or, at least, he has not yet fully learned—that no logical and conclusive answer can be given, even by Jehovah Himself, to the questions of the inquisitive and sceptical intellect ; or that no such answer can be rendered in terms which the intellect of man, while under its present conditions, can grasp : that, when all has been said which can be said, much must still be left to reverence, to faith, to love. Our

“intellectual part” is but a part of our being, not the whole. And when we demand a simply intellectual solution of the mystery of the universe, we demand that which God would not indeed grudge to give us, but which we cannot take. It is not, as some divines have put it, that He resents our “desire to be wise above that which is written ;” for doubtless He would have us wise to the farthest limit of our power : but that when we ask to have the secret of the universe, and of his government of the universe, put into our hand, we ask more than our hand can grasp, more than our intellect, while working under its present limitations, is able to receive ; more, too, than it would be good, even if it were possible, for us to have while our moral nature, which is of even greater moment than our intellectual part, is so imperfect, and needs the very training which only faith, only the ventures of a reverent and affectionate trust, can supply.

To know God is one thing ; to know all about God, all that He knows of Himself and of all things, is another. And, happily, we may know God, and so know as to trust and love Him, without knowing all that He is and all that He knows. And when once we really know *Him*, we shall learn the enormous insolence of the demand we are so often tempted to make ; viz., that the key to the whole course and aim of his Providence should be placed in our feeble and unready hands. This was the lesson Job had still to learn, and for the learning of which that deeper consciousness of his own “smallness,” “lightness,” “weakness,”—in one word, his own “limitations”—which we have heard him confess, was the best and inevitable preparation.

S. COX.

BRIEF NOTICES.

MESSRS. CLARK of Edinburgh could hardly have enriched their Foreign Theological Library with a more valuable and delightful work than *Dr. Godet's Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, of which the first volume has been recently issued by them. The Introduction contains more, and is more suggestive, than many a popular "Life" of the great Apostle: and even those to whom the man and his writings are most familiar may here find much to render their conception of his character, spiritual growth, modes of thought and of teaching still more vivid and complete. The Commentary proper, although it does not always put the largest and most generous conception on St. Paul's words of which they are susceptible—and this we hold to be the supreme canon of interpretation in dealing with the utterances of so large, generous, and catholic a mind—is nevertheless marked by the broad sympathies and delicate penetrating insight which have made Dr. Godet one of the most popular, esteemed, and influential expositors of the day. All who are content to move within the lines of Augustinian theology in its most modern and advanced forms will find themselves in full sympathy with this exposition of St. Paul's greatest Epistle, while even those who take an occasional excursion beyond those lines may yet learn much from it, and cannot fail to find in it much to love and admire. In fine, with this and Mr. Beet's Commentary at hand, every orthodox preacher of the Word may deem himself furnished with all he needs for the study of the grandest and most difficult Letter in the New Testament.

Canon Farrar's contribution to THE CAMBRIDGE SCHOOL BIBLE is one of the most valuable yet made. His annotations on *The Gospel according to St. Luke*, while they display a scholarship at least as sound, and an erudition at least as wide and varied as those of the editors of St. Matthew and St. Mark, are rendered telling and attractive by a more lively imagination, a keener intellectual and spiritual insight, a more incisive and picturesque style. They are marked, in short, by the very qualities most requisite to interest and instruct the class for which this work is designed. His *St. Luke* is worthy to be ranked with Professor Plumptre's *St. James*, than which no higher commendation can well be given.

The Household Library of Exposition makes a capital start with *The Life of David as reflected in his Psalms*. By A. MACLAREN, D.D. The idea of illustrating the life of David, as the life of Cowper or Burns might be illustrated, by his songs or poems, is itself a happy one: and it is here carried out very happily and skilfully. The life grows fuller and richer from the suggestions of the psalms, while the psalms kindle into new force and meaning when interpreted by the history of the poet, by the circumstances which prompted them. Real gems of exposition are to be found in this slight work which might be sought in vain from more erudite and ponderous tomes—as the reader may easily convince himself by noting the treatment of Psalm xxiv. in pages 174-184, Psalm cx. in pages 190-199, Psalm li. in pages 216-227, and Psalm xli. in pages 234-239. The defects of the work are a somewhat overstrained orthodoxy and an occasional over-intensity of expression. An instance of the first may be found on page 190, where the fact that Christ quoted “David” is not only expanded into the assertion, “Christ says that *David wrote*” the Psalm from which He quotes—an assertion much to be questioned, as Dr. Maclaren must know; but is followed by the comment, “Some of us are far enough behind the age to believe that what He said He meant, and that what He meant is truth”—which sounds too much like an insinuation that those who hold that to quote “David” was a common way of quoting the Psalter, and carries with it no specification of authorship, do *not* believe that Christ said what He meant, or do not defer to it as true. Instances of the second defect are more frequent, as might be expected; for the very intensity which is one of the finest qualities of Dr. Maclaren’s work easily slips beyond restraint: and, when it does, we find too much sound and fury in his words, though even at the worst they are far, indeed, from signifying nothing. Yet the book would be improved if some of these excesses were to be corrected—such, for example, as the “*cataract of calamities*” which fell on David’s head in his old age; or the “two *earthquakes* in his life”—viz., his anointing and his call to Court; or the description of the new Divine Name of Psalm xxiv. as “*crashing like a catapult*” at the gates of Jerusalem—here, indeed, the author needs to be reminded that gates do not turn or even “grate back on their brazen hinges” when they are crashed in by a catapult. These blemishes apart—and they are but blemishes—we have nothing but admiration and praise for this valuable little reprint.

WRESTING THE SCRIPTURES.

IN my last paper I tried, in the briefest compass, and from instances at once simple and salient, to shew that, without incessant caution, we may easily be led by ignorance of the text of Scripture, and exclusive dependence upon the English Version, not only into multitudes of minor errors, but, in some instances, to the adoption of opinions which are contrary to truth, and in others to the defence of tenable opinions by untenable applications of particular texts. I wish in this paper to offer a few slight hints upon the subject of other dangers to which the popular and controversial use of the Bible is peculiarly exposed. To give to these scattered hints their due significance it would be necessary to write much of that History of Exegesis which in the last number of THE EXPOSITOR I sketched in its broadest and rudest outlines. But my present object is far humbler. It merely is to point out different *tendencies* by which at all times the interpretation of Scripture has been led astray. Theoretically, most readers would be ready to admit that the necessity for avoiding such tendencies has been proved again and again in the history of the past; but many will perhaps declare that the progress of knowledge has now rendered such warnings superfluous. This is a great mistake. It would be easy, though it might be invidious, to prove from modern sermons, and modern commentaries, and from the daily

misuse of Scripture in party controversies, that it is a flattering self-deception to suppose that we are rescued from such liabilities to error; but any one who supposes that the religious world in general is now in possession of the true key to Scriptural interpretation has only to consider the "texts" which are quoted to refute some fixed but perhaps disputed opinion of his own, and he will not be long before he arrives at the conclusion that, in our exegetical methods as well as in other things,

Our days are heritors of days gone by.

1. We are, for instance, still liable to the dangers of Literalism.

There is a sense in which literalism is among the first duties of the Biblical interpreter. Even the instances adduced in the following pages, as well as many to which I referred in the last, are sufficient to prove that masses of erroneous and pernicious misinterpretation would have been rendered impossible, if Commentators had held fast to the rule that we ought to go to Scripture to find not what *we think*, but what the sacred writers said; that, so far as it is ascertainable, the meaning which their words must have had for their own contemporaries, and especially for those to whom they were addressed, is and must be the meaning which we are intended primarily to find in them; that we are dealing deceitfully with the Word of God when we interpret passages of Scripture into conformity with our own dogmatic bias in senses which were never attached to them by those who were as familiar as we are unfamiliar with the language, the circumstances, and the allusions of the speaker.

In *this* sense literalism—the rigid and determined exclusion of mere mystic fancies—the insistence on the grammatical, philological, historical, simple sense of the words of Scripture—the constant recollection that each writer is primarily speaking as *Judæus, ad Judæos, apud Judæos*—is of the extremest importance. When we consider all the baseless vagaries of Philonian allegory, and the influence which they exercised on the Christian schools of Alexandria, we gratefully acknowledge the services of the School of Antioch, and especially of Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, in rescuing Scripture from a treatment so arbitrary and so artificial. The fact that these great teachers were in advance of their age cost them some suspicion and isolation, but they had the immortal honour of being the founders of the rational—by which I mean the reasonable—school of Scriptural interpretation. St. Thomas of Aquinum laid down the rule: “*Let all the senses of Scripture be based upon a single literal sense, from which alone an argument can be derived, but not from those things which are allegorically stated.*”¹ Calvin, whose dreadful theology should not blind us to his high exegetical merits, admirably remarked in his introduction to the Epistle to the Romans: “*Certainly since this is almost the one duty of the interpreter, to lay open the mind of the writer whom he has undertaken to explain; in proportion as he leads his readers away from it, in that proportion does he wander from his proper aim.*” These rules of a vigorous and truthful common sense find their historical origin in the writings which emanated from the School of Antioch, and the maintenance of *such* a literalism must ever

¹ *Summa Theolog.* i. qu. i. art. 10.

henceforth be regarded as the first duty of a truthful Commentator.¹

It may be readily admitted that these great Antiochene theologians may have been as little exempt as others from "the falsehood of extremes;" and their human infirmity may sometimes have been manifested by their having carried their principles too far. Take, for instance, the estimate formed by Theodore of Mopsuestia respecting the Song of Solomon. He may have adopted a view respecting it which was unduly, because too *exclusively*, literal; and he was condemned for this view by various Church decrees, just as, a thousand years after, Castellio was driven from Geneva by Calvin for rejecting the book as uninspired. Whiston carried such opinions to a foolishly extravagant extreme when he spoke of the Canticles as having been "written by Solomon when he was wicked and foolish and lascivious and idolatrous." Yet the all but unanimous voice of the best modern criticism has long ago decided that—though any one who wills may, as a pious exercise, read the book in a typical or allegorical sense, such as that suggested in the headings of the chapters in our English Version—yet the primary intention of the Song is literal and idyllic, and that much of its primary and permanent value lies in the fact that it describes the triumph of a humble and virtuous love over all the blandishments of wealth and power. When some of

¹ Other theologians besides those quoted, have laid down the same rule; e.g. Cocceius, in the Introduction to his *Summa de Fœdere et Testam. Dei*: "Id significant verba quod significare possunt in integra oratione, sic ut omnia inter se convenient;" and Kuenen (*Criticæ lineamenta*): "Intelligere scriptorem is dicendus est, qui idem quod ille dum scribebat cogitavit, legens cogitat." See Immer, *Hermeneutik*, 26-67.

the Jewish Rabbis decided that the book "defiles the hands,"—or, in other words, that it is uncanonical,—the decision may have been due to an inadequate estimate of the sacredness of the simple lesson that God approves of a pure-hearted and faithful love.

The literalism, then, which may most briefly be described as the elucidation and acceptance of the original sense, is never dangerous; nay, it has furnished the one solid basis of all sound interpretation. But the literalism which *is* dangerous is that which sacrifices the sense to the mere sound; that kind of literalism which, either in ignorance or in wilfulness, insists on abiding by the hard and naked letter, in defiance of every rule which modifies the use of human language. "God," as Luther so admirably said, "*does not reveal grammatical vocables*, but He reveals essential things." All human language, from its very nature, from the very conditions of the beings by whom it is uttered and to whom it is addressed, is, and must be, imperfect. It is an asymptote to thought; it may approach ever nearer and nearer to the circumference of the idea which it wishes to express, but can never coincide with it. "The Law speaks in the tongue of the sons of men." The language of Scripture is full of gracious shadows—clouds which mercifully veil for our feeble vision the excess of light. Thousands of texts of Scripture, multitudes of the utterances of our blessed Lord Himself, were never meant to be taken *au pied de la lettre*; nay, they would, if so taken, stand in deadly antagonism to the very essence of his own Divine teaching. Paradox, and metaphor, and irony, and figures of speech of all kinds, and the general statement of truths applicable only to special circum-

stances, and the universal statement of rules which were never meant to exclude a multitude of modifications, are facts of human utterance which must be taken into consideration at every step. The sacred writers could not possibly frame their language with incessant reference to the assumption that theological interpretation would exclude the exercise of the simplest common sense. "We recognize," says Bullinger, "*no interpretation of Scripture as orthodox and genuine unless it has been sought from the Scriptures themselves, in accordance with the genius of the language in which they are written, and weighed with reference to circumstances,*"¹ and then only (he adds) when it coincides with the rule of faith and charity, and tends to the glory of God and the salvation of mankind. A meaning which would instantly have stamped serious words with downright absurdity in the minds of all who heard them can never be the true meaning. Where the literal sense is immoral and untenable, and where it can be shown that to adopt the literal sense would be to ignore the laws, idioms, and ordinary metaphors of the language in which the words were uttered, *there* literalism becomes the very worst kind of allegory. And in reading our English Bible it must constantly be borne in mind that the word by which another is translated may have a general resemblance to it in meaning, and yet may convey a widely different impression, and may connote an entirely different range of conceptions. This was why the Evangelists wisely transliterated a multitude of technical words, such as Pharisee, Sadducee, corban, &c., rather than represent them by imperfect equivalents. This was why they and our Blessed Lord Him-

¹ *Confess. Helvet.* ii. 2.

self, if He spoke Greek, refused to represent by some confused analogue the purely technical Hebrew word "Gehenna," and thereby set a sacred example which our translators have neglected, and have in consequence done irreparable, though unintentional, injury to the belief of many. But the strangest thing about the unintelligent literalism which dominates uncontrolled over the largest part of popular theology is that it is so perfectly arbitrary in its application. It will fasten with fierce tenacity upon one text or set of texts, while it calmly explains away another text or set of texts, which, if understood with equal literalness, would enforce the modification, or even the abandonment, of some favourite dogma. There are probably thousands who would, with ignorant fervour, apply the name of infidel to any one who should take an allegorical view of the narrative of the Fall, although Calvin applies the phrase "rude simplicity" to the way in which Moses speaks of God making coats of skins, and Luther says that we are not to interpret "God said" as though it meant a voice in the air. They would denounce as "rationalistic" any attempt to shew the great historic truth which lies behind the simple anthropomorphism in which the Book of Genesis describes God as confounding the language of all the earth at Babel, though St. Gregory of Nyssa speaks of the literal comprehension of the passage as "Jewish folly and nonsense." And yet the very same readers will, without the slightest warrant, apply the most extravagant allegory to the interpretation of verse after verse in the Canticles, and even they would hardly suppose that God literally "*came down to see* the city and the tower which the children of men builded." It was this arbitrariness which made the

Roman Catholic controversialists say that Scripture was treated by the Protestants as "a nose of wax," which they could twist in any direction ; a sword which they could put into any scabbard.¹ It was this determination to interpret everything by purely subjective standards which led to the bitter epigram—

Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.

But it is in the New Testament, and most of all in the interpretation of the words of our Lord that this literalism most strangely asserts itself. It was wonderful that the youthful Origen, the most allegoric of all Christian interpreters, should yet, from unacquaintance with a Jewish metaphor, have taken with absolute literalness the one text which led him, to his own ultimate sorrow, to wrong himself for life ;² yet in this respect he was only following the arbitrary method to which almost every reader is more or less addicted. The comprehension of so simple a truth as this—that Christ expressed many of the great laws which He came to inculcate under the form of extreme and unlimited paradox—would alone have saved Europe from multitudes of errors both in practice and in theory. John Bunyan used to be distracted with agony because he took quite literally the saying, "*If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place ; and it shall remove,*"³ and therefore felt driven to test his own faith

¹ Bellarmine, *De Verbo Dei*, III. 1, § 2.

² The proper understanding of the metaphorical character of Matthew xix. 12 can be best seen by comparing the three kinds of *εὐνοῦχοι* there referred to with those classed by the Rabbis under the heads of eunuchs "of the sun," "by men," and "by the hand of heaven." See my *Life of Christ*, vol. ii. pp. 156, 157, and Schöttgen, *ad loc.* Matt.

³ Matt. xvii. 20.

by bidding the puddles on the Bedford roads to dry up at a word. Yet he would never have been troubled had there been any one to tell him that Jesus was but using the strong imaginative metaphor of the East, which would be perfectly intelligible to his hearers from the language of their own prophets.¹ The notion that "to remove mountains" was to be taken quite literally was one which would have only caused a smile on the face of any hearers who were accustomed to confer on any great teacher the complimentary title of "a remover of mountains." They would have understood in a moment that their Lord was only expressing the Divine truth, that difficulties vanish before the prayer of faith.² Again, on the "*Sell all that thou hast*"—a special command given to one alone, and only because he demanded an heroic test—was founded the whole system which cursed Europe for centuries with multitudes of spiritual mendicants. Yet nothing but the crudest literalism would have prevented the recognition of the truth that the command had never been intended to have a general application, and that even those who were nearest and dearest to Christ retained their possessions without blame from their Master, and with direct benefit to the general good. In almost every doctrinal chapter of the New Testament the reader will find texts which have been taken literally by some teachers or some sect, while the whole chapter may be full of other texts of which the literal meaning is either rejected or explained away. In no subject is this

¹ "Who art thou, O great mountain? Before Zerubbabel thou shalt become a plain" (Zech. iv. 7). Comp. Jer. li. 25.

² St. Ambrose was, at least, nearer the mark than Bunyan when he said that "by this mountain is meant the devil" (Ambrose on Psa. xxxvi., p. 503).

license of private interpretation more strangely manifested than in everything which pertains to Christian eschatology. There the imagery of a parable will be paraded as decisive of one view, while the plainest literal statements will be set aside if they seem to favour another. It will be deliberately argued that the "council" and "the judgment" are to be taken literally as Jewish tribunals empowered to inflict fines and ordinary punishment for the offence of being angry or calling a man Raca ; while "the Gehenna of fire" in the next clause is not to mean a Jewish punishment, but is to be taken metaphorically of eternal torments, for the slightly added vehemence of calling him "Thou fool." Nay, more ; literalism and allegory will orthodoxically divide between them the clauses of the same verse, and it will be insisted that the "worm" is metaphorical in one clause, while the flame is material in the next. But perhaps one single clause may sufficiently illustrate the immense dominion which has been claimed by an arbitrary literalism. The Apostles, I firmly believe, would have held it to be impossible that a metaphor so simple, so intelligible, so universal as that which was employed by our Blessed Lord when He said, "*This is my body*," should originate a library of vehement literature and metaphysical discussion, and should lead to centuries of infuriated controversy, in which men should burn each other respectively for holding or for not holding it in a literal sense. Long ago Selden said that the doctrine of transubstantiation was an instance of "rhetoric turned into logic." By that pregnant remark he meant that Christ, when He used those words at the Last Supper, was speaking in accordance with those universally recognized laws of language

which (in the older and truer use of the word) were described as Rhetoric; and that, to take his phrase literally, and without reference to those laws, is to found syllogisms on a mistaken principle of grammatical interpretation. In all languages, "to eat" and "to feed upon" are metaphors, used alike by the refined and the ignorant, to express the most intense union, the most absorbing contemplation. Among the Jews, familiar with such forms of expression as that "Moses on Sinai was fed upon the music of the spheres," and that "The just shall eat of the glory of the Shechinah," nothing but the coarsest determination to cavil could have led to the remark made by the Galileans in the synagogue at Capernaum, "How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" It was a similar literalism which had, on another occasion, called forth the grave and sorrowful rebuke of Christ, "Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word."¹ On this occasion He only *repeated* his metaphor, which it was as inexcusable to misunderstand as it was to take literally the metaphors of the "leaven of the Pharisees" or the "water of life;" but to his disciples He said afterwards, with perfect distinctness, "It is the spirit that quickeneth; *the flesh profiteth nothing*: the words which I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." After such an explanation, the Apostles would have thought it inconceivable that neglect of the simplest rules of utterance could lead men from spiritual interpretations into degrading and unfathomable superstitions.

2. But if a raw literalism has led to many errors, what shall we say of that spirit of Allegory in which

¹ John viii. 43.

Scriptural interpretation has positively revelled? I use the word generally for the extravagant typology, the numerical mysticism, the spiritualizing homiletics which have often gone to the lengths of irreverently sacrificing the sacred letter for the sake of forcing upon it some dogmatic or moral inference with which it has not the remotest connection. The Rabbis began the process. Among them it reached its climax in the days when Rabbi Akhiva professed to find theological or ritualistic mysteries in every turn, or curl, or twist of a Hebrew letter—in the days when a frivolous scholasticism had run to its last dregs of feeble decadence. But long before the days of R. Akhiva, Philo had given a boundless license to the mystical and allegorizing principle; and when we explore the frozen sea of his abstractions we at once find ourselves in a region “where naught is everything and everything is naught.” He handed on his methods to the Fathers as the Palestinian Rabbis also handed theirs. We find in even the second century those numerical fancies—that adoption of strange inferences derived from giving numerical values to the letters of words—of which in Scripture itself there is not a single instance.¹ Thus, even as early as the Pseudo-Barnabas we find that the 318 servants with which Abraham liberated the captives of Sodom were made a type of Christ on the Cross, because 318 may be represented in Greek by the letters $\tau\eta$, of which τ stands for the cross, and η for the two first letters of the name of Jesus; and in Irenæus we find the notion that 666 (and not 616) must be the true

¹ The number of the Beast is not a case in point. It is merely an instance of a cryptograph adopted to avoid unnecessary danger. The number 666 meant “Nero Cæsar,” and to write that name openly would have involved the peril of a trial for *laesa majestas*.

reading of the number of the Beast, *because* (!) Noah was 600 years old when he entered the Ark, and the statue of Nebuchadnezzar was 66 feet high. Not to dwell on the extravagant development of typology, by which, for instance, Jacob becomes a type of Christ in seventeen particulars, and Moses in forty, and Joseph in forty-four, the Fathers sought for allegorical meanings in the plainest and simplest history until we find St. Jerome saying that to seek the literal sense is to eat dust like the serpent. Origen, whose critical contributions to the study of Scripture were of such incomparable value, marred the value of his exegetical labours by his assertion of a threefold sense in Scripture adapted to the Platonic trichotomy of man's being into body, soul, and reason (or spirit). He did not despise the literal sense, but treated it as a mere covering for the higher sense, just as the earthly nature of Christ veiled his Divine nature. His successors, Athanasius and Cyril, while they dropped the far more valuable grammatical and critical side of his labours, adopted his mystic and speculative principle of exegesis to its full extent, and used it to oppose the historical and critical school of Antiochene interpretation. "This allegorizing interpretation of the Bible made no distinction whatever between essence and form in the communication of Divine things, but regarded everything alike as having come from Divine suggestion. The followers of this mode of interpretation looked upon every word as equally Divine; they sought mysteries on all sides; they would not admit that there was any human element to be taken account of; they would not construe this element in accordance with its human individuality of character and human origin—would

explain nothing by reference to human modes of apprehension and development. Under the idea of shewing particular respect to the Bible, they undesignedly detracted from its authority ; because instead of understanding its human form from the history of its human evolution, and perceiving the Divine Spirit revealing Himself there, they explained the whole as a single production, after a system foreign indeed from the Sacred Word, but preconceived and preëstablished as a Divine one by themselves, that of foisting into, and implying in, the Bible what was not really there." ¹

Two instances, one from the New Testament and one from the Old, may suffice by way of passing illustration of a method which, if unchecked, would only reduce the Bible to one vast sea of uncertainty, and would place its interpretation at the mercy of prejudice and dogmatic bias. Both instances shall be taken from Hilary of Poitiers, who however, derived them from older sources.

(a) We may not be able in every instance to see the reason which led to the Levitic distinction between clean and unclean meats. Many very nugatory reasons have been invented, but Maimonides was certainly justified in the belief that sanitary considerations had a large, if not an exclusive influence, in guiding the decision. When allegory claims the right to play a part in the explanation, and we are told that animals which divide the hoof and chew the cud are clean because the cloven hoof symbolizes the firm walk of the believer, and the ruminating process the duty of meditating on the Divine counsels, we feel at once that we are beginning to tread upon a shifting quagmire ; but

¹ Neander, *Ch. Hist.* iv. 11. (E. T.)

when St. Hilary adds that "dividing the hoof" is a symbol of "believing in the Father and the Son," we feel that such wild misapplications tend only to make the Scriptures reflect every hue of fancy and every shade of belief, and we say with Cardinal Perron, that such explanations are *des gaietés joyeuses*.

Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic incredulus odi.

(3) It is quite pitiable to see how this allegorizing process has sometimes been adopted in such a way as to evaporate all poetry from the Bible. Who can read without delight the exquisitely glowing and simple passion of admiration for the works of God which breathes through the eighth and ninth verses of the 147th Psalm? But to Hilary the "clouds" are the writings of the prophets; and the "rain" the evangelical doctrine; and the "mountains which bring forth grass" are the Prophets and Apostles; and the "beasts" men; and the "young ravens" Gentiles. And he adds the remark—how false to the truth of God, how accordant with the conceit of theologians!—that to understand the verses literally is not only erroneous but irreligious—"Hæc ita intelligere non dicam erroris, sed irreligiositatis est." And yet even this is bearable in comparison with the application of similar principles to our Lord's discourses. The "fowls of the air, which neither reap nor gather into barns," are, it appears, the devils, and the "lilies of the field that spin not" are angels. Of all the words which our Blessed Lord uttered few expressed a deeper and more yearning tenderness than those in which He said: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father." The words need no special explanation.

They are transparent in their beautiful meaning. But in the hands of St. Hilary they at once lose half their meaning and all their loveliness, when the sparrows become sinners whose souls and bodies become both as one, the soul by sin thickening as it were into a body, and so forth,—until we have altogether lost sight of the boundless revelation of God's mercy, extending over all his works, but concentrated on each individual man as a child in that Family of which Christ is the elder brother.

Perhaps it may be said, This style of exegesis is quite exploded. Would that it were! Has the reader never heard it in sermons? Is it even confined to the unlearned? Let any one who thinks these warnings needless turn to Bishop Wordsworth's Commentary, where he will find hundreds of specimens of it, some borrowed, and some original. Let him turn, for instance, to the story of Jael. No one will sweepingly condemn the deeply seated treachery and cold-blooded murder of Jael without making every allowance for her time and her circumstances. But if they follow the guidance of Bishop Wordsworth, they are called upon to hold, first, that Jael was supernaturally inspired to commit that treacherous assassination; secondly, that "the act itself was clearly miraculous;" thirdly, that there is a parallel between the tent-peg with which she shattered the skull of Sisera and the stake by which the Gentiles enlarge the Church; fourthly, that there is a tenable comparison (borrowed from Origen and Augustine) of this tent-peg to the Cross; fifthly, that an elaborate parallel may be drawn out between Jael and the Blessed Virgin Mary; sixthly, a discovery, that since Heber takes no part in the story, there is a

mystery in the words, "the tent of Jael, the wife of Heber, the Kenite," because "*the tent in which the Lord of all took our nature, and tabernacled in us was the Blessed Virgin, and she was the wife of Joseph.* Yet Joseph had no part in the work by which the world was saved, and our enemy was destroyed." I quote these extraordinary remarks of a living prelate without comment; but surely—with the deepest and most sincere respect for his learning and goodness—I may venture to say that, be they Rabbinic, or be they Patristic, or be they what they will, they are unwarrantable fancies to which the name of exegesis cannot for a moment be accorded; that they are a mere pious play of the imagination of which the results are not in the most distant degree binding on any human being, and that however harmless and even edifying some persons may suppose them to be, they are liable to the peril of degenerating very rapidly and very perniciously into adulterating and handling deceitfully the Word of God.

(γ) Misplaced literalism and misplaced allegory are perhaps the two tap-roots which supply the constant life of Biblical misinterpretation. I will touch but very briefly on other dangers against which every expositor should be on his guard.

One is the danger of drawing extravagant or impermissible inferences from isolated expressions—what Coleridge so admirably described as "*the ever-widening spiral ergo out of the narrow aperture of single texts.*" We are bound by, we cheerfully accept, all that Scripture undoubtedly teaches as the drift and tenour of its revelation; we are not bound by, and we indignantly repudiate, the self-asserted infallibility of

all the conclusions which men may choose to deduce by whole series of syllogisms from isolated expressions; nor will we ever make the home of our faith in the inverted pyramids of argument which rest their precarious apex upon a single metaphor. If any one will try the deeply instructive plan of taking some one disputed passage—as, for instance, Galatians iii. 19, 20, with its “upwards of three hundred” different interpretations;—or some one disputed parable—say that of the Unjust Steward, where the unjust steward has been taken to mean the Pharisees, the publicans, Judas Iscariot, the Apostle Paul, and even (*spectatum admissi* . . . ?) the Lord Himself!—he will have not only an adequate but a glaring proof how small is the allegiance, how small even the shadow of respect, which he owes to the attempts which are still daily made to “force the senses of men upon the words of God, the special senses of men upon the general words of God, and to lay them both upon men’s consciences under the equal penalty of death and damnation.” When Archbishop Sancroft made “*Sirs, ye should not have loosed from Crete*” the text of a sermon against Dissent, because Crete was an Episcopal Church;—or when the Jacobites referred to the pale horse of the Apocalypse as a symbol of the white horse of the House of Hanover,—they were hardly in earnest. But Innocent III. was in deadly earnest when he argued from St. Peter’s “*Lord, here are two swords*” that he possessed the temporal as well as the spiritual authority; and derived a Scriptural argument for his usurpation from the remark that the Pope was the greater light to rule the day, and the Emperor the lesser light to rule the night. The extent to which the right to draw inferences has been assumed may be seen

from the misapplication of such a verse as "*I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not*" to establish Papal infallibility; of the expression "*filling up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ*" to support the doctrine of works of supererogation; and of the words "elect" and "predestinate" to rear the ponderous scholasticism of a pitiless and repellent theology. Not only was the right to draw inferences left without practical limits, but the rule laid down by St. Augustine was regarded as final down to the Reformation, that "all Scripture which is called the Old Testament, to those who desire to know it diligently, is handed down to us in a fourfold manner—according to history, according to ætiology, according to analogy, and according to allegory." From this rule came the proverb—

Littera gesta docet; quid credas allegoria;
Moralis quid agas; quo tendas anagogia.

The result of such developments was the multiplication of such commentaries as that on Job, in thirty-five books, by St. Gregory the Great, which, though it was the wonder of his contemporaries and of later times, is absolutely valueless for any critical or exegetical purpose. Another result was the blinking of all difficulties—the removal of which was supposed to be at once provided for by the ἀναγωγή εἰς το νοητὸν—the invention of a spiritual sense which could, and often did, practically set aside even the historic narrative, with all the priceless lessons which its due study is always certain to suggest.

(δ) Another danger is neglect of the context. It is so common a practice to make the *words* of Scripture a sort of talisman to conjure with, that scores of instances might be selected in which the application of a text to

express a particular conclusion can only be regarded as a *verbal* argument—an argument founded on a silent interchange of meanings, like the grotesque syllogisms adduced in logical handbooks to illustrate faults of logic. There are many cases in which the practice is so far harmless that it simply furnishes preachers with expressions and illustrations, and serves to impress undoubted truths by the apparent sanction of sacred language. Thus when our Lord's words, "*there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed*" (Matt. x. 26; Luke viii. 17), are adduced to warn men of the detection of hidden sins, the truth thus enforced has ample warrant in other passages of Scripture (1 Cor. iii. 13; iv. 5, &c.); but those particular words of Christ are shewn by the context to have a very different meaning—namely, the right use and further dissemination of the light which He revealed. When "*as thy days are, so shall thy strength be*" (Deut. xxiii. 25) are quoted to illustrate the proportionate mercy of God giving aid in the exact measure in which it is required, the truth is a blessed and beautiful one, but the passage itself is rendered of very dubious meaning because it consists in Hebrew of two words, both of which are ἀπαξ λεγόμενα. "*The secret things belong unto the Lord our God*" (Deut. xxix. 29) is a verse usually quoted to discourage all inquiry into mysterious doctrines; but the context shews that the meaning is, "We know our present duty; God alone knows our future destiny." "*I have trodden the wine-press alone*" (Isa. lxiii. 3) is constantly adduced as a prophecy of Christ's loneliness in the agony of Gethsemane. The merest glance is sufficient to shew that the reference is to the hour of vengeance and of judgment. These and many other misapplica-

tions of texts might well be regarded as harmless if the habit of using Scripture words in senses alien to the original intention did not lead to a carelessness respecting them which readily lends itself to direct dogmatic abuse. Were it not for this abuse it would be sufficient to bear in mind that, though the actual words are those of prophet or evangelist, "it is the speaker or preacher who is standing behind them and adapting them to his own purpose." When the texts are made the basis of sectarian exaggerations or of disputed theological doctrines, the evil of neglecting the context is seen in its true proportions. Take, for instance, the verse, "*The whole head is sick and the whole heart is faint*" (Isa. i. 5) which is always quoted by preachers anxious to enforce the doctrine of "total corruption." Nothing can be farther from the meaning of the original, which describes the results not of original depravity but of fruitless punishment. What strange conclusions as to the character of Paul and as to the language of confession have been derived from the expression, "*Sinners, of whom I am chief*" (1 Tim. i. 15), merely because it has been overlooked that he spoke under that oppression of conscience which he always felt from having been a persecutor of the Church of God. What eschatological inferences have been founded on the question of Isaiah (Chap. xxiii. 14), "*Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?*" Is it honest to quote the verse as though it referred to what are called "endless torments" when the context shews that the original reference is to the devastating fires of the Assyrian invasion? "*Where the tree fallcth there it shall be*" (Eccles. xi. 3) is an expression urged more frequently than any other to prove that the fate of every human

being must be made up finally and irrevocably at the instant of death. Is it not intolerable that it should be urged to quench any conceivable gleam of hope for any poor sinner beyond the grave, when in the first place it is a metaphor, and therefore wholly unsuited for the rigid proof of doctrine ; when, secondly, the metaphor, however unduly pressed, could never support the weight of inference which is laid upon it ; and when, above all, it has not so much as the faintest reference to the state of man beyond the grave, but is part of an exhortation to be diligent and trustful amid the unknown workings of the Providence of God ?

(e) Another fruitful source of Scripture misinterpretation is the neglect of other Scriptures. Our reference Bibles might be thought sufficient to avert the peril, but in reality they enhance it. The "parallel" passages referred to are often in no sense parallel, and can only be so regarded by taking an erroneous view of one of the two passages thus brought into juxtaposition. It would be very desirable in future reference Bibles that the passages referred to should sometimes be those which might even appear to be in direct contrast with, or even to stand in direct contradiction to, the one under consideration. Readers would thus be reminded that even an admitted truth must often be modified by the complementary and supplementary aspects of that truth ; and that so limited are our human faculties that in matters of faith, no less than in matters of reason, and in dealing with the difficulties of revelation, no less than in dealing with the difficulties of nature, we must rest faithful even in the face of apparent contradictions. The insistence on one set of truths while the others are ignored can only lead to onesidedness and error.

And here our Lord has given us the aid of his own Divine wisdom, for when the devil came to Him with that "It is written"—which has been in all ages the favourite method of that evil spirit which sometimes walks in churches under the disguise of an angel of zeal and light—our Lord met and mastered him, not by disputing his "It is written," not by shewing that these were (as is usual in such cases) mere garbled and misinterpreted quotations, but by simply opposing to them an "It is written again." And when, in an instance but too typical, the Sons of Thunder, excusing their human passion under Scripture precedent, wish to flash down fire from heaven, Jesus simply warns them (in a passage which, perhaps, for this very reason has been tampered with) that the Elijah spirit is not the Christ spirit, and that the crude desire for vengeance shews how little they had realized the difference between Carmel and the Mountain of Beatitudes. The guide for moral conduct is to be found in the spirit and unity of Scripture teaching, not in this or that precedent or text. "By what law would you justify the atrocity you would commit?" asks the young soldier in a great work of fiction. "If thou art ignorant of it," replied Burley, "thy companion is well aware of the law which gave the men of Jericho to the sword of Joshua the son of Nun." Yes, "but we," answered the divine, "live under a better dispensation, which instructeth us to return good for evil, and to pray for those who despitefully use us and persecute us."

(5) To these dangers arising from literalism, allegorizing, exaggerated inference, neglect of context, and neglect of other Scriptures, we might add many more. We might, for instance, shew the immense influence of

bias, leading men to all sorts of unconscious insincerities in interpretation, and causing them to wear a veil upon their hearts—a vast system of tradition which, with its ample and penetrating folds, covers every region of religious thought—like the veil which was upon the hearts of the Jews when Moses was read in their synagogues every sabbath day.¹ Take one broad instance. When Marcion read the Old Testament under the influence of bias, he imagined that it presented contradictions so flagrant to the spirit of the New that he set it down as the work not of God but of an imperfect Demiurge, and he wrote his famous *Antitheses* to try and prove the thesis of an irreconcilable opposition between the Law and the Gospel. Thus by subjective bias he was led to the extravagant conclusion that there is practically *nothing* of the true New Testament—the only Testament which he acknowledged as genuine—in the Old. On the other hand, the opposite bias of Christians has endeavoured to maintain that the morality of the Old Testament is as perfect and as finally authoritative as that of the New, and that *all* of the New Testament is in the Old; and this has led to a great mass of exegesis which will always strike unbiassed students as untenable, as extravagant, and even as dishonest, while yet they are prepared to accept heartily the old saying, “In Vetere Testamento Novum latet; in Novo Testamento Vetus patet.” A transposition of what belongs respectively to the old and new dispensations subverts the historical basis of both, and only leaves interpretation at the mercy of arbitrary assumptions. But when bias avowedly reigns supreme, when some temporarily

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 15.

dominant opinion arrogates to itself the name of the voice of the Church, and lays down the Tridentine rule, "*Ecclesiae est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione sacrarum Scripturarum*," then exegesis dies and theology decays. The repetition of an obsolete and unprogressive exegetical tradition becomes the shibboleth of orthodoxy, and commentaries sink into *catenæ* and *variorum* excerpts. What marked all the commentaries of the later scholastic age, it has been said, "is that only theological opinions or speculations are outwardly appended to Scripture without even an attempt at exegetical elucidation." In such ages men think that they are faithful to the Bible when they are faithful only to its utter misinterpretation. They betray it with a kiss.

Has not enough been said to shew that without great care and great humility we are all liable to the danger of "wresting the Scriptures," if not absolutely "to our own perdition," yet certainly to the injury of the truth, and therefore to the loss and damage of the Church and of mankind? In one sense we may possess the Holy Scriptures at the cost of a few pence; but to purchase the Scriptures is not to purchase a knowledge of the Word of God. "It is not," says a modern writer of genius, "to be had at that low figure, the whole long 119th Psalm being little more than one agonizing prayer for the gift of it, and a man's life well spent if he has truly received and learned to read ever so little a part of it." The very humblest, however young, however ignorant, however dull, may by the aid of God's holy Spirit learn from it enough, and more than enough, for his everlasting salvation. Without study and knowledge there are hundreds of pages of

it which we can never adequately understand, and there are perhaps many pages which we shall never thoroughly understand until a ray has fallen on them out of God's eternity; but this is certain, that without love and without humility a man may know it all by heart, and be thought of as a Master in Israel, and yet know less of the inmost life of it than a little Christian child.

F. W. FARRAR.

NOTE.—Since writing the above pages I have met with a book which, by the quotation on its title-page, furnishes a marked instance of this misapplication of Scripture. It is a volume of sermons called *Everlasting Punishment*, by the Dean of Norwich, and it explains its aim by these words, with which it is prefaced: "Ye have . . . strengthened the hands of the wicked, that he should not return from his wicked way, by promising him life" (Ezek. xiii. 22). I can scarcely suppress the sense of indignation with which I read this garbled misapplication of a Scripture text. It appears to me to illustrate all the worst faults and dangers which I have here endeavoured to point out, as well as the worst side of theological controversy and of the theological temper and spirit. The *object* of the quotation is too clear. It is meant to excite odium against those Christians who, in a perfectly reverent and devout spirit, have been led to the humble belief that Scripture nowhere excludes the possibility of that larger hope which many good and holy men—including canonized saints and fathers of the Church of God—have in all ages been permitted to cherish to the great comfort of their own souls, and the souls of many of God's most holy and loving children. No doubt it will be hailed by the hatred of ignorance as a good controversial missile; but—

(1) It is *garbled*. The intervening words are omitted. I suppose that even the Dean of Norwich could not say that to see the possibility of hope for some whom theologians would hopelessly condemn to endless torments, is *not* "to make the hearts of the righteous sad," unless "the righteous" *wish* their "*horribile decretum*" to be true.

(2) It is *misapplied*; for Ezekiel is speaking of immoral prophecies and of the arts by which they seduce men to fornication.

(3) It is *not true witness*; for no one has ever promised life to the wicked unless he repents.

(4) It is in all probability *mistranslated*; for the last words (and, like

the Apocalyptic scorpion, the quotation has its intended sting in its tail) should almost certainly be rendered as in the margin. The *spirit* in which it is made may be judged of by Dean Goulburn's *last* page, in which he tries hard to insinuate that any one who holds a different opinion from himself on this question must almost necessarily be "heretical" in other matters also. It is the old spirit—want of charity, want of tolerance, want of humility—which also breathes through the quotation which I have adduced from St. Hilary, in which, after setting aside the only possible explanation of a perfectly simple Scripture passage, he declares that explanation to be "not only erroneous, but irreligious." Such dicta and such quotations will soon be estimated at their true value—which is zero, or, rather, a negative quantity.

THE BOOK OF JOB.

VIII. THE THEOPHANY.

SECOND DIVINE REMONSTRANCE (CH. XL. 6—XLII. 6).

How to know God without knowing all that He is and does, how to stay himself on a Being whose ways are past finding out, is the lesson Job has still to learn. And he learns this lesson in the most singular but approved way—learns it by being shewn that even when God manifests Himself to man, man cannot comprehend Him, nay, cannot so much as comprehend any one of the works, or acts, in which He manifests Himself.

The mystery which Modern Science recognizes in the more subtle and recondite forces of Nature—in Energy, in Life, in Consciousness—was recognized by ancient thought in its more obvious, its more magnificent and impressive phenomena. But the mystery is the same wherever we find it. We may push back the dark line, or wall, at which our knowledge ends a little further; but, at the best, we soon reach it, and it

is as impassable to us as to the world's grey fathers. There is not a single term we use, however simple and common, of which we can grasp all that it covers and connotes. Our wisest word veils more than it reveals. The more we know the more humbly we confess that we know nothing as it is in itself; our very wisdom, our very reverence, makes agnostics of us, and compels us to admit that every item in the whole range of our knowledge floats unsteadily on a great deep of mystery impenetrable. How, then, can we affect to know Him who *is*, of whom the whole universe with all that it contains, and the whole course of human history with all its changes, are but partial and imperfect manifestations?

Comprehend Him we cannot; but we may know Him, and know Him on precisely the same terms on which we know anything of the universe around us, or of our fellow men. We do know much of the natural world, so much that, save in an idle play of fancy and speculation, we never doubt its existence, although every item of our knowledge soon runs up into mysteries we cannot fathom. And we know much of men, or of some men, although we frankly admit that we do not know even the man we know best *altogether*, much less interpret *all* that our neighbours are and do. While we confess that in their being and history there are profound mysteries which we shall never resolve, we nevertheless know that they *are*, and there are at least some of them whom we may reasonably and confidently honour and trust and love. As we know them, so also we may know God—know that He *is*; know that He reveals Himself to those who seek Him; know that He is worthy of our reverence, our trust, our

supreme affection. The mystery which shrouds Him from us need not hide Him from us any more than the mysteries of our own being need hide us from ourselves, or our incapacity to know all that is in men need hinder us from knowing them at all, or from committing ourselves to those who have shewn themselves worthy of our confidence and love. As many as care to know Him may find Him, as they find their fellows, in his works, his acts, his words.

It is to these revelations of Himself that He appeals—referring Job to them, referring us to them. In his Second Remonstrance Jehovah follows the very line of argument we have traced in the First. As yet the argument, or appeal, had not produced its due and full effect. It had rendered Job more sensible of his weakness indeed, of his inability to comprehend all the ways of God, of his presumption in assuming to criticise and censure them. But even when it is closed, he hints, as we have seen, that he is being overwhelmed by the majesty of God rather than receiving a reply to his doubts and fears. In fine, he has not yet learned his lesson. He is not sufficiently conscious of the limitations of his powers; he is not fully alive to his inability to grasp the mystery by which he is perplexed, or any adequate solution of it; nor is he, as yet, humbled to the very dust by the conviction of his own irreverence and insolence in presuming to censure a Providence he does not and cannot understand.

To this self-knowledge, since there is no other exit from his misery, he must be brought. And hence, in the Second Remonstrance, Jehovah does but iterate the appeal of the First, seeking by this benign iteration

to drive him to a conclusion he ought already to have reached. Once more, therefore, He challenges the man who has impugned his justice to wield, if he can, those cosmical forces, the play and incidence of which enter so largely into the Providence he had impugned (Chap. xl. 7-14); and once more He invites him to consider the works (Chap xl. 15—xli. 34) in which he saw the most marvellous exhibitions of the Divine Wisdom and Power: that he may thus come to know his own weakness more fully, and be more fully persuaded of the majesty and the beneficence of Him whose ways he had ventured to criticise and even to "condemn."

And, at last (Chap. xlii. 1-6), Job catches the Divine intention, responds to the Divine appeal; he confesses that he had known neither himself nor God, repents of his insolent attempt to clear himself by condemning his Maker, to assert his own integrity by impugning the righteousness of the original Source and Fountain of Righteousness, falls in utter submission before the great Adversary in whom he now finds, as he had long hoped to find, his Redeemer and Friend; and in and through that submission rises to his true triumph and reward.

CHAPTERS XL. 6—XLII. 6.

- CHAP. XL. *Then Jehovah answered Job out of the tempest and said.*
 7. *Gird up thy loins, now, like a man;
 I will question thee, and answer thou Me.*
 8. *Wouldest thou also impugn my justice?
 Wouldest thou condemn Me to clear thyself?*
 9. *Hast thou, then, an arm like God,
 Or canst thou thunder with a voice like his?*
 10. *Deck thyself, now, with pomp and majesty,
 And array thyself in glory and splendour;*

11. *Pour forth the floods of thy wrath,
Look on every one that is proud, and bring him low ;*
12. *Look on every one that is proud, and fell him,
And trample down the wicked in their place ;*
13. *Hide them altogether in the dust,
Bind fast their faces with darkness :*
14. *Then even I will acknowledge
That thine own right hand can help thee !*
15. *Behold, now, Behemoth, whom I have made no less than thee.
He feedeth on herbage like the ox :*
16. *Lo, now, his strength is in his loins,
And his might in the muscles of his flanks ;*
17. *He bendeth his tail like a cedar ;
The sinews of his thighs interlace :*
18. *His bones are strong tubes of brass,
Bars of iron are his ribs.*
19. *Of the works of God he is the masterpiece ;
He that made him hath given him a scythe :*
20. *The mountains also yield him pasture,
Where all the beasts of the fields disport themselves :*
21. *He coucheth under the lotus-bushes,
In the covert of reed and bulrush ;*
22. *The lotus-bushes cover him with their shade,
The willows of the stream hang round him.*
23. *Lo, he flieth not when the river is in spate,
He is fearless though a Jordan burst on his mouth !*
24. *Can one catch him when he is on the watch,
And pass cords through his nostrils ?*

- CHAP. XLI. *Canst thou draw out Leviathan with a hook,
Or with a line which thou canst sink into his tongue ?*
2. *Canst thou pass a rush rope through his nostrils,
Or pierce his jaw with a hook ?*
3. *Will he multiply supplications unto thee ?
Will he greet thee with soft words ?*
4. *Will he strike a bargain with thee
That thou mayest take him to be thy servant for ever ?*
5. *Canst thou play with him as with a bird,
And tie him to a string for thy damsels ?*
6. *Do the Fish-Guild traffic with him ?
Do they distribute him among the merchants ?*

7. *Canst thou fill his hide with darts,*
 Or his head with fish-spears ?
 8. *Lift thine hand against him,*
 Thou wilt not again bethink thee of battle !
 9. *See how thine hope is belied !*
 Is he cast down at the sight of thee ?
 10. *None is so bold as to rouse him up :*
 Who, then, can stand before Me ?
 11. *To whom am I indebted that I should repay him ?*
 Under the whole heaven all is mine.
 12. *Of his limbs I will not be silent,*
 Nor of his bruited strength and comely armature :
 13. *Who hath laid bare the surface of his coat ?*
 Who can enter his two-fold row of teeth ?
 14. *Who hath set open the doors of his face ?*
 Round about his teeth is terror !
 15. *The strong shielding scales are his pride,*
 Soldered together as with a close seal ;
 16. *Each joineth on to each*
 So that not a breath can come between them :
 17. *Each is joined to its fellow,*
 They cleave together and cannot be sundered.
 18. *His snortings cause a light to shine,*
 And his eyes are like the eyes of the morning ;
 19. *Out of his mouth go flames,*
 Sparks of fire leap out ;
 20. *From his nostrils cometh forth smoke*
 As of a cauldron on burning reeds :
 21. *His breath would kindle coals,*
 And flame issueth from his mouth .
 22. *On his neck dwelleth Strength,*
 And Horror danceth before him ;
 23. *The laps of his flesh cleave together,*
 Firm, immovable upon him :
 24. *His heart is hard like a stone,*
 Yea, hard as the nether mill-stone.
 25. *When he rouseth himself heroes tremble,*
 They are beside themselves with terror.
 26. *Let one attack him with sword,—it will not avail,*
 Nor spear, nor javelin, nor dart ;
 27. *He reckoneth iron as straw,*

- Brass as rotten wood ;
 28. The arrow cannot put him to flight,
 To him sling-stones are as chaff ;
 29. The club is accounted as stubble,
 And he laughs at the shaking of the spear.
 30. His belly is armed as with the sharp points of sherds,
 He stretcheth out a threshing-sledge on the mire ;
 31. He causeth the deep to boil like a cauldron,
 He maketh the sea like an ointment-kettle ;
 32. Behind him he leaveth a glistening track,
 One would take the deep to be hoary !
 33. There is not his like upon earth :
 Created devoid of fear,
 34. He disdaineth all the lofty,
 He is king over all the sons of pride.
- CHAP. XLII. Then Job answered Jehovah and said :
 2. I know that Thou canst do all things,
 And that nothing is too hard for Thee.
 3. [Thou saidst,] “ Who is he that darkeneth counsel without
 knowledge ? ”
 Yea, I have spoken of that which I understood not,
 Of things too wonderful for me, which I know not.
 4. [When I said,] “ Hear me, and I will speak,
 I will ask of Thee, and hear Thou me, ”
 5. I had heard of Thee with the hearing of the ear,
 But now mine eye hath seen Thee :
 6. Wherefore I retract, and repent
 In dust and ashes.

Chapter xl. Verse 7.—The challenge of Chapter xxxviii. Verse 3, is here repeated in identical terms, as if to imply that the very line of remonstrance and appeal taken in the first section of the Theophany is still to be carried on. But, in Verse 8, the real sin of Job—if not, so far as we know him, his only sin—is more directly and severely denounced than in any words we have heard as yet, whether from the lips of God or man. For the real sin of Job, a sin for which

his only excuse is to be found in his misery and his incorrigible honesty, was that he claimed his righteousness *as his own* ; and that, in order to maintain his own righteousness, he had dared to call in question the righteousness of God, condemning Him to clear himself. His ignorance, his desperation, his stubborn loyalty to facts, his determination not to say more than he could see, and to speak out all that was in his heart, might palliate and account for his offence ; but nothing could justify it. For Jehovah could only be tried by his peers : and where was his peer to be found ? In his criticisms and censures of the Divine Providence Job had assumed that, had he been in the place of the Almighty, he would have ruled the world more wisely and justly, would have shewn a more invariable and equitable favour to the good, and have smitten the evil with a swifter and more exact retribution for their crimes. But how could he tell what he would have done had all power in heaven and on earth been committed to him, had he known all men, all events, and all their causes and issues ? The ignorance, which made him bold and overbold, should have made him diffident and self-distrustful ; the weakness, which rendered him the prey of passionate and uncontrolled excitement, should have constrained him to reverence and awe : the very integrity of which he was conscious, and somewhat too conscious, since this too was the gift of God, should have assured him that the Giver of it must be just. Only a fellow of the Lord of Hosts, his equal in wisdom, in power, in goodness, could possibly judge Him aright. Had Job, then, any pretension to be his fellow and peer ? Had he an arm like his (*Verse 9*) ? Let him, if only in imagination

and for a moment, climb the seat of Supreme Authority, and don the vestures, woven of light, worn by the King of kings; let him mount the chariot of the sun and fling the bolts of retribution on the wicked and the proud (*Verses 10-14*), and mark what would ensue before he ventures to arraign the justice of Jehovah, or to assume that his rule lacked wisdom or equity. If he is content with the results of that usurpation, then, indeed, even Jehovah Himself will defer to him, and acknowledge the might of his hand; but if he shrink from the mere thought of so vast and bold an adventure, how is it that he does not shrink from sitting in judgment on the Almighty and even condemning Him?

At the very lowest, he who claims to be wiser than God, and of a more perfect equity, even if he shrink from climbing to the seat of the Heavenly Majesty, should be prepared to prove his claims by deeds comparable with those which command his admiration and the admiration of the world. He who arraigns the Ruler of men, can he so much as rule the beasts that perish? He who challenges the Lord and Creator of the Universe, can he so much as rival any one of his creative masterpieces? *This* seems to be the ruling and informing thought of the Verses that follow in Chapters xl. and xli. To deepen Job's sense of his presumption and injustice Jehovah once more calls him to study and consider the marvels of the natural world. As even in the creatures with which he was most familiar—as, for example, the Goat, the Bison, the Ass, the Lion, the Raven, the Hawk, the Ostrich, the Eagle, so also in those which were most strange and wonderful to him—as Behemoth and Leviathan—he

would find proofs of a creative skill and providential goodness, before which even he, the critic and censor of the Almighty Maker, could only stand humbled and abashed.

On the two pictures which he now proceeds to elaborate the inspired Artist evidently lavishes his utmost skill. He regards them—he might well regard them—as his masterpieces, even as he also regarded the creatures whom he paints as the masterpieces of their Maker's skill in the animal world (Chap xl. 19; xli. 33). And if his delineations of the Hippopotamus and the Crocodile—mainly because these creatures are not so attractive to us in themselves—do not move us to the same admiration we feel for the Verses in which he depicts the Eagle and the Horse, we can nevertheless understand how profoundly they would impress the men of his own generation, who had heard strange incredible rumours of these monstrous denizens of the Nile, but had never seen them, and had never even met with any graphic and vital description of them. It is easy for us to fancy a Hebrew of Solomon's time sitting under his vine or fig-tree, with this Poem in his hand, rapt in astonishment as he read the glowing Verses which brought these powerful and monstrous forms before him for the first time, and enabled, or even compelled, him to see them as they lived, couching under the lotus-bushes of the Nile or rushing through its sealike stream.

Tristram has them both in his Natural History; and therefore I need only give a few brief exegetical notes.

Verses 15–24.—The Hebrew word *Behemoth* means simply “the beast,” *i.e.*, the beast *par excellence*. Many of the elder Commentators supposed that in these

Verses we had an ideal description of "the typical great beast," an abstract and brief chronicle which combined the more notable features of several species, such as the elephant, the aueroch, and even the mammoth, with other extinct pachyderms. But since the time of Bochart most of the Commentators are agreed that, though the Poet may be describing a type or ideal, he has the Hippopotamus alone in his eye; that, if we have an ideal here, it is the ideal *Pihemont*, as the Egyptians call this "ox of the water." And, beyond a doubt, this massive beast answers sufficiently to every detail of his description. For the hippopotamus does "feed on grass like the ox;" he is strictly herbivorous, "and makes sad havoc among the rice-fields and cultivated grounds when at night he issues forth from the reedy fens."¹ His mouth is enormously large and shovel-shaped, so that it can grasp a vast quantity of food in a single bite. His appetite is immense, and his formidable tusks are so modified in shape that he "can eat the grass as neatly as if it were mown by a scythe"² (*Verse 19*). Though a denizen of the water, the hippopotamus feeds on land, climbing the high grounds adjoining the river in which he has his haunt; "the mountains also yield him pasture" (*Verse 20*). Lichenstein, in his *Travels in South Africa*, says that "the natives take advantage of this habit by placing sharp-pointed stakes in his path, which pierce him as he descends." But his home is in the water, under the shady covert of the overhanging banks, or among the reeds and water-plants of the marshes. That "he coucheth under the lotus-bushes, in the covert of reed and bulrush" (*Verse 21*) is confirmed by

¹ Tristram.² Wood.

the Egyptian monuments, in which he is often depicted as lying among the tall reeds and lotuses of the Nile.

Verse 23 contains a phrase of some difficulty: "He is fearless though a *Jordan* burst on his mouth." If we are to retain the word "Jordan," we must take it as a common noun, applied to every river with a fierce and tumultuous current, and subject, like the Palestinian river, to a sudden and heavy rise in the volume of its waters. But an allusion to the river of Palestine is so foreign to the whole tone of the Poem, which has no specifically Hebrew allusions in it, and moreover it is so out of place in this clause of the Poem, the hippopotamus not being a denizen of the Jordan, that there is much weight in a conjectural emendation of the text which proposes to read "*For*" (an Egyptian name for the Nile, or one of its branches) instead of "*Jordan*," and assumes that this, the original word, may have been altered by an early copyist to whom *For* was an unknown term.

Chapter xli. Verses 1-34.—Beyond a doubt "*Leviathan*" (*livyathan*) was the common Hebrew name for the Crocodile, although in one passage, Psalm civ. 26, it appears to denote one of the great cetaceans which "played" in the Mediterranean Sea. In the opening Verses of the Chapter, and especially in *Verse 5*, there may be, though probably there is not, a covert allusion to the fact that, at least in the district of Egypt in which the Crocodile was worshipped, even this ferocious and unconquerable reptile had been caught and tamed. Herodotus (Book ii. chap. 69) says: "The crocodile is esteemed sacred by some of the Egyptians, by others he is treated as an enemy. Those who live

near Thebes, and those who dwell around Lake Mœris, regard them with especial veneration. In each of these places they keep one crocodile in particular, who is taught to be tame and tractable. They adorn his ears with earrings of crystal or of gold, and put bracelets on his forepaws, giving him daily a set portion of bread with a certain number of victims; and, after having thus treated him with the greatest possible attention while alive, they embalm him when he dies and bury him in a sacred repository." But the keen, almost contemptuous irony of the passage forbids us, I think, to see any allusion to this Egyptian custom. Indeed I do not quite understand by what process an allusion to the taming of the Crocodile has been extracted from a description of its untameable ferocity and pride.

In *Vers*e 6, on the other hand, there is an unquestionable reference to an Egyptian custom in the words "Do the Fish Guild (literally, "the Companions" or "the Confederates") traffic with (or "in") him? do they distribute him among the merchants?" For in Egypt, as in many Eastern lands, "guilds" were as common and as influential as they were in Europe during the Middle Ages. The word for "merchants" is "Canaanites," *i.e.*, Phœnicians—the Phœnicians being the great trading community of Solomon's time.

The impenetrable hide of the Crocodile, referred to or described in *Verses* 7, 15-17, 26-29, is one of his most remarkable features. His whole head, back, and tail are covered with horny quadrangular plates, or scales, set so closely together that the sharpest spear can seldom find its way through them, and even a rifle ball glances off them if it strike obliquely.

Another characteristic feature is noted in *Verses* 13 and 14. "The Crocodile has a single row of teeth in each jaw, implanted in sockets, from which they are reproduced when lost or broken."¹ "The teeth are all made for snatching and tearing, but not for masticating, the Crocodile swallowing its prey entire when possible; and when the animal is too large to be eaten entire, the reptile tears it to pieces, and swallows the fragments without attempting to masticate them."² It has no lips to hide its formidable jaws. "*Round about his teeth is terror!*"

Verses 18-21 describe the Crocodile as he emerges from the water, violently emitting the long-repressed and heated breath; the thick vapour, glistening in the sun, looks like the smoke and flame of burning reeds or coals. Bertram, in his *Travels in North and South Carolina*, says: "I perceived a crocodile rush from a small lake, whose banks were covered with reeds. It puffed out its enormous body, and reared its tail in the air. *Thick smoke* came with a thundering sound from his nostrils. At the same time an immense rival rose from the deep on the opposite bank. They darted one at another, and *the water boiled* beneath them." The last phrase is a capital illustration of *Verses* 31 and 32.

The "threshing-sledge" of *Verse* 30 is of course *the tail* of the Crocodile. And this is his most formidable weapon, at least on shore. It is "one mass of muscle and sinew." Sweeping it from side to side, this heavy unwieldy-looking reptile *sculls* himself through the water at a rate well-nigh incredible. Modern Egyptians affirm that with a single blow of its tail it can break all four legs of an ox or a horse.

¹ Tristram.² Wood.

Shakespeare's allusion ¹ to this "king over all the sons of pride" is quite in the spirit of "Job."

We may as bootless spend our vain commands
Upon the enraged soldiers in their spoil
As send precepts to the leviathan
To come ashore.

Chapter xl. 2.—At last Job has learned his lesson. He has learned that he is incompetent to sit in judgment on Jehovah, since he who cannot comprehend any one of the "wonders" of God must, of necessity, be unable to comprehend the Doer of them all. He has learned that even his integrity is not his own in any sense which entitles him to be proud of it, or to take his stand upon it against God, but is rather the result and outcome of God's grace working inwardly and secretly on his offspring, the Divine image shining up through human infirmities, limitations, defilements. This, indeed, is a truth of which he had caught some glimpses before Jehovah spake to him out of the tempest; for as often as he had confessed (*Cf.* Chap. xxviii. 28; xxxi. 14, 23) the fear of the Lord to be the beginning of wisdom, the root and guarantee of all righteousness, he had virtually acknowledged that he owed his very integrity to Heaven. But the truth he had virtually acknowledged had logical consequences of which he was not fully and practically aware, or which he had not inwardly and strongly felt. It is only now, when he has seen God for himself, that the sense of his own weakness, folly, temerity, presumption comes home to him, and he is so ashamed of having dared to contend with the Giver of all good, and the

¹ Henry V., Act iii. scene 3.

Lord of all power and might (*Verse 2*), that, as he recalls the Divine challenge (*Verse 3*; comp. Chap. xxxviii. 2), "Who is this that darkeneth counsel with words devoid of wisdom?" he frankly confesses that, in questioning the Providence which shapes the ends of men, he had intermeddled with things too high and wonderful for him, and leaped perilously and foolhardily into the great darkness which bounds all human knowledge. Nay, more; as he remembers (*Verse 4*) how, strong in the consciousness of his own integrity, and maddened by misery, he had ventured to arraign and even to condemn the Almighty, he is overwhelmed by a conviction of his own *guilt* as well as of his weakness; and not only confesses that

Merit lives from man to man,
And not from man, O Lord, to Thee !

but also acknowledges that up to this moment he had never truly known either God or himself, or had known Him only by hearsay, and not with the piercing insight of faith. Now that he sees himself in his true proportions, and has at least some inkling of the Majesty and Grace which, after having filled and overflowed the narrow compass of man's mind, swells out in boundless tides of glory infinitely beyond it, he is amazed at his own presumption in having assumed to measure them by any poor faculty he can call his own: he is cut to the very heart by a sense of his transgression; he humbly and wholly retracts all his questions, criticisms, charges, censures, doubts, and flings himself before God in utter penitence and self-abasement—repenting "in dust and ashes" like one bowed down by deep and inconsolable grief (*Verses 5 and 6*).

But when Job thus humbles himself under the mighty hand of Him with whom he had so long striven, but striven only that he might constrain Him to tell him his Name and to win a blessing from Him, we should greatly err were we to collect from his shame and contrition that at length he “renounces his integrity,” and admits that he had incurred his misery by heinous and wanton sins such as those of which he had been suspected by the Friends. The transgression which he really confesses and renounces was committed *after* he had lost all that he had, and consisted in his misinterpretation of his misery. His transgression was, indeed, the immediate offspring, if not of his piety, yet of his theology. Holding, with the Friends, that suffering had no other cause than sin, and no other end than punishment, when God afflicted him he took the affliction as “a *de facto* accusation” of sin. Persuaded that he had not so sinned as to provoke the judgments which fell upon him, he resented them—resenting still more hotly the accusation he read in them; and charged God foolishly, since God, so far from accusing him of sin or punishing him for it, was even then boasting of him as a just man and perfect, and was but purging and refining him that He might raise him to a higher and more ample perfection.

Before Job could regain peace, therefore, he must be convinced that he had misjudged God, that he had misinterpreted the end and purpose of the Lord concerning him. And how could he be more feelingly persuaded of his error than by being taught his necessary and inevitable incapacity to judge God aright, to grasp and comprehend his works and ways—much more Himself—or to read his purposes in his acts? It

was to convince him of this incapacity that he was catechized as we have heard him catechized throughout the Theophany, the keen edge of the Divine irony pressing every question more closely home. He who was fain to penetrate the very arcana of the universe is, as it were, sent back to the alphabet of the phenomenal world, to the "*abecedarium naturæ*:" and as he stumbles over his alphabet it is demanded of him, with a humour as loving as it was keen, how he, who cannot spell out his very letters, the mere rudiments of the simplest and most universal Revelation, can pretend to comprehend the ways of God with man—the sum and crown of his works—and with a whole world of men, in the lot and fate of each of whom these were mysteries as profound, as insoluble, as those which darkened his own? How, in especial, could he hope to penetrate the great mystery which has most of all perplexed the thoughtful and good of every age—the mystery of pain, of loss, of grief, of evil?

This, I take it, was the line of argument, all charged with emotion, along which Job's mind was led, and by which Jehovah broke down the obstinate questioning attitude of his spirit, and made him so conscious of his guilt as well as of his weakness as virtually to exclaim:

The best of what we do and are,
Just God, forgive!

It was this which, by inducing penitence, restored faith, rekindled love, quickened a new heart in him, like the heart of a little child, and made him a new man.

S. COX.

THE VALUE OF THE PATRISTIC WRITINGS FOR
THE CRITICISM AND EXEGESIS OF THE BIBLE.

III.—EXEGESIS (*continued*).

It is now just two years since an article¹ appeared in the *Quarterly Review* which excited a good deal of attention at the time, describing in some detail the life and character of the one great authority on Patristic Literature that the Church of England possessed in the first half of the present century — Dr. Martin Joseph Routh, President of Magdalen College, Oxford. Among the many interesting reminiscences which that article contained was one which, though it will doubtless be remembered by many of those who may glance over these pages, it may perhaps be worth while to repeat in connection with the special subject of this chapter. Dr. Routh was once asked by a young student if “there was any commentary on Scripture which he particularly approved of, and could recommend.” He seemed to take little notice of the question at the time, and gave it no direct answer; but about a year afterwards his questioner received a hint that the President would be glad to see him, and much to his surprise the old man at once went back to the point about which he had been interrogated.

He turned to me, and said rather abruptly, “When you have finished, sir, I have something to say to you.” I was dumb. “Do you remember, sir, about a year ago asking me to recommend to you some commentary on Scripture?” “Perfectly well; but I am altogether astonished that you should remember my having taken such a liberty.” He smiled good-naturedly; remarked, with a slight elevation of his hand, that his memory was not amiss, and then went on somewhat thus: “Well, sir, I have often thought since, that if ever I saw you again I would answer your question.”

¹ Commonly attributed to Dr. Burgon, Dean of Chichester.

I was delighted, and said so. He went on : " If you will take my advice, sir (an old man, sir, but I think you will find the hint worth your notice), whenever you are at a loss about the sense of a passage in the New Testament, you will ascertain how it is rendered *in the Vulgate*; the Latin Vulgate, sir. I am not saying" (here he kindled, and eyed me to ascertain whether there was any chance of my misunderstanding him) "*not* that *the Latin* of the Vulgate is inspired, sir" (he tossed his head a little impatiently and waved his hand)! "Nothing of the sort, sir; but you will consider that it is a very faithful and admirable version, executed from the original by a very learned man—by Jerome—in the fourth century; certainly made therefore from manuscript authority of exceedingly high authority; and in consequence entitled to the greatest attention and deference." I have forgotten what he said besides; except that he enlarged on the paramount importance of such a work.¹

At the time when this advice was given the age of modern commentary writing was only just beginning to set in. The epoch-making works of Meyer and De Wette were already in use in Germany, but they were not yet naturalized in England. Grotius, Bengel, and perhaps Hammond, were the only commentaries at all of the first order to which the average English reader would have access. The labours of Mill were confined to the text. The prince of English scholars, Bentley, had touched occasionally upon New Testament exegesis, and where he had done so he had shewn the same masterly grasp as in other directions, but the places illustrated by him were few and far between. The most conspicuous contemporary commentator was Dr. Blomfield, Bishop of London, and his achievements were not by any means such as to throw earlier works into the shade.

But if it is not surprising that such preëminence should be assigned to the Vulgate in New Testament exegesis, it is perhaps less easy to understand why Dr. Routh should have limited his recommendation to

¹ *Quarterly Review*, No. 291, July, 1878, pp. 30, 31.

that portion of the Bible. Probably the reason is only to be sought in his own greater familiarity with New Testament studies. Otherwise an even stronger claim might be put in for the part which contains the Old Testament. It is true that here, too, Gesenius and Ewald had already broken the ground for a more scientific exegesis, but putting these on one side, it would seem to be very doubtful whether the English reader could have found any single commentary that would have thrown as much continuous light upon the whole of the Old Testament as Jerome's translation.

Taking all his work together, there is not one of the Patristic writers who has done as much for the interpretation of the Bible. In the Old Testament he stands alone. None but he approached it with anything like an adequate knowledge of the language in which it was written. To complain that even his knowledge does not come up to the standard of modern scholarship is mere pedantry. We have already seen that such knowledge as he possessed was derived orally from Jewish teachers. It was not systematized in grammars and lexicons, but was picked up by questions and conversation, much as a temporary resident in a foreign country might pick up the language of the country in which he was staying at the present day, but with the further disadvantage, that in Jerome's case the language that he had to acquire had ceased to be spoken, and was only preserved in a not very trustworthy tradition.

A simple test of the degree of proficiency to which Jerome attained may be seen in the rapidity with which the translation was executed. For the whole of the Old Testament he took about fifteen years—from 390

to 405 A.D. ; ¹ years filled with other exegetical works, with a constant interchange of letters, and with more than one prolonged and bitter controversy ; years broken by sickness and interrupted by barbarian invasion. Single examples tell the same tale even more clearly. Jerome had been much pressed for a translation of the Book of Tobit. This was written in Aramaic, a tongue which he did not understand. Accordingly he got a Jew to turn it for him into Hebrew, and as fast as it was translated for him, he dictated to the scribe his own Latin Version. "For this," he says, "I snatched the work of one day."² To the Book of Judith he could devote still less. "To this," he says, "I gave a single sitting" (*unam lucubratiunculam*), part of which must have been taken up with the criticism of the text which Jerome found in great disorder.³ The Book of Tobit contains fourteen chapters and 244 verses, and the Book of Judith sixteen chapters and 339 verses, so that the reader may form some idea of what Jerome could do when working at high pressure. These facts speak volumes not only for his practical familiarity with Hebrew, but also for his dexterity as a translator, his command of his own native tongue, his power of work, and his general ability.

Of course, it is not to be supposed that all parts of the translation were dispatched at this prodigious rate. It is one of the chief merits of Jerome that he took up so bold a position as he did in regard to the Apocrypha. In regard to these two books, Tobit and

¹ Zöckler, *Hieronymus*, pp. 183, 184 ; Diestel (*Gesch. d. A. T.* p. 96) gives the date at which the work was begun as 392, but the earlier date seems to be the more correct.

² *Prefat. in Tobiam.*

³ *Prefat. in lib. Judith.*

Judith, he apologizes for translating them at all, throwing the responsibility, in the one case, upon the Bishops, Chromatius and Heliodorus, at whose request the translation was made; and in the other, upon the Council of Nicæa, which was said to have reckoned the Book of Judith amongst Holy Scripture.¹ We cannot, therefore, draw any inference as to the degree of care likely to be expended upon the canonical books. Applying a different test, and judging rather by results, we find that on this criterion the verdict upon Jerome's work is satisfactory. The Septuagint Version was made by bilingual Jews at a time when the knowledge of the Biblical Hebrew must have been both fresher and more extensive than was possible some five or six hundred years later. And yet it seems to be admitted on all hands that Jerome's version is distinctly better than the Septuagint. In some parts, at least, the philological knowledge displayed is greater;² and throughout Jerome must bear the palm as to literary skill and power.

These two qualities, along with a third—unrivalled learning in the works of previous commentators—characterize the whole of Jerome's writings on the Old Testament, and place them even now at the head of all the patristic literature upon the subject. The commentaries have the same excellences and the same defects as the Vulgate. They present a strong contrast to those of Theodore of Mopsuestia. That writer, as we have seen, possessed practically no philological equipment. Not only was he entirely ignorant

¹ See the *Prefaces* (Tischendorf's *Bibl. Sacr. Lat.*, V. T. p. xlviii).

² See the art. "Hebrew Learning" in Smith's *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* vol. ii. p. 868.

of Hebrew, but he did not even see that this ignorance was any drawback. His style was at once diffuse and obscure. He went on his own way, caring little to amass materials from those who had gone before him. But all these deficiencies are compensated by his penetrating grasp on the principles of Biblical interpretation. We have little to do but to invert each of these propositions in order to form a very fair idea of the characteristics of Jerome. His philological equipment was, as we have seen, by far the best in all antiquity. No other of the Fathers was, in the least degree, competent to undertake what he undertook,¹ and not only undertook, but carried out with, on the whole, remarkable success. By a piece of singular good fortune he seems to have obtained access to the best Jewish tradition of his time, and the mere fact that he is the vehicle of this tradition invests his writings with importance for the critical scholars of the present day. As his text approached closely to that of the Masoretic editors, so also his interpretation represents more fully than any other extant work can do the authorized and accepted traditions of the most eminent Jewish scholars. Without assuming that that tradition was necessarily right, it could not fail to be, from a merely historical point of view, most valuable.

Then, again, his style is brilliant. It sparkles with epigram and with fine and uncommon, though at times somewhat turgid, metaphor. Erasmus could find in it something that was wanting even in Cicero.² That something was probably the native force and fiery energy which was foreign to the smoother periods of the

¹ Diestel, *Gesch. d. A. T.* p. 94; Merx, *Joel und ihre Ausleger*, pp. 156, 168.

² Quoted in Zöckler, *Hieronymus*, p. 340, n.

master of classical Latin. Jerome by no means avoids errors of taste. His very command of metaphor is accompanied by too little discrimination. In his desire to place a subject in its most graphic light no scruples of delicacy restrain him. His invective is coarse and savage. But whatever else it may be, or may not be, his prose is always alive; it has always a buoyant and forcible movement that carries the reader along with it. Learning in his hands never becomes dull. The brilliant writer is nowhere lost in the mere collector.

And yet as a collector, too, Jerome accumulated stores such as no other writer of ancient times has left behind him. He has made amends for the loss of so many of the works of Origen by incorporating the comments of that great author largely among his own; and not only those of Origen, but of many other writers, famous or obscure. Any one who wished not so much to make acquaintance with some one of the greater minds of antiquity as to form an average conception of the nature of patristic exegesis could not do better than go to Jerome. He would find there the digest that he sought made ready to his hand.

But the same thing which was in one sense Jerome's strength was in another his weakness. Jerome is before all things eclectic. Both in principles and in details he was vacillating and uncertain. Even in regard to the Septuagint he was not consistent. He frequently quotes either from the Septuagint or the Old Latin in preference to his own version, and in that version many errors have been allowed to stand which he had himself directly combated.¹

In like manner in regard to the interpretation. It

¹ See Zöckler, *Hieronymus*, p. 363.

is not difficult to find in the writings of Jerome excellent maxims as to the importance of ascertaining the historical sense. He speaks with scorn of those who, "coming, like himself, to the study of Holy Scripture from that of profane literature, after they have caught the popular ear with their rounded periods, imagine that whatever they say must needs be the law of God; nor do they condescend to learn what was the opinion of prophets or apostles, but fit incongruous proofs to their own opinions; as if it were a fine thing and not a most perverted method of teaching to distort expressions and wrest reluctant Scripture into agreement with one's own fancies."¹ Again: "I am obliged, against my own will, frequently to discuss the peculiarities of the Hebrew tongue; for we do not copy the orators in hunting after periods, piling together words, and exciting the hearers or readers to applause by our declamations; but things which are obscure, and naturally so, to people of another tongue, we are doing our best to explain."² In sending to Amabilis what he calls a literal or historical exposition of a part of Isaiah, he says that his object is "not to win praise for his own efforts, but to have the words of the prophet understood; nor does he make a boast of his own eloquence, but what he seeks is rather a knowledge of the Scriptures."³ At the end of the commentary on Obadiah he bids the discreet reader look rather for consecutiveness in the sense than for elegance of style.⁴ In his Preface to the same prophecy he remarks that he had first taken it up in his youth, and returned to it in his old

¹ *Epist. ad Paulinum* (ap. Tischendorf, *Bibl. Sacr. Lat.* p. xxx.)

² Vallarsi, *Hieron. Op.* tom. vi. p. 118.

³ *Ibid.* tom. iv. p. 169.

⁴ *Ibid.* tom. p. 386.

age: "'When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.' If the Apostle makes progress and passes on to the things that are before, forgetting that which is behind, and according to the precept of our Saviour he who has put his hand to the plough is not to look back, how much more may I, who have not yet reached the age of the perfect man, the stature of Christ, claim indulgence if in my youth, carried away by an ardent temper and zeal for the Scriptures, I interpreted allegorically the prophet Obadiah, the history of which I did not understand?"¹ Of this juvenile attempt Jerome is now heartily ashamed. Nor is he content with seeking for the historical sense himself, but he notes repeatedly the absence of any adequate treatment of it as a blemish in the works of others.

And yet this very same writer, who is so anxious to restrict allegorizing and to secure a plain, direct, literal interpretation—this very same Jerome is himself full of extravagant allegories. Nor are these isolated or accidental, but they run through whole books at once. In the Book of Leviticus "every sacrifice, nay, almost every syllable, and the garments of Aaron and the whole Levitical order, are instinct with heavenly meanings" (*sacramenta*). In the Book of Numbers the forty-four stations of the wanderings are so many "mysteries." The Pentateuch is the "five words" with which the Apostle wished to be able to speak (1 Cor. xiv. 19). Under the "cities, villages, mountains, rivers, torrents, and boundaries" mentioned in the Book of Joshua are really described "the spiritual

¹ Vallarsi, *Hieron. Op.* tom. vi. p. 360.

kingdoms of the Church and of the heavenly Jerusalem." In the Book of Judges there are "as many types (*figuræ*) as there are rulers of the people." "Ruth the Moabitess fulfils the prophecy of Isaiah where he says: *Send forth the Lamb, O Lord, that ruleth over the earth, from Petra in the wilderness, to the mount of the daughter of Sion*" (Isa. xvi. 1, Vulgate Version). "Samuel, by the death of Eli and the slaughter of Saul, shews that the old law was abolished; and further, in Zadok and David testifies to the deep significance of a new priesthood and a new sovereignty" (*novi sacerdotii novique imperii sacramenta testatur*). "If you look at the history of the Book of Kings the words are plain enough; if you look at the sense hidden beneath the letter, the story told is that of the smallness of the Church and the wars waged by the heretics against the Church." ¹ And so on. It goes without saying that detailed instances of the same kind could be multiplied to any extent from the commentaries.

Perhaps this ought not to be called exactly a "halt-ing between two opinions." There does not seem to be anything to shew that Jerome was directly influenced by the Antiochene movement. If he lays stress upon the historical sense, this is probably a simple reaction of common sense, which could not fail to be greatly aided by his superior philological attainments and the scholarly instinct that would naturally go with them. Origen himself recognized, in theory at least, the necessity of first ascertaining both the true text and its plain and straightforward meaning. In the more obscure parts of Scripture his practice did

¹ *Epist. ad Paulinum.*

not always conform to this. Wherever a difficulty of any kind presented itself in the literal sense the expedient of allegory was close at hand, and Origen never hesitated to avail himself of it. Jerome did the same thing, especially where the difficulty was moral. Abishag, whom David took to wife in his old age, is to be interpreted of the "Divine wisdom," to which, as his end drew near, he devoted himself more closely. The stories of Judah and Tamar, of Samson and Delilah, of Solomon and Rahab, of David and Bathsheba, are all to be taken spiritually. The adulteress whom the prophet Hosea is commanded to marry is the same as she who anointed the feet of the Lord and wiped them with her hair, the same as Rahab, as the Ethiopian wife of Moses, the same as the "black but comely" bride of the Song of Songs; in other words, the Church.¹ Difficulties of another kind—those which were mainly philological—Jerome was more competent to deal with. And of his very considerable success in dealing with these the Vulgate is a conspicuous monument.

And yet, though the mere fact of literal and allegorical interpretations being placed side by side is no proof of inconsistency or vacillation, there are other proofs in abundance that Jerome as a commentator really bore this character. He constantly gives alternative explanations, between which he himself makes no decision. Sometimes, indeed, his uncertainty is very excusable. It really resides in the subject matter of that which is being explained, and it is a merit in the commentator to point out its existence. For instance, in the com-

¹ See Zöckler, p. 372, and *Præfat. Comm. in Osce Proph.* (Vallarsi, tom. vi. pp. xix-xxi.)

mentary on the Book of Joel, Jerome makes a good point when he remarks: "The invasion of the enemy is described under the figure of locusts, and again, language is used about the locusts themselves as if they were being compared to an enemy, so that when you read about locusts you think of an enemy, and when you think of an enemy you come back to the locusts."¹ A very true description this of one main cause of the difficulty of the whole prophecy, a difficulty which both in ancient and in modern times has divided commentators into two great camps, according as they took as their starting-point the literal sense or the figurative. Jerome believes that a hostile invasion is meant, and he gives a choice between the Assyrians and Babylonians, or the Medes and Persians, or the Macedonians, or even the Romans, though he himself prefers the Babylonians and Chaldæans, not on chronological grounds, but because the description seems to tally best with their proverbial ferocity.

The same difficulty of definitely fixing the sense dogs the steps of the commentator all the way through the book. It reaches a climax at the beginning of the third chapter. The previous passage about the outpouring of the Spirit, Jerome naturally referred to the day of Pentecost, but he himself confesses that he found it a "matter of the greatest difficulty how to fit on what follows to what has gone before." Here again Jerome deserves credit for perceiving the obstacles to his own interpretation, obstacles which his predecessors had got over lightly enough. He contents himself with stating a number of different views, but apparently leaning to that which he is inclined to lay down as a

¹ Merx, *Joel*, p. 157.

general principle, that prophecies which the Jews regarded as relating to the last day really had their fulfilment at the coming of our Lord. In accordance with this he would explain the last chapter as having reference to the siege and destruction of Jerusalem by Vespasian and Titus, though he does not speak with confidence, and leaves open other possibilities.¹

(One reason for the indecision which characterizes Jerome's work is, no doubt, the haste with which most of it was accomplished. The commentaries in this respect came off no better than the translations.² A fortnight sufficed to complete the Commentary on St. Matthew, and that at a time when the author was but just recovering from a severe illness.³ Of the Commentary on Ephesians he sometimes composed as much as a thousand lines a day, and in the preface to his Commentary on Galatians he explains that weak eyesight and many bodily infirmities prevented him from writing with his own hand, and hence he summoned a scribe and dictated to him "whatever came first to his lips,"+ for if he stopped dictating the man seemed by his impatience to hint that it was no use his being there.

It is certainly a colossal work. Not one man in a generation could do anything at all like it now. True, we have learnt to "verify references" and apply more scientific methods, but the very abundance of books and mechanical facilities have weakened the natural powers. Jerome gives a list of his authorities for the Commentary on Galatians. They include the ponderous tomes of Origen, Didymus, whom, with allu-

¹ For the foregoing, see Merx, *Joel*, pp. 157-169.

² Zöckler, *Hieronymus*, p. 212.

³ *Ibid.* p. 165.

⁴ Vallarsi, tom. vii. p. 486.

sion to his blindness, Jerome calls "his seer," Apollinaris, Alexander, an ancient heretic, Eusebius of Emesa, and Theodorus of Heraclea. All these, he says, he has read, "and piling one thing upon another in his brain,"¹ he dictated to his scribe sometimes matter of his own, sometimes that of others, but not always recollecting the order, the words, or even the sense.

We may see here a part at least of the secret of Jerome's strength. The reader does not flag because the writer did not flag. It is all "*aus einem Gusse*." Jerome has the most consummate command of language. He can say just what he pleases, and not only say it but adorn it and drive it home with a style at once in the highest degree pointed and vigorous. Never was learning so little accompanied by pedantry. It is wielded with as much ease and dexterity as if it were only the waving of a conjurer's wand. Not, of course, that the style is perfect. It has the faults of taste and exaggeration to which allusion has already been made; but when all the necessary deductions have been made for these, it is still most impressive, and must be, one would think, unique in learned work of this kind.

We have already had occasion to quote some of the introductory matter to St. Paul's Epistles in general, and that to the Galatians in particular, in Chrysostom and Theodore. A specimen of Jerome's way of dealing with the same subject will shew at once the difference between them. The new element introduced is that of learning, and in order to give an idea of the style as well as the nature, the paraphrase that follows shall be somewhat full. Jerome asks the question with which neither Chrysostom nor Theodore had troubled

¹ Vallarsi, tom. vii. p. 370.

themselves : Who were the Galatians, where they had settled, and whence they came? Were they native born or strangers to the soil which they inhabited? Had they lost their proper tongue by intermarriage, or had they learnt a new one while retaining their own? Marcus Varro, a most diligent antiquary, with his followers, had written much that was of interest about the race. But as it was Jerome's purpose not to introduce the uncircumcised into the Temple of God, and as (to speak the truth) it was some years since he had last read about these things, he would rather quote Lactantius, who derived the name Galatæ from the "milkwhite necks" of the Gauls [Galatæ, as if from γάλα]. These Gauls had settled in the province of Galatia, and mingling with the Greeks, had given to it the name of Gallo-Græcia. Nor was it to be wondered at that a Western people should be found so far to the East when Eastern colonies had made their way so far to the West. There was Massilia, founded by the Phocæans, "trilingual," as Varro called them. Then there was the town of Rhoda, founded by the Rhodians, which gave its name to the river Rhone [Jerome is mistaken here, as Rhoda was in Spain, but he seems to have had the good authority of Pliny for his statement¹]. He will not speak of the Tyrian founders of Carthage and Agenor's city, or of Liberian Thebes, and other Greek cities of Libya. He will confine himself to Spain, where was Saguntum, founded by Greeks from Zacynthus and Tartessus, an Ionian colony; besides that a number of Greek names for mountains and islands attested their origin. Even Italy once bore the name of Greater Greece, and none could deny

¹ See Vallarsi's Note, p. 426.

that the Romans were descended from the Asian Æneas. The consequence of this mixture of races was that the subtlety of the Greeks might be found among the orators of Gaul, while barbarian stupidity reigned in Eastern Galatia; and to this St. Paul alluded when he addressed the Galatians as "foolish," just as in other cases he hit the characteristic quality of the Church to which he was writing—the piety of Rome, the irregular customs and intellectual vanity of Corinth, the charity and busy gossip of Macedonia. Any one who had been at Ancyra, the metropolis of Galatia, would still recognize the portrait of that Church in the endless variety of obscure and absurd sects into which it was divided—Passaloryncites, Ascodrobi, and Artotyrites, not to speak of the more respectable. One more fact Jerome will mention in fulfilment of his promise at the outset. Besides Greek, which was spoken all over the East, the native tongue of the Galatians was almost the same as that of the Treveri. If some corruptions had been introduced that was no matter, as other languages, the Phœnician and Latin itself, for instance, were apt to change with time and place.¹

This last statement of Jerome's has given rise to much discussion. It has been argued that the Treveri were a German race, and that therefore, in spite of the *primâ facie* view of the case, the Galatians also must have been German. The premiss of this argument, however, seems to be doubtful as well as the conclusion.² But into this we need not enter here. The passage has been adduced in illustration of Jerome's

¹ *Hieron. Op.* tom. vii. pp. 425-430.

² See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, pp. 235-246.

wide and varied knowledge, and that purpose will, perhaps, have been attained.

Not the least of Jerome's merits is the frank way in which he recognizes difficulties and the ability with which he frequently meets them. Here, however, a distinction must be made. In some cases Jerome is free from, or rises superior to, prejudices which are felt more strongly now. In other instances he succumbs to temptations which a modern critic has no difficulty in resisting. As an instance of the first class may be taken a passage (Gal. v. 12) which even Bishop Ellicott has been led to explain away. Jerome, on the contrary, first states the case as strongly as it can possibly be stated, insisting upon the contrast which it presents to the character and demeanour of Him who was "meek and lowly of heart," and then he gives the following answer to his own accusation. "The Apostle," he says, "speaks not so much from passion against his adversaries as from love for the Church. He saw, in fact, the whole province which he himself, at the cost of his own blood, and at the peril of his own life, had won over from idolatry to the faith of Christ; he saw this whole province harassed by an incursion of proselytism, and with the grief of an Apostle—the grief of a father—he could contain himself no longer, but he began to change his tone and to grow angry with those whom he had hitherto dealt with softly, in order to hold back by objurgation those whom he could not hold by kindness. Nor can it be considered wonderful if an Apostle, himself a man, and still shut up in a vessel of infirmity, seeing too, as he did, another law in his body taking him captive and leading him bound in the law of sin, should for once have spoken in a way into which holy

men may often be seen to fall." ¹ After some further argument to shew that the language used was not really, after all, that of malediction, he very skilfully turns his weapon against the followers of Marcion, and appeals to them to say if there is anything in the Old Testament—to which they objected on this very ground—as stern and bloodthirsty as these words of an Apostle.

There were other questions that touched Jerome more nearly, and on which he was more liable to prepossession. His strong views in favour of the unmarried state found a stumbling-block in the marriage of St. Peter. He has two ways of getting over this; one is, the assertion that though St. Peter was married he "forsook his wife along with his nets and his ship;" another is, that he must needs wash off the stain so contracted by the blood of martyrdom.²

It was in the interest of the same theory that Jerome propounded the hypothesis usually identified with his name as to the relationship indicated by the phrase, "brethren of the Lord." This can hardly, however, be quoted to Jerome's disadvantage in comparison with modern writers, as many moderns³ have adopted it from him, and have held it with greater tenacity than he himself seems to have done.

But there is one episode that has left a deeper scar on Jerome's reputation—his controversy with Augustine about the conduct of St. Peter at Antioch.⁴ The charge, however, really affects not Jerome alone, but others of the Fathers with him. The statement in Galatians ii. 11, "When Cephas was come to Antioch I withstood him to the face because he was condemned,"

¹ *Hieron. Op.* tom. vii. p. 493.

³ *E.g.*, Wordsworth and Ellicott.

² Zöckler, *Hieronimus*, pp. 201, 372.

⁴ See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, pp. 127-131.

gave great offence. The partizans of Petrine Christianity bitterly resented what they considered the presumption of St. Paul. On the other hand, those who exaggerated the principles of the latter Apostle caught at the apparent evidence of his antagonism to Judaic Christianity. And in the mean time writers like Porphyry attacked both Apostles at once, the one for his error, the other for forwardness in rebuking that error, and made use of the dispute as an argument against the truth of Christian doctrine. To meet these assaults two expedients were devised, both equally disingenuous and both in fact equally absurd. Clement of Alexandria started the theory, which found considerable acceptance, that the Cephias here mentioned was not really St. Peter, but one of the seventy disciples. Jerome has every right on his side when he says that "the whole argument of the Epistle, which glances at Peter, James, and John, is repugnant to this supposition." But he himself only discards it in order to adopt the no less untenable view of Origen, that the two Apostles were really only acting a part; that the scene at Antioch was got up between them, "that their feigned contention might restore peace among believers, and that the faith of the Church might be made unanimous by their sanctified wrangling." Not only St. Paul's rebuke, but St. Peter's concession to Gentile prejudices, was a piece of pious hypocrisy. Hypocrisy of one kind was to be remedied by hypocrisy of another. St. Peter was to set an example of humility and submission, and so to shame the Jewish Christians into following his example.

If it had been possible to defend such a theory, Jerome would have succeeded in defending it. He

asserts that St. Paul cannot really have "withstood" his brother Apostle. To have done so would have been inconsistent with the flexibility of his character, who to the Jews became as a Jew, and condescended even to Jewish prejudices. He then adduces examples of fictions with a pious object—Jehu and the worshippers of Baal, David before Abimelech at Nob. He argues that openly to rebuke another would be a breach of the Gospel precept to "tell thy brother his fault between thee and him alone." And he ends by appealing to his own experience in the law courts at Rome, where he had seen the advocates on either side indulge in the most violent invectives only in order to remove all suspicion of collusion.¹

These points are put by Jerome with all his wonted vigour and ability. They are, however, clearly the kind of argument which may be used to make the worse appear the better cause. Jerome found a contemporary of his own prepared to expose them. Augustine wrote to remonstrate with him, and begged him to "sing a palinode," as Stesichorus had done with less reason. A correspondence followed, which was conducted with some warmth, especially on the part of Jerome. The ill-temper was naturally upon the losing side, and though Jerome did not formally retract, he seems to have tacitly withdrawn from his position.

This correspondence admits in other ways an interesting light upon the two great men who were the parties to it, but the further comparison of them must be reserved for the next paper, in which it is hoped that the review of the chief patristic commentators may be brought to a close.

W. SANDAY.

¹ *Hieron. Op.* tom. vii. pp. 407-409.

BIBLICAL NOTE.

ST. JOHN III. 8.

DR. WESTCOTT, in his valuable annotations to St. John's Gospel in the recently issued volume of the *Speaker's Commentary*, adopts the current rendering of these momentous words.

1. The Redeemer has just addressed to the bewildered and gross mind of Nicodemus the declaration that "that which has been born of the flesh, flesh it is;" while "that which has been born of the Spirit, spirit it is. Marvel no more at my word to you, You must be born again." Groping in the darkness of his soul for some glimmering of light, Nicodemus had even for a moment thought of a physical realization of the new birth. But flesh does not become spirit, nor spirit flesh. The Spirit does not work up the old *στοιχεῖα* into a new substance. It does not start (*πρόθεν*) from the old *ἐλθ*, and produce therefrom (*πῶς*) a new *σπέρμα*. The creative process is entirely *de novo*. Surely this is the current of the argument.

2. Let us suppose a student with a competent knowledge of the Greek, but happily a stranger to controversy and the conflict of versions and authorities and interpretations on the one hand, and on the other possessing and possessed by a full faith in the sacrament of our regeneration—let us suppose, I say, such a student, having pursued the line of thought in the preceding paragraph (1), entering on the examination of the eighth Verse. He is already familiar with *Τὸ Πνεῦμα*. In the context of the Verse, in the context of the Chapter, in the context of the New Testament phraseology, it is always *Spirit*.¹ There is positively nothing *ab extra* or *ab intra* to justify a rendering of the word wholly different from the rendering maintained up to Verse 8—nothing to call for a new and arbitrary rendering, which, in the close of the same Verse, is as arbitrarily abandoned. In very truth, the current of the Divine teaching addressed to correct the materializing fancy of Nicodemus, who was dreaming of nature re-wombing itself, thence to reissue spirit, is crossed by the introduction of the *πῶς*, a material agent, touching whose nature we are not so exceptionally ignorant as would seem to be insinuated, but of which, if we know anything, we do certainly know the "whence" and "whither." Holy Scripture itself reveals it (Eccles. i. 6). No doubt all the agencies of nature are images and echoes of the power and

¹ In Hebrews ii. 4 another version is sometimes adopted inconsistently.

outgoings of the Almighty. But of no agency is it true, in the language of the Spirit, that it acts ὅπου θέλει. So vivid a personification of a natural power is out of keeping with the guarded phrase of Holy Writ, and is halfway on to the conceptions of heathendom.

3. But the Redeemer corrects the profane curiosity of his listener, who seemed ready with the pert query of Zedekiah, the son of Chenaanah: "Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak with thee?" (1 Kings xxii. 24). So far as the drift of the Redeemer's argument is concerned, the introduction of the natural element darkens rather than clears the meaning. Having set forth the unlikeness of flesh and Spirit, and their inter-incommunicableness, the Saviour proceeds to set forth the likeness between the Spirit-producing and the spirit-produced; the likeness between ὁ γεννήτωρ and ὁ γεννητός; between ὁ σπείρων and τὸ σπρέμα. As the movements of the Divine Spirit are illocal—inapprehensible by soul or sense, incomprehensible by reason and understanding, as indefinable, let us say, as the presence of Christ in the Eucharist—so is the *outcome* of those movements, the spirit-born; a mysterious reality that evades all moral anatomy, all spiritual analysis. There is, indeed, a *when* and a *where*—*when* the creative *Word* is spoken, *where* the water is poured. But in all else as He is so are we in this world, and the world knoweth us not, nor yet the abiding presence of that Holy Spirit who is convincing it of sin. In a word, as the Christian is like the Lord who redeems him, so is he like the Spirit that sanctifies him in the fulness of the supramundane supernatural life—the Christ-quickenened life of faith.

4. The introduction of the wind—the sad night-wind sighing outside—adds no doubt to the natural picturesqueness of the scene; but it mars, I hold, the continuous poetry and the Divine rhythmical perfection of the Saviour's thought. The Divine selection of a term of admittedly (in the LXX.) equivocal import, when the spirit of the Scripture had already sealed ἀνεμος, λάλαψ, πνοή, ἤχος, is suggestive, no doubt, of the earthly type—a type, it is granted, glorious and sublime; but the exclusion of such terms, associated as the two latter with the Pentecost itself, surely implies that Πνεῦμα is to be rendered strictly. Then φωνή, applied in Greek with some restrictiveness to articulate or quasi-articulate sounds, has been exalted by St. John to the highest canonization. It is with St. Luke the term employed for the unique universally-self-interpretative utterance of the Holy Ghost (Acts ii. 6). It is the title of the Baptist. He devolves it on the Bridegroom, and the Bridegroom (St. John i. 23; iii. 29), whose

voice rings throughout the Canticles as the Good Shepherd, broods over it in his heavenly *παροιμία* (Chap. x. 4). This articulate *φωνή* (it is in the accusative case) Nicodemus hears, and—not to press the article—

The Spirit, where [it] willeth, breatheth; and *the* voice of It, thou art intelligently listening to; [now in listening to Me]. But thou knowest not *whence* cometh, *whither* goeth [this Spirit]; and so [incomprehensible by human reason and feeling] is every Spirit-born person [*τις*], *Ὁ κόσμος οὐ γινώσκει τοιούτους*.

5. I scarcely think the interpretation of the passage under review is a question whose decision can be settled finally by authority of interpreters, albeit if the scales were even it might be otherwise. Augustine may surely decide, in favour of the view here advocated, whatever is ambiguous in the Latin or Syriac. And the exegesis of Augustine is adopted by such popular expositors as Wiclif and the Rheimists. One shrinks from denying a reference to the natural wind, so eminently fitted, as the invisible cause of visible effects, to illustrate the action of the Holy Spirit; but I am earnest to maintain the *primary* and, as I hold, the literal meaning of the terms, while I dread accepting such a rule of interpretation as ventures to decide of itself what is or is not to be pressed.

CHARLES INGHAM BLACK.

BRIEF NOTICES.

THE CENTENARY BIBLE. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.) This handsome volume consists of two parts, namely, the "Variorum Bible," with various renderings and readings, and the "Aids to the Student of the Holy Bible." As each of those parts has already received a separate notice in the pages of THE EXPOSITOR, I may confine myself to a very few remarks on the combined form in which they are now presented to Biblical students. The book as now completed is a very remarkable one. It presents us with the best and most recent results of Biblical research in the smallest possible compass; and those results have been collected by the patient and unpretending toil of such scholars as Mr. Cheyne, Dr. Sanday, Dr. Green, Professor Sayce, Professor Stanley Leathes, Canon Tristram, and others no less competent in their several departments. The

consequence is that, in one single volume of very moderate price, we have a Bible rich in information, which could only be gathered from a multitude of learned and expensive books, and from which even the most advanced scholar will still find something to learn. It is not too much to say that twenty years ago—or even ten years ago—such a book could not have been provided. It is one of the most conspicuous proofs of the immense growth and interest in the study of the Bible, and a happy sign that the tyranny of misapplication which has long prevailed in the use of Scripture is doomed to be brought to an end by the growth of a riper and wider knowledge. I need do no more than call passing attention to the mine of valuable information of every kind which is offered to all readers in that portion of the “Centenary Bible” which is composed of the well-known “Aids.” Besides the useful Concordance, it contains sketches of the Parables, Miracles, and Prophecies, a summary of the Books of the Old and New Testament, and papers by the first authorities on the Geography, Plants, Animals, and Coins of the Bible; on its Poetry, Music, Weights, and Money; on Ethnology, Chronology, and History; on its Proper Names and Symbolic Language; and on the Illustrations to Scripture History which are furnished by the monuments of Oriental kingdoms. He who has mastered all these papers may know more of the sources to which we look for the elucidation of Holy Writ than many would have gained by lifelong labour in less fortunate times.

But the other part of the work—the “*Variorum Bible*”—is even more remarkable. Twenty years ago the various readings and renderings of even the New Testament were little noticed, except by professed scholars; some of the most valuable manuscripts were unknown, or had been most imperfectly collated. As for the readings and renderings of the Old Testament, it was enough to listen to the manner in which the First Lessons were read in Church even by clergymen of university training, and with some repute for learning, to hear the wrong emphasis and the untenable exegesis which shewed how many texts were entirely misunderstood. The materials for a more perfect knowledge are now placed in the hands of the humblest Sunday-school teacher. He will here see at a glance the corrections, not only of recurrent errors of translation, such as (in the Old Testament), “grove” for “Asherah,” and “plain” for “oak,” and in the New Testament, “devils” for “demons,” and “Christ” for “the Christ,” and “hell” for “Hades” and “Gehenna;” but, what is of even more importance, he will be able to read such glorious

passages of Scripture as the Song of Deborah, the Blessings of Jacob and of Moses (*Eccles. xii.*), and the Sermon on the Mount, with at least some glimpse of the light which has been thrown on many expressions by better translations, or by the readings of the best MSS. As it is impossible to give a due conception of the advantages which the thoughtful student may gain from a right use of this book without entering much more into detail than it is here possible to do, I will content myself with merely referring to one or two passages. Take the most graphic of the Gospels, and see the additional vividness imparted by such touches as will be found by the readings and renderings of Mark *iv. 38*, and *vi. 40*, or the extremely important passage, Mark *vii. 19*, the mistaken translation of which, from the days of St. Chrysostom to our own, has robbed us of one of the most important utterances of our Lord respecting his own relation to the Levitic Law. Or, turn to "the most beautiful book ever written," the Gospel of St. Luke. How many readers will be glad to read the possibly genuine addition of the Codex Bezae to Luke *vi. 4*. What interesting suggestions may be found in the readings and translation of Luke *vii. 37*, which adds a yet deeper tenderness to the words and action of Christ to the poor woman; of Chap. *viii. 44*, which corrects the old mistranslation of "border;" of Chap. *xiv. 5*, which gives the almost certainly genuine reading of "son" for "ass;" of Chap. *xviii. 11*, which gives a still more finished detail of the self-satisfaction of the Pharisee; and of Chap. *xix. 48*, which restores the fine picturesque figure of the original Greek. Again, in the Gospel of St. John, let the reader refer to Chap. *v. 35*, which brings out the true force of what our Lord said about the Baptist; to Chap. *viii. 25*, which will give some suggestion on a difficult Greek expression; to Chap. *xii. 13*, which adds an illustrative touch; or to Chap. *xii. 17*, which gives new significance to the miracle of the Raising of Lazarus. These are only the first instances which come casually to hand on turning over the pages. We may confidently hope that the multiplication of such books as these will give a fresh impulse to the desire to understand Scripture aright. We trust that the mere interest of acquiring such knowledge will send many a reader to the systematic and continuous study of the oracles of God. To the scholars who have thus read many books, in order that English readers might be enabled to read with better understanding the best of all books—and to the publishers who have given the result of their labours in this convenient form—the best thanks of the English public are due.

F. W. FARRAR.

In Canon Farrar's commendation whether of the "Variorum" or of the "Teachers' Bible," separately considered, I most heartily concur. But in combining the two I cannot but think the Publishers have made a grave mistake; and if, as I am afraid, they have combined them in order to profit by the excitement of the Sunday School Centenary, their motive does not command my respect. The fact is that the two Bibles are intended, or at least adapted, for two wholly different classes; the one for earnest and cultivated students of the Word who are able, and the other for those who as a rule are not able, to use even the simple critical apparatus which the "Variorum Bible" supplies. It is well if even one Sunday School teacher in a score is able to appreciate the various readings and renderings of the Sacred Text; it is quite certain that at least the other nineteen will only be perplexed and confused by them. On the other hand, those students who will most value and profit by these various readings and renderings will care less for the Notes, Essays, &c., which are admirably adapted for the use of Sunday School teachers, since *they* have access to more copious and elaborate works—to commentaries, dictionaries, cyclopedias, which will better serve their turn.

I may save such students from disappointment, and an expenditure which some of them can ill afford, if I also warn them that this "Centenary Bible" is printed in a small and somewhat indistinct type, which makes it very trying to use as a book for constant reference. In fine, my advice to teachers is to stick to the "Teachers' Bible:" while to students, capable of using a critical apparatus, I would say, Wait until a new edition of the "Variorum Bible," containing Dr. Sanday's new and valuable contribution, is brought out. Then, at least if the second edition is printed in as good and bold a type as the first, we shall have, in a serviceable form, the very best Bible for constant use with which I am acquainted. I have habitually worked with the first edition—which I shall be very happy to exchange for the second—for the last four years, and feel myself much at loss when, by any accident, I am unable to refer to it. Hence I can commend it to my fellow-students with a confidence born of experience.

EDITOR.

Among the books recently published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton there are three which fall within our province and call for some recognition at our hands.

I. THE RELIGIONS OF CHINA, by *Professor James Legge*, consists of four lectures delivered to the students of the Presbyterian College,

Guildford Street, on Confucianism and Taoism, as compared with Christianity. In the first three Lectures he gives a very instructive account of the leading religious principles enunciated by Confucius and Láo-tsze, and of the various modes in which these principles have been corrupted from their original simplicity during the lapse of long ages. In the last he compares the dogmata and ethics of these two great teachers with those of our Lord Jesus Christ, and shows how far, even when taken at their best, they fall beneath the teaching of the New Testament. Dr. Legge's immense learning and erudition in the Chinese scriptures are admitted on all hands, and are quite apparent in the volume before us: but the main value and charm of this book spring from the fact that he here presents the results of his learning and erudition in a simple and popular form. Any man of ordinary intelligence and culture may read it with ease and pleasure. But any such reader will need to bear in mind that the Lecturer, as was natural under the conditions, selects the noblest passages from the teachings of Confucius and Láo-tsze, and is likely therefore to leave an unduly favourable impression of them on the minds of his readers; and that without any intention of prejudicing his readers in their favour. It is natural that a scholar should over-value authors to whose works he has devoted the studious hours of his life. It is fair, if the Chinese sages are to be compared with the Great Teacher, that their finest utterances should be introduced into a comparison which cannot fail to be a contrast to their immense disadvantage. But, nevertheless, in such a comparison, so conducted, the Sages cannot fail to receive far more than their due. And if we may judge from a careful perusal of Dr. Legge's own translation of the Works of Confucius, Confucius at least does get very much more than his due in these Lectures. A more dreary religious book than the Confucian Analects, with their eternal insistence on "deportment," and the "superior person," it would be hard to find. Even the Talmud, nay, even the Coran, taken as a whole, is not so dull, though it must be confessed that, in a translation, the Coran is dull enough to weary any but an ardent student of the religious conceptions and ways of men.

2. *Dr. Pressensé's* CONTEMPORARY PORTRAITS includes sketches of Thiers, Strauss as compared with Voltaire, Arnauld de l'Ariege, Dupanloup, Adolphe Monod, Vinet, Verny and Robertson. All these sketches are executed with the vivacity which Dr. Pressensé has taught us to expect from his pen; and cannot fail to interest those who

are familiar with the religious movements of modern times. The essays on Monod and Vinet are something more than sketches; they are elaborated portraits of the men and their work: for here Dr. Pressensé is writing with intimate knowledge of men whom he loves and honours, and whose work he has done much to carry on. But English readers, while happy to learn what Dr. Pressensé can tell them of some of the leading spirits in the Churches of France and Switzerland, will no doubt be most deeply interested in his fine and appreciative study of Verny and Robertson, in which he gives Robertson, as was due, the larger share. Even yet justice has not been done to the piercing spirit and burning heart of Robertson of Brighton, who from his very grave is probably doing more to shape the religious thought of the age than any of the ostensible leaders of the Church either do themselves or suspect him of doing. Even Dr. Pressensé hardly appreciates his work to the full, though he depicts the man with a sympathy both sincere and keen. But no one who loved Robertson, or feels that he owes much that is best in his own character and thoughts to impulses derived from him, can be anything but grateful for this graceful tribute to his memory from a foreign hand. Of Verny, we regret to say, we knew nothing till Dr. Pressensé's sketch of him appeared; but if the single volume of Discourses, which is all that is now left to us of this ardent and eloquent preacher, in any measure answers to the high estimate of it formed by so competent a judge as Dr. Pressensé, we would suggest to the Publishers that they would be conferring a great benefit on the English Church by bringing out a translation of it by the accomplished hand to which we are indebted for the pleasant and instructive volume before us.

3. *Dr. Leathes's Warburton Lecture on OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY* is as dull and heavy in form as Dr. Pressensé's is lively and attractive; but it contains much good matter nevertheless. Instead of attempting to cover the whole range of Old Testament prediction, the learned Professor has very wisely confined himself to a few palmary instances—as, for example, the promise to Abraham, the promise to David, the Captivity threatened to Israel for her sins, and the promised Redemption from that Captivity—in which the predictive element is clear beyond question; and has argued that this prophetic insight, extending through long years and centuries, must have had a Divine origin, and bears an emphatic testimony to a continuous and progressive Revelation of the Divine Will.

THE BOOK OF JOB.

IX.—THE EPILOGUE (CHAPTER XLII. 7-17).

A MODERN poet would probably, a Christian poet would certainly, have given a more inward and spiritual *développement* to the story of Job than that contained in the Verses before us. But even the man of genius cannot be before his age at all points : and we must not expect modern or Christian ideas of the greatest poet of the ancient world, much less of a poet who wrought under the conditions of Hebrew thought and inspiration. Even in the legend of Prometheus, though it be—at least as handled by Æschylus—the most fascinating that we owe to classical antiquity, and profoundly tinged by the spirit which pervades the Christian revelation, the triumph of the Sufferer consists simply in his release from his agonies and his restoration to his original and august conditions, enhanced, perhaps, by a consciousness of the immense benefaction he had conferred on the feeble race of man. And, for reasons which even yet we have not wholly mastered, though some of them are obvious enough, it was the will of God that only glimpses, only partial and occasional previsions, of life and immortality should be vouchsafed to the prophetic soul of Israel, musing on things to come. Hence our Poet, though he knew, even as it is our happiness to know, that

There is a Height higher than mortal thought ;
There is a Love warmer than mortal love ;
There is a Life which taketh not its hues

From earth or earthly things, and so grows pure
And higher than the petty cares of men,
And is a blessed life and glorified,

nevertheless brings his story to what may fairly seem to us a somewhat tame, if not impotent, conclusion : and we have constant need, as we study this Epilogue, to bear in mind the limitations under which he was compelled to work.

The general thought he had to express in these Verses, the consolatory promise he was commissioned to carry to as many as would suffer and be strong, was that which Shakespeare has thrown into the tender fanciful lines :

The liquid drops that you have shed
Shall come again, transform'd to orient pearl,
Advantaging their loss with interest
Of ten times double gain of happiness.

But this consolatory thought and promise had to be expressed, if at least he was to bring it home to the heart of his time, under the "forms of mentation" common to his time. Glimpses of a higher, and even of the highest and most Christian, solution of the mystery he has already given us, in that he has shewn us a man who could be true to his convictions even when he could gain no reward thereby ; true to his God even when God seemed to abandon, afflict, and mock him without cause : a man whom even the unmerited unprovoked anger of the Almighty drove only to larger thoughts of Him, and a more inward and hearty affiance upon Him ; a man who plunged, by the worst wrongs of time, into the very depths of despair, could spring up out of them to grasp a life beyond the reach of time. These were Job's true gains, his true compensations ; in these lay his true victory. But these

were not gains that could be thrown into concrete forms and made plain and attractive to Hebrew eyes. For them there must be an outward, as well as an inward, gain and victory. The triumph of Job, which was also the triumph of God, must have its "ovation ;" that is, it must be clothed in forms which would touch the popular imagination and bring it home to the popular heart. They must see the good man released from his undeserved sufferings, rewarded with "ten times double gain of happiness," loaded with the very blessings which they and their fathers had been taught to regard as "the portion" of the good. If they were to learn patience from his patience, and a brave endurance of hardness, he must ride through their midst, bringing his "spoils" with him.

All this the Poet enabled them to see and learn by the brief Epilogue which he now appends to his sublime Poem. *We* may feel it to be the least satisfactory part of his work ; but to *them* it would be the most satisfactory, animating, and inspiriting ; and even inspired men, if they are to serve their own generation, must speak to it in a language it can understand. Nor need we, should this formal *dénouement* of the story seem to us pitched in too low a key, either part with the higher solution of the great problem of human suffering and its issues which we have gathered from the main body of the Poem, or too conclusively turn away from the solution suggested by the Epilogue. For here, too, there lies under the mere form and letter a thought which can hardly fail to be welcome to us. Much as in certain moods we are tempted to long for a better country, even a heavenly, nevertheless this present world is our home, and has long been our

home. We love it for its beauty, and for our innumerable associations with it, even when we are most impatient of it. We crave to see it brought under the law, into the freedom, of righteousness, with all its sin and misery clean swept out of it : we look forward with strong desire to the advent of a time when its inhabitants being wholly redeemed from evil, its sighs and groans shall be hushed, its earnest expectation fulfilled, and the world, so long made subject to vanity and corruption, shall rise into the glorious liberty it is to share with us. And in this Epilogue we have a clear intimation that our hope for the world is one day to become a fair and sacred reality. For Job is a representative of suffering humanity. As he was restored to the happy days when the Almighty "kept" him, when the lamp of the Divine favour shone brightly and stedfastly upon him, and the very stones of the field were at peace with him ; so also we are to see a day when the happiness and peace vouchsafed to him are to be vouchsafed to the whole race, when the long agony and travail of the creation shall be accomplished, and there shall come forth a new heaven and a new earth in which only righteousness and peace will dwell.

CHAPTER XLII.

(7.) *And it came to pass that, after the Lord had spoken these words to Job, the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My anger is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends, because ye have not spoken of me aright, like my servant Job.* (8.) *Therefore, now, take to you seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer them up as an offering on your behalf ; and Job my servant shall intercede for you ; for I will surely accept him, and not deal out to you according to your impiety : for ye have not spoken of me aright, like my servant Job.* (9.) *Then Eliphaz the Temanite, and Bildad the Shuchite, and Zophar the Naamathite, went and did as the Lord bade them ;* (10.) *and the*

Lord accepted Job ; and the Lord turned the captivity of Job when he interceded for his friends : and the Lord gave to Job twice as much as he had before.

(11.) *Then came to him all his brothers, and all his sisters, and all who had known him aforetime, and ate bread with him in his house ; and condoled with him, and comforted him, for all the evil which the Lord had brought upon him. And they every one gave him a kesitah, and every one a gold ring. (12.) Thus the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than the beginning : for he had fourteen thousand sheep and six thousand camels, and a thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand she-asses. (13.) He had also seven sons, and three daughters ; (14.) and he called the name of the first Jemima, and the name of the second Cassia, and the name of the third Keren-happuch : (15.) and in all the land were no women so fair as the daughters of Job. And their father gave them an inheritance among their brethren. (16.) After this, Job lived a hundred and forty years, and beheld his sons, and his sons' sons, even four generations.*

(17.) *So Job died, old and full of days.*

Chapter xlii. Verse 7.—Even in the First Colloquy Job had detected a certain base courtier tone in the apologies of the Friends, and had warned them (Chap. xiii. 7-11) both that they were speaking wrongfully for God, and that He would “heavily rebuke” them for saying what they thought would be welcome to Him rather than what they knew to be true. And now his prevision is verified. No sooner has Jehovah reconciled Job to Himself than He turns on the Friends with the rebuke : “Mine anger is kindled against you, for ye have not spoken of me aright, like my servant Job.” But had not Job spoken wrongfully of God ? Yes, often ; but he had not spoken wrongfully *for* God. He had criticised, censured, condemned whatever seemed unjust in the ways of God with men, not stopping to consider whether he were competent to judge, whether he understood the ways he condemned ; and for this “presumptuous sin” he had been punished

and corrected, his heaviest punishment being the misery which his own suspicions and misconceptions had caused him ; but he had never belied his honest convictions. It was his very fidelity to his convictions which had led him to charge God foolishly. He had dared to believe (Chap. xvi. 21) that, if God had wronged him, He would "right a man even *against* Himself, and a son of man against a fellow" of the Lord of hosts. And in this he had thought rightly of God, and spoken rightly ; while the Friends had thought wrongly and spoken wrongly. If Job had condemned God to clear himself (Chap. xl. 8), they had condemned Job to clear God ; and whereas he had spoken sincerely, they had paltered with their conscience and forced themselves to believe that Job must have sinned rather than admit that there was more in the moral government of God than their theology had dreamed of.

For this sin an atonement must be made. The atonement demanded of them is (*Verse* 8) that they should recognize and confess their sin ; that they should humble themselves before the very man whom they had condemned as a sinner above all men, and beg him to intercede for them with the God whom they seem to have regarded as their property rather than their Lord, whom they certainly regarded as with and for them and against him. It was a terrible downfall, a bitter but wholesome humiliation, for men who were so familiar with all the secrets of Heaven ; and one hardly knows with what face Zophar, who had reviled Job so loudly and harshly, could urge such a prayer as this upon him.

There is a fine stroke in *Verse* 10 ; for here the Penitent brings forth fruit meet for repentance. Job

had been forgiven his trespass against God, the proof of his forgiveness being that God had convicted him of his sin; and now he forgives those who had trespassed against him, and proves his forgiveness by interceding on their behalf. And the Poet marks this moment of magnanimity and forgiveness as at once the crown, climax, and consummation of his virtue, and the turning-point in his career. It was *when*, if not because, Job prayed for his unfriendly Friends that God delivered him from his captivity to loss and pain and shame. His flesh came back to him like that of a little child, and a new day of grace and favour dawned upon him.

It is as we study the final paragraph of the Epilogue that we most need to remember the conditions under which the Poet worked. No doubt, as I have admitted, a modern Christian poet would have carried the story to a different close. *He* would have felt that the gifts of Fortune were but a sorry compensation for a tried and perfected virtue like that of Job; that it would be but a poor comfort to him to be fawned upon once more by the kinsfolk and acquaintance who had abandoned him in the long day of his destitution and misery; and that the children born to him in the years of his recovered prosperity could not in any way "make up" to him for the children he had lost. And hence *he* would probably have translated Job, so soon as his love and trust were restored, to that ampler and serener world of which he had caught some glimpses in the dark night of his sorrow, and which men so seldom see till they can see nothing else. But such a close, however natural and satisfactory it might be to

us, would have been unnatural, unsatisfactory, dispiriting to the men whether of Job's day or of Solomon's. And so, for their teaching and encouragement, the inspired Hebrew Poet submits to the limitations of his age; he abandons the higher *dénouement* which he himself probably was perfectly capable of grasping—as we may infer from the hints scattered through the Poem proper—and carries his story to a conclusion such as his own generation was able to receive. He portrays him as receiving “double” for all his losses (*Verses* 10, 12); as submitting to the caresses of his brothers, sisters, and all who had known him aforetime, although they had stood aloof from him while the hand of God was heavy upon him (*Comp. Verse* 11 with *Chap. xix. 13-19*); and as having seven sons and three daughters born to him, to replace the ten children of whom he had been bereaved (*Verse* 13).

We need not therefore assume, however, that Job “committed himself” to the kinsfolk and acquaintance, who were as “ready chorus” to the favour as to the apparent anger of the Almighty; and it would be monstrous to suppose that a *father* could be content so that he had children round him, and the same number of children, even if they wore new faces and were called by new names. Job could not forget the goodly sons and daughters whom the Lord had taken from him because it pleased the Lord to give him other sons and daughters as goodly. Even in the ancient world, even in the East—although to many these phrases seem to explain everything, however contrary to nature—a father's heart was made of more penetrable stuff than that, and could be as fond and constant as if it were beating now. What, for example,

could have compensated Abraham for the loss of Isaac, or Isaac for the loss of Esau, although *he* was not the son of the promise? And did not Jacob utterly refuse to be comforted for the loss of Joseph, although many stalwart sons were left to him, and Benjamin, the darling of his old age, was there to take the vacant place? No, we are not to imagine that Job was "past feeling" because he was an Oriental of the antique world; but we are to admit that to the ancient Eastern world, as indeed to the great bulk of the world, both Eastern and Western, to this day, a catastrophe which did not replace suffering Virtue in all opulent and happy conditions would have seemed a sin alike against art and against morality.

Hence it was, I take it, that the Poet surrounded Job, after his trial, with troops of friends, with goodly sons and daughters, so fair that no names could adequately express their charms; and lavished on him droves, and herds, and flocks—all of which, although they were the usual and coveted signs of wealth and enjoyment, must have been but a very little thing to "the man who had been in hell," and who, even in torment, had lifted up his eyes and seen that, for him at least, heaven was *not* very far off.

The *kesitah* of *Verses* 11 is commonly taken, as in the Septuagint, to be a silver coin stamped with the figure of a lamb. The simple fact is that no one knows what it was. But the best authorities incline to think that it was not a coin at all, but a lump, bar, or wedge of silver. Thus Madden, in his learned and elaborate *History of Jewish Coinage*, says: "The real meaning of *kesitah* seems to be 'a portion,' and it is evidently a piece of silver of unknown weight." Whatever it

may have been, and whether the "rings" presented with the kesitahs were earrings or noserings, they constituted, I suppose, the *nuzzur*, or present—such as Orientals still make on paying a visit of ceremony—offered to Job by those who had known him aforetime when they came to condole with him and comfort him.

The names of *Verse* 14 are, of course, significant. *Jemima*, according to its Arabic derivation, means "dove;" according to its Greek derivation, it means "day." *Cassia* is simply the cassia, or cinnamon, of our commerce, a sweet and fragrant bark. And *Kern-happuch* may be either the Hebrew form of the Greek "cornucopia," or, more probably, "horn of pigment"—the pigment used by Eastern women for enhancing the beauty of their eyes.

These names were given to Job's daughters to denote the excellent beauty of these fair women; and that these dazzling beauties *were* what their names implied we are expressly told in *Verse* 15. Here, too, we are told that their father gave them an equal portion with his sons; and this fact is doubtless noted in order to suggest that his new children lived together on terms as frank and kindly as those which had obtained among the children he had lost.¹

Women so fair and well endowed were not likely to lack husbands. And, in *Verse* 16, it seems to be implied that his sons found wives and his daughters husbands; and that Jehovah vouchsafed both to them and their offspring that "heritage from the Lord" which Orientals most covet.² It was only when Job was "old and full of days" (*Verse* 17), when he was *satisfied*, or even *satiated with life*, only when he had

¹ See Note on Chap. i. Ver. 4.

² Psalm cxxvii. 3.

seen his children's children to the fourth generation, that he died—died unto men, to live more truly and more fully unto God.

Here the Story ends—in the Hebrew ; but in the Septuagint there is the following significant addition to it : "*It is written that he will rise again with those whom the Lord raiseth ;*" a sentence which seems to indicate that even in the ancient Eastern world there were some, if not many, besides the Poet himself, who could appreciate a higher and happier *dénouement* to the tragical history of Job than that contained in the Epilogue. What is the age of the tradition embodied in this sentence it is impossible to say ; in all probability it could not have originated till the days of Ezra : but both those who wrote and those who received it must have looked, as we look, for far better things for Job than wealth, children, troops of friends, however frankly they may have admitted that all these were not intended as a compensation for the things he had suffered, nor as a reward for his patient endurance of them, but simply as the outward and visible sign of his complete restoration to the Divine favour and goodwill.

The Problem of this Scripture is one which has engaged the thoughts of many of the most admired poets. Æschylus, Omar Khayyám, Milton, Goethe, Shelley, Byron, and many more, have tried their hands upon it, though only Æschylus, I think, can be said to have carried it to a satisfactory close. His Prometheus steals fire from heaven to comfort the feeble and timid race of men, and will not repent, nor yield to the cruel will of Zeus whatever tortures are inflicted on

him: nailed to the rock, with the vulture tearing at his heart, he still glories in his good deed. But Milton's Satan, though equally indomitable and defiant, is resolute only to do ill; and Goethe's Faust, by his vulgar craving for sensual indulgence, forfeits the respect inspired by his insatiable thirst for knowledge, and has to be forgiven, not justified: while the Prometheus of Shelley and the Cain of Byron are portrayed as baffled and defeated by a capricious and malignant Power, rather than reconciled to the infinite Love which sits at the centre and shines through the mystery of life. Even Omar,¹ profound as is the admiration inspired by his noble *Rubáiyát*, disappoints us, and compels us to confess that he gives up the problem instead of solving it, and, in his despair of finding a law of justice in the tangled lot of man, sinks into moral indifference. Much as we may admire the weight of thought which he compresses into a few words, or even into a single word, the subtle irony of his style, the original and prodigal beauty of his illustrations, who is not moved to very sadness as he reads the verses in which the great Persian—if indeed Omar be not a mask behind which we are to see a modern English face—sums up his “conclusion of the whole matter”?

What! out of senseless Nothing to provoke
A conscious Something to resent the yoke
Of unpermitted Pleasure, under pain
Of everlasting penalties if broke!

What! from his helpless Creature be repaid
Pure Gold for what He lent us dross-allay'd—
Sue for a Debt we never did contract,
And cannot answer—Oh the sorry trade!

¹ A very instructive and pathetic Essay might be written by any scholar who would be at the pains of comparing the very different treatment of this Problem in the Book of Job and in the *Rubáiyát* of Omar Khayyám.

Oh Thou, who didst with pitfall and with gin
Beset the road I was to wander in,

Thou wilt not with predestin'd Evil round
Enmesh, and then impute my Fall to Sin !

Oh Thou, who man of baser Earth didst make,
And e'en with Paradise devise the Snake ;

For all the Sin wherewith the Face of Man
Is blackened, Man's forgiveness give, and *take* !

It is an unspeakable relief to turn from all these sceptical solutions of the mystery of life, which yet are no solutions, to the story of Job, which, as it moves in a higher plane of thought, so also it offers us a true and adequate solution of the mystery. For here, too, "the same great spectacle of heroic endurance is set before us ;" and Job, like Omar, like Prometheus, is the representative of humanity. A man of like passions with ourselves, he suffers as we suffer, and breaks his heart on the very problems we are all compelled to confront, and passes victoriously through the very agony which every reflective and religious spirit is called to undergo. To him, as to us, it was long inexplicable why the best efforts of man are baffled, and his purest happiness is marred, by pain, loss, change, sin ; and how He who made us what we are, and rules the whole process of our life, can nevertheless be just. But at last he learned that, though we cannot hope to comprehend the ways of an infinite and eternal God—so long at least as we are involved in the trammels of time and sense—we may nevertheless, and reasonably, trust in the Lord and do good without fear ; since, to the good, suffering is a discipline of perfection, a discipline which, while it even now brings forth in us the peaceable fruit of righteousness, also prepares us to inherit an ampler, fuller, happier life beyond the grave. And

whosoever has learned to see in suffering a proof of God's love, and beyond the darkness of death a land of light, in which all wrongs shall be redressed and all virtue meet its due reward—a land, in fine, in which the varied discipline of this world shall issue in a life conformed to its fair and high ideal, and cherished by all happy and auspicious conditions—he has a solution of the great Problem in which he may rest and rejoice.

As we look back, then, on all the way in which we have been led by our great Poet, on Jehovah's appeal to his creative acts and Job's controversy with his Friends, we may well sum up the impressions it has left upon us in the ascription which Blake engraved above the final plate of his noble "Inventions of Job :"
 "GREAT AND MARVELLOUS ARE THY WORKS, LORD GOD
 ALMIGHTY ; JUST AND TRUE ARE THY WAYS, O THOU
 KING OF SAINTS."
 S. COX.

STUDIES IN THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

XVI.—THE CHIEF PRIESTS—THE TRIAL.

IT is remarkable that "the chief priests" have at first no place in the evangelical history ; they begin to appear only when it begins to be tragic. Their presence is as the shadow of death. While the Pharisees and scribes, like men zealous for the law and careful of the people, anxiously examine every act and criticise every word of Jesus, the priests seem while He is most active to be entirely unconcerned, leave Him untroubled with questions, undisturbed by opposition or argument. The men who are shocked at the good deeds done on the Sabbath,¹ who murmur

¹ Mark iii. 1-6 ; Luke vi. 1-II.

at the Rabbi that teaches "publicans and sinners," and "eateth with them,"¹ who persistently interrogate Christ and attempt to silence Him with legal maxims and puzzle Him with exegetical difficulties,² who even dare to measure his sanctity by their legalism and his truth by their traditions,³ are the Pharisees and scribes. But while they are the invariable background of the picture, the priests are conspicuous by their absence. They neither resist nor befriend Christ; they simply do not appear. This absence cannot be explained by any gentleness of speech or spirit of conciliation on his part. The Good Samaritan⁴ was as severe a satire on the priest as the two men praying in the temple⁵ was on the Pharisee. But priestly silence did not mean priestly tenderness, as is evident from the first and most significant synoptic reference to "the chief priests." This is made by Christ Himself. He declares, before ever they have appeared on the scene, that He is to suffer many things at their hands, is to be delivered unto them and to be by them condemned to death.⁶ If we confine ourselves to the Synoptists,

¹ Luke xv. 2; vii. 39; Matt. ix. 10, 11; Mark ii. 16.

² Matt. xix. 3; xxii. 35-40; Mark x. 2.

³ Matt. xv. 1, 2; Mark vii. 1-5; Luke xi. 37, 38.

⁴ Luke x. 31, 32.

⁵ Luke xviii. 10-14.

⁶ Matt. xvi. 21; xx. 18; Mark viii. 31; x. 33; Luke ix. 22. It is an extraordinary and instructive fact that no allusion to the "chief priests" in connection with Christ should be made in the Synoptic Gospels till He begins to anticipate his passion and foretell his death. It is a fact of equal critical and historical importance; critical, inasmuch as it shews how the Fourth Gospel can explain otherwise inexplicable references in the Synoptic Gospels (comp. with the above texts John vii. 32, 45, 46); historical, inasmuch as it brings out the essential character of the great Jewish parties, defines and determines their relation both to Judaism and Christ. The mere figures are suggestive and significant. Thus ἀρχιερεῖς occurs (Matt. ii. 4; Mark ii. 16; and Luke iii. 2 having no relevance to the history) first in Matt. in xvi. 21, then in xx. once, xxi. thrice, xxvi. eleven times, xxvii. seven times, xxviii. once; first in Mark in viii. 31, x. once, xi. twice, xiv. twelve times, xv. five times; first in Luke in ix. 22, xix. once, xx. twice, xxii. six times, xxiii. four times, xxiv. once; first in John in vii. 32, 45, xi. four times, xii.

this reference to men who have never either spoken or acted against Him is surprising ; but if we turn to the Fourth Gospel it ceases to surprise. There the action and allusions in the synoptic histories are explained. Christ knew the priests to be absolute enemies ; his prophecy but expressed his experience. Their antagonism was too deep to condescend to words ; deeds alone could declare it. The Pharisees might aim at victory by argument, but the priests did not mean to waste words on one doomed to death. So the moment Jesus came within their reach their fatal activity began. They took offence at his presence and conduct in the temple, demanded the authority by which He acted, and abstained from seizing Him only because "they feared the multitude."¹ Their purpose was one and inflexible ; their only point of uncertainty how best and most safely to work his death.²

once, xviii. eleven times, xix. thrice. The earlier references, with the exception of those in John vii., are to Christ's predictions of their action ; the later describe that action, which belongs entirely to the history of the passion. As to the Pharisees, the order is entirely reversed. The references are, in Matt. iii. once, v. once, vii. once, ix. thrice, xii. four times, xv. twice, xvi. four times, xix. once (?), xxi. once, xxii. three times, xxiii. (the woes) nine times, xxvii. once ; in Mark ii. four times, iii. once, vii. thrice, viii. twice, ix. once, xii. once ; in Luke v. four times, vi. twice, vii. five times, xi. seven times, xii. once, xiii. once, xiv. twice, xv. once, xvi. once, xvii. once, xviii. twice, xix. once ; in John i. once, iii. once, iv. once, vii. five times, viii. twice, ix. four times, xi. thrice, xii. twice, xviii. once. By comparing these references we see that the Pharisaic activity was greatest during the ministry, the priestly during the passion. So far as the Synoptics are concerned, the Pharisees may be said to have been as completely absent from the passion as the priests from the ministry. The Fourth Gospel shows them, in the earlier stages of the passion, associated with the priests, but never active as they were, disappearing finally at the capture, taking no part whatever in the trial and crucifixion. The synoptists indeed often associate the scribes with the chief priests in the processes that resulted in the death on the cross ; but it is evident they did not regard this as equal to the participation of the Pharisees as a party or a body. "Chief priests and scribes" (Luke xxii. 2, 66 ; xxiii. 10 ; Mark xiv. 1) was but a phrase denotive of the Sanhedrim, which, though it contained Pharisees, was essentially priestly in its constitution.

¹ Matt. xxi. 15, 23, 46.

² Matt. xxv. 3, 4 ; Luke xxii. 2 ; John xi. 50.

Now, how is this extraordinary difference in attitude and action of the Pharisees and priests to be explained? Without the former, Christ the Teacher would have been without contradiction and criticism; without the latter, Christ the Sufferer would not have known the mockery of the trial or the shame and agony of the cross. The men who most strenuously argued against Him appear to have shrunk from the national infidelity and crime needed to work his death; while the men who compassed it were the men who had seemed to stand carelessly aloof from Him in the period of his mightiest activity and influence. Yet there was no decrease of antagonism on the one hand, or increase of it on the other. The Pharisees did not cease to be opposed to Christ, or the priests then begin their opposition. They had always hated and always been ready to express their hatred, but ever in deadly forms, and only when they promised to be effectual, never in the way of remonstrance or argument. The Pharisees were wishful to controvert that they might convert. We can well believe that the men who would have compassed heaven and earth to make one proselyte would feel an almost boundless desire to bring to their side the young Rabbi of Nazareth. But the priests had no such desire, had no need or room for Him, had only the conviction that his life was a standing menace to their authority, and his death a politic expedient.

In seeking the reason of these differences we must clearly conceive the historical character and relations of the parties concerned. The Pharisees in their relation to Jesus have already been discussed and described.¹ They were the party of national principle and patriotism,

¹ Art. *Jesus and the Jews*, THE EXPOSITOR, vol. viii. p. 431, ff.

who believed in the absolute kingdom of Jahveh, the continuous and progressive character of his revelation, the supremacy of his law, the obligation of his people to obey Him in all things—the minutest as well as the mightiest. The chief priests, on the other hand, belonged to the Sadducees,¹ the party of expediency and official policy. This association of the chief priests, the highest representatives of Jewish religion, with the Sadducees, the poorest representatives of Jewish faith, may seem curious and almost unreal. But it is as eminently natural as it is undoubtedly historical. In ideal Judaism the priest is as the foremost, also the noblest man. He is the representative of God before men, of man before God, approved and trusted of both. With man he is able to sympathize, with God he is qualified to plead, a mediator the weak can love and the strong can respect.² Into his ear man can confess his sin, into his hands commit his soul, certain that he will be gracious to the one and obtain forgiveness for the other. God makes him the vehicle of his mercy, the interpreter of his authority for men, certain that he will not weaken the authority or deprave the mercy. But the ideal priest finds a tragic contrast in the actual. In Judaism he was as often a mischievous as a beneficent power. The prophets before the captivity found sacerdotal worship sensuous, unspiritual, and unethical, strove to repress it by representing Jahveh as “full of the burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts,” as One not to be “pleased with thousands of rams or ten thousand rivers of oil,” as not desiring sacrifice or delighting in burnt offering, but only in the

¹ Acts v. 17; iv. 1. Josephus, *Antt.* xx. 9, 1.

² Heb. ii. 17, 18; v. 1-4; vii. 25-28.

broken and contrite heart.¹ At and after the captivity the priests seemed to become a nobler race, possessed of the prophetic beliefs, the organs of the prophetic ideals, living to realize in and through Israel the reign of the one God.² Into their worship another spirit had been breathed, its sensuous forms were ruled by an ethical purpose and purified by holier and more transcendent ideas. In the completed Mosaic legislation the theocratic faith was articulated, and every part of the Levitical ritual penetrated and illumined by the mind which lives and speaks in Deuteronomy. But the period of exaltation was short-lived, form and routine proved stronger than spirit, and God and his people were made to exist for the priest rather than the priest for them.³ The sacerdotal Judaism and the prophetic Hebraism were distinctly incompatible—a universal monotheism could not be incorporated in a worship that was at once inflexibly sensuous and fanatically national. So there grew up within Judaism a tendency opposed to the priestly, more akin to the spiritual and prophetic. This was embodied in the Sopherim, the wise, the men learned in the law, the written and spoken word of God.⁴ These scribes, interpreters of the Scriptures and conservers of tradition, represented the belief in the living God who continued to speak to his people and to act on their behalf. They and the priests were in their fundamental ideas radically opposed. The scribes emphasized the ideas of law and precept, and so believed that man's best service of God was by obedience; but the priests emphasized the idea of

¹ Isaiah i. 11; Micah vi. 7; Psa. li. 17, 18.

² Haggai ii. 1-9; Zech. iii. iv.; vi. 9-15.

³ Mal. i. 5-14; ii. 7-10, 17.

⁴ Ewald, *Geschichte des Volks Israel*, iv. 162, ff. (2nd ed.) Kuenen, *Godsdienst van Israel*, ii. 237, ff.

worship, and so held that man could best please God by sacrifice and offering. The scribes had a keen sense for the ethical, but the priests for the ritual, elements in Mosaism; the former held the whole of the Hebrew Scriptures sacred, but for the latter sanctity and authority mainly belonged to the books which embodied the Mosaic legislation. The scribes were the interpreters of an ever-living Will, but the priests the ministers and administrators of a constituted system, which invested them with all the rights and authority they possessed. It necessarily followed that these orders, representative of so different ideas, stood in very different relations to the people and their history and hopes. The priests were conservative, the scribes progressive. The priests were zealous for everything that concerned the worship, could allow the intrusion of no alien god or rite, and had proved themselves, as in the case of the Maccabees, capable of the most splendid heroism both in resistance and defence. The scribes were zealous for everything that concerned the law, *i.e.*, the living revelation of the living God, and were ambitious, not simply that the theocratic worship might be performed, but that the theocratic polity might be realized in society and the State. And so the highest idea of the priest was expressed in the temple, and his best hope for Israel was the maintenance of a clear and well-ordered worship; but the highest idea of the scribe was a people free to obey the law and entirely obedient to it, and his great hope the Messiah who was to come, who was to be no priest, but a prince, able victoriously, not to sacrifice, but to deliver Israel from the alien and leave him the willing subject of Jahveh alone.

It ought to be more possible now to understand

the relations of the Pharisaic scribes and Sadducean priests to Jesus.¹ The scribes were essentially teachers, and the scene of their activity was the school and the synagogue,² but the priests were essentially officiants, performers of a worship mainly ritual, and their proper and peculiar sphere was the temple. These two places, indeed—the synagogue and the temple—represented the two great forces in Judaism, the one didactic and rational, the other sensuous and sacerdotal; the one diffused and expansive, seeking to instruct and guide the people, the other concentrated and conservative, seeking to maintain its place in the nation and prevent the various disintegrating agencies from breaking up the system it crowned and completed. In the very nature of things the teachers would be the first to be jealous of Jesus. He was a Teacher; his great themes were the very themes the scribes were accustomed to handle. The purpose and end of the Law and the Prophets, their meaning and range, the kind of service God required, the interpretation and value of the different commandments, the nature of prayer, the character of God and his relation to man in general and the Jews in particular, the kingdom of God, what it was, when it was to come, and who were to be its citizens—these, and such-like, were the questions discussed in the Jewish schools and discoursed on by Christ. He was to the scribes one who

¹ While in the Synoptic Gospels the scribes and Pharisees are so associated as to be now and then almost identified, yet it is necessary to keep them distinct. All scribes were not Pharisees, nor all Pharisees scribes. The Pharisees were a politico-religious party, the scribes a learned corporation. The Sadducees had their scribes as well as the Pharisees; but while the former reposed on the hereditary and family principle, the latter built on Scripture and tradition, and so had much more affinity with the scribes. See Lightfoot's *Horæ Heb. et Talm.*, Works, vol. ii. p. 433 (ed. 1684).

² Ezra vii. 10.

had invaded their province and defied their authority, who denied the traditions of the fathers, ridiculed and reversed all the interpretations of the schools. And so they resisted Him at every step, opposed Him in every possible way, exhausted the resources of their scholastic subtlety to refute and discredit Him. All this the priests might greatly enjoy. They did not love the scribes, disbelieved their traditions, feared their fundamental ideas, disliked their power with the people. And so they might well be pleased when they heard that a new Teacher had arisen who was confounding their ancient foes. But the matter was entirely changed when He touched their order, threatened their city and system. Once they comprehended his position, saw the action of his ideas and aims, they at once became inimical and vigilant. They did not argue or reason—that was not in their way; they acted. And the reality and design of their action are seen in Christ's anticipations and predictions. To go to Jerusalem is to go into suffering; to fall into their hands is to fall into the jaws of death. In Galilee, where the priests did not reign, He was safe, but He could "not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill him."¹ Where He was most active, where He had by his words and acts given deepest and most deadly offence, He was not threatened; but He could not touch Judea without, as it were, feeling the cold shadow of the cross.

It is here where the Fourth Gospel becomes so significant and, in the highest sense, historical; by shewing the attitude of Jerusalem to Jesus it explains his attitude to Jerusalem. The Synoptists, who are

¹ John vii. 1.

mainly concerned with Galilee, have no premonition of the cross till almost, like a bolt out of a blue sky, it breaks on us from the mouth of Jesus ; but John, who is mainly concerned with Judea, shews us Jesus forced on each visit to retire from it in danger of death.¹ The scribes alone would reason, but would not kill ; the priests would not reason, but would crucify. From the hands of his great antagonists Christ anticipates no evil, but at the hands of the "chief priests and rulers" He knows He is to die.

But the whole case is not yet before us. The "chief priests" of the New Testament can become fully intelligible only when their peculiar historical and political position is comprehended. What may be termed the Sadducean ideal was a hierocracy, while that of their rivals was a theocracy. The very conditions that made the theocracy impossible favoured the growth of the hierocracy. The first could not live in the presence of foreign domination, but the second was easily reconciled to it, and even developed by it. In the high priest the Jewish state culminated ; he was its highest authority, its living representative. It knew no native king, but had to bear a foreign rule. During the Persian and Greek dominion the people had to appeal to their conquerors through the priest, and through the priest the conquerors had to speak to the people. He was thus, on the one hand, a sort of sacerdotal monarch, and, on the other, a civil ethnarch. This position was at once defined and strengthened by the achievements of the Maccabees. They were in the fullest sense king-priests, possessed both of regal and

¹ Chaps. iv. 3 ; v. 16 ; vii. 1, 19, 25, 30, 32, 44 ; viii. 59. Jesus significantly escapes from this attempt to stone Him by escaping out of the temple (Chaps. x. 31, 39 ; xi. 8, 50-53, 57).

sacerdotal functions. But the events that ended their dynasty separated these functions. The Idumean Herod might be king, but he could not be priest. The Jew might bear a foreign ruler, but his priest must be of pure blood and belong to the priestly stock. So while Herod usurped the regal, he had to leave untouched the sacerdotal functions. But what he could not take, he did his best to deprave. He made the priest his own creature, instituted and deposed at will. An office that had hitherto been inalienable he made to depend on his pleasure. And it was his pleasure to offend the tenderest susceptibilities of the Jews. It was not in the Idumean to be gracious to what his people loved ; he had joy in being insolent to the office they most revered. He shewed his savage insolence both by the kind of men he selected and his modes of displacement. He first appointed Ananel, a Babylonian Jew, of priestly descent, but unimportant family.¹ Him he deposed to make way for Aristobulus, the last of the Maccabees, who was instituted to please the Jews, but drowned to please Herod.² He was succeeded by Ananel again, he by Jesus the son of Phabes,³ who had to make way for Simon, the son of Boethus, an Alexandrian Jew, raised to the high priesthood because Herod wished to marry his daughter, the second Mariamne.⁴ From this family of Boethus sprang probably the Baithusin of the Talmud,⁵ the despised enemies of the scribes, and their counterpart in the evangelical history, the Herodians.⁶ The custom of Herod was followed both by the Herodian family and

¹ Jos., *Antt.* xv. 2, 4 ; 3, 1.

² Ibid. xv. 2, 5-7 ; 3, 1.

³ Ibid. xv. 9, 3.

⁴ Ibid. xv. 9, 3 ; xvii. 4, 2 ; xviii. 5, 1.

⁵ Kuenen, *Godsdienst van Israel*, vol. ii. pp. 456, 457.

⁶ Matt. xxii. 16 ; Mark iii. 6 ; xii. 13.

the Romans—the ruler for the time being, king or procurator, instituted or deposed for reasons of personal pleasure or political expediency; and so frequent were the changes that in the course of little more than a century, from 37 B.C., to 70 A.D., no fewer than twenty-eight high priests can be reckoned.¹ And so it happened that the office which was the holiest and the most significant in Israel, the peak by which the pyramid touched heaven, where man immediately in one point and at one moment met Jahveh,² became the tool or plaything of lustful or Gentile tyrants.

Now these changes in the terms and tenure of the office had varied disastrous consequences, personal, religious, and historical. The office was depraved in the view of the people: they could not respect the creature of the alien even when invested with the name and dignity of God's high priest. He was an offence to their faith, an insult to their holiest hopes. He did not represent trust in Jahveh, but the power of the Gentile, the last and worst captivity of Zion. So patriotic zeal was not, as in the period of the return, sacerdotal; the national party was strongly opposed to the priesthood. The scribes laboured to make Israel independent of the temple, to substitute for it the synagogue, to develop the elements of individual observance and obedience in the law as distinguished from those collective, hieratic, and hierarchic. Then the men chosen to the office were not of the noblest sort. The motives that determined the choice were not religious, but either personal or political. The man appointed was not he who had, by blood or character,

¹ Schürer, *Die ἀρχιερεῖς im Neuen Testaments, Studien u. Krit.* pp. 593, ff. 1872. See also his *N. Testamentliche Zeitgeschichte*, pp. 418, ff.

² Wellhausen, *Geschichte Israels*, vol. i. p. 154.

the best claim to the office, but he who had made himself most agreeable to the ruler or could best serve his purpose. The men that most please tyrants and conquerors are not the most pleasant to men; their promotion has no promise of good in it for land or people. The son of Boethus is made priest that he may be ennobled and Herod enabled with dignity to wed his daughter. Joazar¹ and Eleazar² are appointed to the priesthood because brothers-in-law of Herod. Annas,³ the most fortunate man of his time, sees five sons and a son-in-law raised to the sacred office because he has wealth, and Roman procurators know how to rule provinces so as to enrich themselves. And these were not the only evils. The frequent changes created two classes—one privileged, the men who had held office, another ambitious and time-serving, those who hoped to hold it. A man who had been chief priest did not lose the name with the dignity. He continued to bear it, and with it many of its privileges. He had a seat in the Sanhedrim, with the authority and influence that belong to one who has held the highest place. He could exercise both with a view to his own or family ends. He might hope, like Ananel and Joazar, to be appointed a second time, or he might wish to secure the elevation of a son or brother. "The kindred of the high priest"⁴ were potent forces in Jewish politics, constituted the circle to which those ambitious of office belonged. In the period now before us, many as were the chief priests they were selected from only a few families—three were of the family of Phabi, three of the family of Kamith,

¹ Jos., *Antt.* xvii. 6.² *Ibid.* xvii. 13, 1.³ *Ibid.* xx. 9, 1, 2.⁴ Acts iv. 6. The New Testament in its mode of speaking of "the chief priests" and describing their action is entirely in harmony with Josephus. Cf. *Vita*, 38; *B. J.* ii. 12, 6; 20, 4; iv. 3, 7; 4, 3; 9, 11; 3, 6, 9.

six of the family of Boethus, eight of the family of Annas.¹ These, then, may be said to have been the ruling families, each possessing influence in the council in proportion to the number of past chief priests it could count. As the acting priest was the creature of an arbitrary will, no one could tell how long he might reign. Each family would live watchful of change and anxious to profit by it, yet all united in the common purpose and endeavour not to offend Rome or furnish her with an occasion or excuse for taking away their office or nation.

Let us now see how men like these "chief priests" would act in an emergency such as Christ had created. The family in power was that of Annas. His son-in-law, Joseph Caiaphas, was high priest, the thirteenth in order from Ananias. A crafty man this Caiaphas must have been, for he held office much longer than any other man in this century of change, viz., from 18 to 36 A.D. He and his associates knew at once the rulers and the ruled: knew how easy it was to exasperate Rome and how merciless she was in her exasperation; and knew how turbulent the Jews were, and how susceptible in all things touching their religion. The procurator had proved himself fierce and irascible, was capable alike of utmost contempt for Jewish superstitions and coldest cruelty to Jewish citizens, as the introduction of the imperial eagles into the holy city and the massacre of the Galileans shewed.² And the priests, as the men who best knew and most feared him, would be sure to dread and seek to repress every sign of discontent or

¹ The violence and craft of these families is specially lamented in the Talmud. See text in Derenbourg, *Essai sur l'Histoire et la Géographie de la Palestine*, pp. 232, 233. See also Geiger, *Urschrift und Uebersetzungen der Bibel*, p. 110.

² Jos., *Antt.* xviii. 3, 1; *B. J.* ii. 9, 2, 3; Luke xiii. 1.

incipient disturbance. They would judge as men whose seats were insecure and whose security depended on the prompt severity of their judgments. And this is one of the features of their sect Josephus specially emphasizes: the Sadducees were much severer as judges than the Pharisees. And this is no less apparent in the New Testament. It is a man of the Pharisees who speaks in the council in defence of Jesus, and on these grounds: "Doth our law judge any man unless it first hear him?"¹ It is a man of the same sect who pleads that it is better to leave the Apostles alone, and to the judgment of God.² It is to the Pharisees that Paul appeals as against the Sadducees, and not in vain.³ If the Pharisees could not persuade they would not persecute; it is the priests and Sadducees alone that harass and distress the Church in Jerusalem. And the reason is obvious; the sincerity of the Pharisees made them mild, the policy of the priests made them severe. The former could not invoke Cæsar without denying their faith; the latter must please Cæsar or lose office and influence. The man faithful to principle is never cruel; the victim of expediency always is.

These men then find themselves suddenly confronted by Christ, forced to judge as to his claims, and decide how to act in relation to Him. The situation is complex and critical. He has entered the city amid exulting and expectant enthusiasm. He speaks and acts like one having authority, not now simply against the hated Pharisees, but also against the priests. He invades the temple, deals sharply with their vested

¹ John vii. 51. And to the same sect the one dissentient in the Sanhedrim that condemned Jesus (Luke xxiii. 51). ² Acts v. 34-40. ³ Ibid. xxiii. 6-7.

interests, declares Himself the foe of the old and the founder of a new order. His ideas of worship contradict theirs, and threaten to abolish sacrifice, priesthood, and temple. And He does not belong to their class, is of no priestly stock, is without hierarchic notion or reverence, has lived without respect to their ritual and their sacerdotal laws. They have found it impossible to vanquish Him by ominous speech, or dark looks, or open and violent reproofs. The people believe on Him, wait on his every word, watch his every act. Miracles have made Him marvellous, and to excited hope He is the Messiah, the Redeemer who is to deliver them from their later and most hateful captivity. And the multitude is immense. Jerusalem alone might be managed, but Jerusalem is not alone. Israel is there, men out of all Judea and Galilee, Jews from the uttermost parts of the earth. The strangers are stirred by the strange news, expectancy and wonder are abroad, and men feel their spirits thrilled by the presence of hopes that had seemed too glorious to be realized. And in the heart of the city the abomination of desolation stands ; over it there floats the ensign of Rome. Always a bitter sight, it was made far more bitter by being in Jerusalem and at the feast, when Israel came to confess his faith and realize his unity and mission. But to the men who found by the coming of Jesus their Messianic hopes kindled into burning passion and desire, it must have seemed an affront hardly to be borne, an hourly provocation to revolt. And Pilate, suspicious, cruel, unscrupulous, was in his palace watching all, ready to let loose his legions and begin the work Rome but too well knew how to do when dealing with a subject people that

would rebel. All this the priests divined and understood ; but what was to be done ? Rebellion simply meant destruction ; it seemed inevitable if Jesus was spared. " If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him ; and the Romans shall come and take away both our place and our nation." ¹ They had no concern with his claims, only with their own safety. They knew Him as at once the enemy of their order, temple, and worship, and the cause of all those dangerous and explosive hopes. The case was one where Caiaphas' craft was sure to seem wisdom. He went right to what they thought the heart of the matter when he said to the council, " Ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for us, that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not." ² There was no need to name the " one man." The men who ruled by pleasure of the Roman would sacrifice the greatest person of their race that the Roman might be pleased and they allowed to live.

To decide was to act ; promptitude was necessary to success ; the people must be surprised into connivance, and Rome into judicial approval and action. The priests proceed with wonderful courage and tact. The first thing is to get Christ into their power. Captivity will break the spell that binds the people to Him, and may even change them into enemies. By the grace of Judas the first step is taken. In the still night Jesus is seized and carried bound to the palace of the high priest. There all was wakefulness ; and, though yet in the night, a council was summoned. While it was being got together, Annas, the head of the reigning house, saw and examined Him. This is

¹ John xi. 48.

² Ibid. xi. 50.

one of the finely significant details we owe to John, the more historical and vivid that it is so unexpected. Yet, once the situation is comprehended, nothing is more probable. Annas was in all likelihood the oldest past chief priest. Appointed in the year 6 after Christ, his family had ever since, with a break of only two years, held office. The old man was subtle; his was the serpent's brood, theirs, as the Talmud says, the serpent's hiss.¹ Where the family had managed so excellently, its founder was sure to come by his honour. In the inner circle he could not but remain the high priest, though to the city and people the son-in-law filled the office. So John, with most conscious verbal inconsistency, but most significant accuracy, names now Annas and now Caiaphas high priest.² And the private process before this patriarch—reckoned happiest of men because the man with most sons in the priesthood—was most characteristic. The subtle old man used his opportunity dexterously. He "asked Jesus of his disciples and of his doctrine." These were the very points on which a little knowledge, privately gained, was sure to be most helpful at the trial, and after it. For what purpose had He organized a school, what sort of men formed it, how many were they, and what without their head would they be likely to attempt or do? In what principles had He instructed them? What did He think, how had He spoken, of the scribes, the priests, Rome? But Jesus declined to satisfy his astute curiosity. He had formed no secret society; what He had spoken to his disciples He had spoken "openly to the world." He had no secret doctrine; had taught in the most public places, in syna-

¹ Derenbourg, *ut supra*.

² Jol.n xviii. 13, 1).

gogues, in the temple. Let those who heard be asked ; they knew what had been said. The answer was offensive because so mild yet true, and the reply to it was a blow from one of the attendants. The master is known by his servants, the priest by his ministers.

But now the hastily summoned council is ready, and the captive is led bound into its presence. The judges sit in a semicircle, Caiaphas in the midst, before them the accused, at either end of the crescent the clerks or secretaries. A judicial process was necessary, and the priests were masters enough of legal forms to use them for illegal ends. Christ is there alone ; no friend beside Him, no advocate to speak for Him, no opportunity granted to call witnesses in his defence. But what need of defence ? No charge is as yet formulated ; He is being tried for a crime that has yet to be discovered. He is an accused without an accuser, or rather, with only accusers and no judge. In their hour of need why did they not call the traitor ? He had known Christ, had heard his most confidential words and doctrines, and so might have helped them to frame a charge. But he had done his work, and it was now doing a most unexpected work in him. It was not ill to find witnesses, but it was not easy to make their testimonies agree, or be agreeable to the purposes of the prosecuting judges.¹ But at last two witnesses came who said, "He said, 'I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it in three days.'" This seemed enough for the council ; it could be made to prove Him a plotter against the existing order, an enemy to the worship and law of his people. The witnesses had, indeed, changed his

¹ Mark xiv. 55-59 ; Matt. xxvi. 59-61.

saying. He said, "Destroy"—the destruction was to be their work, not his—"and I will build it up in three days." It was a parable, too; a speech which shewed in symbol the destructive work they were daily doing, and the restorative work He was victoriously to achieve. But as they took it, it was, remarkably enough, the gravest charge they could formulate. Out of all the words He had spoken and works He had done they could find no graver. They could not charge Him with violation of the Sabbath law without approving the interpretations of their old enemies, the Pharisees. They could not charge Him with violent conduct in purifying the temple, for it was precisely conduct all the Pharisees and zealots would approve. They could not prove that the triumphal entry had any political origin or purpose, for He had not used it or made to it any public reference. His denunciations of the Pharisees they could not condemn; nor in his discourses in the city could they find matter to their mind. The utmost they could do was to build on this poor perverted misinterpreted saying, "I am able to destroy the temple of God and build it in three days."

The priest must be careful of the temple; so it was with the air of one whose very heart was touched that Caiaphas demanded, "Answerest thou nothing? What is it which these witness against thee?"¹ But Jesus, with serene dignity, "held his peace." Before expediency, imitating justice that it might the better work its unjust will, He could not condescend to plead; speech had only dealt with the semblance as if it were reality. In his silence there was a majesty that awed the council, and though now was the moment for the high

¹ Mark xiv. 60, 61; Matt. xxvi. 62, 63.

priest to gather and declare its mind, Caiaphas was too crafty to do so. He could not condemn and he would not acquit, and so, with the cunning of his house, he resolved to change his method. He would enlist on their side the honour, the conscious kinghood, of the Victim they had doomed to death. So in the name of the Holiest he appealed to Jesus to declare who and what He was—"I adjure thee by the living God that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God." Silence was not now possible to Jesus. He could not be unfaithful to Himself, or to the Name which had been invoked. "I am," He said. The consciousness of his Messiahship was never serener and stronger than now. In his hour of deepest humiliation He was most consciously the King; in the moment of utmost loneliness and desertion He knew Himself the Son of God, and feared not, even before the priestly council, to complete his confession.—"Ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power and coming in the clouds of heaven."

The high priest well knew what the words meant. Into the one phrase—"the Christ, the Son of God"—the hopes of a Psalm,¹ dear to Judaism for the victory and dominion it promised, were expressed; into the other the high apocalyptic dreams of Daniel were condensed.² In his soul he had little regard to either. They belonged to the things in which the Pharisees gloried, on which the zealots lived. He had seen many enthusiasts live and die, had often seen the fanaticism created by the ancient Messianic hopes break into useless rebellion and perish in blood. The man of expediency regards enthusiasm with cold and cynical

¹ Psa. ii. 7-12.

² Dan. vii. 13, 14, 22.

scorn, while the child of enthusiasm regards expediency with blind and passionate hate. But in the hate there is more intelligence than in the scorn. Caiaphas could not distinguish between a Jesus of Nazareth and a Judas of Gamala, did not dream that the confession he had heard was to be the symbol of a New Religion, wherein man was to become consciously the Son of God, and God to be loved as the Father of man. All he knew was that his subtlety had succeeded. In claiming to be the Son of God Jesus could be charged with blasphemy under the law of Moses; in claiming to be the Messiah He could be represented as denying the authority of Cæsar and setting up as the Jewish king. So, happy in his exultant horror, the priest rose, rent his clothes, and cried, "What further need have we of witnesses? Lo, ye have heard the blasphemy! What think ye?" And the response came, clear and unanimous, "He is worthy of death!"¹

Over the scene that followed it is well to draw the veil. Leaving the men who had the heart so to spit and buffet one so meek and guileless, let us watch a scene proceeding in the court below. There a fire was burning, and its lurid light fell upon a circle of faces pressing round to share its warmth. Into the court love had drawn two disciples. Peter was one, and, chilled by his sleep in Gethsemane, he stood forward to warm himself. The flame fell on his face, and a serving-maid, recognizing the strongly marked features, said in the hearing of the coarse and truculent band, doubtless discussing, in the brutal manner of their class, the terror in which "all had forsook Him and fled," "Thou also wast with Jesus of Nazareth." The sud-

¹ Mark xiv. 63, 64; Matt. xxvi. 64, 65.

den charge was too much for Peter's ebbing courage, and he denied that he knew the Man. Withdrawing into the shade to escape further notice, he only stumbled upon another recognition and into another denial. Wretched, out of heart and hope, yet held by his very misery to the spot, he was not equal to a third recognition, and denied with cursing. But just at that moment a calm eye met his, and the passion changed into penitence, the cursing into tears. That night the silent heaven looked down on two men, the one driven by a tearless remorse and the burning stain of innocent blood on his conscience to seek the awful consolation of death, the other led by the tenderness of denied yet Divine love to tearful penitence and a nobler life. Without Peter the penitent we might never have had Peter the apostle. The love that impelled him to follow Christ was mightier than the shame that surprised him into the denial. He rose by falling. The event that shewed him his own weakness also revealed the secret of stability and strength.

In the morning, "as soon as it was day,"¹ the full Sanhedrim met. The proceedings of the council that had sat over night had to be revised and ratified. Without this these could have no validity. Judaism was at least merciful, and provided that the criminal should be tried by day and condemned by day; but, that temper might not control judgment, he was not to be condemned on the day on which his trial began. But the scruples of the scribes did not trouble the Sadducees, especially when commanded by expediency. The process begun by night was ended in the morning. The session was short, the witnesses were not called,

¹ Mark xv. 1; Luke xxii. 66.

the confession was not repeated, there was no discussion as to the guilt or innocence of Jesus. The only question was, What shall be done with Him? The priests were too adroit to hesitate. The sooner He was in the hands of the Procurator the safer they would be. While they held Him, there was no saying what the people might do; once He was in the power of Rome disbelief would be universal—no one would believe in a Messiah who could not resist the Gentile. The Pharisees might dislike asking Rome to punish an offender against their own law, but the Sadducees were not so nice of conscience, knew that Rome, and not they, had the power of life and death. So the council resolved to deliver Jesus to the Governor.

In Pilate there appears the character that was needed to make the tragedy complete. In him Heathenism as it then was lived, and now, side by side with Judaism, confronted Christ, each asking the other what was to be done with Him, each helping the other by deepening his present shame to heighten his ultimate glory. Three religions here stood face to face, two of the past and one of the future. The religions of the past were exhausted, hollow, and unreal, but the religion of the future a thing of infinite promise and potency. Pride and strength seemed to belong to the old, humiliation and weakness to the new; but within the old the merciless forces of decay and disintegration were at work, while within the new germinative and organizing energies were generously active. The persons that act in this drama but veil great principles, and help us to see how the evil, even where most victorious over the good, may be only the more working its own defeat, and fulfilling the Divine purpose.

Pilate was, so far as he stands revealed in Christian and Jewish history, a true child of the Roman Empire in its period of insolence and victorious aggression. His was precisely the kind of character sure to be formed under the combined influences of its conquests and cosmopolitanism. Few races can bear conquest undepraved; the subject often suffers less than the subjecting people. The man who rules the men his kinsmen have vanquished is prone to regard them as a lower race, made of poorer and feebler stuff than his own. And where the ruler so regards the ruled, justice is impossible; his administration will be too thoroughly penetrated by his own spirit to be, where most regular or legal, altogether just. And this radical evil vitiated the Roman rule. What was wise and generous in it was perverted and poisoned by the men it employed; and they by the false attitude they occupied. The only remedy for the evil was the complete incorporation of the provinces with the empire; but this was less possible in its earlier than in its golden period, the days of Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius. Rome was tolerant of national institutions, but national instincts and institutions were not always tolerant of Rome. And where they were recalcitrant she was severe; and where the subject was an insubordinate race, too weak to rebel, too proud to be submissive, too tenacious of its own will and customs to love Rome, there her ruler would find his task the heaviest—exercise and apology for qualities imperial rather than regal or legal. Then while conquest depraved, cosmopolitanism enervated, weakened the faith that had created the moral and political ideals of Rome. As the Roman came to know many peoples he came to know as many religions; each believed

within its own circle, unknown or disbelieved beyond it. To his rigorous practical intelligence the main matter in each was its political significance. All could not be true, none had a universal truth, and each served a local purpose and had a particular use. A religion had only to be national to be recognized at Rome ; she tolerated all that she might the better rule all peoples. The inevitable consequence was the one so well stated by Gibbon—while all religions were to the people equally true, they were to the philosopher equally false, to the magistrate equally useful.

And Pilate was in these respects a true Roman magistrate. His attitude to the Jews is expressed in the history of his government, his careless sacrifice of life, his insolent affronts to their deepest and dearest convictions. His attitude to religion is expressed in the question, asked in cynical impatience, "What is truth?"¹ meaning, "What is your truth to me? Fools may reason about it, statesmen cannot rule by it; he but wastes his time who seeks it." To such a man the Jews were an insoluble problem, and their religious discussions and differences an irritating trouble. He had come from Cæsarea to Jerusalem because of the feast. The multitudes were dangerous and discontented, and he had to be there at once to overawe the people and administer justice. His memories of the city were unpleasant. He had been truculent, but they fanatical, and his truculence had been defied and mastered by their fanaticism. And he finds them again agitated and fierce over these religious differences of theirs. And what was worse, they evidently mean to draw him into their disputes, and use his authority for

¹ John xviii. 38.

their sectarian ends. The priests had got soldiers the night before to capture a Man who was no political offender, and now here in the early morning they are bringing Him to the Prætorium.¹ Their conduct is irritating, a succession of small yet exasperating offences to a hard vain man like Pilate. They send their Victim into the Prætorium, but they themselves will not enter. They are but Jewish priests, yet would feel defiled by contact with the majesty of Rome. They wish him to work their will, but he has to go out to speak with them; they, for reasons he must as a governor respect, and as a man despise, refuse to plead in the hall of judgment. His feeling of impatient and fretful contempt is expressed in the question, "What accusation bring ye against this man?" They attempt, by standing on their dignity, to carry their point at once, "We deliver Him to thee; that is proof enough of his guilt." He, determined not to be their tool or any friend to their factions, stands on his authority and legal rights. "If I do not try Him, I will not execute Him. Judge Him according to your law." They, forced to feel that as they have no power to inflict they have no right to award the last penalty, have to submit their whole case to Pilate. But the new is not the old indictment; it is skilfully modified and enlarged into what seems a capital offence, whether measured by the law of Judæa or Rome. The charges are three—He has corrupted the nation, has forbidden to give tribute to Cæsar, and has claimed to be King Messiah.² Pilate, having heard their charge, returns to examine Christ. He asks, seizing the cardinal point for him, "Art thou the King of the Jews?"³ But the question is not so easily

¹ John xviii. 28–32.² Luke xxiii. 2.³ John xviii. 33–38.

answered: it may admit of either a yes or a no. So Jesus wishes to know whose it is—Pilate's or the Jews' ? Pilate declares ignorance ; he knows but what he has been told ; he would never have imagined that the person before him could claim to be a king. Then Jesus breaks into a wonderful exposition of his kingdom and kingdom --“ My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants have fought that I should not be delivered to the Jews : but now is my kingdom not from hence.” And Pilate, anxious to reach what was for him the root of the matter, asks, “ Art thou a king, then ? ” Jesus answered, “ Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice.”

These words are so remarkable, and form so striking a contrast to the sayings and conduct of Christ, as given in the Synoptics, that their authenticity has been amply doubted. But comparison with the synoptic narratives confirms rather than invalidates their truth. It is evident from all the gospels that Pilate condemned Jesus most reluctantly, or rather, refused to condemn Him, and allowed Him to be crucified only to please the Jews. He could not be made to believe in his guilt, believed instead that He was the victim of factious and unjust hate, struggled hard to save Him, and yielded simply to avoid a tumult. Now how had Pilate been so deeply impressed in favour of Jesus ? Why so strongly convinced that the Jewish clamour was utterly unreasonable ? Simple pity cannot explain it. He had seen too much to be easily touched, and was too much of a Roman to be ruled by sentiment.

And where political claims and fiscal agitation were concerned he could be as pitiless as any of his class. But grant this interview, and all is plain. These words would make on Pilate the impression of innocence unsurpassed. They would seem to him like the speech of a child, a simple and unworldly idealist too remote from the politics and concerns of life to be a trouble in the State. He knew the Jews, right well understood the kind of men that disguised policy in religion. But this was not one of them. His speech was without worldliness, a sweet and limpid idealism, no sour and impracticable fanaticism, and must be offensive to the Jews for reasons that concerned their superstition and in no way concerned Rome, which they did not love. And so the governor tried to save the Christ. He first pronounced Him innocent, but only to hear the chief priests the more fiercely charge Him with corrupting the people from Galilee to Jerusalem.¹ Then, anxious to be rid of the matter, he sent Him to Herod. But Herod, with the cruel and indulgent spirit of his race, only made sport out of the Sufferer, and sent Him back derisively arrayed to Pilate. With Jesus once more on his hands, the governor was forced to assume the responsibilities involved in judgment. He did not wish to sacrifice Jesus, but still less did he wish to risk a tumult. So he tried to avoid both by a mean expedient. Should he—addressing the excited multitude now gathered before his palace, and skilfully fomented into vindictiveness against Him who had deceived them into the thought that He was Messiah—should he, as they were accustomed to an act of grace at the feast, release unto them the king of the Jews? But

¹ Luke xxiii. 5-11.

"the chief priests moved the people" to cry, "Not this man, but Bar-Abbas."¹ By this appeal to the crowd the control of events passed from the hands of Pilate. Passion now reigned; the only question was, how long he would hold out and how best it could compel him to yield. He ordered Jesus to be scourged, clad in the symbols of mock royalty, and then shewed Him, bleeding and humiliated, a spectacle calculated to awaken pity and satisfy revenge. But the only response was the cry, "Crucify him, crucify him!"² If they would have it, then they must know the guilt was theirs. He would not condemn Him; he would remain "innocent of the blood of this just person." But the guilt they were ready to assume: "His blood be on us and on our children."³ "Shall I," then said he, now willing to execute any sentence they might determine, "crucify your king?" And they, sealing their national crime by national infidelity, shouted, "Crucify him! we have no king but Cæsar."⁴

And so the conflict of the three religions ended; the Christ who held the future was to be crucified by the passion of sacerdotal Judaism and the weakness of cosmopolitan Heathenism. The tragic story is a parable in action. The religion of Israel, falsified by priests, perverted from a service of the living God into a sensuous worship, where the symbol superseded the reality, the temple overshadowed the God, and the hierarch supplanted his law, could find no love in its heart, no reverence in its will for the holiest Person of the race; met Him not as the fruition of its hopes and the end of its being, but as the last calamity of its life,

¹ Mark xv. 11.

² John xix. 4-6.

³ Matt. xxvii. 24, 25.

⁴ John xix. 15.

a being that must perish that it might live. The religions of the Gentile, penetrated and transformed by the thought of Greece and the political ideal of Rome, stood between Judaism and Christ, saw its want of the holy and hate of the good, saw, too, his innocence, the beauty that made his marred visage winsome and his ideal of manhood sweetly reasonable; but it had not heart enough to love the Christ, had not even conscience enough to compel the Jew to forego his hate and love his King. And between these there is the religion of Christ, which is the religion of man and his future, made the victim of their vices, sacrificed, as it might seem, to their blended hate and impotence. But his death is its life. Christ is like a holy and beautiful being bruised and broken by the collision of two brutal forces that cannot understand the sanctity and loveliness of Him they have destroyed, but they bruised Him only that there might escape from Him a fragrance that has sweetened the air of the world, made it for all time and for all men balmier and more healthful, like a diffused celestial presence, the very breath of God passing over the earth and abiding on it. His kingdom was not of this world, and in its unworldliness has lived its permanence and power. While the empires of Augustus and Constantine, of Charlemagne and Barbarossa, of the Frank and the Teuton, have flourished and perished, the kingdom of Christ has widened with the ages, strengthened with the truth, and now lives in the heart of humanity, the one presence of infinite promise and hopefulness and love.

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

ON COLOSSIANS II. 22, 23.

THE exegetical difficulties of "this profound and difficult Epistle" are at their greatest, both in number and degree, in the Second Chapter, and culminate in its last verse. They arise partly from the phraseology of the Epistle and the number of rare and obscure words it contains, partly from its extreme abruptness and "want of finish," and the neglect by the Writer of those conjunctive and modal particles in which the Greek language is so incomparably rich, and which form the connective tissue of its sentences. The controversial purport of the Letter, with the crude and novel, as well as subtle and many-sided character of the form of error that it has to deal with, go far to account for these peculiarities. Some of the more crucial difficulties of this Second Chapter may be due, as I have tried to shew in a former Paper on Verse 18, to the allusions the Apostle has occasion to make to the tenets and phrases of the party he is attacking. Indeed, it would be strange if we did not meet with passages extremely obscure and perplexing in a controversy so far personal and local, at least in the immediate occasion of it, as was that between St. Paul and the false teachers of Colossæ, and one about which we know so little beyond what can be gathered from the pages of the Epistle itself, where it is dealt with in such brief and summary fashion. And the more swift and telling are the sharp home-thrusts of the Apostle's mighty dialectic, the more likely are they to baffle the eye of the distant observer in attempting to follow them.

Out of the thirty-three *Hapax legomena* of the

Epistle, three belong to this verse alone—the words ἐθελοθρησκεία, ἀφειδεία, and πλησμονή. The first of these three appears to be an inspired coinage of the Apostle's own. It only occurs besides, and that very rarely, in later ecclesiastical writings. Two distinct shades of meaning have been assigned to it. The sense of ἀφειδεία, on the other hand, is unmistakably definite; but that of πλησμονή has been grave matter of dispute. If, with most modern interpreters, we blend λόγον . . . ἔχοντα (our *having a show*) into a single phrase, then we have a fourth expression (given by Alford in his list of *Haraph legomena*) peculiar to this passage, and which affords a choice of various renderings. Add to this that τιμή may mean *honour* or *value*, and the preposition πρὸς (before πλησμονήν) as readily *against* as *for*; and as to σάρξ, the last word of the verse, every one knows how naturally it will lend itself to different interpretations. So much for the lexical conditions of the problem.

Its syntactical difficulties will be appreciated when it is observed that the relative ἅτινα (*such as*), forming the subject of the sentence, may be fairly referred to either of two quite different antecedents; and that the predicate is made up of one participial followed by three prepositional phrases—with the addition of a dependent dative without preposition thrown in amongst them, if we follow a somewhat probable correction of the Received Text—and these strung together without a single particle to help us to adjust them, except a “solitary μὲν” bereft of its corresponding δέ. In fact, the verse at first sight looks like nothing so much as a series of rough notes or memoranda, hastily jotted down for one's own private use, to be enlarged upon

and worked up afterwards, but which, as they stand, must be little more than a riddle to every one except the Writer himself. And such an enigma the sentence appears to have proved. It would be no very great exaggeration to say that every combination of its details arithmetically possible has been tried by one interpreter or another; and indeed such an estimate would not include all the views proposed, Alford, for instance, connecting the last phrase, *πρὸς πλησμονὴν κ.τ.λ.*, with *ἐσχηματίζεσθε* of Verse 20. Thanks to the labours of recent Commentators, the ground is now, however, considerably cleared, and the points at issue have been reduced to a comparatively narrow compass. But I venture to doubt whether, after all, the position of the Verse as forming the conclusion of the Apostle's polemic has been sufficiently considered, and whether due weight has been given to the indications it contains of *backward reference*, both as explaining its summary character, and as elucidating what is otherwise doubtful in its meaning and connection of thought.

Another consideration determining the line of exposition adopted here is this: that when a number of phrases follow each other asyndetically, without conjunctive or modulating particles, the presumption is that *their order gives their connection*, and that they appear on the page just as they issued from the Writer's mind. In such a case link-words can be dispensed with where the desire for brief and energetic expression dictates their absence, for the sentence holds together by the mere position of its different parts. Directly we abandon this principle, and are tempted to take the words otherwise than as they stand, we are landed in

the arbitrary and uncertain, and, in fact, turn the verse into a sort of elaborate amphibology, as the history of its exegesis too plainly shews.

Should these two principles coincide in the result to which they point us, we may feel tolerably sure of being in the right direction, and by the aid of such light as we can gather from the general analogy of Pauline modes of thought and expression elsewhere, may, perhaps, even hope to reach some definite and well-established conclusion as to the sense of this most vexed of all vexed passages.

1. We must, therefore, refer *such as*, the all important subject of the Verse, with Alford, Ellicott, Hofmann, Meyer, to the immediately antecedent *commandments and teachings of men*. The first glance at the contents of Verse 23 shews that they have a far wider reference than simply to the "decrees" of Verses 20, 21. And this wider reference is already implied in "the commandments and teachings of men," as constituting the system "according to" which these special prohibitions (*handle not*, &c.) were enacted and enforced. Comparison of Verse 22 with the similar words of Verse 8, and with the striking parallel in Ephesians iv. 14, will shew that it is a clause of most significant and fundamental import in its bearing on the Colossian heresy. That the saying was borrowed from Old Testament Scripture, and was also one of the (probably) well-known phrases of Christ Himself, would lend to it a peculiarly solemn judicial emphasis.¹ Its ἐντάλματα gives a wider extension to the δόγματα of the two preceding verses, and the διδασκαλίας τ. ἀνθρώπων links them

¹ See Isaiah xxix. 13 (LXX.); Matthew xv. 6-9; Mark vii. 6-13; also Titus i. 14.

on to the general body of doctrine to which they belonged. And so, by a bold and easy transition, the Apostle passes from the particular warnings and denunciations of the previous verses to the general survey and review of the whole Colossian error that we find condensed into the brief and pregnant words of Verse 23. And it is just the note of solemn repetition struck in the 22nd Verse that prepares us for this final summing up.

2. If in *the commandments and teachings of men* in Verse 22 *the tradition of men* of Verse 8 is repeated and amplified, the loudly sounded warning against *philosophy and empty deceit* contained in that former verse is echoed no less distinctly in the λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίης of Verse 23. And with this reference in our minds, and remembering the standing proverbial antithesis between λόγος and ἔργον, δύναμις, and the like (*word* and *work*, &c.),¹ this latter phrase becomes sufficiently complete in itself. "Having *word* (or *form*, *show*) indeed of wisdom" clearly means "having that and nothing more—no inner truth, no pith and substance of wisdom"—λόγον, οὐ πράγματα, μάλλον δὲ πιθανολογίας λόγον ψίλον (*mere words, nothing but words*), as Œcumenius puts it. So already Chrysostom—Λόγον, οὐκ ἀληθείαν, οὐδὲ δύναμιν. Here we have exactly the conditions under which the classical μὲν *solitarium* appears, "where a sentence or word with εἰ can easily be supplied in thought;"² and the search for the missing half of the antithesis in the latter part of the

¹ Compare, for St. Paul, Col. iii. 17; Rom. xv. 18; 1 Cor. iv. 19, 20; 2 Cor. x. 11; 1 Thess. i. 5; 2 Thess. ii. 17; also 1 John ii. 18; James i. 23-25. And, for classical usage, see, e.g., Thuc. i. 22; Eurip. *Heracl.* 5; Aristotle, *Polit.* iii. 9. 8; and the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργον σκία.

² Matthiä, *Gr. Grammatik*, 622. 6. 'Ὡς μὲν λέγουσιν (as indeed they say), Eurip. *Orestes*, 8, is a fair example of the idiom.

verse becomes as needless as it has proved precarious.¹ This view of the force of *μὲν* has in its favour the suffrages of Erasmus, Winer,² A. Buttmann,³ Meyer, amongst others.

But, as Œcumenius has already indicated, this clause reminds us of Verse 4 almost as forcibly as of Verse 8. "This I say lest any one should be deceiving you (playing off fallacies upon you) in persuasive speech"—such were the Apostle's first words of warning to his readers. And now he comes round to the same point again when he writes in the language of this concluding verse, "having *speech* indeed of wisdom." The force of the double verbal association (*παραλογίζεται ἐν πιθανολογία . . . λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα*) it is impossible to reproduce in English, because we have no word to unite the ideas of *reasoning* and *speech* under one concept, as the Greeks have done in their marvellous *λόγος*. It is precisely the same style of expression and the same association of ideas that we meet in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, when the Apostle acknowledges *word of wisdom* (*λόγος σοφίας*) as one form of "the manifestation of the Spirit,"⁴ but repudiates for himself *wisdom of word*⁵ (much the same as "*word indeed of wisdom*") and *persuasive words of wisdom*.⁶ Indeed, the whole of 1 Corinthians i. 17—ii. 16 is a most profound and eloquent inspired play upon the notions of *word* and *wisdom*, which binds them together

¹ Hofmann (apparently) finds it in *ἐν ἐθελοθρησκείᾳ κ.τ.λ.*; Peirce, Bengel, and Eadie in *πρὸς πλησμονήν*; Ellcott (apparently) and Lightfoot in *οὐκ ἐν τιμῇτινι*.

² *Grammar*, p. 719, E.T.

³ *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, pp. 365, 366, E.T.

⁴ 1. Cor. xii. 8. Compare *Ibid.* i. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.* i. 17; ii. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.* ii. 4, 13. The language of these two verses combines and blends completely the phrases we have attempted to link together in Col. ii. 4, 8, and 23.

inseparably in the mind of every reader of St. Paul. This parallelism of expression is the more certain and decisive because it appears to be due to the common "philosophical" character of the errors the Apostle is dealing with in each case.¹

We have no need, then, to search amongst the various uses of *λόγον ἔχω* for that most fitting here. The sense of the grammatically inseparable *λόγον σοφίας* is defined by Pauline usage, and of *λόγον μὲν σοφίας* by the previous context. And "Having *word* indeed of wisdom" describes sufficiently the sophistical nature of the Colossian heresy, the show of logical method, and of philosophical breadth and thoroughness of treatment, which naturally made it so attractive to half-educated minds, to men perhaps of a speculative and mystical bent, but whose intellectual grasp of the Christian system was as yet but partial and imperfect.²

3. While the external form and garb of the new doctrine are described in the participial clause *λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας*, its content as a system of religion and morals is indicated in the prepositional adjuncts that follow. For beyond a doubt *ἐν ἐθελοθρησκείᾳ κ. ταπεινοφροσύνῃ* is a repetition from Verse 18, while *ἀφειδεῖα σώματος* points hardly less distinctly to the ascetic regulations of Verse 21.

Ἐθελοθρησκεία seems to be not merely connected with, but even etymologically derived from, the *θέλων ἐν . . . θρησκείᾳ τῶν ἀγγέλων* of Verse 18. It is a word which St. Paul himself compounds to set forth

¹ See also a previous Paper on Col. ii. 18, in Vol. xi. pp. 388-397. The bitter word of condemnation, *φυσικόμενος*, is used by St. Paul only in these two Epistles.

² See Col. i. 9; ii. 2. It is for this Church alone that the Apostle asks the gift of *σύνεσις* (intellectual *comprehension*, the power to *put things together*). Comp. Eph. iii. 4; Luke ii. 47.

the characteristic quality and temper of the man who has been spoken of just before as "Delighting in worshipping of the angels."¹ Its appearance here, in conjunction with *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, cannot be accounted for in any other way. Its meaning, therefore, must correspond with this derivation. Examination of the parallel compounds of *ἐθέλω* confirms this presumption; for this prefix (nearly synonymous with *φιλο-*) usually denotes *addiction to*, or *delight in*, the state, or quality, or practice signified by the other half of the word. In fact, *ἐθελο-* appears to connote *willingness* rather than *wilfulness*.² No better example could be found than the *ἐθελοπερισσοθησκεία* (*zeal for excess of ritual*) quoted by several commentators from Epiphanius, as attributed to the Pharisees. And therefore, as Hofmann puts it, "if *θησκεία* is not in itself anything evil, so neither is *ἐθελοθησκεία*;"³ so neither, indeed, is *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, nor *ἄφειδεία σώματος*, nor *λόγος σοφίας* (without

¹ There is no other way, I suppose, of rendering *θέλων* (Verse 18) if *ἐν ταπειν. κ. θησκεία* are immediately dependent on it, and that they are so *ἐθελοθησκεία* strongly indicates. So Bengel, Lightfoot, and others. For use of *θέλω* compare Gal. iv. 9, 21.

² It is true that Suidas explains this word as denoting "worshipping at one's own will what one thinks fit" (*ἰδίῳ θελήματι σέβειν τὸ δοκοῦν*). See Ellicott on the passage. But this consideration seems to be outweighed by the arguments drawn from the analogy of compounds of *ἐθέλω*, and from the connection of Verses 18 and 23. Allowance must be made for the tendency of interpreters to *aggravate* the sense of words of condemnation.

³ Hofmann's treatment of the philological point is the most full and satisfactory I have met with. See his *Die Briefe Pauli an d. Kolosser u. an Philemon*, pp. 102, 103. No commentator is more stimulating and suggestive than Hofmann, nor more arbitrary and ingeniously perverse than he in the combinations he sometimes adopts. M. Godet's characterization of this writer, in the Preface to his recent commentary on *Romans*, one may perhaps be allowed to quote: "Hofmann applies to the analysis of the Apostle's thought the keenest critical insight; he never overlooks the slightest detail of the text; in wealth of philological knowledge he is no way inferior to Meyer. But he is too often wanting in accuracy, and dwells complacently on exegetical novelties, in which it is hard to persuade one's self that he seriously believes." After his admirable elucidation of *ἐθελοθησκεία*, he connects it with *σώματος*!

the μέν). Δεισιδαιμονία (*religiousness*) is the equivalent given for ἐθελοθρησκεία by the modern Greek scholar Byzantios.¹ At the same time θρησκεία, as denoting *worship as matter of ritual and outward form*, is, like δεισιδαιμονία in another way, always ready to assume an unfavourable sense,² and such a sense has here been stamped upon it already by Verse 18.

Ἐθελοθρησκεία, then, appears to be the general characteristic and governing religious principle of the θέλων ἐν θρησκείᾳ τῶν ἀγγέλων, whose love of worship for mere worship's sake prompts him at once to accumulate³ and elaborate its forms, and to *multiply its objects*. Such an one, for whom the act and outward exercise of worship is the chief part of religion, and the recognition⁴ of its true object but a secondary matter, is ready to pay his adoration to angel, or saint, or Virgin mother, metaphysical abstractions, forces of nature, or *grand être de l'humanité*—anything that his superstitious fancy, or philosophic theory, or the fashion of the hour may present to his religious instinct.

This kind of *zeal for worship*, especially in the form of angel-worship, naturally has about it a plausible air of "humility;" it appears to manifest a becoming

¹ In his *Lexicon*. Athens, 1839.

² See Trench's *Synonyms of N. T.*, s.v. θρήσκος. Trench furnishes a reference to "a very instructive passage on the merely *external* character of θρησκεία" occurring in Philo (*Quod Det. Pot. Insid.* 7), in which, refusing the character of "devout" to those who seek it by divers washings, sacrifices, temple-building, &c., he speaks of them as *making outward worship a substitute for piety* (θρησκείαν ἀντὶ ὁσιότητος ἡγοούμενος). One cannot help noticing that it is only in the Ephesian Epistle (Chap. iv. 24) that St. Paul uses ὁσιότης, the other of these two contrasted words, in express distinction, one might suppose, from the θρησκεία which so troubled him at Colossæ. θρησκεία is only used here in St. Paul's Epistles; but see Acts xxvi. 5; James i. 26, 27. ³ Col. ii. 16.

⁴ Compare Gal. iv. 9, 10, where the *knowledge of God* is appealed to as that which should have rendered a return to petty ceremonialism impossible.

reverence for the great powers above us, and a proper sense of our "low estate" as compared with them. But the Apostle has already shewn what pride and falsehood lay hid under this specious garb of piety. He has no need to repeat what his readers have only just learned from him a few verses back (in Verse 18). He has said enough in these two words (ἐν ἐθελοθρησκείᾳ κ. ταπεινοφροσύνῃ) to serve his purpose here, and to explain the *religious fascination*, as the previous clause, in the light of earlier warnings, explains the *intellectual attractiveness* of the Colossian heresy.

4. In discussing the last clause of the verse, it may be convenient to begin with πλησμονή, the meaning of which, unless we are to set aside all lexical usage, is *repletion, surfeiting*, and nothing else.¹ Granting this, then, the meaning of σὰρξ is determined on the one hand, for it is only *the flesh*, as *the sensual in man*, that is capable of such indulgence;² and the force of πρὸς is fixed on the other hand, as denoting *against*. No one would suppose the Apostle to charge the errorists with laying down ascetic rules "*for (in order to promote) surfeiting of the flesh*;" "such language would defeat its own object by its extravagance." And to describe them as "*not . . . for surfeiting of the flesh*" would be altogether pointless, as it would also be to speak of them as actually "*against surfeiting of the flesh*." Evidently, then, πρὸς πλησμονὴν τ. σαρκὸς is a

¹ For proof of this see Lightfoot's Note on the verse; also Stephens's *Thesaurus*, s. v. πλησμονή. At the same time it must be allowed that "the majority of the Fathers, Greek and Latin," read the word in a milder sense, as though it might denote legitimate and natural gratification. So Luther, very decidedly.

² The "excess of riot" described in 1 Peter iv. 3 is an exhibition of πλησμονή τ. σαρκός. Philo uses the word of Noah's drunkenness, in *De Sobriet.* 1. The Greek proverb, Ἐν πλησμονῇ Κύρις, sufficiently indicates the current associations of the term.

part of the negative phrase following ἀφειδέα σώματος, and the Apostle is denying to these practices a merit which they claimed or might seem to possess (that of being directed against sensuality), not charging them with a new demerit. But πρὸς πλησμονὴν κ. τ. λ. is connected with οὐκ through ἐν τιμῇ τινι, and in his treatment of τιμῇ Lightfoot is not at all so convincing as in regard to πλησμονή. He renders it *value*, i.e., *value in use, utility, efficiency*. It is hard to see how his examples justify putting this sense on τιμῇ. *Value* in the sense of *price* it often means, of course; but that usage is obviously inapplicable here.¹ 1 Thessalonians iv. 4 gives the only Pauline parallel to ἐν τιμῇ: "That each of you should know how to gain possession of his own vessel (i.e., *his body*)² in sanctification and honour." The more closely the two passages are compared, the more one is persuaded, with Alford and Wordsworth, that the use of ἐν τιμῇ is identical in the two cases,³ and expresses a principle of the most vital importance as a part of St. Paul's moral teaching. The word *sanctification* in the Thessalonian passage points us again to 1 Corinthians vi. 13-20, where we learn what it is that gives the human body its dignity and sacredness and its imperishable worth, and what it is that most deeply wounds and shamefully tarnishes its honour.⁴ How naturally the idea of *honour* occurs to St. Paul's mind

¹ Τιμῇ is *price* in 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23; elsewhere in St. Paul always *honour*. Comp. Matt. xxvii. 6; Acts v. 2.

² See Wordsworth's full and very valuable Note on this passage, as against Alford and Ellicott.

³ This limits the reference of οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ to ἀφειδέα σώματος. Meyer opposes it to ἐν ἐθελοθροσκειᾷ κ. τ. λ. as well, on account of the repeated ἐν; but this consideration of itself is of no decisive weight.

⁴ We speak, in common parlance, of a man's "honour" as consisting in his truthfulness, and a woman's in her chastity. When shall we be Christians enough to recognize that the one sex is as much *dishonoured* by impurity as the other?

in connection with the body we see again in 1 Corinthians xii. 22-27. Twice over in the fearful denunciation of Romans i. 18-32 does he speak of *dishonour* as that which was so deeply branded on *the body* by the dark and nameless pollutions to which it was subjected in a Paganism where idolatry and unbelief had worked out their last results. To him, therefore, the ascetic rules of these new teachers were sure to present themselves from this point of view; and it particularly concerned him to state whether or not he allowed to their "hard treatment of the body" the honour which it seemed to have, or was perhaps represented to have, as a means of "escaping the corruption that was in the world through lust." Especially was he bound to be explicit here, and to distinguish between the true and the false asceticism, since there were decided ascetic leanings in his own moral teaching, and certain phrases on record, such as Romans viii. 13; xiii. 14; 1 Corinthians vii. 1; ix. 27, which might easily be made to lend a colour to the Colossian rigorism. Ἀφειδεία σώματος he neither could nor did condemn absolutely and in every sense. The language of Philippians iii. 19 (*whose god is their belly, and their glory is in their shame*) gives us a hint as to the connection of τιμή with πρὸς πλεγμασμονὴν τ. σαρκός, sensual indulgence being there identified with open (shameless) shame, and therefore implicitly opposed to the *honour* of a man's person. In the Septuagint, Habakkuk ii. 16 (the Chapter from which, by the way, comes St. Paul's cardinal quotation, *The just shall live by faith*), we have an instance of the use of πλεγμασμονή that may possibly throw some further light on this connection. "*Surfeiting of dishonour* (πλεγμασμονὴν ἀτιμίας) from glory drink thou also," is the

rendering of the LXX.¹ The picture drawn by the prophet is repulsive in the extreme; *surfeiting* and *dishonour* appear together at their worst, and are blended in one of those bold expressions which print themselves indelibly on a reader's memory and are likely to reappear in other forms. As sensual excess brings dishonour, so a right Christian estimate of the dignity of the body is its surest preventive, and St. Paul's τιμὴ πρὸς πλησμονήν κ. τ. λ. is (to use a logical phrase) the contrapositive of Habakkuk's (LXX.) πλησμονὴ ἀτιμίας. What prepares us for the hostile sense implied in πρὸς, and in virtue of which it links πλησμονή to τιμή, is that ἀφειδεία already connotes hostility to something; the Apostle complains that it is *the body* as such that is the object of this severity, and that it is not, in a way of true honour to the body, directed against indulgence of the flesh. So we may do justice to the sharp antithesis so well insisted on by Meyer between ἀφειδεία σώματος and πλησμονή τ. σαρκός, and yet give οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ τινι its due place between them, the whole clause being thus drawn together into the closest and most compact unity.

In dealing with the moral and practical side of the Colossian heresy, the Apostle does not therefore simply repeat by way of conclusion, and in a more general manner, what he had said before, but adds a new element of essential moment to his counter argument. He had condemned the moral code of the errorists in Verses 20-22, on the ground of its arbitrariness and pettiness, and the intrinsically trivial and

¹ The LXX. translators appear to have read the Verse with a slightly different vocalization and punctuation—שִׁבְעַת קָלִיז מִכְבוֹד שְׂתֵה גַם אֶתָּה. This is a striking and surely a feasible reading. It does not appear in the *Various Renderings and Readings Bible*.

perishing nature of the objects with which it mainly dealt.¹ Now he lays hold of the inner principle of their entire scheme of morality, its *hostility to the body* as a physical organism, and a part of material nature.² Such treatment, he declares, robs it of its honour and sacredness, and is not directed against that *feeding of the flesh* in which lies our real peril and dishonour in relation to this "vessel" of our earthly life.³ St. Paul has, perhaps, reserved this objection to the last in order to give him a suitable starting-point for the exhortations of the next Chapter, where (in Verses 1-4) he shews the only sure way to be delivered from sensual sin, by "seeking and minding the things above, where Christ is,"⁴ and sets forth the true Christian asceticism (*ἀφειδεία τῆς σαρκὸς* indeed) as a "making dead the members that are upon the earth"—that belong to the earthly body of "the old man that is under corruption according to the lusts of deceit."

On its ethical side, therefore, the system of the Colossian heresiarch (the founder and father, shall we say, of Gnosticism ?) held out the charm of a lofty and severe morality attainable by simple and plain rules of life and a strict external regimen, but based unhappily on a false and fatal principle—a principle the deadly mischief of which the history of the Church since the time of the Pastoral Epistles has hardly ever ceased to illustrate. It taught men to hate the body and the

¹ For we may safely follow Meyer, Ellicott, Lightfoot, Wordsworth, Eadie, &c., in finding in 1 Cor. vi. 13, Matt. xv. 17, the true explanation of Verse 21.

² See Lightfoot, pp. 76 ff.; and Excursus A in *New Testament Commentary for English Readers (Colossians)*.

³ In Section 7 of Philo's *Quod. Det. Pot. Insid.*, previously referred to in illustration of *θρησκεία*, there is also an instructive account of modes then in use of *ἀφειδεία σώματος*. Those who practise them, Philo says, are to be shewn "the true way of temperance."

⁴ See again Phil. iii. 19, 20.

natural world instead of hating "the flesh which is not subject to the law of God."

A word or two further is necessary on the connection of the clauses of the 23rd Verse, and then our task is completed. With Lachmann, Lightfoot, and other eminent critics, we may suppose it probable that the *καὶ* before *ἀφειδεία* should be deleted. And, indeed, that word is not exactly on the same footing as the two previous nouns governed by *ἐν*. And, in regard to the *ἐν* which attaches *ἐθελοθρησκεία κ. ταπεινοφροσύνη* to *λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας*, we may adopt Ellicott's excellent remark that it points "not to the instrument by which, but, as usual, to the *ethical domain in which* the *λόγος σοφίας* was acquired." It was in its mode of developing, combining, and applying its theological and ethical principles that this system exhibited so much "word (and logical form) of wisdom," and assumed the character indeed of a *Theosophy*.

Gathering up the results of the previous discussion, we may venture to translate as follows: "'According to the commandments and teachings of men,'—such as have *word* indeed of wisdom, in zeal for worship and humility, with hard treatment of (the) body—not in any honour (as) against surfeiting of the flesh."

I have already described the incipient Gnosticism of Colossæ as a "compound of intellectual pride, visionary pseudo-mystic spiritualism, and ritualistic fervour," with (may now be added) a harsh and misguided asceticism that, in seeking to reduce the body, succeeded only in debasing and enfeebling the soul.

GEO. G. FINDLAY.

THE VALUE OF THE PATRISTIC WRITINGS FOR
THE CRITICISM AND EXEGESIS OF THE BIBLE.

III.—EXEGESIS (*concluded*).

THE greater Fathers have all their distinctive characteristics. Thus, for instance, it has been said that of the three leading figures in the Latin Church "Ambrose is the character; Jerome the talent; Augustine the genius,"¹ reminding us of Goethe's well-known saying—

Es bildet ein Talent sich in der Stille,
Ein Character sich in dem Strom der Welt.

Jerome's quiet cell at Bethlehem and the stormy position of Ambrose at Milan certainly correspond to these conditions. The term "genius" applied to Augustine will not of course be supposed to exclude "character," or even "talent." Augustine was a born ruler of men as much as Ambrose was; he possessed ability, equal perhaps in its way, though differently directed, to that of Jerome; but he possessed yet a third quality which seemed to throw these into shade. His sensitive emotional nature, rendering him highly susceptible to the most varied impressions, and at the same time the quick and daring imagination, which is often seen to go along with fine organizations of this kind, combined to give to his writings that peculiar stamp which is known as "genius."

Nor is it difficult to indicate, with reference to the particular subject before us, the special direction which the different mental constitution of the most eminent patristic commentators led them to take. In this limited field, too, the individualities are clearly marked.

¹ Ebert, *Geschichte der christlichlateinischen Literatur*, p. 203.

Taking the five great contemporaries, "if Chrysostom is the type of the homilist, and Theodoret of the annotator,"¹ Theodore of Mopsuestia is primarily and peculiarly, the exegete; and in like manner if Jerome is *par excellence* the learned commentator, Augustine would have an equally undisputed title to be called the doctrinal commentator. As a commentator Augustine has many weaknesses. In all the vast range of his writings there is probably no one department in which the result is as a whole so marred by imperfections. And yet even here his excellence comes out, and he is able to contribute what no other commentator has contributed in equal degree.

Let us work out this proposition a little more fully. And first we must needs pursue the ungracious task of pointing out some of the faults which detract from the value of Augustine's commentaries. We have had occasion to speak of the defects of preceding writers. We have seen how the work of Origen and his followers was spoilt by allegorizing and the ignoring of the difference between the Old and New Testaments. We have seen how the Antiochene school, though avoiding to a greater or less extent this error yet fell into the prevalent superstition in regard to the Septuagint, and approached the Old Testament especially with very inadequate philological preparation. Every one of these defects Augustine shared. He abounds in allegories. He is constantly finding New Testament doctrines in Old Testament texts. His knowledge of the Greek of the New Testament was very defective, while of Hebrew he not only knew nothing, but preferred the Septuagint Version of the Hebrew books to the original.

¹ Swete, *Theod. Episc. Mops. in Epist. B. Pauli Comm.* vol. i. p. lxxviii.

At the end of the last paper allusion was made to the controversy between Augustine and Jerome about the passage in the Epistle to the Galatians relating the rebuke of St. Peter by St. Paul at Antioch. We saw there how Augustine set an example of honest and straightforward interpretation where, from the very beginning of Christian commenting, the temptation to explain away the obvious meaning of the narrative had proved too strong. Into these tortuous paths both Clement of Alexandria and Origen had entered, and in the steps of the latter the greatest of succeeding commentators had followed. Both Chrysostom and Jerome had strongly maintained the view put forward by him, and even Theodore of Mopsuestia, though apparently leaning to the natural interpretation, only stated it as an alternative with the other. Augustine deserves every credit for the moral clearheadedness with which he refused to accept the current explanation, and for his independence in resisting so great a weight of authority; but if we turn to another side of the same controversy, his position was as weak as on this it was unassailable.

The same letter which conveyed Augustine's remonstrances to Jerome over his unworthy view of the behaviour of the two Apostles at Antioch, also contained another remonstrance directed against Jerome's immortal work, the Vulgate. Augustine was as much the inferior of Jerome in scholarship and the scholarly instinct as he was superior to him in depth of Christian character. He was not free from the timidity which has always stood in the way of the thoroughgoing revision—however abundantly justified in itself—either of the current forms of the Sacred Text or of a much

used and cherished Version. He took his stand upon the universal acceptance which the Septuagint enjoyed. He himself gave credence to the legends which surrounded its origin.¹ Even the story of the seventy-two cells in which the translators were confined and yet produced a coincident result, finds favour with him, though it is brusquely rejected by Jerome. He was naturally reluctant to see the accepted Latin Version, made from a text which he thus believed to be divinely inspired, superseded by another, even though it was made not at second-hand, but directly from the original. He foresaw great evils from its introduction. He feared that it would cause a breach between the Eastern and Western Churches if they used a different Bible. Already the new Version had begun to cause excitement and commotion. An African bishop who had read from it the passage Jonah iv. 6, in which *hedera*, "ivy" had been substituted for the familiar "gourd," had been interrupted by such clamours that after consulting with a Jew he had been obliged to admit the error, and withdrew the obnoxious word.² For his own part Augustine wished to see a revision of the old Latin Version by comparison with the Septuagint, but further than this he was not prepared to go.

A glimpse like this into the difficulties with which Jerome had to contend, and the recollection that he was opposed not only by Augustine, but also by Theodore of Mopsuestia, the most critical spirit of his time,

¹ Trench, *St. Augustine on the Sermon on the Mount*, p. 18.

² Zöckler, *Hieronymus*, p. 271. In the rendering *hedera* Jerome had followed the Greek Versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, all of which had *κισσός*, apparently in imitation of the Hebrew word *לִיקָאֵן*. Modern commentators identify the plant in question with the "palmcrist."

increases our respect for his great achievement and removes any lingering wonder at the concessions to popular prejudice which have left their marks upon it. Let us only hope that the similar revision which the English-speaking branch of the Church has undertaken may meet with a more calm and reasonable judgment at the outset as well as with a like ultimate success.

The principles of Scriptural interpretation which Augustine followed are laid down in a treatise specially devoted to this subject. There is much in this that is still not without value. The spiritual qualifications of the interpreter are well defined.¹ And the range of general knowledge required cannot be said to be too restricted. Here at least the study of Hebrew and Greek is enjoined, though only, as it would seem, to decide between the Latin Versions where they differed. But beside these linguistic attainments, which hardly have the first place, there is a long catalogue of other things which the Biblical interpreter ought to know. He must be acquainted with the properties of plants and animals, in order to understand what the Scripture says about them. He should have some knowledge of music, so as to be aware of the difference between a harp and a psaltery. He must study history, chronology, rhetoric, and the like. The works of profane writers are not to be ignored, so far as they are free from superstition.

And yet, even here, sound as these remarks are in the abstract, it is clear that Augustine's theoretical

¹ *De Doct. Christ.* ii. 7, 9-11. Still more striking and profoundly true, though paradoxical, are the following: "Dicet mihi homo, Intelligam ut credam. Ego ei respondeam, Immo crede ut intelligas. Intellectus enim merces est fidei." And again: "Credat in Christum ut possit intelligere Christum" (quoted by Trench, *Sermon on the Mount*, p. 11).

standpoint was higher than his practice. He gives good advice, but the examples by which he illustrates it are often futile enough. Thus natural history teaches that the serpent offers its body rather than its head to a blow. This is supposed to throw a light upon the precept to be "wise as serpents," as if it meant that the Christian was to give his body to the persecutors rather than deny his head which is Christ.¹ Again, music will explain the hidden meaning of the number "forty and six years" that the temple was building, in its relation to the Lord's body; it will also give a clue to the origin of fables such as that of the nine Muses.² A comparison of sacred and profane history will shew that the forty-six years cannot refer, as some imagined, to the age at which the Lord suffered, but rather to the mystical configuration of his human body.³ Or, again, when the Platonists assert that Christian teaching is borrowed from Plato, Gentile history proves that Plato was in Egypt at the same time as Jeremiah, and learnt the truth from him.⁴

Augustine did not go so far as Origen, nor even quite so far as Jerome, in resolving history entirely into allegory. He was not prepared to give up the literal sense of a narrative altogether, unless it could be shewn to be distinctly opposed to sound doctrine. His greater breadth of view and moral insight led him to defend the literal accuracy of the narrative of David and Bathsheba which Jerome was prepared to sacrifice; and in words at least he lays it down that the historical foundations of every narrative must be

¹ *De Doct. Christ.* ii. 16. 24. ² *Ibid.* ii. 16. 26. 17. 27. ³ *Ibid.* ii. 28. 42.

⁴ *Ibid.* § 43. The value of Augustine's chronology is seen in the fact that the prophet Jeremiah was dead nearly a century and a half before Plato was born!

accepted as true, otherwise the spiritual meaning deduced from it will be built upon air.¹ But, in practice, this does not prevent him from carrying allegory to the most extravagant lengths. We have just seen some examples of his method, and they might be multiplied indefinitely. The whole history of the Jewish kings is quite as much a prophecy of things future as a record of things past.² That beautiful nature-psalm, the 104th, is reduced to a dry skeleton of "figures and mysteries." Even the anointing of the feet of Jesus at Bethany must needs be explained away. "No sober person can believe that our Lord really had his feet anointed by a woman with precious ointment, as luxurious and wicked men are wont to do at feasts—the like of which we detest."³

But the reader ceases to wonder at anything when he has before him the "Rules" of the dominant exegesis which Augustine quotes with thorough approval.⁴ These "Rules" had been drawn up by a certain Tichonius, formerly a Donatist, who had afterwards, as Augustine says, written most conclusively against the Donatists. His Rules are seven in number. The first rule is entitled, "Of the Lord and His Body." The meaning of this rule is that the same sentence may refer at once to Christ and the Church without any change of person. For instance, the faithful "are Abraham's seed" (Gal. iii. 29), though Abraham has but one seed, viz., Christ. Tichonius' second rule is "Of the Lord's Bipartite Body"—a title which Augustine somewhat criticises, and which he explains as referring to the mixture of good and bad of the Church; as, for instance, where it is said in the Song of Songs,

¹ Trench, *Sermon on the Mount*, p. 51.

² *De Doct. Christ.* iii. 12. 18.

³ *Ibid.* p. 55.

⁴ *Ibid.* iii. 30-37.

"I am black, but comely as the tents of Kedar, as the curtains of Solomon." The mention of Kedar shews that the descendants of Ishmael are meant who shall not be heirs with the son of the free woman. The third rule has for its subject "The Promises and the Law," which Augustine himself considers to be not so much a rule as a weighty theological problem. The fourth rule deals with "Species and Genus," or, in other words, "whole and part." According to this rule, single cities or states, such as Jerusalem, Tyre, Judæa, Egypt, may stand for the whole nation or aggregate of nations of which they form a part; and, again, single individuals, like Solomon, may stand for Christ and the Church. The fifth rule is "Of Times." These are partly reckoned by synecdoche, parts of days being reckoned as whole days, *e.g.*, where the same event is said in one Gospel to have taken place "after six days" (*i.e.*, six whole days), and in another, "after eight days," adding to the six whole days the end of one and beginning of another. Partly the rule relates to the peculiar properties of numbers 7, 10, 70, and so on. His sixth rule Tichonius called "Recapitulation." By this rule events which might seem to be related out of order might really bear reference to some previous narrative, of which they formed a recapitulation. For instance, where it is said that "the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and here he put the man whom he had formed; and out of the ground the Lord made to grow every tree," &c., this last statement should have really in order of time preceded the last but one. It is, however, merely a recapitulatory reference to the first of the three propositions, describing how the garden was planted. The seventh rule is entitled, "Of the Devil and his Body." This is

the antithesis of the first rule. The devil is (in a sense) the head of the wicked, and they (in a sense) form his body, just as Christ is the head of the Church and the Church is his body; and the same care must be used in discriminating the expressions which refer to the one or the other.

It is only fair to say that these rules are stated by Augustine in a form considerably more reasonable than they seem to have borne in the original.¹ The element of truth and sense in them is brought into the foreground, and the more absurd extravagances are left comparatively out of sight. But still they can hardly be considered to promise very much for the sound interpretation of Scripture; nor, as we have seen, did Augustine's superior ability exempt him to any large extent from the radically vicious methods of his time.

The directions in which Augustine's exegesis has produced results of really permanent value are mainly two—in the department of apologetics and in that of doctrine; or, in other words, of doctrine on its negative side, where it is necessary to clear up misconceptions and to ward off attacks; and of doctrine on its positive side, where exegesis helps to construct and fill in the details of Christian teaching.

It cannot be said that Augustine was impartial in the sense in which impartiality is so loudly demanded at the present day. His practice was certainly not that of many critics who call themselves, and are called by others, impartial. If the *primâ facie* view of a passage seemed adverse to the truth of Scripture and of Christianity, he was very far from assuming eagerly and at once that this *primâ facie* view must necessarily be right. He went, it must be confessed, to the oppo-

¹ See the examples given in Merx, *Eine Rede vom Auslegen*, &c., pp. 61-64.

site extreme. The facile instrument of allegory always lay within his reach, and if any real difficulty arose, the temptation was great to have recourse to it. He asserts in so many words that whatever in Holy Writ cannot properly be referred to moral rectitude or orthodoxy of doctrine may be understood to be figurative or allegorical¹—obviously a dangerous principle, and one that has led Augustine, as it has led others of the Fathers, very much astray. But there was a safeguard in Augustine's case which made the principle less pernicious than it proved to others, and might have been to him. His vast range of spiritual experience and unequalled penetration of spiritual insight supplied him with the solution for many a difficulty which otherwise might have seemed insoluble. Augustine is indeed a conspicuous example of the true function which difficulties fill in the Divine economy. Their object seems to be to drive man back upon himself, to make him search at the foundations of things, and so gradually lead him to deeper views of truth than those which he finds in vogue about him. Augustine himself brings out this well. "Was the doctrine of the Trinity," he asks, "handled at all completely before the Arians began to bark against it? Was the treatment of penitents handled completely before the Novatians began to raise opposition? In like manner the question of baptism was not handled completely until the re-baptizers outside the Church began their contradictions."²

The difficulties that Augustine does most to meet are the *moral* difficulties. In spite of his allegorizing, he seems to have grasped the idea to which allegory is so apt to be fatal—of the progressiveness of revela-

¹ *De Doct. Christ.* iii. 10. 14.

² Quoted by Trench, p. 41.

tion. He rebukes the censorious strictness of those who would judge the actions of the patriarchs by their own petty standard: "As if on a day when business is publicly stopped in the afternoon, one were angered at not being allowed to keep open shop, because he had been in the forenoon; or when in one house he observeth some servant take a thing in his hand, which the butler is not allowed to meddle with; or something permitted out of doors which is forbidden in the dining-room; and should be angry that in one house and one family the same thing is not allowed everywhere and to all. Even such are they, who are fretted to hear something to have been lawful for righteous men formerly, which now is not; or that God, for certain temporal respects, commanded them one thing and these another, obeying both the same righteousness: whereas they see, in one man, and one day, and one house, different things to be fit for different members, and a thing formerly lawful, after a certain time not so; in one corner permitted or commended, but in another rightly forbidden and punished. Is justice, therefore, various or mutable? No; but the times over which it presides flow not evenly, because they are times." ¹ This thoroughly sound and most important principle Augustine largely applies to the questions raised in regard to the Old Testament. It is on this ground that he defends such practices as polygamy, circumcision, the distinction in meats, the law of retaliation. By this principle he explains the apparent discrepancy between the character ascribed to God in the Old Testament and that ascribed to Him in the New. In a similar way he accounts for the severity exercised against the Canaanites—it was really a righteous

¹ *Confessions*, iii. 7. 13 (quoted by Trench, as above).

punishment for flagrant sin, a punishment not in itself excessive because it only hastened the hour of mortality, and not greater than the sin deserved. The true spirit in which it was intended that such a punishment should be inflicted was one of pure justice, not of vindictiveness or hate; and if the individual Israelite allowed such feelings to enter in, just so far he forgot and disobeyed his commission.¹

In like manner Augustine dealt with the private sins of the patriarchs and kings of Israel. He rarely sought to diminish the significance of the sin itself, or to allegorize it away. He kept to the literal sense of the narrative, though at the same time he very rightly repelled the exaggerated construction that his Manichaean opponents were in the habit of placing upon such acts, treating them as if they represented an habitual and inveterate bent of character. Acts which were in themselves more or less isolated were not taken in their proper perspective along with the rest of the lives of which they formed a part, but were magnified so as to fill the whole canvas. Noah became a drunkard for his one recorded sin, and Moses a murderer for the single slaughter of the Egyptian. Augustine remarks that acts like these are mentioned sometimes with express condemnation, sometimes without comment, but in no case with praise; the intention of Scripture being, where the judgment of God is given, to instruct our ignorance, where it is not given to rouse the slothful mind and make it either recollect that which it has already learnt, or seek for that which it does not know.²

On all this side of things Augustine shews a deep practical wisdom—not merely the ready intelligence of

¹ Trench, p. 74.

² See the quotation in Trench, p. 76.

a Chrysostom, or the acumen of Theodore, but a true σοφία of a profounder kind than theirs—which goes out beyond the limits of the age in which he lived, and makes him a model and pattern for all time. Nor is it otherwise in the field of doctrine. Here, too, Augustine had an advantage over his fellows. With most of them the doctrinal system was a result of speculation undisturbed by great spiritual crises. With him it was the final outcome of a series of mental struggles. Like Jacob, he had wrestled with God and prevailed. The very changes of his youth had all contributed something. As a Pagan, as a Manichee, as a Neoplatonist, he had tasted of a wide experience which was not without value for him as a Christian teacher. The richness and sensitiveness of his own nature had made him reap all that was to be reaped from these successive phases of conviction. He more distinctly than any other of the Fathers of whom we have spoken had gone through the pangs of a heart-rending “conversion.” And of the knowledge which this gave he made a full use. He knew in a real and vivid sense what was meant by the state of sin and the state of grace. What to others were ideas and abstractions repeated and passed from mouth to mouth for him were concrete things, the very names of which awoke a thrill throughout his whole being. He had tested and proved that of which others only spoke with a partial and onesided experience. Where they could unlock a door here and a door there, he possessed the master-key to the Scriptures, so far, at least, as their moral and spiritual side was concerned. Hence we find that he has not seldom thrown more light upon obscure passages than others who approached

them with a better technical training and sounder principles of exegesis.

According as the one or the other of these two sides has been put most prominently forward, the estimate of Augustine as a commentator has been comparatively lower or higher. Thus Bishop Lightfoot¹ gives a warning that "spiritual insight, though a far diviner gift than the critical faculty, will not supply its place. In this faculty Augustine was wanting, and owing to this defect, as a continuous expositor he is disappointing. With great thoughts here and there, his commentary on the Galatians is inferior as a whole to several of the patristic expositions." On the other hand, Archbishop Trench, in speaking of a particular passage, the meaning of which had been correctly given by Origen, Chrysostom, and Ambrose, while it is missed by Augustine, rightly describes these writers as "men every one of them less penetrated with the spirit of St. Paul than he was."² And in the same sense Dr. Westcott says of him, "Augustine, in his 'Lectures on St. John,' is strongest where Chrysostom is weakest. His ignorance of Greek constantly betrays him into the adoption of a false sense of the words, but his genius no less frequently enables him to enter with the fullest insight into the thought of a passage which may escape the verbal interpreter."³

A single example must suffice for the present,⁴ and this example shall be taken from the comments upon a chapter which has already been employed—and is well qualified to be employed—as a test of interpretative

¹ *Galatians*, p. 229.

² *Serm. on the Mount*, p. 85.

³ *Speaker's Commentary*, N. T., vol. ii. p. xciv.

⁴ A very full examination of Augustine's characteristics as a commentator will be found in the work of Archbishop Trench, frequently quoted above.

penetration, St. John vi.¹ Augustine more than any other ancient commentator has made his way through the outer crust of sign and symbol and grasped the full spiritual meaning of that profound chapter. "*This is the work of God that ye believe on him whom he hath sent. This, then, is to eat, not that meat which perisheth, but, that which remaineth unto eternal life. Why make ready the teeth and belly? Believe and thou hast eaten. [The famous *Crede et manducasti*, which contains the key to the whole passage.] . . . The Jews murmured and said, *Is not this Jesus, son of Joseph, of whom we know father and mother? How then saith he I came down from heaven? These men were far from the Bread of heaven, and knew not how to hunger after it. The jaws of the heart they list not to stir; with ears open they were deaf; they saw and stood blind. For that Bread requireth hungering of the inner man, of which He saith in another place, *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.* Now that Christ is unto us righteousness, the Apostle Paul declareth. And, therefore, whoso hungereth after this Bread, let him hunger after righteousness; only it must be that righteousness which cometh down from heaven, the righteousness which God giveth, not that which man maketh for himself. . . . No man cometh unto me unless the Father which sent me draw him. 'If he is drawn,' saith one, 'he cometh against his will.' If he cometh against his will, neither doth he believe; if he believeth not, neither doth he come. For we run not to Christ by putting one foot before the other (*ambulando*), but by believing; neither by motion of**

¹ Here, as elsewhere, the translation is that of the Oxford *Library of the Fathers*, with some slight alteration.

the body, but by will of the heart do we draw nigh to Him. Consequently that woman which touched the hem of his garment did more touch Him than the throng which pressed Him. . . . What is *touched* but believed? . . . Hence is it also, if thou give good heed, that He saith in this place, *No man cometh unto me, save whom the Father shall draw.* Do not imagine that thou art drawn against thy will: the mind is drawn also by love. . . . There is a pleasure of the heart, to which sweet is that Bread of heaven. Moreover, if the poet had leave to say, *Trahit sua quemque voluptas*—‘Each has his dear delight which draws him on’—not necessity but pleasure; not obligation but delight; how much more strongly ought we to say that man is *drawn* to Christ when he delights in truth, delights in blessedness, delights in righteousness, delights in everlasting life, all which Christ is? . . . Give me one that loves, and he feels what I say. Give me one that longs, one that hungers; give me one that is on pilgrimage in this wilderness, and doth thirst and pant after the fountain of his eternal home; give me such an one, and he knows what I would say. But if I speak to one who is cold, he knows not what I speak. Such were they who murmured among themselves. . . . If then these things, which among delights and pleasures of earth are revealed to those that love them, do draw them, since it is true, *Trahit sua quemque voluptas*, doth not Christ revealed by the Father draw? What doth the soul more eagerly desire than truth? For what ought it to have an eager appetite, wherefore to wish that there may be a healthy palate within to judge what is true, but that it may eat and drink wisdom, righteousness, truth, eternity? . . . *Your fathers, He saith, ate manna in the wilderness, and died.* . . . *Your*

fathers in this, that ye are like them. For, my brethren, so far as it regards this visible and corporeal death, do not we die who eat the Bread that cometh down from heaven? They died just as we must die, in regard, as I said, of the visible and carnal death of this body. But as it regards that death from which the Lord deterreth us, the death by which their fathers died, Moses too ate manna, Aaron ate manna, Phineas ate manna, many ate there who pleased the Lord, and died not. Why? Because that visible food they spiritually understood, spiritually hungered after, spiritually tasted, that they might spiritually be filled. For we too at this day do receive visible food; but the Sacrament is one, the virtue of the Sacrament another." ¹

Beyond Augustine we need not go. With his death in 430 A.D. the creative period of patristic exegesis was virtually closed. The materials accumulated during these first four centuries satisfied the wants of those which followed. A period of secondary commentaries set in. Compilations, excerpts, "*catenæ*," took the place of original and independent work. In the West especially the knowledge of Greek as well as of Hebrew began rapidly to die out. Augustine and Jerome supplied an inexhaustible quarry from which succeeding writers were content to draw. All that was added was a few more idle allegories and not very recondite practical applications. In the East the one figure of real importance is Photius; yet even he contributed in the way of exegesis little that was new, and he, properly speaking, lies outside the patristic age. The last of the Greek Fathers was John Damascene, the predecessor of Photius by rather more than a century, who died at some time not very long after A.D. 754.

¹ *In Joh. Evang. Tract.* xxv., xxvi.

This later period lay wholly under the shadow of the allegorical method. In this, as in other ways, it shews a retrogression from that which had gone before. In the fourth century A.D. the allegorists were engaged in a hard struggle, and the greatest among their number had something much more than allegory to recommend them. By the end of the fifth century they were victorious all along the line, and in the middle of the sixth century their leading opponents were visited with solemn ecclesiastical censure. It is true that this censure was directed in the first instance rather against their dogmatic opinions than their principles of exegesis; but the two things hung too closely together. Theodore and Theodoret still found a place in "catenæ," but their principles received no development, and their practical influence was almost confined to the Nestorian sect.

In this fact a mind that is intent upon the philosophy of history will have a problem set before it. One who believes in the "survival of the fittest" among ideas as well as in the world of animate being, or (what is the same thing) in the providential guidance of the course of human thought by nearer and nearer approximations to the truth—may well think it strange that in this instance at least the less fit of two conflicting theories should seem to have survived, while the more fit sank apparently out of sight and did not reappear in any strength until after the lapse of nearly a thousand years. This, however, is not, of course, an isolated phenomenon. In more ways than one the same period presented a real retrogression. The fallacy lies in forgetting that the "survival of the fittest" means not that which is fittest *absolutely*—in itself and apart from all surrounding conditions—but that which is fittest in relation to the particular set of conditions in which

it is placed. All these conditions are present to the Divine Mind though they cannot be to ours. And hence it has often happened that there have been apparent periods of retrogression and decay, the true function of which has been to lay the seeds of a wider and riper growth. "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit," is a principle of most extended application. Decay is itself the means as well as the accompaniment of renovation.

So when we look a little more attentively at the question before us, reasons for the Divine disposition of things come into view, which perhaps do not lie quite upon the surface. There is a spiritual truth and there is a scientific truth, which in the ideal and perfect state will be combined, but which in a period of transition may be found not only separated but even opposed, and the triumph of the one may mean a serious and fatal loss to the other. This was very much the position of things in the century which followed the Council of Nicæa. The system of Augustine contained an immense wealth of spiritual truth—truth adapted to the highest and finest capacities of man. The system of Theodore of Mopsuestia contained potentialities at least of science. But there is nothing to shew that the two were capable of amalgamation, or that there was any prospect of their development in union. And apart from any *a priori* estimate of the comparative value of the two forms of truth, it was evident enough from a mere consideration of the historical conditions which must go to the wall. The world was not yet prepared for science. We have seen that with Theodore himself the truths that he

apprehended were rather happy intuitions, flashes of insight, than the regularly obtained results of logical method. The same is the case with the other fragments of scientific principle which might be detected here and there in other writers of the day. There was no firm and solid scientific foundation on which each succeeding builder might lay his contribution of wood or stone. And if this was so with the leading minds, what was to be expected of the masses? The barbarian hordes who poured their new blood and virile energy into the veins of decrepit Greece and Rome, were little qualified even to appreciate what had been done, much less to carry on the work that was still to do. The first thing needful for them was a moral training similar to that which the Israelites had received of old. For this, Augustine was a much better teacher than Theodore of Mopsuestia. The self-reliant Pelagianizing rationalist was not the man to humble the haughty chieftains of the North into contrite submission to Almighty Power, or to bring home to their hardy followers the sinfulness and misery of sin. The Great Artificer adapts his instruments to the work that He has in hand. He lays down one and takes up another as seemeth best in his sight; and however incomplete may be the particular stage of his operation that we chance to see, yet doubtless in view of its ultimate end it is nothing else than "very good."

A time has come in the revolution of the ages when Theodore of Mopsuestia as well as Augustine has a function to perform. The elements of truth that his writings contain are sure of recognition. The defects by which they are accompanied have been in a great degree made good, while the laws of a progressive

development are more clearly ascertained. The scientific study of the Bible has made great advance in recent years, and is likely to make still more as the extravagances of tentative and temporary hypotheses are stripped away. Only it should be remembered that the better the prospect of developing this side of the great aggregate which we call Truth, the more important is it that the other and complementary side should not be neglected. Ultimately we may be quite sure that the conclusions of the intellect and of the emotions must be capable of reconciliation. If at any time they seem to be in conflict, that alone is sufficient proof that the final stage has not yet been reached ; the rest for the sole of the foot has not yet been found, and the inquirer must be content to go forward and still forward, deeper and still deeper, until a more satisfactory synthesis can be obtained. Probably never has the outlook been on the whole more hopeful than it is now. In spite of divergences—great and glaring—to the right hand and to the left, there seems to be still more of an equilibrium between the chief moving forces than at any previous time. Both are real ; both are active ; both are pressing on sanguinely to the goal. And there is at the same time a tendency in them to approximate, a friendliness and a desire for union, such as it seems true to say that there has never been before. The end may still be very far distant, but the scattered groups of seekers seem to be at least gradually working their way into those converging roads that lead towards it. If nothing else is gained this alone will be a great gain, if we can only bring ourselves to see that the roads must and do converge.

W. SANDAY.

LOST GOSPELS.

Those who affirm and those who deny the trustworthiness of the canonical Gospels will alike admit that their record is imperfect. Nothing can be more certain than that our Gospels do not give the whole narrative, and that there were many, both of the acts and of the words of Jesus, which they do not contain. The last verse of the Fourth Gospel states this, at least as to the acts, most clearly; while a very beautiful and characteristic saying of Jesus, which had escaped the Evangelists, is preserved in the Acts of the Apostles. We need not, therefore, travel beyond the New Testament itself for proof of the fact that there existed in very early times much traditional knowledge of the Founder of Christianity which has not been embodied in the four narratives subsequently recognized as authentic by the Church. These traditions to some extent were passed orally from preacher to hearer, and many of them may have perished with the apostolic generation. But there is evidence that much was committed to writing at a very early date. The very first words of St. Luke prove his acquaintance with a considerable body of evangelic literature; and the earliest Christian writers made use of records which, in some cases certainly, and in others more or less probably, were other than our received Gospels. Without entering upon ground where the orthodox and the heterodox

contend for the mastery, we may take as proved the fact that a very great variety of Gospels, more or less perfect, more or less authentic, more or less fabulous, were current in the first age of the Church. It is also highly probable that, while much or most of this literature deservedly fell into disrepute and perished, some of it contained genuine narratives, which were somehow dropped out of the main current of tradition. It is impossible now to prove that this was so; yet the bare chance that a real saying of Jesus, or an approximately correct narrative of one of his actions, may be preserved in a fragment of a lost Gospel surely makes it worth while to ascertain what those fragments are. If those who have paid no attention to the subject will follow us for a few pages they will probably be convinced that the lost Gospels, or at least one of them, deserve much more attention than they have hitherto received, except at the hands of a few scholars.

First, let us try to understand as well as we may the conditions under which this lost literature came into being. The new religion was carried with great rapidity from city to city, from country to country; but this was done at first, in great part, by men whose knowledge of Christianity was limited to its chief principles, and whose acquaintance with the words and works of Christ was but small. Apollos, we are told, began to preach "knowing only the baptism of John;" and we may infer with something approaching certainty that many went on their way to preach Christ with little knowledge of Him beyond the bare facts that He died and rose from the dead. As soon as the Church began to organize its missionary efforts, the travelling preachers would be furnished with much

oral and probably some written instruction. There is evidence that two brief evangelical records existed in very early times, one of which contained a short summary of the acts, and the other of the discourses or "oracles" of the Lord. It is not improbable that these may have been drawn up in a concise and portable form especially for the use of missionaries, who would treat them as authoritative text, to be amplified verbally from memory. Thus, more or less well furnished, the preachers of the Gospel travelled far and wide: seldom, as it seems, stopping in one place, but founding a Christian community, and then passing on to the same work elsewhere. If this be a tolerably correct account of the way in which Christianity was first spread, it will be evident that many communities had to be content for some time with but a slender stock of information. Their father in the faith stayed no long time with them—months perhaps, or weeks, or possibly only days. During that time he had been chiefly occupied in convincing them of the main truths which he desired to impart; and these would be few and simple. Sometimes he may have left in writing a few anecdotes of the life of Christ; some notes may have been taken of his preaching; or recollections of what he had said may have been written later, when the want of definite records began to be felt, and no new teacher came. In some such way the nucleus of the Gospel of that particular Church would be formed, and might long remain without any addition. Later on some emissary from one of the older Churches would supply fresh matter; or one of their own brethren would travel to Jerusalem, Rome, or Ephesus, and bring back fuller information concerning the words

and works of Christ. But when the Gospel came to be regarded as complete, the stages by which it had grown would soon be forgotten ; it would be jealously guarded as the peculiar possession of that Church, and referred in popular belief to the authority of the first preacher, or to some other name which locally commanded most reverence. Thus in early times almost every Christian community which was in any degree isolated from the rest would have its own Gospel ; or at any rate would keep to the edition of the Gospel which in that region was held in especial regard. Such Gospels would be almost necessarily imperfect, and often heretical, according to the standard of later times. Views which, in their first unformed state, passed current without rebuke came afterwards to be connected with the opinions of declared heretics. Thus an early preacher, who was, or meant to be, quite orthodox, might leave behind him matter which ultimately would be condemned by the Church authorities, and this might linger long unrebuked in remote districts. Thus, and also, perhaps, in consequence of conscious corruptions of the text, it happened that uncanonical Gospels were sooner or later condemned for heresy, and, after a longer or shorter struggle, were disused and dropped out of existence. One instance may be given to shew that this account of the matter is supported by history. A certain Serapion, Bishop of Antioch, visited the Church of Rhossus, in Cilicia, about the year A.D. 200, and found that the Christians of that place used a certain "Gospel according to Peter." The use of this document seems to have caused some searchings of heart to those among the Rhossians who were most anxious for exact ortho-

doxy : but the bishop, good easy man, assumed that "all were united in a right faith," and, without reading through the local Gospel, gave sentence that "if this is all which seems to give you anxiety, let it be read." But when he returned to Antioch he found that he had been too hasty, and wrote again to the Rhossians to the effect that his attention had been especially drawn to the matter, and heresy had been discovered. The Gospel was then declared to be a forgery, and the bishop announced his speedy return to set the question right. This instance will serve for many. The bishops had much trouble with uncanonical Gospels ; but in the end the episcopal authority prevailed, and the use of the four canonical Gospels became universal in the orthodox Churches.

Enough has perhaps been said to shew the wide difference between these lost Gospels with which we are here concerned and the apocryphal writings which came into existence later. Several of these exist at the present day ; more than enough it may be thought by those who have had the patience to read their ridiculous and sometimes disgusting details. The *Prot-evangelium* of James seems to be one of the earliest of these ; and Tischendorf thinks that there is nothing in it alien from the spirit of the middle of the second century. Be that as it may, it is no better than a childish forgery, full of absurd and sometimes very unedifying inventions. The Gospel of Thomas represents the infant Jesus as a young god, striking dead the children who interfere with his sports and the master who offers to correct him. The Arabian Gospel describes all manner of prodigies which happened in Egypt, but represents the Divine Infant as

benevolent, until towards the end some of the malicious pranks are borrowed from the narrative to which the name of Thomas was given. Some of these writings undertook to relate the closing events of the life of Christ, basing the narrative upon the Gospel record, and adding further particulars invented by the writer. Of these is the work called the "Acts of Pilate;" and Dr. Sanday, writing recently in *THE EXPOSITOR*, describes this entire class of compositions when he speaks of it as "the earliest perhaps of Christian forgeries." These apocryphal Gospels have some value for scholars, but for our present purpose they have none; for it is certain that wherever they deviate from the canonical narrative their story is pure and late fiction, and we should therefore vainly search among them for any fresh information which might by any possibility be correct. They are therefore to be set aside from the present inquiry, and the rather because it would be in vain to expect readers to take interest in an investigation dealing only with mere forgeries. The claims advanced by many critics in behalf of the lost Gospels allege for them a wholly different value; and it is these that are now to be considered.

Have we, then, anything remaining out of that evangelic literature which grew up in the earliest times; any remnant of the "declaration of those things" which were most surely believed among the men of Luke's time, as set forth by the "many" of whom he speaks; any sayings of Jesus or records of his actions which were believed to be genuine by Christians of the apostolic or sub-apostolic age? No work of this description has come down to us; and of the fragments that remain quoted in the works of later

authors many cannot be assigned with certainty to one rather than to another of the lost Gospels; while in the case of some it is even uncertain whether they may not be merely inaccurate quotations from the canonical writings. We have therefore but little on which to build an argument. Yet if reason can be shewn for thinking that any one or more of the lost Gospels was really valuable, it would be worth while to draw attention to the fact, since the chances of recovery are even yet by no means so small as many may imagine. Let us see, therefore, whether such examples as remain to us, and such further evidence concerning the nature and authenticity of the lost Gospels as is attainable, incline us to encourage search and hope for more matter of the same kind.

The early Christian Writers were in possession of much information concerning the life and sayings of Christ which has not come down to us. Heretical writers had their own Gospels, some of which would be valuable if they were still in existence; but of these we need not speak now. Perfectly orthodox Fathers of the Church cite incidents or sayings which are not in our Gospels. Thus, to take a single instance, Justin, writing in the second century, seems to be as confident that a fire was kindled in Jordan at Christ's baptism as that the Spirit descended in the form of a dove. Besides, some old and important Greek and Latin MSS. have passages of a very curious nature interpolated in their text. It is plain, then, that there was a body of evangelic tradition, whether oral or written, sanctioned by considerable authority, which remains outside the four received Gospels. Very early writers had loose habits of quotation; citing passages from memory and

with little accuracy ; and for the most part with no more definite reference than "he says," or, "it is said," or, "the Scripture says." In these cases it must often remain uncertain whether the quotation is taken from our Gospels ; or, if the divergence from them is too great to be accounted for by mere inaccuracy, what other source may have been used. Sometimes the name of the authority is given, though occasionally in a form which causes much trouble to critics and apologists. Justin cites the "Memoirs of the Apostles," and whether he means our four Gospels, or three of them, or a different work, is disputed among the learned to this day. Other Fathers refer to the Gospel according to the Egyptians, to the Gospel according to the Twelve Apostles, and so on. With regard to these the greatest uncertainty prevails. We hardly know whether they were really independent works, or editions of the same, or nearly the same Gospel, used in different places ; and these doubts are not likely to be cleared up. But there was one Gospel to which most of the extra-canonical fragments and allusions may be more or less certainly referred ; the genuine character and even apostolic origin of which is asserted by very high authority, and which, moreover, is, in its entire form, by no means lost beyond chance of recovery. This is the Gospel according to the Hebrews ; and those who have sufficient interest to master the contents of a small volume will find all accessible information on the subject in the excellent monograph by Mr. Nicholson.¹ But there are many who will be deterred by the scientific form of this work, and by the

¹ *The Gospel according to the Hebrews.* By G. B. Nicholson. London : Kegan Paul and Co.

numerous quotations in Greek and Latin, who may like to have the results of the inquiry placed before them in a shorter and simpler form.

It has been already explained how a Christian community, if isolated from others, would often have its peculiar version of the Gospel. But this isolation had sometimes causes other than geographical position. Heretical or even peculiar doctrines might fix a deep gulf between one set of Christians and those in whose midst they lived, or a different language might keep the religious traditions of those who used it apart from those of their neighbours. Now, from very early times there was such a people, living among, yet apart from, other Christians, peculiar in habits, language, and opinions, who for long preserved traditions which once had been almost universal. The name Nazarene, which at first belonged to all Christians, came to be applied to them alone, and with the name they retained the ideas of James and the first Church at Jerusalem, strictly adhering to Jewish rites, and rejecting all things "common and unclean." These traditions they kept unchanged as late as the fifth century, living separate from, yet apparently respected by others; the most in-offensive of heretics, if indeed the main body of them were considered as heretics in any sense. Judaizers of a strict sort, their language, at least among themselves and in the services of religion, was Hebrew; that is to say, the Aramaic dialect then current in Palestine. They had a Gospel of their own in this language, which certainly was very ancient, and may have been brought by them from Jerusalem to Pella; although in that case it probably received subsequent alterations and additions, like other documents of equal antiquity.

However that may have been, their Gospel, after its completion, was carefully preserved. As Greek became the language of most Christians, the Gospel of the Nazarenes was known to others only through report, and was commonly spoken of as the "Gospel according to the Hebrews;" that is, as the version of the Gospel narrative in use among those who were looked upon as Hebrew Christians.

The separation between the Nazarenes and other Christians had a double effect upon this Gospel. As the lava hid the treasures of Herculaneum for ages, but also preserved them to our time in singular perfection, so the solitary life and peculiar language of the Nazarene community kept their Gospel out of general use, but at the same time preserved it from the alterations which it would have undergone had it become current among the whole body of Christians. The small and excessively conservative sect of Nazarenes kept their treasure with jealous care; and there is every reason to suppose that it remained unaltered from a very early time. Had it been written in Greek it would have passed into general use; for until comparatively late there seems to have been no suspicion that it was other than genuine. But then its deviations from the canonical text would have been observed, and it would have been altered to their standard, or suppressed as heretical, unless indeed it had come with sufficient authority to be accepted as a parallel and genuine, though varying, narrative. In fact, however, it was accessible, at least in its purest form, only to the few scholars who could read Aramaic, and had an opportunity of visiting a Nazarene community. It remained therefore untouched and respected, until it

began to be spoken against as the possession of a sect of doubtful orthodoxy, and in the end disappeared when the Nazarenes themselves had ceased to exist.

An attempt was made to rescue the Gospel according to the Hebrews from this fate, and to place it beside the sacred books of Christians, by the great Biblical scholar Jerome, who for his pains was accused of trying to pass off upon the public a fifth Gospel. It is well known that, towards the end of the fourth century, Jerome undertook and accomplished the work of reducing to order the confused and corrupted manuscripts of the New Testament, especially those known as the Old Latin Versions; and one result of his labours was the Vulgate. He was a good Hebrew scholar, and took peculiar interest in the Gospel preserved by the Nazarenes. Early tradition affirmed that Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew; that is to say, in Aramaic; and for a long time this Gospel according to the Hebrews was held by many to be Matthew's original work. To this view Jerome inclined, and he took the trouble to go to Bercea, where the Nazarenes were numerous, to examine and copy the manuscript in their possession, and to translate it both into Greek and into Latin. His translations have unhappily been lost, like the original itself; but his opinion of its value is shewn by the trouble he took in the matter.

Those who know what weight to attach to the judgment of Jerome will perceive the importance of a work which he translated for the general use of Christians. Much additional testimony might be added from Origen and others, but we fear we have already held our readers too long from the main subject. We

must, however, trespass upon their patience for yet a short time before we can give samples of so much as remains of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, since it is necessary first to say something of the sources from whence our information is derived.

The existing fragments are to be divided into two classes. The first consists of those certainly or probably taken from the Nazarene version of this lost Gospel, which are found in the writings of Jerome and certain other Fathers : and four fragments are written in the margin of a manuscript of the New Testament belonging to the ninth century. There is no reason to doubt that these faithfully correspond with the genuine ancient text. But we have also a number of citations which were taken from a different version of this same Gospel ; that, namely, in use among the Ebionites, a heretical sect which had branched off from the Nazarenes. This Ebionite Gospel may have been in Greek ; or at least some copies of it seem to have been written in that language. The heretical Ebionites rejected the doctrine of the Incarnation, and are said to have cut out from the beginning of the Gospel those parts which made against their views, and to have corrupted other passages. Hilgenfeld treats the Ebionite as distinct from the Nazarene Gospel, and even places the " Gospel according to Peter " between the two in point of time ; that is, later than the latter and earlier than the former. It is to be remembered, however, that our knowledge of the Ebionite edition of the Gospel comes from Epiphanius, who was reckless in assertion, careless of verification, and violently prejudiced against heretics. Mr. Nicholson treats the Ebionite Gospel as in the main the same as that of the

Nazarenes, although there is "good reason to charge the Ebionites with altering and interpolating;" and this must be remembered in dealing with the fragments themselves.

But besides these we have in various authorities quotations from an unnamed source, many of which are assigned with more or less probability to the Gospel according to the Hebrews. With one of these, on account of its interest and of its connection with an undoubted fragment of the lost Gospel, we will begin.

In an early and important manuscript of the New Testament, the Codex Bezae, the following passage is inserted immediately after Luke vi. 4:

"On the same day, seeing one working on the sabbath, he saith to him: Man, if thou knowest what thou doest, thou art blessed: but if thou knowest not, thou art cursed, and a transgressor of the law."

This is certainly a striking addition to the text. It can scarcely have belonged to the original Luke; but has rather the appearance of an insertion, taken from an independent narrative. It is easy to imagine that it may have formed part of an authentic record; for the idea conveyed seems to be profound, not alien to the teaching of Christ, and similar to Paul's distinction between observances done or omitted "to the Lord," or through carelessness and indifference. But here we want the context; since much depends upon the work on which the man was engaged. The performance of ordinary business on the sabbath would not be likely to receive commendation from Christ; and if this is intended, the passage cannot be considered genuine. Now the parallel to Luke vi. 6-11

is Matthew xii. 9-14; and in his commentary on the latter passage Jerome tells us that, "in the Gospel which the Nazarenes and Ebionites use," the man with the withered hand speaks thus:

"I was a mason, gaining a living with my hands; I pray thee, Jesus, restore my health, lest I shamefully beg food."

Is it possible that these two passages may have formed part of one incident recorded in the Gospel according to the Hebrews? If we might imagine that the mason used his restored hand for work on the sabbath, under circumstances which left it uncertain whether he was building for charity or for hire, the speech of Jesus as recorded in Codex Bezae would become intelligible. This view seems to be taken by Dr. Abbott in his *Philochristus*, where an imaginary framework is given to this and other incidents from canonical and uncanonical Gospels, seen through which they at once become natural and life-like. We may be allowed in passing to say that this work, though in form a romance, is really a commentary on the Gospels and the Gospel history of very great excellence. With this aspect of it we are not here concerned; but many important fragments of lost Gospels will be found in *Philochristus* fitted into probable places and natural connection by the light touch of genius.

We may now pass in brief review some of the fragments; and, first, those which only probably or possibly belong to the Gospel according to the Hebrews. A saying very frequently quoted by early Christian writers, and referred by most of them to Christ, is this: "Be approved money changers," or "bankers," if, as Mr. Nicholson thinks, that trans-

lation is more exact. This is, of course, an exhortation to test doctrine as dealers in money ring, bite, and assay the coins which pass through their hands.

"He who is near me is near the fire; he who is far from me is far from the kingdom."

Origen has read this "somewhere, as if from the mouth of the Saviour," and wishes he could find out whether it is genuine. The saying is at any rate remarkable, and may perhaps be sufficiently explained by the following beautiful fragment:

"Ye shall be as lambs among wolves. Peter answered Him and said: If then the wolves rend the lambs in pieces? Jesus said to Peter: Let not the lambs, after they are dead, fear the wolves. And you, fear not them who kill you, and can do nothing to you. But fear him who, after killing you, has authority over soul and body to cast into the Gehenna of fire."

The Gospel according to the Hebrews contained, as we know from Papias, the story of the woman taken in adultery, which is now generally admitted to be an interpolation where it stands in our fourth Gospel. We cannot say whether the text as we have it corresponds with that of the lost Gospel, but it may be remarked that Codex Bezae is the oldest manuscript in which that narrative is found, and we have seen reason to think that Codex Bezae may have incorporated in the text another passage from the Gospel according to the Hebrews. The conclusion is not unreasonable that both were introduced from this source.

Passing now to the fragments which are quoted from the Gospel according to the Hebrews by name, we will first notice those of historical interest. They are

too long to give entire, and we will confine ourselves to their most striking peculiarities and contrasts with the canonical text.

The preface to the Gospel is Ebionite, and is of no especial importance, except perhaps for fixing the date, for which purpose it shall be reserved for the present, with two or three other passages. We then come to the account of the Baptism, of which there are several fragments. The first is Ebionite; and alters John's locusts into oil-cake. The reason for this corruption of the text was that the Ebionites were strict vegetarians, and could not endure that the Baptist should eat anything which had been alive. For the same reason, it is said, they altered the words of Christ into these :

"Have I desired with desire to eat this flesh, the passover, with you?" thus changing the earnest wish into a question expressive of dislike and even of loathing. In the Nazarene, that is, the uncorrupted version of the lost Gospel, an interesting dialogue is given between the Lord and his mother, in which she urges baptism for repentance at the hands of John; and He replies :

"In what have I sinned, that I should go and be baptized by him? unless perhaps this very thing which I have said is ignorance."

If we could suppose this passage to be genuine, the reasons for dropping it out of the later orthodox tradition would be obvious enough. Then follows an Ebionite account of the great light which shone round the place, reminding us of Justin's fire in the waters of Jordan, and the descent of "the whole fountain of the Holy Spirit" in the Nazarene Gospel.

The Nazarene had also the question of "Simon, his

disciple," as to the forgiveness of sins ; and this reason for the answer :

" For in the prophets also, after they were anointed with the Holy Spirit, mention of sin was found."

It will be observed that the " young man " of the Gospel narrative has become two rich men in the following narrative, which presents other interesting variations.

" The other of the rich men said to Him : ' Master, what good thing shall I do and live ? ' He said to him : ' Man, keep the law and the prophets.' He answered Him : ' I have kept them.' He said to him : ' Go, sell all that thou hast and distribute to the poor ; and come, follow me.' But the rich man began to scratch his head, and it pleased him not. And the Lord said to him : ' How sayest thou—I have kept the law and the prophets—when it is written in the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself ; and lo, many, thy brothers, sons of Abraham, are clad in filth, dying of hunger ; and thy house is full of many goods ; and nothing at all goes out from it to them.' And He turned and said to Simon his disciple, seated by Him : ' Simon, son of John, it is easier for a camel to enter through the eye of a needle than a rich man into the kingdom of the heavens.' "

Instead of the rending of the veil of the Temple, it is the " lintel of the Temple of immense size," which was broken in two. Lastly, an appearance of the risen Lord to James the Just is described, James having vowed that he would not eat bread until he had seen Jesus alive again.

There is an evangelic ring about most of these fragments, wholly different from the fictitious productions

of later times, which, if it does not quite justify the opinion of Jerome, yet goes some way towards establishing for this lost Gospel an affinity with the works of the canonical four.

"And be ye never joyful save when ye have looked in love upon your brother" is a saying that might well have been uttered by Christ.

"He that hath marvelled shall reign, and he that hath reigned shall rest" may at first seem rather strange and forced; yet so probably would some of the sayings in our received Gospels, if they were new to us, and stood alone, without the support of the accustomed context. But the more we think of it, the more clearly we shall see that roused attention implies wonder; fixed attention, power; while power, rightly used, ends in rest; and we shall perhaps conclude that this saying is inferior in depth and beauty to few of the recorded words even of Christ.

There is, however, one strange fragment which comes to us from the purest source, and must therefore be accepted as authentic. It is quoted by Origen from the Gospel according to the Hebrews, "where," he writes, "the Saviour Himself says:—"

"Just now my mother the Holy Spirit took me by one of my hairs, and bore me to the great mountain Tabor;" and Jerome also gives it as assigned to Jesus by the same Gospel.

No doubt it is always hazardous to condemn a sentence which has been torn from a lost context; and for its defence as it stands we may refer to Mr. Nicholson's book. We must admit, however, that this passage points very strongly to a later date; and when we take into account the limited number of fragments that

remain, we must consider the possibility that more passages similar to this were to be found in the entire Gospel. Mr. Nicholson, like Baur and others, is in favour of a very early date; and even believes that the Gospel according to the Hebrews may have been written, as tradition records, by Matthew himself. His hypothesis, as he states it, is "that Matthew wrote at different times the canonical Gospel and the Gospel according to the Hebrews, or at least that large part of the latter which was parallel to the former." Of this hypothesis we need only say here that it is modestly put forward, and fortified by illustrations which are valuable in any case. But the existence of such a passage as that last quoted makes, we must think, against his view. In a note to the article "Gospels" in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. x., other indications of the later date of the lost Gospel are enumerated; among which are the constantly recurring use of "the Lord" where the earlier canonical writings would have simply "Jesus;" the softening of moral difficulties; the increase of the miraculous element; and the epithet "the Just" added to James. Some of the objections do not appear to us to be of great force, yet there is something in them all. It may perhaps be added that in the preface to the lost Gospel the first place is given to John, which would have been impossible, at least in the times of the Synoptic Gospels. Yet on the most moderate view the great antiquity of the Gospel according to the Hebrews cannot be denied. Hilgenfeld¹ calls it without doubt the most ancient of all the books relating to the New Testament outside the received canon; and if we were

¹ *Novum Testamentum extra Canonem Receptum.*

to venture on a guess, we should be inclined to place it in order of date after our first three and before the fourth Gospel. But, apart from such speculations, it will now, we may hope, be evident that in this Gospel we have lost a very early embodiment of apostolic traditions, which may not improbably have contained genuine words and narratives of Christ unrecorded in the received Gospels. If the Gospel according to the Hebrews grew up amid such a community as we have described, secluded and mildly fanatical, some chaff would be naturally mingled with the wheat; but that grains of true wheat were there the fragments that remain to us testify.

Perhaps some readers may care to turn to the books we have cited, and study the remnants of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, and of other lost or apocryphal Gospels, for themselves. Others, who lack time or inclination for this task, may yet be induced to interest themselves in the recovery of such manuscripts as may still be lying in some Eastern monasteries—in Asia, Egypt, or Abyssinia—forgotten in a corner, or destined at some undetermined period to light a fire and boil a kettle for the monks. Some copies of the translations made by Jerome of the Gospel according to the Hebrews may very possibly yet exist; and we need scarcely point out how important such a discovery would be. It is indeed strange that a people so devoted to the Bible as ourselves should take so little interest in the recovery of Biblical manuscripts that few know how one of the most important was found and saved little more than twenty years ago. If a proper search were made much might be added to the stock of Biblical scholars, and thus indirectly to the

aid and benefit of all readers of the Bible ; much, too, that might be far more important even than an entire copy of the Gospel according to the Hebrews.

M. W. MOGGRIDGE.

THE CONVERSION OF SARAH.

GENESIS XVIII. 1-15 ; HEBREWS XI. 11.

ABRAHAM is so great a personage, his figure bulks so large and towers so high in our imagination, that his wife is well-nigh lost in the shadow he casts ; and we make little effort to conceive what manner of woman she was, or to enter into her spiritual experience, even if we give her credit for spiritual experiences distinctly her own. And yet Sarah deserves, and will repay, an attentive regard. She was no unworthy mate of one of the greatest of men. If not a perfect woman, she was nevertheless "a woman nobly planned, to warn, to comfort," yes, and "to command." Her very name means "Princess;" and the omen of her name, of the change in it, was abundantly verified. She proved herself to be of a right royal strain, not simply by her splendid personal beauty, nor simply by the air of native authority with which she ruled her household ; but also by her magnanimity, her fidelity, and by the faith in virtue of which St. Peter calls her "the mother of all believers." She had her faults, no doubt, the defects of her qualities. She was jealous, exacting, imperious—as other women and princesses are said to have been. And if we reckon it among her virtues—and this fact is much insisted on in the Sacred Record—that she could laugh—laugh

heartily, laugh ironically, laugh enjoyingly—we must reckon it among her faults that she could not bear to be laughed at, but cruelly resented Hagar's smiling triumph over her babe, and Ishmael's boyish malice in making fun of Isaac.

Sarah has still another claim on our respectful and admiring regard, although it is a claim which, so far as I know, has not been recognized. She was a poetess ; she is the very *first poetess* of whom we have any record : and one, if not two, of her simple primitive songs—I shall quote them presently—are preserved for us in the pages of Holy Writ.

But her great claim on us, as the Writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews points out, is her *faith*. And this faith is the more remarkable because it was preceded by a confirmed scepticism, a scepticism which she did not scruple to cast into satirical forms. It is to this faith, or, rather, to her conversion from a mocking but rueful scepticism to a hearty confidence in God and the word of God, that we must mainly direct our thoughts.

The story of Sarah's Conversion is told at some length, and with a charming and picturesque simplicity, in the first fifteen verses of Genesis xviii. In these Verses the sacred historian sets before us the oak-grove of Mamre. Abraham's tent stands under the shadow of a venerable and magnificent tree, known throughout the East as "*the tree*," or "*the oak*" of Mamre. The time is burning noon, when all travellers rest, and those who keep their tents seek repose. Abraham has gone, as the Arabs go to this day, to the shaded entrance of the tent, *i.e.*, into the open but sheltered space beyond the falling curtains which screen off the interior, to get the cooler air, to rest, perhaps to sleep.

Sarah remains, as the Bedaween women still remain, in the privacy of the inner tent, behind the falling curtains. Three travellers approach, one of whom is marked out by the splendour of his appearance, or his air of authority and the deference of his companions, as the chief. With the ready courtesy of Eastern habit and ancient times, Abraham runs to meet them, bows before them to the very ground; and, addressing the Chief, says, "O Adonai! if now I have found favour in thy sight, pass not away, I pray thee, from thy servant." Then, courteously including the suite of his Guest in his invitation, he adds, "Let a little water, I pray you, be fetched, and wash from your feet the dust of travel, and rest yourselves under the tree; and I will fetch a morsel of bread, and comfort ye your hearts: after that ye shall pass on; for therefore are ye come unto your servant." That is to say, he overflows with hospitality, and offers eagerly what travellers most needed in the heat of the day—rest, shade, water, food. Obviously Abraham had been much impressed with the noble mien of the distinguished Personage who led the group, or he would never have saluted him as *Adonai*, a title only given to the very highest whether in heaven or on earth—a name adopted even by the Most High Himself. And his impression would be deepened and confirmed by the quiet dignity with which the great Unknown accepts his hospitality: "So do as thou hast said."

Abraham hurries into the tent, profoundly impressed by the noble bearing of his chief Guest, but not suspecting as yet that he is entertaining angels, and even the Lord of angels. He bids Sarah make a bushel of the finest flour into cakes, selects a calf tender and

good from the herd, gives it to a servant to be dressed, orders other servants to bring sour milk and fresh, curds and clotted cream ; and soon has a royal feast spread before his visitors under the shade of the great oak. They eat ; and he himself, although a wealthy and aged man, stands and waits upon them, his courteous and profuse hospitality indicating how deeply he desires to do them honour.

When the feast is over, they settle down for a talk with their host, and Sarah, whom custom and etiquette confine to the tent, draws as close to them as she may, stands behind, and I daresay peeps through, the falling curtain of the tent, and listens to their talk ; and laughs within herself as she hears the strange words of the Divine Stranger : "At the time appointed, this time next year, lo, Sarah thy wife shall bear a son."

Sarah laughs at the promise, and well might laugh at it. For Abraham had received this promise of a son and heir as much as four and twenty years ago ; and nothing had come of it. Even Abraham himself had fallen on his face and laughed (Gen. xvii. 17) when the promise was first made to him that a son should be born to him in his old age, although he instantly accepted the promise, and cast himself upon it, and shewed that he believed it by his prayer, "O that *Ishmael* might live before thee !" for had he not felt that *Ishmael* was to be displaced, disinherited, by the newly promised child, there would have been no need to ask God to provide for him : he was already provided for.

But though a promise had been made to Abraham again and again, nothing had yet been said to Sarah herself. It was not inevitable, therefore, that she per-

sonally should be the mother of the promised "seed;" or, rather, she may not have thought that it was. And when many years had passed, and no son was born to her, she seems to have concluded that she was not to have the happiness of giving Abraham an heir. She had consented to, she had proposed, the Hagar expedient, and had shewn her magnanimity by hoping that by some other, since not by herself, the desire of Abraham might be fulfilled. But, now, the promise long since made to Abraham is made to her; and she overhears her husband's distinguished Guest predicting that, within a year, *she* shall be the joyful mother of the promised child. Ishmael, then, was not to be the heir of the promise. But she—how could she, now long past bearing, hope that so great a happiness was to be vouchsafed to her? Abraham still hoped, indeed, and would now be more full of hope than ever; but the dear good man was a little credulous, a little apt to dream and to take his dreams for realities. "It is the old story," she thinks within herself; "the old incredible story, with a still more incredible addition to it, and nothing will ever come of it!" And so, safe in the shelter of the tent, she laughs her poor, sceptical, rueful laugh, wishing the good news could be true indeed, but quite sure that such a wonder could never be.

But her scepticism is rudely shaken before her wistful laugh is well over. For He who had *promised* a wonder *performs* a wonder, and a wonder that fills her with amazement and awe. She is behind the curtains. She has only laughed, as we are expressly told, "within herself," uttering no sound. The Guest sits with his back to her; for the tent, in which she stood, was "behind" him (Verse 10). And yet He knows what

she is doing ; He hears her soundless inward laugh : He is aware of the flash of sceptical amusement—half sigh, half smile—which has passed through her soul, and quietly asks : “ Wherefore did Sarah laugh ? ” *i.e.*, “ Why do you doubt ? Is anything, even this hard wonderful thing, too hard and wonderful for the Lord ? ”

Sarah is ashamed—ashamed both to have her secret read and published thus, and to have been detected in an act of discourtesy to Abraham’s Guest. She covers her confusion with a fib, an equivocation, crying from behind the curtain, “ I did *not* laugh ; ” and, flattering herself, I daresay, that as she did not laugh *out*, she could not fairly be said to have laughed at all—a kind of equivocation of which many are guilty to this day, and in which, indeed, many profess to see no guilt. But she is “ *afraid* ” nevertheless. She trembles with astonishment and awe at being so inwardly known, and known by One who cannot so much as see her. She begins to suspect that He must be more than man ; for has He not shewn a more than mortal power ? With a strange blending of fear and hope she begins to apprehend that the Lord, who has so often spoken to Abraham, is now speaking to her ; that it is *his* word she has doubted to whom nothing is impossible. He who knows the present so strangely, may He not also know the future ? He who has just told her what she was doing in the darkness of the closed tent, may He not be able to foretell things to come, things hidden from her in the darkness of the years to be ? As she ponders these questions, *faith* springs up in her heart. She accepts the word, the promise, which she had distrusted until it came to her personally, as the word of

God. She judges Him faithful who had sent her that word of promise. She ventures herself on it, incredible as it seemed. She commits herself to it, believing that it will be fulfilled, and looking for its fulfilment with joyful and confident expectation.

"By faith Sarah herself received strength to conceive seed, and was delivered of a child when she was past age, because she judged him faithful who had promised."

This was the Conversion of Sarah ; her conversion from doubt to assurance, from sceptical incredulous amazement at a Word which seemed too good to be true, into a firm, simple, self-verifying trust that it was true and must come to pass.

And, verily, her faith had its reward. At the appointed time, when the year had run its course, "the Lord visited Sarah, and the Lord did unto Sarah as he had spoken ;" and "Sarah conceived, and bare Abraham a son in his old age."

Now even the most prosaic of women is apt to grow romantic and poetic as she embraces her firstborn ; apt to see in him a beauty and a promise hidden from other eyes, apt to augur for him, or at the lowest to hope for him, the greatest things and the best. Nothing is too good for him, no destiny, no access of fortune ; no happiness, no honour too high and rare. As the fountain of maternal love is unsealed, her heart breaks forth into singing, even though she cannot beat its song into articulate and musical words. Sarah was happier than most mothers in that she had the poetic faculty as well as the poetic vision. Like Mary, like Elizabeth, like Hannah—each of whom sang a psalm when her baby was born—Sarah had her song, her psalm, welling up

in her heart and taking shape on her lips (Genesis xxi. 7). It is very simple, very brief, very antique; but, in the Original, it is in the regular and approved form of Hebrew lyrical poetry, and deals in the most direct straightforward way with the facts on which her joy, as wife and mother, was based.

*Who would have said unto Abraham,
Sarah gives baby the breast?
For I have borne him a son in his old age!*

The wonderful word was a true word; but even yet it seems almost incredible to her although it has been fulfilled, and she holds her infant in her arms and marks the grave joy on Abraham's face. "Who would have thought it? who *could* have believed it? O rare wonder! O exquisite and unlooked-for joy!" This is all her song.

And now what shall the boy be called? He shall be called *Isaac*, says Sarah; Isaac, which means *Laughter*. The name was chosen partly, no doubt, because, like every mother, Sarah thought that everybody would be glad, everybody would laugh, to see her boy—thus sharing and enhancing her mirth. Partly, too, no doubt, the name was chosen in order to commemorate the laugh of hearty and joyous faith with which Abraham had greeted the promise of his birth years ago, and the rueful ironical laugh of mere wonder and doubt with which Sarah herself had greeted it only a twelvemonth before it was fulfilled. But mainly, no doubt, this name was conferred on the child of the promise to indicate the immense and sacred joy which the fulfilment of the promise carried to the hearts of Abraham and his wife. For as Sarah ponders what his name shall be, and hits upon the name of Isaac, a

new psalm of joy and triumph bubbles up to her lips, and she sings (Genesis xxi. 6) :

*God hath made me to laugh,
So that all who hear will laugh with me.*

Memory and prediction are both in the Name ; both the past and the future are present in it : while it records Abraham's faith and Sarah's lack of faith, it also foretells the joy that would come to the whole world through the Child whom God had given to them and yet claimed for his own.

Sarah, then, was converted by her faith in a Divine Word which it was very hard for her to believe, and on which she had to adventure herself before it could be verified. And is not that the history of all the conversions through which we pass ? When we are first converted, first raised out of the natural life into the life that is spiritual, it is by our faithful and personal reception of the glad tidings of great joy, tidings which seem too good to be true. We are told that God loves us and wants us to love Him ; that to prove his love and win ours He has taken flesh and dwelt among us, making an atonement for our sins, dying that we might live, living that we might live more abundantly, throwing open a heavenly kingdom in which we may dwell, and a path of righteousness in which we may walk, and offering us the aid of his Spirit to help our manifold infirmities. And when we first really *hear* that message, and understand that it is delivered to *us*, is it not very hard for us to believe it, to accept it, to adventure ourselves on it, and commit ourselves to it ? Do we not share Sarah's scepticism, and say, " What, the good great God love *me* ! What,

I, so infirm of will, so tainted with guilt, so averse to many forms of goodness, to whom it is so easy to go wrong and so hard to do right—*I* to be quickened to an immortal life, a steadfast love and pursuit of all things good, a growing hatred of all things evil—O, it cannot be!" Yes, to us, as to Sarah, the news seems too good to be true. And so God has to shew us that He knows what we are, and what we are doing, and whither we are tending, before we can believe that we shall ever become what we ought to be, what He promises that we shall be. He convinces us that He does love us as we are, and despite our weakness and our sins: and from the love He shews us now, we begin to argue to the still greater love which as yet we cannot see, and by which our redemption is to be accomplished; and we say: "If He loves me as I am, what cannot He do for me? what may He not make of me?" And thus, by the revelation of his love, we are borne on and up to a saving trust in his love, and venture to believe that He will yet make us what we long to be, and give us all that we need to possess.

Every word that God speaks to us is a hard word, a word hard for us to believe; and that because his thoughts are so much higher than our thoughts, and his ways so much kinder than our ways. The very greatness of his thoughts, of his compassion, of his love and the purpose of his love for us, render them incredible to us. We cannot believe for joy and wonder, even if there be no other hindrance in the way. Whether He assure us that it is nobler and happier to walk after the spirit than after the flesh, to live for truth, justice, kindness, goodness than for gain and ease and pleasure, and that He therefore means

to draw us up into that higher happier life ; or whether He assure us that we are put on earth for a little space, and hardened by its discipline that we may learn to bear the beams of an unclouded Love, and that *that* is why we are called to endure hardness here : whatever his word, his promise to us may be, it is so much larger and better than we deserve, or had looked for, that it is very hard for us to grasp it, to fling ourselves upon it with an unhesitating faith, to wait for its fulfilment with a glad and unwavering hope. The whole secret of the difficulty lies in this—that He is *so* good, so much better than we take Him to be, and so bent on securing the very best things for us.

Our best way out of the difficulty is Sarah's way ; viz., to look away from the word of the moment, the promise of the moment, to Him who has spoken the word, and who stands behind it, and to ask ourselves whether or not we *account Him faithful who has promised*. If we feel that He is true ; if we cannot so much as conceive of Him as going back from his word ; if we are sure that He must always be more and better than his word, why should we doubt, why hesitate to commit ourselves to any word that He has spoken ? It is often our wisdom to argue from his character to his promises. If we can trust *Him*, we need not distrust his word. And as we go on our way, leaning on his word, that word will be more and more fully verified ; every new verification of it will increase and confirm our faith ; faith will unseal the fountains of love ; and love will well forth in songs of praise. S. COX.

STUDIES IN THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

XVII.—THE CRUCIFIXION.

THE cross of Christ has in a most wondrous way, like the glittering eye of God, held man spell-bound, and made him listen to its strange story "like a three years' child" who "cannot choose but hear." Were not the fact so familiar, men would call it miraculous. Had its action and history been capable of *a priori* statement, it would have seemed, even to the most credulous age, the maddest of mad and unsubstantial dreams. For it is not only that in the immense history of human experience it stands alone, a fact without a fellow, the most potent factor of human good, yet with what seems the least inherent fitness for it, but it even appears to contradict the most certain and common principles man has deduced from his experience. We do not wonder at the cross having been a stumbling-block to the Jew and foolishness to the Greek. We should have wondered much more had it been anything else. In the cross by itself there was nothing to dignify, and everything to deprave. Men would at first interpret it rather by its old associations than its new meaning. It had by its positive achievements to prove its peculiar significance and merit before it could make out an indefeasible claim on man's rational regard. But the extraordinary thing was how, with its ancient obloquy and intrinsic unsuitableness to its destined end, it could ever accomplish any positive good. There would indeed have been little to marvel at in the posthumous fame and power of Christ. His was a name and personality that could hardly but be

made beautiful by death. One who had been so loved and lovely could not fail to be idealized when He lived only to the memory too fond to forget and the imagination too deeply touched to be prosaic. The dead are always holier and more perfect to us than the living. To lose is only to love more deeply, to become forgetful of faults that pained, mindful only of virtues that ennobled and graces that adorned. Could we love and think of our living as we love and think of our dead, the loftiest dreams and most hopeful prophecies as to human happiness would be more than fulfilled. But Christ's death was in all that strikes the senses not one the memory could love to recall or the imagination so dwell on as to idealize and glorify. It was the worst the men that hated Him could think of. Even they were satisfied with its horror and shame. It made Him, in the eye of their law and people, accursed.¹ We can hardly imagine what the cross then was—so different has it now become. It stood almost below hatred, was the instrument of death to the guiltiest and most servile. Rome in her nobler and simpler days had not known it, had only, when depraved by conquest and brutalized by magnificence, borrowed it from the baser and crueller East. But she had used it with proud discrimination, too much respecting herself in her meanest citizen to crucify him, crucifying, as a rule, only the conquered, the alien, and the enslaved. To be doomed to the cross was to be doomed not simply to death but to dishonour, to be made a name hateful, infamous, whose chief good was oblivion. The death was horrible enough, so cruel as to be abhorrent to the merciful

¹ Deut. xxi. 23 ; Gal. iii. 13.

spirit that animated the Hebrew legislation. But the very horror that surrounded the death now commended it to "the chief priests and elders." He who had claimed to be above their law was to die a death it hated. The very act that ended his life was to outlaw Him, was to prove Him a disowned Child of Abraham, a Son Moses had repudiated. The name that had so gone down in infamy could never be honoured, bore a curse from which it could be saved only by oblivion. The voice that had first cried, "Crucify him!" seemed to have formulated a new and final argument against all high Divine claims—disproof by odium, refutation of the claim to the Messiahship by the abhorred symbol of shame and crime.

But Providence, by an irony infinitely subtler and more terrible than the priests', was to prove their genius but idiocy. Their elaborate attempt at refutation by odium became only the most splendid opportunity possible for the exercise of Christ's transforming might. The cross did not eclipse his name, his name transfigured the cross, making it luminous, radiant, a light for the ages, the sign of the gentleness of God. What is so extraordinary is the suddenness and completeness of the change. It was accomplished, as it were, at once and for ever. Suddenly, by the very fact of Christ's dying on it, it ceased to be to the imagination the old loathed implement of death and became the symbol of life. Time was not allowed to soften its horrors; it was not left to distance to weave its enchantments round it; in the very generation when, and the very city where, He died the cross was glorified. This is one of the strangest yet most certain historical facts. There is nothing more primitive in

Christianity than the preëminence of the cross, and apparently there is nothing more permanent. Peter, in his earliest discourses, emphasized the fact of the crucifixion.¹ The one object Paul gloried in was the cross,² and the one thing he determined to know and make known in the cities he visited was Christ and Him crucified.³ The death and its symbol constituted the very heart of his theology, what gave to it being, vitality, and significance. In the very age when the cross was most hated, when its bad associations were intensest and most vivid, Christ crucified was preached as the power and the wisdom of God.⁴ And as extraordinary as the preaching was its success: "the word of God grew mighty and prevailed." Suddenly, as it exchanged infamy for imperishable fame, it became the organ of Divine recreative energies, stood up like a living being, breathing the breath of life into our dead humanity. And its might has not been short-lived; its energies seem inexhaustible. For centuries it has been the sign of the grace that reigns through righteousness, the pledge of God's peace with man and man's with God, the comfort of the penitent, the inspiration of the philanthropist, the symbol on fields of slaughter of Divine charity working through kindly human hearts and gentle human hands, the banner which, as a New Shechinah, has witnessed to the Divine Presence in the van of every battle good has waged with ill. If we think what the cross had been to the centuries before Christ, then what it has been to the centuries since Christ, we may find it in some degree a measure of the exaltation of Him who could

¹ Acts ii. 22-24; iii. 13-15; iv. 10.

² Gal. vi. 14.

³ 1 Cor. ii. 2.

⁴ Ibid. i. 24.

so exalt it. His enemies meant it to make an utter end of Him and his cause, but He made it the emblem of the eternal reconciliation worked through Him of God and man. Their worst against Him became their very best for Him. The setting of crime and passion which they gave to his death only makes it look the Diviner, surrounds it with a glory more wonderful than any the radiance of heaven has ever woven out of the darkness of earth. The shadow of the cross is like the shadow of the sun, the light and life of the world.

Now, how was it that Christ was able to work this most extraordinary, as it were, posthumous miracle? For miracle in a real sense it undoubtedly was. The achievement of his death was a more violent contradiction to the probabilities or uniform sequences which men call laws of nature or of history than any achievement of his life. No death has had for man the same significance as his; no instrument of death has ever exercised so mysterious a power or subsumed and symbolized so many transcendental truths as the cross. And why? Why out of the innumerable millions of deaths that have happened in history has his alone had so extraordinary a meaning, and been a spiritual force so immense and permanent, capable of working the mightiest changes while itself incapable of change? The reasons are not apparent to the senses. A sensuous description of Christ's death may fill us with horror, or touch us with pity, but cannot subdue us to reverence or win us to love. There have been thousands of deaths more tragic and terrible, more ostensibly heroic, with more immediate and evident and calculable results. Nor can the dogmatic meaning

attributed to his death explain its unique preëminence in place and power. The very point is, why it only, of all the deaths man has suffered, came to have this dogmatic meaning, to be so construed and interpreted? Dogma did not create its preëminence; its preëminence created dogma. Christian doctrine is but a witness to the infinite peculiarity which belongs to Christ's death. Centuries before Augustine and Anselm speculated the cross had proved itself to be the power and the wisdom of God; and their speculations were but attempts to find a theory that would explain the fact. Nor can the reason be found in the nation and descent of the Crucified. The Jews had, indeed, an ancient sacerdotal worship, a system of sacrifices extensive and minute; but the thing after idolatry they most abhorred was the association of the sacrificial idea with any human death. Into the heart of Judaism, pure and simple, the notions, so familiar to the apostles, which represented Christ as the Lamb of God bearing the sin of the world, a propitiation for sin, dying for our sins, could never have entered. Then, too, as we have so distinctly seen, the affinities of Jesus were not with Jewish sacerdotalism. It crucified Him; He stood in absolute antagonism to it. The preëminence of the death is due to no secondary or accidental cause, but to the preëminence of the Person who died. It is only as the death is interpreted in its relation to Him and his history that its wonderful significance and charm for the world can be understood.

But is the significance attached to his death really due to Jesus? Was it not rather created by Paul and other and later Christian teachers?

We touch here one of the most interesting problems

in the history of New Testament thought. How was it that the apostles came to give such prominence to the death of Christ, to assign to it a place so cardinal, and to attribute to it so constitutive a significance? The Tübingen school used to argue: The primitive Christian creed was simply this, Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah. In making this confession the first Christians did not renounce Judaism. They remained good Jews, distinguished from their brethren—all of whom held Messianic beliefs, many of whom believed particular persons to be the Messiah—only by their special faith, Jesus is our Christ. But this speciously conceals a radical difference. The predicative term may be in each case the same, but what it expresses is an absolute antithesis. Jesus is *not* the Jewish Messiah—is in character, mission, fate the exact opposite. He is no prince, no victor in the sense known to Judaism, no militant incorporation of its most violent antipathies. He is meek and lowly in heart, gentle to the alien, tender to the sinner, friendly to the publican, a patient sufferer who, disbelieved by the Pharisees and priests, is crucified by the Gentiles, and pitied for his pains and weakness by the Gentile who crucifies Him. Now there were no notions so radically incompatible with the Messiah of Judaism, and the development and interpretation they at once received made them more incompatible still. What has to be determined, then, is how this set of new and alien notions came to be associated with the idea of the Christ in order that Christhood might be attributed to Jesus? Pfleiderer¹ has ingeniously attempted to explain this by tracing the psychological genesis of the Pauline theology.

¹ *Paulinismus*, pp. 1 ff.

Paul comes to believe in the resurrection of Jesus ; that changes his whole mental attitude and outlook. One who has risen from the dead and now lives and reigns must be the Messiah. It was a more wonderful thing to die and to rise than never to die at all. The death as the condition of the resurrection was glorified by it, became with all its passion and pain necessary to it, and therefore to the full and perfect Messiahship. The moment this position was reached Old Testament prophecy came to help out the Apostle's thought. He recalled the idea of the suffering servant of God, despised and forsaken of the people, bearing their sins, carrying their sorrows, for their sakes stricken, smitten, and afflicted, yet by his very patience and self-sacrifice redeeming Israel and working out for him a nobler and holier being. The attributes and achievements of this servant Paul transferred to Jesus, and so gave a new significance to his passion and death, and planted Him in a relation to Old Testament prophecy that made Him at once its fulfilment and Messiah.

Now, all this is clever, ingenious, subtle ; indeed, exceedingly so ; but—it is not historical. Grant that it explains the genesis of the Pauline theology, what then ? Greater things are left unexplained, and things that are necessary to explain it. There is the power of this ingeniously analyzed and derived doctrine over the hearts and minds of men, Gentiles as well as Jews. It did not strike them as a dogma strongly marked by the idiosyncrasies of an intensely Hebraistic nature, working with scholastic tools and combining old convictions with a new belief ; but it came to them as a revelation of God. It was not the theology of Paul that converted men and created Churches, but the doctrine of the

cross common to him and the other Christian preachers. The speech to Peter at Antioch,¹ the confession in the crucial passage in the First Epistle to Corinthians,² that by Apollos as well as by himself men had been persuaded to believe, proves that Paul on this point recognized their essential agreement. Then Pfeiderer's evolutionary theory might shew how well adapted Paul's theology was to conciliate the Jew; but it fails to shew how, with all its adaptation to the Jew, it was so deeply offensive to him, and how, in spite of its twofold root of rabbinical scholasticism and prophetic idealism, it was so splendidly real and potent to the Greek. This ingenious theory but helps to throw us the more strongly back on the reality. The passion and death of Christ do not owe their significance to Paul, but to Christ. The Apostle sought to explain a belief he found in possession, but the belief was created by the Person in whom he believed. The ideas as to the death of Christ current in the primitive Church were Christ's ideas. He is here the creative Presence; his Person dignifies the death; his words interpret it.

It is necessary, then, to reach Christ's own idea of his death and what it was to be, and then see how He realized it. He early anticipated his death, knew that without it He could not be faithful to Himself and his mission. Its scene was to be Jerusalem, its agents "the chief priests."³ Its place and meaning in his history were typified to the imagination of the Evangelists by the Transfiguration.⁴ Just about the time when He began to speak of it openly, Moses and Elias, the founder and reformer of Israel, the representatives

¹ Gal. ii. 14 ff.

² Chap. iii. 5.

³ Matt. xvi. 21.

⁴ Matt. xvii. 1-13; Mark ix. 2-7; Luke ix. 28-35.

of the Law and the Prophets, appeared to Him. "The decease which He should accomplish at Jerusalem" they approved: their approval was ratified by Heaven and symbolized by the glory which changed "the fashion of his countenance" and made his "raiment white and glistening." The idea so expressed is evident: the death is to perfect his work and make it the fulfilment alike of Law and Prophecy in Israel; though it may seem to shame, yet it is to exalt and transfigure Him; though it may be worked by human hate, yet it pleases and glorifies God. And these ideas penetrate all Christ's references to it. He is the gift of God, sent into the world that the world through Him might be saved.¹ He is the Good Shepherd who giveth his life for his sheep.² His death is to be so rich in Divine meaning and power as to draw all men unto Him. And these thoughts possess Him the more the nearer He comes to death. They receive fullest expression in the words that institute the Supper, in the Supper He institutes. Its symbols perpetuate the mind of One who believed that He died for man, shed his "blood for many for the remission of sins."³

But now we must see how Christ realized his own idea of what his death was to be. In order to this we must study Him in the article of death. And, happily, in it He stands, as it were, clear in the sunlight. It is not here as in the trial, where the shadow cast of man almost hides Him from our view, save when by the graphic hand of John He is drawn forth from the shade and set living and articulate before our eyes. But now in death and on the cross He fills the eye and prospect of the soul, the shadow of man only helping the better

¹ John iii. 16, 17. ² Ibid. x'. 11. ³ See THE EXPOSITOR, vol. x. pp. 49-51.

to shew Him clothed with a light which makes the very place of his feet glorious. In those last hours how dignified his silence, how Divine his speech, how complete his self-sufficiency! Round Him there is fretful noise, in Him there is majestic calm; about Him violence, within peace. In his last extremity, when man's faith in Him has perished, He knows Himself, and dies, while He seems to men the vanquished, the conscious Victor of the world.

In every moment of the Passion Jesus stands before us as the calm self-conscious Christ. He knows Himself, and no event can unsettle his knowledge or disturb his spirit. The hour of greatest prostration is the hour of supreme solitude; where He was most alone there He felt most awed by the magnitude of his mission and the issues it involved. But man's action, however fierce and fatal, failed to touch the quietness and the assurance which possessed his soul. The priests and the people, Herod and Pilate, were all depraved by the trial; no one of them was after it as good as he had been before. Successful crime, disguised in legal or patriotic and pious forms, is more injurious to the moral nature than crime ineffectual and confessed. Judas was happier in his death than Caiaphas or Pilate in his life. The priest would henceforth be more a man of subtlety and craft, the readier to use his sacred office for selfish and immoral ends. The governor would be a man less upright before his own conscience, fallen deeply in his own regard, less careful of justice, more respectful to astute strength, more fearful of the intrigue that could create a tumult, and might work him grief. But the trial had not broken Christ's spirit or lowered his judgment of

Himself, had only made Him the more clearly and consciously the Messiah. The mockery, the scourging, the presentation to the people, did not make Him in his own eyes any the less the Christ. We feel the almost infinite impertinence in Pilate daring to pity and patronize and, in his obstinately vacillating way, seek to save Jesus; but He was too lofty to feel the impertinence, was too surely the King to feel as if anything could deny or destroy his kingdom.

And this serene consciousness of his Divine dignity and mission He carries with Him to the cross. He does not go to it as one condemned, or as one who feels evil mightier than good. He is not despondent and reproachful like conscious virtue driven vanquished before victorious vice. Luke enables us to see Him as He emerges from the trial on his way with the cross to the crucifixion.¹ The men around Him are brutal enough, but the women leave Him not unpitied. The once loved but now forsaken, round whose name so many hopes had gathered, of whose deeds so many praises had been spoken, they cannot now dislike or despise. The contrast of his present misery with his past fame only the more appeals to their imaginative sympathies, and, womanlike, it is the mother they pity even more than the Son. But an object of pity He cannot allow Himself to become. His lot is not one to be bewailed or lamented—theirs is who are working his death. There is nothing pitiful in his sufferings as He bears them, though much to pity in those by whom they have been inflicted. The standpoint is not subjective or egoistic, but objective and universal. He does not need compassion, but is able to give it.

¹ Luke xxiii. 26-31.

Suffering can be to Him no ultimate evil, is rather the condition of perfect obedience and perfect power. But to the men that work it it must bring ill. The last calamity to the doer of a wrong is complete success in doing it, for then it becomes a challenge the Righteousness that rules the world cannot allow to go unaccepted. And retribution cannot always touch the guilty and spare the innocent. The guilty so contain the innocent, so act and speak for them, that they become, as it were, incorporated, participators in the crime and in its fruits. All this is most apparent to the mind of Christ. There has been a national sin, which must have national consequences, and the calamities which come of criminal folly shew no mercy to those who have been neither criminal nor foolish. And the heart of Christ is touched not at the thought of Himself, his wrongs, and his sufferings, but at the thought of the innocent who are to suffer with and through the guilty. "Daughters of Jerusalem," He says, "weep not for me, but weep for yourselves, and for your children." And then, in language which recalls his later and prophetic discourses, He tells what the end is to be. Two pictures stand before his soul, one grimly real, the other finely ideal. He sees a besieged city, gaunt famine and hungry pestilence in its homes, fierce and fanatical factions in its councils, impotence in its hands and on its ramparts; while despair has turned the mother's love to misery, and made the barren seem blessed, and the warrior's courage to the despondency that covets death to escape defeat. This is the picture of what is to be; the answer to the cry, "His blood be on us and on our children." ¹ Then beyond it He

¹ Matt. xxvii. 25.

sees another vision—two trees, one of ancient growth, immense, many-branched, umbrageous, but utterly dry and decayed, its vitality spent, its glory almost gone; the other, green, young, sapful, a tree that has sprung from the roots and grown under the shadow of the older and vaster. Wisdom had said, "Spare the green; let the withered perish that the vigorous may live." But craft and passion struck down the green that it might underprop the dry; yet all in vain. Trees live not by being propped or girded, but by their own vital and inherent energies. The fate of the green tree will only make the fall of the dry more utter and inevitable. Here is the ideal picture. Christ is the green tree, Judaism is the dry. He must be sacrificed that it may be saved. But Nature laughs at the cunning of man; in her realm there is only room for the living; and he who seeks by destroying the living to preserve the dead will find that Nature disdains his sacrifice, and, in her own beneficently inflexible way, reserves what ought to live, removes what must die.

Jesus, then, even while He bears the cross, knows Himself to be a source, not an object of pity; able to compassionate, not fit to be compassionated. The evil that was being worked in selfish fear was an evil to its workers, not to Him. In the bosom of their future there was lying the most calamitous retribution; in his the most enduring glory and power. The dry tree which was to be burned with fire unquenchable needed pity; the green tree, which no flames of their kindling could consume, needed it not. And this consciousness waxed rather than waned under the experience of the cross. It was a kindly Jewish custom, unknown to the harsher Romans, to mitigate the

agonies of crucifixion by giving a stupefying drink to the condemned. But when, in conformity with the custom, drink was offered to Jesus, He refused it.¹ His death was of too universal significance to be suffered in stupor. He must know both dying and death; conquer not by drowned senses but by victorious spirit. And the spirit stands before us incorporated, as it were, in its own words. Jesus uttered seven sayings on the cross—three in the earlier stages, while the tide of life was still strong; four in the later, while life was painfully ebbing away. The first concern his relations to the men and the world He is leaving, the second concern his relations to God and the world He was entering. Together they shew us how Christ in this supreme moment was related to God and man.

The three sayings of the earlier period form a beautiful unity, shewing Christ first in his universal, next in his particular relations to the guilty, and then in his personal relation to the true and saintly. The first saying is like the tender echo or Amen to the reply to the weeping women, is the perfect expression of compassion for the guilty and pity for the innocent who were to suffer after and for them. In his supreme hour self, in a sense, ceased to be, and Christ was sublimed into universal love. He had no tear for his own sorrows, no lament for Himself as forsaken, crucified, dying. His grief was for those wicked enough to crucify the Sinless, to sin against the light. Before Him lay the city, white, beautiful, vocal with religious songs, busy with festive rites and preparations for solemn sacrifice, but its heart defiled with blood, a bond

¹ Matt. xxvii. 34; Mark xv. 23.

of invisible darkness lying across its radiant sunlight. Round Him were the priests and scribes and people untouched by pity, spiteful while their noble enemy was in the very article of death, crying at Him in mockery, "He saved others, himself he cannot save." "If he be the king of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe him."¹ And their blindness, their guilt, their insensibility even to sensuous pity, filled his soul with a compassion that could only struggle to his lips in the cry, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."² The flight from man to God, the sense of the Divine paternal presence amid the desertion of man, is most beautiful. The prayer, "forgive them," is the finest blossom of his own teaching, what makes forgiveness of enemies a reality to all time and a possibility for every man. It was the creation of a new thing in the world—love deeply wronged daring to love, unashamed, in the face of the enormity that wronged it; and the new was to be a creative thing, making the apotheosis of revenge for ever impossible. But the miracle of tenderness is the reason—"they know not what they do." Passion is blind, hate sees only the way to gratification, not whither it tends or what it means. Christ does not extenuate the ignorance, but He allows the ignorance to lighten the sin. It does not cease to be a sin because done in ignorance—the very ignorance is sin—but Christ wishes, as it were, that everything personal to Himself should perish from the Divine view of their act. The prayer may be said to embody the feeling of God as He looks down upon man, sinning in fancied strength, heedless that Omnipotence lives, Omniscience

¹ Matt. xxvii. 42.² Luke xxiii. 34.

watches, and Righteousness rules, just as in the crowd about the cross we see man, untouched by the wondrous Divine pity, going on his mocking way, vengeful to the bitter end.

The saying that expresses his particular relation to the guilty is also peculiar to Luke.¹ The priests, no doubt, thought it a happy stroke of policy to place Jesus between the two thieves. Association in death was the nearest thing they could get to association in guilt. It made it impossible to deny that He had died the death of the guilty with the guilty. The men who had loved Him could not recall his life without also recalling his death; but the one was so steeped in horror that they would be willing, in order to escape it, to forget the other. The death on the cross and between the thieves was sure to break the beautiful image of his life, and make it a thing too hideous to be loved, too horrible for memory. But Mephistopheles is most foolish when most cunning; his subtlest are his least successful deeds. The transfiguring force in Christ compelled their wicked design to speak his praise. Their fine combination became an acted parable, a living symbol of Christ's action in time. The inmost nature of the men beside him blossomed at his touch. The one thief was possessed by the spirit of the multitude, the other was penetrated by the spirit of Christ. The first mocked with the mockers, felt no sanctity in death, no awe in its presence, no evil in sin, dared, though stained with many a crime, to associate himself with the Stainless, and demand with cool profanity, "Save thyself and us." The second, like one who sits in the shadow of eternity and gropes that he may touch the hand of

¹ Luke xxiii. 32, 33, 39-43.

God, feels that men who are "in the same condemnation" ought to be sacred to each other, knows himself to be justly, while Jesus is unjustly, condemned, believes that one who is condemned for his very goodness, and is so good as to be gracious to the men who condemn Him, must be indeed the Christ, the very gentleness of God come to live and suffer in soft strength among men. And so he prays Jesus to remember him when He comes in his kingdom, recognizing the Messiah in the very article of death. The answer is extraordinary—"To-day thou shalt be with me in paradise." Christ is serenely conscious of his dignity. The cross has not shamed Him into silence as to his claims. He knows Himself to be the Son of God, that He has paradise before Him, that He has the right and the might to save. Perhaps in no other saying does Jesus so strongly witness to Himself as the Christ. In beautiful silence He hears the railer, leaving him to be reproved by the echo of his own words; in beautiful speech He answers the prayer of the penitent, and promises more than is asked. Was the promise but an empty word? The heart of the ages has confessed, if Jesus was ever real it was now. He who after such a life could so speak in the face of death to the dying must hold the keys of paradise; and if He could open it then, what must He be able to do now?

But more than the guilty demanded his care. At the foot of the cross stood a group of women, in its heart the mother of the Crucified, by her side the disciple Jesus loved. The tearful face of the mother touched her Son, and called up perhaps visions of childhood, memories of the happy home at Nazareth, where care dwelt not, and love brooded, and the shadow

of the cross was too distant to dash the sunlight that streamed over all. But the visions of the past died before the sight of the present. Before his mother's agony He forgot his own. The look of desolate and ravished love, of the despair that had quenched her once splendid hopes, of horror at the loneliness that was creeping into and poisoning her very life, pierced Him to the heart. He seemed to feel what it was to a mother so to lose such a Son; and so with richest tenderness He gave her one she could love for his sake, who himself would be comforted in loving the mother of the Master he loved. "Woman, behold thy son!" was his word to Mary; "Son, behold thy mother!" his charge to John. The world has loved Him the more for his filial love, and feels maternity the holier for his dutiful and beautiful Sonship.

But now we must consider the four sayings of the later period of the agony, when the tide of life was painfully ebbing. They fall into two pairs. Of the first pair, the one expresses his physical distress, the other his spiritual desolation. The cry of physical distress is, "I thirst;"¹ the cry of spiritual is, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" The first is significant of the coming end, and stands fitly enough in the Fourth Gospel, where the very history is an allegory and each event the symbol of a sacred truth. To the mind of John Christ is the Paschal Lamb; at his cry the men about Him who have prepared Him for the sacrifice now make ready for the feast. Their acts are a mockery of the real, a perversion of the true. He thirsts for the consummation,

¹ John xix. 28.

and in derision they prepare Him for the end. But the cry of spiritual desolation is of immenser meaning and must be understood if Christ in his death is to be known. Does it mean that at this tremendous moment the Father hid his face from the Son, turning away in wrath from Him as the bearer of human sin? Does it mean that Jesus was in his darkest hour absolutely forsaken of the Father, left, when his need was sorest, without the light and help of the Divine Presence? Looked at from the standpoint of system, these positions may be affirmed; looked at from the standpoint of spirit, there is perhaps no position more deeply offensive to the moral sense. It introduces the profoundest unreality into the relations of the Father and the Son, and empties the most tragic event of time of all its tragic significance. Here there can have been no seeming, and the cry must be interpreted in the light of principles valid and universal. Here, then, two points must be noted:—

1. The relation of the Father to the mission of the Son. He sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world. The Son came to do the Father's will, made obedience to it his delight. He did ever the things that pleased God, and God was ever pleased in Him. But if the death was necessary to the work, if the very obedience culminated in the cross, how could it be that the Father would then desert the Son, or turn from Him as from an object of wrath? The hour of death was the moment of supreme obedience; how then could the Love obeyed forsake the Love obedient? If there was reality in the relations of Father and Son, if the work the one did the other approved, then it was simply impossible that He who is faithful to his love and his promise

could have forsaken the One who most trusted Him in life and trusted Him most of all in death.

2. The person of the Son in relation to the Father. Jesus Christ was a being in whom man could find no sin and God only holiness. His joy in God was perfect. In Him the union of the Divine and human was absolutely realized. He was in the Father, and the Father in Him. He had a will, but the will was not his own. His words and works were not his, but his Father's who had sent Him. The union of his being and will, heart and conscience, with God's was so complete as to become almost identity. He lived and He died to finish the work the Father had given Him to do.

Now the cry of desertion must be interpreted in the light of these two principles. It cannot stand in conflict with either. It is the solitary cry with despair in it that ever proceeded from the lips of Christ; but the despair was the child of human weakness, not of Divine conduct. He went into his sorrow deserted of man, yet upheld of God, certain that He was not alone, strong in the strength of the Unseen Hand.¹ He went out of his suffering into the silence and peace of the Eternal, certain that the Father waited to receive his forsaken and crucified Son.² And the cry that stands between these filial confessions describes no act of God, but a real and sad human experience which only the more shewed Jesus to be the Brother of man while the Son of God.

But we must now seek to understand the experience which prompted the cry. Here, then, it is necessary to note that Christ, while a supernatural person,

¹ John xvi. 32.

² Luke xxiii. 46.

accomplished his work under natural conditions. His power existed and was used, not for Himself, but for others, not for personal, but for universal ends. His Divine might helped man, did not help his own weakness or relieve his own hunger. The paralyzed under his touch stood up strong and supple, but He Himself had to rest by a wayside well and ask water to quench his thirst. The sick unto death came back at his bidding, but though He had power over his own life, He never used it to escape the doom that compels every child of Adam to go down into the silence and darkness of the grave. He is the splendid and solitary example of One who was by nature and for others more than man, but by choice and for Himself man only. And being man in all things, born into our common lot, unaided in his work, in his conflict with evil and against sin, by any supernatural energies or diviner agencies than are common to man, He tasted in the exceeding weakness of man the exceeding terror and gloom and strength of death. And yet He could not feel in the jaws of death like one of its common victims; He was more to it, it was more to Him. His consciousness was vaster than ours, his relations with man as with God infinitely closer and more complex. He came to death as incarnate humanity, our race personified, the second Head, the type and germ of a new and spiritual mankind. And so the issues in his dying, as in his living, were immenser than in man's. The father is a man, but also a father, bears in him the happiness, well-being, comfort of a loved home, and death to him is painful not for what it is, but for what it brings to them who love and are about to lose. The general is a man, but also a general; and if he falls wounded in the

battle, he fears death less for his own sake than his army's, the men who in losing him may lose everything. So Jesus dies as the Man and as the Christ; and the cry of desertion comes from Him as the Man, but the the Man dying as the Christ.

In order to understand why it was so two points must be considered; first, the universal experience in death, and next, the particular circumstances of Christ. As to the first, He was experiencing at this moment what man in all his multitudinous generations had experienced, or was to experience, in the hour and article of death. What death is to man, to human nature as such, it then was to Christ. He tasted it to the uttermost—its darkness, its loss to the living, its dread to the dying, its mockery of hope, its cruelty to love, its fateful defeat of promise, the stern and merciless foot with which it walks over and tramples down the fondest dreams and affections of the heart. It is hardly in human nature to love God in death, for death seems the negation of God. In dying time is lost, eternity is not yet won, the known is fading, the unknown has still to shew its unfamiliar face, so as to let it be seen, all old experiences are perishing, no new experiences are formed. And so the supports of faith have fallen utterly from the spirit, and it feels for the moment absolutely alone. It is a moment when neither time nor eternity is to the spirit, and God has ceased to be. And this moment, inevitable to human nature, Christ realized as Man—as, in a sense, collective Humanity—and out of its absolute loneliness, out of its dense gloom, came the despairing cry, “My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?” The experience so expressed completed, as it were, his identification with man. Our

nature's last and utmost misery was tasted, and the Captain of our salvation died perfected through suffering.

As to the particular circumstances of Christ's death, it is to be noted how they intensify the common human experience as realized in Him. These were creative of the sorrow that was realest suffering. The wooden cross of Calvary was not the cross of Christ, but what it symbolized, the contradiction of sinners, the bitterness and evil of sin. In physical suffering as such there is no intrinsic good, but much actual evil. It does not by itself tend to elevate and sanctify the mind, but rather to harden and deprave. In plague-stricken cities the worst passions are often developed. Men grow indifferent to life, indifferent to death, coarse, even brutish, in thought and feeling, speech and action. If a distinguished sufferer is also a distinguished saint, it is not because of the suffering, but because of a Holy Presence in the soul transmuting the base metal of earth into the pure gold of heaven. Now the grand thing about Christ is not his physical pain, but his spiritual sorrow. And this sorrow is due to sin. The guilty may feel its legal penalties, but the guiltless are touched and pierced by its moral results. The devil's sin is a greater sorrow to God than to the devil, and the crime of the crucifiers is a pain to Christ infinitely beyond what retribution can ever make it to them. He had loved, still loved, them, yet their only response is the cross, with all its mockery and hate. And his sorrow for their sin is mightiest as he goes down into death. For the moment his experience is double; coincident with his sense of being forsaken is his sense of the power of sin. Loss of God is a transcendent evil; loss of being were better. A saintly

spirit would prefer annihilation to exclusion from the vision of the Divine face. But to feel as if the soul had lost hold of God just as the life was being quenched by victorious sin, may well indeed seem the last and worst agony. And this was Christ's—a moment long perhaps, yet intense as eternity, expressed in the cry that has so long thrilled with awe the pulses of the world, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

But the darkness soon passed. The Father heard and answered. Into the consciousness of the Saviour a Presence came that changed his consciousness of desertion and loss into one of victory and peace. And this consciousness lives in the sayings that are his last. One breathes the serenest resignation, the most holy and beautiful trust, like the smile that comes across the face of the dying in response to greetings not of this world—"Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." The other welcomes the end, celebrates the triumph, proclaims that the death accomplished is the work done—"It is finished." In the first He confesses that God has not forsaken Him, that the eternal hands are round his spirit and the eternal face brooding over his uplifted soul; in the second He declares that sin is not victorious, that He is, that its evil has but helped the completion of his work. And fitly, with the double testimony, "He bows his head and gives up the ghost." He dies on the cross, but not by it. Men marvel that his struggle is so soon over; pierce his side, and shew to the reverence and love of all ages that—He died of a broken heart. And they love Him, and are constrained by his love to live not unto themselves, but unto "Him who died for them and rose again."

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

THE WISDOM OF THE HEBREWS.

SECOND PART.

IN a former paper the first period of the Hebrew Wisdom was described as that in which there is a complete harmony between principles and phenomena; the affairs of life and the events of Providence are in perfect correspondence with the *a priori* principles which the Wise Man held in regard to God and the moral order of the world. This condition of the Wisdom appears in the Proverbs of Solomon, particularly in the Chapters from the tenth onwards. The moral maxims and generalizings on life and Providence contained in these proverbs are in all probability the earliest examples which remain to us of the efforts and activity of the Wisdom. There is no valid reason to doubt that many at least of these proverbs belong to Solomon, and others to his age. The renown for Wisdom which this king had among his own people, and even, although in a distorted and fantastic form, among the other peoples of the East, must have rested on some real foundation of fact. No doubt reputations grow, and veneration enlarges its hero sometimes in proportion to the indistinctness of its real knowledge of him; and objects seen in the broad blaze of day are very insignificant compared with the bulk they assume when seen between us and the light still lingering on the horizon of a day that has gone down. But making allowance for the exaggerations of later and less happy times, thirsting for the wells of an ancient Wisdom now run dry, we should leave tradition and history altogether unexplained if we disallowed the claim of Solomon to be the first and greatest of the Wise, and

refused to accept some considerable portion at least of the Proverbs that pass under his name as really his.

Our present Book of Proverbs is a miscellaneous collection. It is an anthology of the words of the Wise just as the Psalter has gathered into one the hymnology of Israel, the product of every age and the reflection of every feeling of the people's life. But there is no more reason to doubt that Solomon was a Wise Man than there is to doubt that David was a poet. The breaks in the Book of Proverbs that reveal its composite character are quite visible. After the general heading: *The proverbs of Solomon the son of David, king of Israel*, in the beginning of the Book, we are surprised to come upon another: *The Proverbs of Solomon*, in the beginning of the tenth Chapter. The first heading is probably due to a general editor, although how much more is due to him may be difficult to say. It is not improbable that Chapters i.-ix. may be also from his pen. These Chapters are wholly unlike the rest of the Book, consisting of connected moral pieces, and are less expositions or expressions of Wisdom herself than exhortations to a diligent seeking after her. There is that kind of difference between Chapter x. foll. and these Chapters that we are familiar with as the difference between productivity and criticism. In the middle Chapters the Wisdom is creative; and, absorbed in the fascination of her own activity, and in the delight of expressing and revealing herself, she has no place in her own thoughts herself; in these nine early Chapters she is become self-conscious; she is fascinated by her own beauty; she invites men to behold her and to love her. It must have taken some

time before a pursuit, followed at first instinctively and without even consciousness, out of the mere religious and mental delight which it afforded, was drawn under the eye of reflection and became, as an operation of the mind or a posture of the whole nature, a subject of contemplation and discussion. On this internal ground alone we must assume that these nine Chapters are considerably later than those in the middle of the Book. It is of little consequence whom we suppose to have been the writer of them, whether an author working independently, or the editor of a collection of Solomonic proverbs at an earlier time, or the general editor at last. Their relation to the body of the Book is the main thing, as exhibiting a later development of the Wisdom, when she had ceased to be creative and become self-conscious and the subject of her own contemplation.

There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the superscription in Chapter x. It marks an early collection of Solomonic proverbs. It is not necessary to suppose that every one of these proverbs is Solomon's. Words of other Wise Men may have become mixed with his. The same or similar sentiments may have been uttered by others, and in a kind of literature much in the popular mouth, and liable to alteration as circumstances *a propos* of which quotations were made altered, occasional substitutions may have occurred, and found their way into MSS., as happened with the sayings in the Gospels. We are without materials for judging how far this may have been the case, for we have no knowledge of the condition of the MSS., or of the means taken to preserve them, nor of the date at which this collection was made. We may fairly

assume that the contents of the middle Chapters correspond in the main to the heading. The presence of other small collections is marked by headings more or less distinct. The great collection beginning with Chapter x. ends with Chapter xxii. 16. Then commences a new section with the words, "Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise." This section continues to Chapter xxiv. 22, and is followed by a small collection beginning, "These also belong to the wise." Then follows a further collection of Solomonic proverbs "which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah, copied out," *i.e.*, probably, edited from various sources. This collection extends to the end of Chapter xxix., and is followed by several other small collections, which bring the Book to a close.

It is not easy to say in a word how this kind of literature differs from other kinds represented in the Old Testament. The point of view of the Wise is general, while in other writings of the Old Testament it is particularistic; it is here human, while elsewhere it is national. There are certain terms and ideas characteristic of the other writings in the Old Testament which are absent from the literature of the Wisdom, and perhaps a better idea of its nature can be got from this negative peculiarity than from its positive contents. For example, though sacrifice is once or twice referred to, the ritual system which occupies so large a place in the Pentateuch is completely ignored. The mass of positive enactments of the ceremonial law, the complicated arrangements of the Tabernacle and Temple service, the priesthood and the hierarchy, do not seem honoured even with an allusion. The Wise Man is occupied with the thought

of God and man, with the relations of men to God and to one another; but it is only what is moral in all this, what touches mind and conduct, that interests him: the external exercises of worship are passed by without mention. Again, the Wise Man differs as much from the Prophet as from the Lawgiver. All those ideas around which prophecy revolves, such as the idea of a Kingdom of God, of a chosen people, of a Messiah, and the like, are, if not unknown, without significance to the Wise. The distinction between "Israel" and "the Gentiles" has no place in his mind. The darling phraseology of the prophets, such as "Judah," "Israel," "Jacob," "Zion," "my people," "the latter day," and the whole terminology of particularism, nowhere occurs in the Wisdom. The universalistic idea of God has created an idea of mankind equally large.

Conclusions have been drawn from these peculiarities of the Wisdom which though natural are hasty. It has been inferred from the meagre allusions to ceremonial that in the age of the Wise the ritual was much less developed than it became at a later period. It may be true that the ritual was scanty and less imposing in early times, but such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the Proverbs, for other portions of the literature of the Wisdom, such as Ecclesiastes, usually considered a very late book, are marked by the same want of ritual allusions. And unquestionably the prophetic age ran parallel in great part to the age of the Wisdom; but the whole circle of prophetic ideas are foreign to the Wise.

Again, it has been inferred from the universalistic point of view of the Wisdom that the Wise were men

who found themselves outside the circle of beliefs cherished by their countrymen, which they repudiated or sought to reduce to a naturalistic basis. But this view confounds the Wise with their direct opponents, the *letsîm*, or scorers. The latter were a class of sophists or sceptics, the deadliest enemies of the Wise, who being "wicked" and "sinners" (Psa. i. 1) had gone the length of finding a speculative justification for their wickedness and unbelief. Looking back from the distance at which we ourselves live to the times of Revelation, we are apt to fancy that it came in a manner which made all denial of it or opposition to it impossible. But this was far from being the case. The evidence which authenticates Revelation is never demonstrative, but always moral. The contents of Revelation have always been the largest part of the evidence for its truth. But moral evidence is strong or weak according to the kind of mind to which it appeals. And thus there has always been opportunity for opposing, and, in point of fact, the same opposition to, Revelation. The prophets were disbelieved and persecuted. They were confronted by other prophets whom *they* called false, and who were so; but all of whom were not consciously false. There were the same confusions and the same difficulties in the path of faith at the time when Revelation was given that exist now when it is complete. The essence of faith lies deeper than intellectual judgment, and, consequently, external evidence is never of more than negative and secondary value. That "scorers," or sceptics, should exist alongside of Revelation, and be found like waifs in the pools and eddies down its whole course, was to be expected. How far they com-

bined into societies, or formed a propaganda, is not easy to say. From allusions in the Proverbs it is evident that they strove assiduously to gain possession of the youthful mind of the country, and in this attempt they were met by the Wise, who put forth efforts equally strenuous to draw the rising thought of the land to their side. The aim of the Wise Man who gathered the Proverbs together was "to give subtilty to the simple [*i.e.*, the undeveloped mind], to the young man knowledge and discretion" (Chap. i. 4). And most of the exhortations of the Wisdom are directed to youth; for the hearer before the ancient sage is always his "son," that is, youthful scholar and friend. But however peculiar and distinctive may be the direction which the Wisdom takes, the Wise Men stand on the common foundations of the faith of their people, and pursue the same ends with the other teachers in the nation.

The best known and best loved of the Wise is the author of the Proverbs Chapters x. xxii. Among these proverbs there are a few which seem to want any very deep moral purpose, and are little else than the remarks of a keen insight into the ways and motives of men, all of which to a thoughtful mind are full of interest, and the observation of them conducive to a lively though quiet enjoyment. Most of them, however, have a visible connection with higher principles, and are designed to exhibit God realizing Himself in life and providence. Of whatever kind they be, the observations are always good-natured and never betray irritation or dislike on the part of the Philosopher to his fellow men. He walks through the bazaars and observes the peculiarities of oriental marketing: "It is

naught, it is naught, sayeth the buyer ; but when he is gone his way then he boasteth " (Chap. xx. 14). Or he remarks how our natural selfishness cuts into us somewhat deeper, and describes it with a certain caustic though even still kindly cynicism : " All the brothers of the poor man do hate him ; how much more will his neighbours go far from him " (Chap. xix. 7). The difficulty of one's poor relations existed already in those days. Sometimes his expressions are so pointed as to border on humour, as when he represents the slothful man expressing his deadly dread of labour by saying, " There is a lion in the road ; " or as too lazy to lift his hand from the dish to his mouth, or to roast what he had taken in hunting ; or when he describes the poor man whose domestic relations have been unfortunate as preferring to squeeze himself into a corner of the house-top rather than dwell with a brawling woman in a wide house (Chap. xxv. 24) ; or when he ridicules the over-tenderness of the paternal heart : " Withhold not correction from the child ; if thou beatest him with the rod he will not *die* " (Chap. xxiii. 13). But usually he shews a broad sympathy and a grave kindly tenderness for all the natural feelings and the instinctive desires of every sentient creature, embracing even the lower creation in his benevolent regard : " A righteous man regards the natural desires (*nephesh*) of his beast " (Chap. xii. 10). That philosophy which annihilates the individual, which recognizes mankind but not men, to which humanity is an ever renewing advancing tree, from which the separate leaves drop off exhausted, where " the individual withers and the race is more and more "—this philosophy is unknown to him. The

whole endures because each part endures, and he knows an antidote to the individual's fall : " Righteousness delivereth from death " (Chap. x. 2). Hence to him every emotion and natural desire of the individual is of worth, and he regards it with sympathy, whether it be sorrow or its opposite, joy : " Sorrow in the heart of a man bears him down " (Chap. xii. 25) ; and on the other hand, " A merry heart doeth good like a medicine " (Chap. xvii. 22). And his perception is delicate enough to see that, however grateful ordinarily the fellow feeling of other men is to us, there are times when we must be left alone with our feelings, and that in every human soul there is an inmost core so sensitive that it shrinks from all external condolence or sympathy as something too rude : " The heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a stranger intermeddleth not with his joy " (Chap. xiv. 10). Yet, on the other hand, we live in one another, we stretch out our hands to the future, and sometimes we are divided, and the " half of our soul " embarks upon the sea or wanders in distant lands, and we long to know how he fares : " Hope deferred maketh the heart sick, but the desire accomplished is sweet to the soul " (Chap. xiii. 12, 19) ; " The light of the eyes rejoiceth the heart, and a good report maketh the bones fat " (Chap. xv. 30) ; and, " As cold water to a thirsty soul, so is good news from a far country " (Chap. xxv. 25). Nothing human is alien to the Wise Man ; he is philanthropic in the literal sense ; every way of man and every expression of his mind or nature has a charm for him.

Again, when we pass from the individual in itself to those broad distinctions which characterize it, as man and woman, father and child, youth and old man, it is

singular to observe with what pleasure the Wise Man dwells on them as all beautiful in their place, and how he seizes on that in each which is becoming to it, and constitutes its charm: "A gracious woman attains to honour, and strong (or laborious) men attain to wealth" (Chap. xi. 16). That indescribable delicacy in woman, whether you call it tact, or taste, or sensibility, or grace, which is the complement of the strength or force of man, and gives her her power and secures her her place as surely as these secure him his, the Wise Man's eye fastens upon at once; and he is almost rude when he describes the opposite of this, that which we call vulgarity or coarseness, and which he calls want of "discretion," which even beauty is so far from hiding that it throws it into relief: "As a jewel of gold in a swine's snout, so is beauty in a woman who is without discretion" (Chap. xi. 22). Similar is his judgment on other classes: "The glory of young men is their strength, the glory of old men is the grey head" (Chap. xx. 29). It is not nature alone, but moral conduct, that makes the young man strong (Chap. xxxi. 3, 4); and why the glory of old men is the grey head is explained in the following proverb: "The hoary head is a crown of glory, it is found in the way of righteousness" (Chap. xvi. 31). The English Version spoils this by translating "*if* it be found," misapprehending entirely the Hebrew point of view, which is that "The fear of the Lord prolongeth days, but the years of the wicked shall be shortened" (Chap. x. 27). To the Hebrew mind this life in the body was the normal life. He had no doctrine of the immortality of the soul as distinct from the man. Neither had he any doctrine of a transcendent place

of blessedness different from this earth, where the principles of God's government, impeded in their flow here by many obstacles, should roll on in their majestic course smooth and straight. He saw all those principles realized here. "Life" to him was what we ordinarily call by that name, and as lived in the body; and immortality was the continuance of this life, and was conferred by righteousness. The blessedness of the just arising from the fellowship of God was enjoyed here. This at least is the point of view of these proverbs and of the early lyrics. The *fact* of death was ignored. In the lyrics death is absorbed in the higher feeling of life and in the ecstasy of conscious blessedness. And in the deep flow of principles in the proverbs it is submerged. To us Westerns, our metaphysical ideas about the "soul" and its natural immortality, and the ideas naturally accompanying these of the imperfection of matter and the body, and its being a clog upon the spirit and its prison-house, have suggested a different train of thought. "They whom the gods love die soon."

The good die early,
And they whose hearts are dry as summer dust
Burn to the socket.

There is scarcely a trace of such an idea in Scripture: "In the way of righteousness is life, and the pathway thereof is immortality" (Chap. xii. 28). Perhaps the other idea might be suggested by the events recorded regarding Enoch; but it was an idea foreign to the whole strain of Hebrew conception, which regarded this life as fully expressing the principles of Divine government, in which therefore the destiny of man was to be conclusively worked out, whether the

destiny of the individual or the race. Such passages as Isaiah lvii. 1, "The righteous is taken away from the evil to come," are misinterpreted; the meaning being that the righteous is swept away and destroyed before the advancing tide of evil.

If now, before passing on to the individual's relation to that which is without him, we inquire how he should bear himself, what conditions and habits of mind he should cherish, and what activities he should pursue, we enter into the region of duty, and that brings up the great fixed idea on which all is built, viz., the idea of Jehovah. The prevailing feeling in the mind should be the fear of the Lord, the sense of the all-present God, and that awe which this sense carries with it. Out of this will grow those conditions of mind that are becoming. One of the first of these will be *humility*, which in a world where God is all must be the way to all conduct that has in it success: "The fear of the Lord is the instruction of wisdom, and before honour is humility" (Chap. xv. 33): "By humility and the fear of the Lord are riches and honour and life" (Chap. xxii. 4): "When pride cometh then cometh shame" (Chap. xi. 2). This humility is not merely a temperament, or a social or ethical condition of mind; it is a religious attitude; it is the broad general sense of what a man is in the presence of God; hence one of its expressions is this: "Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?" (Chap. xx. 9). But this abiding awe of God will reveal itself in the whole life in a general gravity of deportment befitting him that is Wise, in equanimity of mind, in self-restraint and patience of temper, in thoughtful consideration in the

presence of men, or on matters of importance, and slowness to speak, and even in a dignified manner of utterance, in opposition to the levity and want of consideration and the unthinking haste of the fool, and in general in a cautious and discreet course of conduct: "He that is soon angry dealeth foolishly" (Chap. xiv. 17); "An equal temper is the life of the flesh, but keenness of mind is the rottenness of the bones" (Chap. xiv. 30); "He that is slow to anger is greater than a hero, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city" (Chap. xvi. 32); "The heart of the righteous meditates in order to answer, but the mouth of the wicked bubbleth over with evil things" (Chap. xv. 28); "The tongue of the righteous gracefully uttereth knowledge, but the mouth of fools poureth out foolishness" (Chap. xv. 2); "He that spareth words hath knowledge; Wise men reserve knowledge, but the mouth of the fool is an imminent downfall" (Chap. x. 14); "A fool's chagrin is presently known, but a prudent man covereth an affront" (Chap. xii. 16). Many more proverbs to the same effect might be cited; they culminate in that which is the highest encomium of reticence: "Even a fool when he holds his peace is accounted a wise man" (Chap. xvii. 28). There is an exquisite polish in these proverbs in the original which a translation cannot convey, a delicate balance and opposition of clause to clause and word to word which betrays acute thinking and great elaboration. The proverbs Chapter xv. 2, and Chapter x. 14, are good examples; in the latter the caution and reserve with which the Wise Man speaks, and the knowledge which at last he expresses, are balanced against the readiness of the fool, which is like a toppling

ruin, and his utterance, which is like the clatter and confusion of the ruin when it falls.

These proverbs describing how the individual expresses himself already form a passage over to his general activity and relations to men. However profound the sense of Jehovah's power and efficiency was in the mind of the Wise, it never paralyzed the man or led to a fatalistic and inert quiescence. Rather it stimulated him. For this Jehovah, whose spirit pervaded all, was not a Being unsympathetic with man or inaccessible to him, much less an insensible stream of force, deaf to appeal. Rather there was in man, or man himself was, a spirit similar; perhaps even it was the same spirit that was in man: "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts of the breast" (Chap. xx. 27). This spirit of man which goes through his breast like a lighted candle, bringing to view all that is there, being both a consciousness and a conscience, has been kindled by Jehovah, and he has lighted it at his own flame (Job xxxii. 8). Man is but a dimmer God; his capacities and motives and aims are the same, though feebler and more contracted. The nearness to him, therefore, of the great primal light will not be to obscure his own, but to make it burn the brighter. It will arouse him to activity, and an activity in harmony with God Himself. In these proverbs there is no trace of the strong sense of God driving men either to a pantheistic sluggishness and quietude, or to the despondency of a hopeless individualism. In this early time of the nation's strength and high fortune, the spirit was too fresh and strong to feel overpowered. Rather it was quickened, and the sense of harmony with Jehovah

made it feel almost omnipotent. Later, when the nation sank beneath its accumulated misfortunes, and the individual lay prostrate under a heap of miseries which he could do nothing to shake off, there did begin to lie on the breast the nightmare of a destiny almost fatalistic, and the best advice Coheleth has to give is to accommodate one's self to it with what skill he may, in fear and reverence, and to snatch at the same time what enjoyment the senses or the sunshine will afford. But there is at no time any trace of that annihilation of effort seen in other Oriental religions, where "the life of the All is but the course of nature, where there is no history with a spiritual goal to be attained by moral activity . . . where there is no ideal yet to be reached . . . where the stream of world-history flows on of itself without the coöperation of man, man having simply to yield himself to it, to adapt himself unresistingly to the eternally unvarying order of the world, to join himself as a passively revolved wheel into the constantly uniform moving clockwork." ¹ Man is free as God is, if not so powerful; and his task is to use his freedom to fall into harmony of thought and conduct with Jehovah, the righteous Lord who loveth righteousness. Hence the encomiums passed upon diligence and the severe reprobation of sloth: "The hand of the diligent maketh rich" (Chap. x. 4); "Love not sleep, lest thou come to poverty" (Chap. xx. 13); "In all labour there is gain" (Chap. xiv. 23).

But of course it is in intercourse with men that this activity can be best displayed, and the dispositions that should accompany and animate it can best be seen.

¹ Wuttke, *Ethics*, vol. i. p. 45.

This disposition, to state it in a single word, is charity, philanthropy in the widest sense. The grave considerate kindliness of the Wise Man is one of his most attractive traits. Looking abroad upon the classes of men, his eye alights upon the poor, whom we have always with us, and he compassionates the dreary monotony of their condition: "All the days of the poor are evil" (Chap. xv. 15); and he puts in a plea for their kindly treatment: "He that despiseth his neighbour sinneth; but he that hath mercy on the poor happy is he" (Chap. xiv. 21). Nay, regarding the various orders of society as the will and creation of Jehovah, he who disdains any of them seems to him to slight Jehovah Himself: "He that oppresseth the poor reproacheth his Maker" (Chap. xiv. 31); but on the other hand, "He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord, and that which he hath given will he pay him again" (Chap. xix. 17). But the bearing of the Wise among all classes is the expression of a wide human goodness. In the presence of men in general he is courteous: "A soft answer turneth away wrath;" he esteems others highly: "He who despiseth his neighbour is a fool" (Chap. xi. 12); and should evil rumours regarding others reach his ear he will give them no further currency: "He that divulges a slander is a fool" (Chap. x. 18). Tale-bearing and slander are alluded to in the Old Testament in language of particular virulence. It seems to have been conducted of old, as a kind of private warfare, with great ferocity. In Psalm ci., which has been called "The King's Mirror," the royal author expresses his detestation of it and resolution to proscribe it in his court; and in Psalm xv. it is treated almost

as a cardinal sin. In our day the number of sins has greatly diminished, and it is only particular classes that can fall into them. A clergyman may still be guilty of several; a trader, perhaps, of one; but an independent man of wealth or station cannot sin. To the Hebrew mind backbiting was an odious vice. But civilization has softened our verdicts regarding many things; it has also taught us discrimination in applying our judgments. Perhaps in those days, from want of the means of public speech, slander was the weapon of strong men; it has now very much fallen into the hands of the weak things of the world, such as controversial writers on Scripture, and we mind it less. Christianity, too, the finest evidence for the truth of which is not miracles, nor its moral contents and the answer which it evokes in our own heart, but that it has raised woman to her true place, has perhaps contributed to the same result. By the softening influence of women on this species of warfare its horrors have been greatly mitigated.—In a word (to return to the Wise), the feeling of the Wise Man toward his neighbours is *love*, which thinketh no evil: "Hatred stirreth up strife; but love covereth all sins" (Chap. x. 12); so that, so far from seeking to revenge evil, he hideth it: "He that covereth an offence seeketh love" (Chap. xvii. 9). Of course coupled with this there was the practice of the severer virtues of justice, and particularly truthfulness, no vice being stigmatized so often as lying, and especially that form of it which is injurious to others, the bearing of false witness.

The foregoing pages, though containing little more than a number of passages from the Proverbs, may have given some distant and partial glimpses of the

benevolent countenance and stately demeanour of the Wise Man. It remains to allude in conclusion to the question, To what does this conduct inculcated by the Wise Man, and followed by him, lead? The answer to this question, though here put last, is in truth the presupposition of the Wisdom, which is not a mere ethic but an outcome of religion.

The reward of such conduct as the Wise Man inculcates might seem already attained in the satisfaction of doing good. But this mode of thinking was little in the way of the Hebrew mind. Both in speculation and in temperament the Jew was sensuous. As the body entered into his anthropology and his conception of life as an essential factor, the material world entered also as an essential element into his conception of the universe and its government. He was as far as possible from being an idealist. He demanded that his moral principles should be realized in the external world, and he believed that he saw his demand complied with. It was needless to raise the question whether virtue was its own reward. It had its external reward in the necessary principles of God's government: "Many a one scatters and yet it increases" (Chap. xi. 24); "The liberal soul is made fat; in the good of the righteous the city rejoices" (Chap. x. 13). There is a moral order in the world without, and in the heart of man, and it pursues its end with an irreversible certainty. It is here that the explanation is to be found of what has been thought extremely puzzling, the absence of a formal doctrine of immortality from the Old Testament Scriptures, and not in any intentional avoiding of such a topic by the Lawgiver or Revelation for the purpose of inculcating the principles of a present moral life, or for

any other purpose. That style of speaking of Revelation, common half a century ago, which told us that it was constructed so as by its difficulties to try our faith, and that prophecy was given in such a way that it should not be understood till it was fulfilled, and that its obscurity was necessary lest infidels might say it had been fulfilled by men of set purpose—this style of thinking, which represented the Author of Revelation as stooping to subtleties and quirks for the purpose, of all others, of tripping up infidels, is happily disappearing. “I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth . . . I, the Lord, speak righteousness, I declare things that are right” (Isa. xlv. 19). Scripture speaks simply and without passion, and it says to infidels as to all others: “Whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear.” Instead of looking for an explanation of the form of Scripture to an intention having respect to the future, we are turning more to seek a reasonable and sufficient cause in the conditions of the present. The theory that the doctrine of immortality was kept hid from Israel in order that the attention of the people might be fastened on the conditions of a moral life here, introduces Western ideas into Scripture, makes two things out of one, and puts the cause for the effect. A moral life here *was* immortality. To what purpose present in early or later Scripture an explicit doctrine of immortality, when the doctrine was already given in the very conception of the universe current among the people? when it was held that life was that existence of the whole man in the body which we ordinarily so call; that this life was had in fellowship with God or in its coördinate human righteousness, and that it was indissoluble because the conditions of

the universe were normal, fully representing the character of God and his relations to men? Of course all this was, in some respects, ideal, and *facts*, such as death, were opposed to it. But the Hebrew doctrine of immortality was given in the idea and in the consciousness of the living saint; and the task of after revelation was to move out of the way the obstacles that stood before it. To us, on the contrary, the obstacles bulk so largely that we begin with them; and we are scarcely able to conceive a condition of mind that could give death a secondary place, or sweep it away in the rush of great principles regarding God and the universe, or sublime it in the intense ecstasy of conscious life in fellowship with God.

A. B. DAVIDSON.

BRIEF NOTICES.

THE BOOK OF JOB: a Metrical Translation. With Introduction and Notes. *By Rev. H. T. Clarke.* (London: Hodder and Stoughton.) As one who has himself but just emerged from a long and exhausting study of this "most marvellous product of Semitic genius," I still retain a keen sense of its difficulties and a deep sympathy with those who are brave enough to encounter them. I have therefore every motive, as I have every wish, to say all the good that can be said of Mr. Clarke's work, and must ask the reader to make such allowance for my present "personal equation" as he may think requisite.

It is of good omen that Mr. Clarke is profoundly sensible of the immense difficulties of rendering "the pregnant words of embarrassingly rich significance, and the perplexingly attenuated forms of construction" with which the Book of Job abounds, into "perspicuous and idiomatic English;" and that he has set himself to give a "real" rather than an "ostensible" translation of them, betaking himself to blank verse only that he may make the best amends in his power

"for the absence of the untranslatable music of the Divine original," and binding himself to amplify the author's "phrases in the way of evolution only, and not in that of addition."

Nor in the Introduction which he prefixes to his Translation is there anything to dissipate the hopes which the promise of his brief Preface has raised. It does not touch many of the more difficult questions, indeed, which the Poem suggests, or answer those which it does take up, in any very definite and conclusive way. Still, as far as it goes, it moves within the right lines and hints at the true conclusions.

When we reach the Translation itself, it must still be allowed that he has in his mind an accurate conception of the meaning of this great inspired Poem. I, of all men, should be the last to question his reading of it, since, in the main, it curiously resembles that which has recently appeared in this Magazine. But of the form of his translation it is impossible to speak so well as of its substance. He who undertakes to render the sublime conceptions of "Job" into blank verse should at least be quite sure that he can write blank verse: and in this rudimentary qualification Mr. Clarke seems to be wholly wanting. There is not, I am afraid, a single fine line throughout his work. I doubt whether there are a dozen which any poet would pass. There are hundreds on hundreds which even those whom "the gods have" not "made poetic" must condemn. Even his prose renderings—though he can write good enough prose, as is evident from the few phrases I have quoted from his Preface—are careless and awkward. What, for example, is gained by substituting for the familiar, "I am escaped, even I alone, to tell thee," so often and pathetically repeated in Chapter i., words of so modern a tone as, "I only have escaped *to bring thee the news*"? or for such a rendering of Chapter xlii. Verse 8 as, "Job my servant shall intercede for you: for I will surely accept him, and not deal out to you according to your iniquity: for ye have not spoken of me aright, like my servant Job," the jejune and clumsy periphrasis, "My servant Job shall pray for you; *I will not do otherwise than accept his person, that I may not deal with you as impiety deserves to be treated*: for ye have not spoken in reference to me *that which is well founded*, as my servant Job hath"? or for the brief firm statement of Chapter xl. Verse 1, "Moreover Jehovah answered Job and said," the loose gossip phrase, "Jehovah, *proceeding to bring home the argument to Job*, now said"?

But of course it is when we come to the poetical parts of the Book

that the real test is applied, and the excellences or defects of the "blank verse" rendering become apparent. I give a few examples, therefore, that the reader may judge for himself whether or not this new metrical version brings out more "precisely the ideas" latent in "the author's vividly metaphorical and richly suggestive language," or in any way "compensates for the absence of the untranslatable music of the Divine original." Compare, for instance, these two renderings of Chapter iv. Verse 8, the latter being the new "blank verse" translation :

As I have seen, they who plow iniquity
And sow mischief, reap it ;

As oft as I have any seen
Who ploughed iniquity, and mischief sowed,
They reaped the same ;

or of Chapter xi. Verses 2-4 :

Shall a multitude of words not be answered,
And shall a babbler be justified ?
Shall men let thy vaunts pass in silence,
So that thou mock with none to shame thee,
And say, " My discourse is pure
And I am clean in thine eyes " ?

Or should *a man of volubility*
Be counted to have justice on his side ?
Is thy mere babbling rant to silence men,
That when thou triflest *none shall set thee down*,
And when thou sayest, " The doctrine which I hold
Is pure, and I am sinless in Thine eyes " ?

Or take the 11th Verse of the same Chapter :

For He knoweth evil men,
And seeth iniquity when He seemeth not to regard it.

How is that bettered by being turned into,

For well He understands falsehearted men,
And all contempt of principle He marks,
Nor needs to look into it narrowly ?

Or, to take a more familiar instance, compare these two renderings of Chapter xiv. Verse 1 :

Man, born of woman,
Of few days and full of trouble ;

Man, born of woman, is of but few days,
And full of *harassing disquietude* ;

or those of Verse 4 in the same Chapter :

Oh that the clean could come forth from the unclean !
But not one can.

Ah ! *who shall make it possible to get*
A clean thing from an unclean ? No one can.

Or what do the close terse lines (Chapter xxv. Verse 1),

Dominion and dread are with Him,
Author of peace in his high places !

gain by being beaten out thin into :

*Absolute sway, and dread-inspiring might,
Are his prerogative : He causes peace
To reign in every quarter of his realm
On high.*

It would be easy to multiply illustrations, easy even to ridicule such changes as turn the question of Chapter xxvii. Verse 10, "Can he delight himself in the Almighty?" into, "Can he *experience a soothing joy* in the Almighty?" or the affirmation of Verse 13 in the same Chapter, "This is the heritage of the oppressor from the Almighty," into, "This is the heritage each *ruffian* shall *get* from the Almighty." But I will only add one of the nobler and longer passages of the Poem, in order that the reader may have an opportunity of judging Mr. Clarke's verse at its best. Here, then, is a prose translation of the incomparable description of the Horse given in Chapter xxxix. Verses 19-25 : "Dost thou give strength to the horse? Dost thou clothe his neck with the waving mane? Dost thou make him charge like a locust? The snort of his nostrils is terrible! He paweth on the plain, and rejoiceth in his strength; He rusheth forth to confront the weapons; He laugheth at fear and

is never dismayed, And he recoileth not from the sword ; The arrows rattle against him, The glittering spear and the javelin : With a bound, and a rush, he drinketh up the ground ; He cannot contain himself at the blast of the trumpet ; At every blast he crieth, ' Ha, ha ! ' He scenteth the battle from afar, The thunder of the captains and the shouting ! " And here is Mr. Clarke's blank verse rendering of the same passage :

Dost thou to the horse
Give strength ? Dost clothe his neck with quivering mane ?
Dost cause that, bounding like the locust, he
Shall *prance* ? The thunder of his snorting is
Terrific. On the plain he paws the ground,
Rejoicing in his strength. He dashes forth
To meet the armed array ; he mocks at fear,
Is never *paralysed with fright*, nor turns
Before the sabre. Rattles over him
The quiver, the bright flashing lance, and spear.
With fret and fume he swallows up the ground,
And will no longer stand, when once the trump
Has sounded. At each trumpet blast he saith,
Ha, ha ! and from afar the battle scents,
The thundering of the captains, and the shout
Of war.

Here, surely, are quotations enough to warrant the assertion that, whether for sense or sound, a simple translation of the words of this sacred Poem is much to be preferred to such metrical versions as this. And I cannot doubt that the intelligent reader will share my regret that Mr. Clarke did not content himself with giving us a plain prose translation instead of the halting and miserable pinchbeck which he palms off on himself for blank verse. That he is capable of getting at the meaning of Scripture it is impossible to doubt ; that he has the vision and faculty of the poet it is impossible to believe.

A POPULAR COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. Vol. V.
By D. D. Whedon, D.D. (London : Hodder and Stoughton.)
Previous volumes of this Commentary have been commended in THE EXPOSITOR. We need only say of this final volume, therefore, that, though its annotations are brief, there is much good sense in them, much compressed reading and thought.

EDITOR.

STUDIES IN THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

XVIII.—THE RESURRECTION.

THE Resurrection of Christ is in the Christian system a cardinal fact, one of the great hinges on which it turns. Certain miracles have only an accidental, while others possess an essential, value. The first are but incidents in the gospel history; the second belong to its essence, constitute, as it were, its substance. The accidental miracles are those Christ did, but the essential are those constituted by his person or realized in it. The former enrich and adorn the evangelical narratives; while their loss would impoverish the setting of the evangelical facts, it need not abolish their reality. But the latter make the very matter believed—are the gospel. Then, too, the essential may involve the accidental, but the accidental do not necessarily involve the essential. So long as Jesus remains the risen Christ, the Child of Mary, but the Son of God, He is by his very nature so supernatural that his normal action can be hardly ordinary; the miraculous to us must be the natural to Him. But were the essential denied and the accidental affirmed, it would be as if the trees were cut down to get at the fruit, or the main figure of a picture erased to let the background be seen—the creative source would perish, the end which required and determined the others' existence would cease.

The essential miracles may be said to be three—the

Birth, the Person, and the Resurrection. These all stand indissolubly together ; partition is impossible. A supernatural person cannot be the result of natural processes, or be the victim of a natural destiny. He is, by the very terms of his being, above what the forces of nature can produce, and above what they can destroy. Whatever, therefore, tends to prove the Person of Christ miraculous tends to make alike the supernatural Birth and the Resurrection more credible. On the other hand, whatever tends to vindicate the reality of the supernatural in these events tends to make the miraculous Person at once more conceivable and more real. We have already seen how the conception of the Person justifies the belief in miracles ; we have now to see how a miracle may justify and confirm the idea of the Person.

Of the two supernatural events just specified, the Resurrection alone is capable of distinct historical proof or disproof. The other, which culminated in the birth, is not. There we must believe, we cannot know. Where and when and to whom the Child came can be known, but into what lies behind sight cannot go, faith alone can. But the Resurrection, however extraordinary, can be dealt with as an historical fact. All the forces creating its opportunity can be traced, the witnesses for it examined, its evidence sifted, compared, weighed. By what we may term a Divine instinct its preëminent importance was understood at the very first. It was the fact which the oldest Christian testimony placed ever in the forefront ; it was everywhere confessed as the reality on which the Church was built, and which it could not afford to forget. The apostles were its witnesses, existed to preach it. Had it not happened

they would have had no mission, would never have been what they were. The Resurrection created the Church, the risen Christ made Christianity ; and even now the Christian faith stands or falls with Him. The Resurrection is a *résumé* of historical yet supernatural Christianity. If Christ be not risen our faith is vain. If it be proved that no living Christ ever issued from the tomb of Joseph, then that tomb becomes the grave not of a man but of a religion, with all the hopes built on it and all the splendid enthusiasms it has inspired.

The story of the Resurrection is one of exquisite pathos and beauty. The crucifixion had created despair, had smitten the shepherd and scattered the sheep. The cry had gone forth, "Leave him alone ; every man to his own." In loving secrecy and weeping silence the faithful few had removed the body from the cross and laid it in the new tomb of Joseph. The great feast came, and while Jerusalem held holyday the disciples had to bear as best they might their bitter shame and ruined hopes. But the women could not forget the marred visage, now rigid in death, but once so expressive of holy and beautiful life, and, with characteristic devotion, waited to seize the earliest moment to look on it once more, before the effacing fingers of decay had swept the lines of its lingering beauty, and in the little, yet to the living great and helpful, ministries of tender regretful affection, at once express and relieve the sorrow that burdened their hearts. So in the dim dawn of the morning after the sabbath they stole to the tomb, but only to find in it no buried Lord. They never thought of a Resurrection ; thought only, "the grave has been rifled ;" and one fled in an anguished woman's way, blind to every-

thing but her awful loss, crying, "They have taken away my Lord." But the angels within the tomb and the Lord without made the tear-blinded woman and the sense-bound men slowly awake to the strange glad fact, "He is risen, as he said." "God has not allowed his Holy One to see corruption." In that tomb, the gloomiest earth had known, because the grave of the Holiest known to earth, a torch had been lighted that made sable death luminous, and forced from him his dread secret, translating it into Resurrection and Life. And so there was set under the weak but wishful feet of hope, no instinct of the human heart, or inference of the human reason, but the strong rock of historical yet eternal fact—the Person of the risen Christ.

Before attempting to discuss the historical and critical questions involved, it may be as well to glance at the beautiful and exalted ideal truths which find in the Resurrection their fittest expression. For it is not an arbitrary and violent fact, standing in sharp contradiction to the spiritual, which are the true regnant, forces of the universe; nor is it an irrational unconnected event, whose only right to be believed is that it happened. It is the sublime symbol, perhaps rather prophetic realization, of truths which the colder intellect of the world has doubted and criticised, fearing they were too good to be true, but which its warmer heart has everywhere victoriously striven to believe. Man is not born to die, and death, though universal, has not quenched his belief in his own immortal being. There is no fact of human experience so remarkable, so significant of the power of the reason to command, to conquer, and to defy the senses. The intelligible world is created from within not from without; what

man believes he believes in obedience to the laws of mind, often in rigorous opposition to the alien and inhuman forces of matter. And this is nowhere so vividly seen as when he stands throughout all the centuries of his history daring, in the very face of death, to believe in his own continued being. An experience as old and as universal as the race has not been able to compel the reason to regard the grave as its end, or physical dissolution as meaning annihilation of spirit. Death man can better explain as the result of his own wrong than as the rightful and ultimate lord of life, allowed to reign only that it may by chastising the more completely reform him, by dissolving the body the more perfectly liberate the soul. And so he has ever tended to believe that where man's sin is not, death's reign must cease, where his wrong has no place, its dominion can have no force. And thus when One is born into our common lot, not as a simple link to bind the generations each to each, but to become a Sinless Personality, to be the only holy Person of the race, then it would be but according to the nature which God animates, according to the spiritual ends for which all material things exist, that He achieve the victory over death. He must achieve it if the moral is to remain the supreme power, if brute force is not to become mightier than spirit and reason. By achieving it He becomes the symbol of what God is aiming at—the prophecy of what God will do. If death come to Him by wicked hands, what they do God must undo, that righteousness may not perish or human hope die wearied with the greatness of its way. Over the reason that remains Divine even while incarnate, death cannot be victor, may be allowed to seem to

triumph, but only that it may be the more utterly broken and defeated. The vitality of God can never fall before the breath of mortality. And so Jesus, while He dies upon the cross, dies only to issue from the grave, on the one side, a response to the prayers of mortals, conscious that they ought to be immortal, on the other, the victorious proof for all time that He who made our spirits will, when our spirits are what He made them to be, draw them out of cold and desolate death back into the light of his countenance, to their eternal home in his bosom.

The Resurrection of Christ raises many questions, philosophical, historical, literary, and critical. The philosophical question is general, refers to the possibility and credibility of miracles; but the others are particular, concern the reality and proof of this special fact, the authenticity, truth, consistency, credibility of the narratives, the veracity, qualifications, trustworthiness of the witnesses, the nature, validity, sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidences. The philosophical question it is not necessary to discuss; it would carry us too far into simple and assumed first principles. Miracles are supernatural and, indeed, impossible to a nature without God, but possible and, indeed, natural to a nature with Him. To Theism nature exists for God, God does not exist for nature. It is the arena on which He is working out his purpose, and the arena must be subordinated to the purpose, not the purpose to the arena. Nature and history must be interpreted through our idea of God, rather than our idea of God through scientific and empirical ideas of nature and history. Denial of the possibility of miracles is possible, then, only where there is denial of the being and per-

sonality of God, or, what is equivalent, where nature is made his God, and its laws the bars of the prison within which He is confined. But with this theistic problem we are not now concerned, and allude to it mainly to protest that, measured by our idea of God, the Resurrection of Christ is neither miraculous nor supernatural, but normal and natural, an event in finest harmony with his character and the attributes that determine his ends. Our immediate concern is with the particular questions, and we must endeavour so to conduct the discussion as to cover as nearly as possible the whole field.

The question may be discussed either from the subjective or the objective side. The men either did or did not believe that Christ rose from the dead. If they did not, the whole thing was a fabrication, the story an invention from beginning to end. There must have been falsehood of the most daring and deliberate kind, aided by the most credulous folly. The men who had the audacity to concoct the story would be audacious enough to steal and conceal the body, and so to tell their tale as to win the faith of the simple-minded people who are always only too willing to be deceived. This is the sort of theory against which Paley's argument of the twelve honest men is absolutely conclusive. Happily, it is not one that need now be argued against. If any hold it, it can only be the utterly illiterate. The man capable of believing it is a man incapable of being reasoned with, too passionate of nature to be either rational or just. A sane and honourable and informed spirit could never either conceive or believe such a theory. That a company of men could be confederate in evil for purposes of good;

that they could be throughout life a society of organized hypocrites without ever smiling to each other, or letting the mask fall; that they could preach virtue or live virtuously with a damning lie on their consciences; that they could nurse their souls, most of all in the very face of death, in the hope of being with Christ for ever in blessedness, while aware that He was rotting in an unknown grave—are positions that involve so many psychological impossibilities that any grave discussion of the matter would simply be absurd. Criticism must postulate the honesty of the witnesses; without it the history is not one any reason can handle, or out of which any good can come.

The witnesses, then, did believe that Christ rose from the dead. In this belief they were absolutely honest, were as certain that Christ had risen as that they themselves lived and preached in his name. But honesty of belief is no proof of the reality of the thing believed. The possibilities of mistake are almost infinite, and the honest belief of fictions is as common as the honest belief of facts. The honesty saves the character of the believer, but not of the thing believed. Modern criticism unreservedly accepts the truth and reality of the apostolic belief. *That* its historical sense is too sure and too keen to question or doubt for a moment. Baur's position was this:¹ the Church is inexplicable without the belief in the Resurrection; it supplied Christianity with a firm basis for its development. But what history requires is not so much the reality of the Resurrection as the belief that it was real. How the belief became real, whether by an ob-

¹ *Kirchengeschichte der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, pp. 39, 40. English Trans. pp. 42, 43.

jective miracle or a subjective psychological process, is of minor importance ; the grand thing is that the Resurrection became a fact to the apostolic consciousness, and had to it all the reality of an historical event.

But this position is unscientific and inconclusive. It can as little satisfy the claims of historical science as of Christian faith ; both must equally strive after the truth of the matter and be contented only when face to face with it. Science can never be sure that it knows either Christ or Christianity till it has ascertained whether He rose or did not rise ; and if He did not, by what psychological process so many honest men came to believe that He did, and so to believe it as to persuade the civilized world to be of their mind. Faith can never be satisfied with a theory that leaves it uncertain whether its most transcendent fact was an objective reality or the creation of a psychological process, which is but a euphonious paraphrase for the dream or delusion of a too credulous and visionary mind. It must ask, What is it that I believe, a reality or an imagination ? The subjective thus necessarily falls over into an objective inquiry, each, indeed, when it becomes fundamental, involving the other. The question, then, in its objective, which will also be found to raise all the issues of the subjective form, is this : Did the Resurrection of Christ happen or did it not ? Is it or is it not an historical fact ? To the question so stated there are three possible answers. Either—

1. Christ did not die on the cross, only swooned, and afterwards reviving in the grave, issued from it and appeared to his disciples in his proper physical form ; or—

2. He died and did not rise ; or—
3. He died and rose.

These questions we will now discuss in succession.

1. Jesus did not die on the cross, only swooned, and, reviving in the grave, issued from it, appeared to his disciples, and was by them regarded as having risen from death. Astonishing as it may seem, this theory has had its advocates, and may have its advocates still. It existed in two forms, a more and a less gross. The one made Jesus feign death for the express purpose of making his reappearance seem a resurrection, another made the swoon real, the result of exhaustion and agony, from which He was restored by the cool atmosphere of the tomb and the stimulating fragrance of the spices. But no conjecture could be more gratuitous, absurd, impossible. The mere physical difficulties are insuperable. That a person exhausted, wounded, half-dead, in need of delicate nursing, of quiet and rest, of choice and strengthening food, with bleeding feet and a pierced side and a body shaken and out of joint, should be able to steal out of the sepulchre, escape the vigilance and merciless malice of his enemies, represent himself to his disheartened and scattered friends as the victor over death and the grave, is conceivable only as a series of cumulative absurdities that would be merrily ridiculous were they not so terribly profane. Such an appearance had appalled the men that witnessed it, frightened out of them the little faith and hope that remained. And as on this supposition the half-dead Jesus did soon die, was dying all the while he was appearing to the men he had known, the only conviction He could have left must have been of a broken and vanquished life lingering into hideous death. It is impossible to

believe that from any such miserable source the faith in the Resurrection could have been derived.

2. Christ died and did not rise. This theory seems to have the merit of simplicity and definiteness, and may be said to be built on two positions; first, that history can recognize no miracle, and must regard the events it seeks to explain and describe as natural, happening according to known or discoverable laws; and, secondly, that the evidences in this case are entirely inadequate, the narratives inconsistent, the testimonies perplexed, confused, often contradictory. Now, for reasons already stated, the first position need not be discussed here. It is a question of first principles; it entirely depends on the philosophy of the historian whether miracles are or are not to him impossible. The best history is the history without dogmatic assumptions, that does not determine beforehand what must or must not be, but simply examines what has been or is. As to the second position, it will be discussed later on, and meanwhile we simply note that on one point there is perfect agreement, the reality and the sincerity of the belief in the Resurrection of Christ. No modern critic questions it, or doubts that without it the history of the Church had been impossible. But now, how is the origin of the belief to be explained? by what mental or psychological process was it created? The problem is very complex, and as delicate as complex. There is the question as to the first inception of the belief—how a notion so extraordinary as that Christ had risen or could rise first came to be entertained. Then, why was it that it did not remain singular, but became general—the faith not of one excited and credulous person, but of many sane and

doubtful men? And how was it that it exercised over the men an influence at once so sober and rationalizing, and so inspiring and determinative? Why, too, was the belief so primitive and, as it were, aboriginal, flourishing at the centre, on the very spot and in the very city where Christ had died? These and many similar points are so hard to resolve, and start so many difficulties, that Baur was content to leave the matter in a for him curiously nebulous state, certain only that the faith was real, entirely uncertain how it became so. But later inquirers could not rest where he did. An event that happens by an unexplained or inexplicable process is to history little better than a miracle; and so the criticism that denies miracles could not feel satisfied of having achieved anything scientific until it had discovered and described the psychological process by which a real belief in an unreal event was possible and became actual. Clearly this is the cardinal problem—granted the honesty of the witnesses and the reality of their belief, how, on the supposition that Christ died and did not rise, did they come by their belief? and how did it come to wield such a tremendous power over them, and through them over the Church and over mankind? This problem has been attempted to be solved by two dissimilar yet related theories, which we may name respectively the phantasmal and the visional. Let us see with what success.

I. THE PHANTASMAL.—The theory so named we owe to the brilliant and fertile imagination of M. Renan. It is one no other modern scholar and critic is capable of conceiving, and unfolding in grave and graceful sentences. It is so strongly marked by his peculiar idiosyncrasies that it is fully as interesting for

the light it sheds on M. Renan as for its significance as a serious attempt to explain the origin of our belief. It starts from this position—the creative power of enthusiasm and love. They play with the impossible, and, rather than abandon hope, will do violence to all reality.¹ Heroes do not die, and God could not allow his Son to see death.² The immortality of the soul was a Greek idea, not clear to the Jews; their notion was the kingdom of God, which consisted in the renovation of the world and the annihilation of death. The disciples could not believe that He who had come to institute the kingdom could be the vanquished of the grave; and so they had no choice between despair and an heroic affirmation³—which is a very fine phrase for not so fine a thing. The heroic affirmation was chosen; the little Christian society worked the veritable miracle, raised Jesus from the dead in its heart by the intense love which it bore to him. The creative spirit was Mary of Magdala; she made the faith of the future.⁴ She was an imaginative creature—had once been possessed of seven devils.⁵ When she came to the tomb the stone was rolled away, the body gone; surprise and grief seized her, crossed, perhaps, by a gleam of hope. Without losing a moment she runs for Peter and John. They examine the tomb, and depart; she remains before it weeping, possessed by the thought, Where have they laid him? Suddenly she hears a light noise behind her, and thinks, “’Tis a man, the gardener,” and cries, “Where have ye taken my Lord?” For answer she hears the old familiar voice say, “Mary!” “O my Master!” she cries, and turns

¹ *Les Apôtres*, p. 2.² *Ibid.* pp. 3, 4.³ *Ibid.* p. 5.⁴ *Ibid.* p. 7.⁵ *Ibid.* p. 11.

to touch Him ; He forbids, and his shade gradually disappears. " But the miracle of love is accomplished. What Peter was unequal to, Mary has done." ¹ " Peter saw only the empty tomb ; Mary alone so loved as to surpass nature, raise and vivify the phantom of the gentle and beautiful Master." In such marvellous crises, to see after another is nothing ; who sees first has all the merit.² And so the glory of the Resurrection belongs to Mary ; after Jesus, she has done the most for the foundation of Christianity, has, as became the queen and patroness of idealists, imposed on all the sainted the vision of her impassioned soul.³ Ecstasy is contagious. What she has seen the others see. The society is conquered in detail. Each section, women and men alike, has its own separate vision, tells its separate tale, and swells the general excitement. As they are gathered together with imaginations made vivid by these weird tales, the wind breathed in their faces, and lo ! it became his voice murmuring " peace." " In these decisive moments a current of air, a window which creaked, a chance murmur, fixed for ages the belief of the peoples." ⁴ And thus was crowned and completed the achievement of the Magdalene.

Such is the theory stated, in all sobriety of spirit, with all his wonted brilliance of style by M. Renan. But we have here to do with it simply as a professedly scientific and veracious account of how the faith in the Resurrection came into being. Can we regard it as what it professes to be ? Well, then, its first and cardinal defect is evident—it does not save the honesty of the men. It reduces them to a society of fools, whose folly was all the deeper that it was so knavish. They

¹ *Les Apôtres*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.* p. 12.

³ *Ibid.* p. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 22.

behave like a circle of hysterical women, no one having sanity enough to ask whether their alarms or their joys were real. The men believed because they wished to believe, and by an utter suppression of reason and rational inquiry. Then, the body of Jesus was gone—whither? and by what means? It must have been removed; more than one must have been concerned in its removal—why were they silent? If foes had removed it, how they could have crushed the nascent belief! if friends, they could be silent in its presence only by conscious and wicked conspiracy. The enemies were too thoroughly bent on suppression to allow so dangerous a belief to take root while they had irresistible evidence of its utter falsity; the circle of friends was too limited to permit any single member to remain ignorant of the new belief and untouched by the new enthusiasm. In either case, therefore, knowledge of what had become of the body could not fail to reach the disciples, and only their silence could allow the fiction to be believed as fact. But connivance in a deception so enormous was at such a moment morally impossible. Enthusiasm was necessary to the life of the belief; but conscious deceivers, while they may imitate an old ideal, cannot create a new enthusiasm or form a new religious faith. Men, too, who are smitten to the heart, pierced through and through with a great sorrow, are too earnest to be insincere, to speak a cruel falsehood to their own and other consciences. This, indeed, is one of the many cases where the critic proves himself strangely destitute of moral sense and spiritual insight; and so but little able to read the transcendent moments of the history he has so long and so deeply studied.

But, further, M. Renan's first principle is false, quite opposed to the evidence. Enthusiasm and love are creative, but what of the love without the enthusiasm, with only the numbness and the dumbness of new and desolating loss? Enthusiasm is creative when living, impersonated, victorious; but how could it live in the face of the cross, the symbol of utter defeat, and of the tomb, the symbol of corruption and decay? Were the belief created it must have been early, while the sense of loss was deepest; but the sense of loss means simply the inability to create the belief. The further they got from the death, the less would they feel the need of the living Christ; the nearer they stood to the cross, the less able were they to imagine the Resurrection. And we gather as much from the narratives. They prove, if they prove anything, that the state of expectancy M. Renan's theory requires did not exist. Death had conquered, and before his iron hand and silent lips hope, now as always, ceased to live. The men who had lived through the agony of the last two days, who had seen the Roman spear do its work, and the grave receive its dead, must have been in no mood to be carried away by the tale of a possessed and frenzied woman who had seen a ghost. Expectant minds may be prone to faith, minds doubtful from despair, despondent from loss, are the most deeply incredulous.

But, again, the theory leaves unexplained the most characteristic thing in the belief—its remarkable and altogether unique form. The conception stands absolutely alone; there is nothing like it in the history of thought and belief. Many societies of men have been situated as the disciples were, and have created curious myths, but all the myths have had a generic character,

embody ideas radically unlike those embodied in the Resurrection of Christ. The Jews believed that Enoch and Elijah had not died, but been translated, vanished from earth into heaven. Omar might rush, sabre in hand, from the tent where the body of Mohammed lay, declaring that he would strike off the head of the man who should say, "The prophet is dead." The Roman world might live in the fear that the terrible Nero was yet to return to vex and disturb it. Mediæval Germany might believe that Barbarossa was asleep in his mountain cave, and would yet awake and come forth to restore the glories of the empire and the house of Hohenstaufen. Our own legends might tell how Arthur had sailed away to his island home of Avillon, whence, when happier days dawned, he would come to erect his table round, and open his chaste and chivalrous court. But all these rest on similar ideas, speak of the mythical imagination, as they speak to it. Death is in each case denied; the men can return because they have escaped death, and are only absent or asleep. But here it is altogether different. Christ dies—his death is real, absolute; He is buried, going down into the very grave. And his return is not an expected thing. He has escaped from the very hands of death, come out of the very grave, and has done so before the eyes of the men that knew Him best. In the other cases the contradiction of our universal experience is apparent rather than real, but here it is direct and absolute. In these, death is eluded; in this, it is endured; there, hope is because life is; here, the belief rises, as it were, sheer out of the tomb. Now, how are these characteristics to be explained? M. Renan never sees them, never feels

their meaning, yet till he does so he has not even grasped the problem he has set himself to solve. Where the problem has been so misconceived its handling may have an æsthetic or personal worth, but can have no rational significance.

2. THE VISIONAL.—This is a much more scientific and rational theory than M. Renan's. Its first and ablest exponent was Holsten. It found a genial interpreter in the late Heinrich Lang, was adopted by Strauss in the *Neues Leben*, and has been accepted by the author of *Supernatural Religion*. Its starting-point is this—Paul does not make any distinction as regards nature or kind between Christ's appearance to himself and his appearance to the first and earliest witnesses.¹ In each case the same term (ὡφθῆναι) is used; in each the same reality, the same evidential and historical value, is attributed to the appearance. And of what kind was the appearance to Paul? It was a vision, *i.e.*, a state or process of his own mind, investing with reality what was not. While he maintains that he has seen the Lord,² yet in the history of his conversion he speaks only of an internal revelation.³ His was a nature prone to ecstasy, and so visions were frequent and familiar to him.⁴ In immediate connection with these visions he speaks of his "thorn in the flesh,"⁵ just as if they stood in some relation to each other. Now, by an ingenious interpretation, this "thorn" is made out to be "epilepsy," or some form of nervous disease, which made him peculiarly liable to visions and hallucinations. To this physical tendency he owed his sight of Christ, which to him had all the effects of

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 5-8.

² Ibid. ix. 1; xv. 1.

³ Gal. i. 13-17.

⁴ 2 Cor. xii. 1-5.

⁵ Ibid. xii. 7.

reality while purely ideal. And from his language the other appearances were no more real, all belong to the same category, are subjective, not objective phenomena, were creations and visions of the mind.

Now this is a much more scientific and rational theory than M. Renan's. It deals with the matter gravely, is exegetical, psychological, careful in its analysis, and minute in its criticism—but is it historical? Well, then, the first dubious point is its interpretation of Paul. He was no diseased visionary, but a man of sane strong nature. His admittedly authentic epistles are full of the most radiant sanity. In things intellectual his reason reigns, in things emotional his judgment. No man was ever less governed by impulse, more by firmly grasped principles. When he speculates, there is no cloud on his intellect; when he reasons, his dialectic is dexterous, his logic sharp and swift. The ethical are, perhaps, the most remarkable parts of his epistles, they are so wise, so practical and practicable, yet they are so really magnanimous, so explicative of ideal relations between man and man. In his conduct to the men from whom he differs he is the very antipodes of a visionary. Nervous dislikes, hatreds without reason, behaviour governed by petulance or passion or states of physical disease are unknown to him. His difference with Peter at Antioch, his view of the Corinthian parties and mode of dealing with them, his most complex and perplexing, yet admirably maintained relations to the Churches, his power of work, his physical vigour and extraordinary recuperative energies—all imply qualities, bodily and mental, utterly incompatible with the notion that he was an imaginative epileptic. The Pauline epistles

are wonderful examples of unconscious autobiography ; but they are, perhaps, least significant of the man where he is most consciously autobiographical. There is a proud reserve in him which makes him dislike speech about himself, and he reveals himself least where he writes most under conscious restraint. The Paul of the visional theory is not the Paul of the epistles, but of a few texts forced into novel relations and ingeniously interpreted. The one is too sane to be a visionary, but the other is a vision indeed.

But the theory is open to other and graver objections. It fails to distinguish sufficiently between the mental attitude of Paul and that of the earlier witnesses. His was one of anticipation, theirs was not. He knew of the belief before he saw the Christ ; it was in his mind, even though only to be contradicted and denied. But the first witnesses did not find the belief ; it found and made them. Hence their belief cannot be explained through Paul's, his must be explained through theirs. We are, therefore, thrown back on the prior question, How did they come by the belief ? And it cannot be answered without a discussion of the evangelical histories. And on this ground the visional theory lies open to the criticism directed against M. Renan's. Once it comes to handle the facts, the explanation built on its Pauline psychology ceases to be applicable. Visions come only where there is distance, expectancy, and creative enthusiasm ; they come not to minds face to face with hard sensuous facts, desolate, despondent, irresolute, divided. The very reasons that render the theory applicable to mind, when once the belief has come into possession, render it inapplicable before the belief has come to be. The laws or factors that operate in

periods of ecstasy and exaltation do not exist in periods of desolation and dismay. Where there is an exultant belief in the Resurrection, visional appearances are not only possible but inevitable; but where there is no such belief, how are they to be explained? Where the creative conditions are absent, how can the creation arise?

We reach, then, the conclusion that, on the terms fixed and defined by modern criticism, there is, on the supposition that Christ did not rise from the dead, no sufficient explanation of the origin of our belief. It is impossible to account for it and yet save the honesty and rationality of the men. We must, then, seek the explanation along another line, and this brings us to our next position—

3. CHRIST DIED AND DID RISE.—Let us see, then, whether there be evidence to sustain this position; in other words, whether the belief necessarily leads back to this as its only and sufficient cause. Here, indeed, a plea may be entered in bar of argument or further proof. The witnesses do not always agree; their testimonies are often inconsistent and discrepant. But to what extent do they disagree? Of what nature is their discrepancies? Do they extend to cardinal or essential matters? or do they concern simply points of detail? On details they are discrepant; on the cardinal matter there is absolute and emphatic agreement. Independent testimonies are, where thoroughly independent, made more not less credible by differences in detail. They prove conspiracy or concoction impossible; each new witness is a distinct and independent voice, not a mere echo of his neighbour's. Standpoints differ, and where the same thing has been seen from

many and dissimilar standpoints, their concurrent testimonies are strengthened by the varieties in their respective narratives. Instead, therefore, of seeking to minimize the discrepancies, let us acknowledge their existence to the full, and proceed at once to examine the evidences for the historical origin of the belief.

Let us start, then, from this point—the Resurrection of Christ is the most prominent, the most distinctly emphasized, fact in the New Testament; one, too, as regards which there is, amid almost every possible variety of detail, on all hands the most absolute agreement. No one denies it; nor is there in the oldest literature any hint that at Jerusalem or among the Jews there was any attempt at denial, or inquiry, with a view to disproof, into the facts of the case. The Christian writers are unanimous in setting it forth as the one fact which gives Christians the right to be and to be believed. This agreement is the more remarkable that it exists amid the most pronounced differences. Parties existed, opposed schools and tendencies, each zealous for its own men and doctrines. But though they differed in their views as to the person of Christ, his work, his relation to the old economy, his authority and place in the kingdom of God, they all affirmed most absolutely his Resurrection from the dead. The Petrine and the Pauline tendencies, the Hebraistic and the Hellenic parties, the men who held that Jesus had respected and observed the law, and the men who held that He had utterly abolished it, were at one in the belief that He had risen, that without his Resurrection faith in Him were vain. And what does the unanimity so remarkably emphasized signify? That every Christian writer and every community they represented

believed that the Resurrection was their grand creative fact, the event to which they owed their existence, what entitled them to live and claim man's faith. This fact lies behind their doctrines, is their common source, was before their differences, and exists amid them as their one bond of union. Their faith is a witness to the action of the event, testifies that before it they were not, after it they were, and without it they had entirely ceased to be. And this testimony history corroborates in a wonderful way. Christianity, as the oldest documents prove, was not a secret but a public faith, singularly outspoken and aggressive. Its career began in the very city where its Founder had been crucified; and there, where the hate to Him was deepest, where the memory of his fate must have been most vivid, the faith in his Resurrection lived a fearless and victorious life, challenging an exposure which never came, invincible before the combined interests and passions of priests and rulers. Grant the Acts of the Apostles a late and untrustworthy book, yet here is a fact no criticism can touch—ten years after the crucifixion a fierce persecution was raging at and around Jerusalem;¹ one which implied that the Christians had utterly broken with Judaism, and were working within and against it with extraordinary daring, activity, and success. Not only was no charge of deception or imposition attempted in that persecution, but its most distinguished leader became a Christian convert. And the ground of his conversion was the belief that Christ had risen from the dead.

Now, the testimony of Paul is of singular force and value. It is twofold, verbal and historical, consists of

¹ Gal. i. 13, 22, 23.

what he says and what he becomes and does. The verbal is mainly valuable for the light it sheds on the historical and personal. Let us put the case. A new religion has risen in the heart of Judaism, denying its authority, renouncing its most honoured customs, depriving the Jew of his most exclusive privileges, and looking kindly on the Gentiles. Its warrant is the resurrection and exaltation of the Christ the priests had crucified. Now, there is no hate like religious hate, and religious hate is deepest where the kinship is most near and the division most recent. But though the new religion is hated, the old cannot suppress it. The priests have the will but not the power, and the most eminent of the Pharisees is significantly hesitating in his attitude, does not assail the Christians as his party had assailed Christ, but leaves them alone, as if half convinced, even against his will, that God was on their side. In this man's school there is a strong resolute spirit, a young man fresh from Tarsus, full of glowing enthusiasm for the city and faith of his fathers. Apostasy is to him a hateful thing, and the Christians seem apostates, daring even within the very holy city to deny Moses and be unfaithful to God. He sees them through the prejudices of the school, and holds that they ought to be dealt with as if the law were no dead letter, but a living power. The law commanded that the man who denied Moses should be stoned; and Saul, with the courage of his convictions, was prepared to obey Moses. The first that fell was Stephen; but the success in this case only made Saul the more anxious to do more. He "made havoc of the Church," haling men and women to prison, and, Pharisee though he was, asking help of the chief priest. But now a

curious thing happened—actual contact with the persecuted worked a change in the persecutor. Once he confronted them in the flesh, came to know their actual belief and behaviour, he was so moved as to be shaken out of his old faith and made ready to receive the new. Now, what was it that so worked on him? There can be no doubt that it was the Christian belief in the Resurrection. It was this belief that predisposed him to the heavenly vision. This belief became the centre of his system; round it his ideas all crystallized. It revolutionized his notion of Jesus, of his mission, death, cross, his relation to the law, his notion, too, of God, of his purposes and relations to the Jews and to mankind. There never was a completer conversion, a more radical and penetrating change. And he was not a man to whom change was easy. His was not a flexible nature, must have resisted long, yielded reluctantly and with a tremendous shock. And his words shew that he had not believed without anxious searching and sifting. He had evidently questioned Peter, as evidently inquired of the five hundred. He speaks like a man who knew the survivors, who had known those fallen asleep, watching them as a man will watch those to whom he owes his highest spiritual good. Here then is the point: can this man who stood so near the event, who was certainly the keenest-eyed and loftiest-souled of all the men who did stand near it, who hated it with passion, who came to it with the most rooted prejudices, yet was, by the sheer strength of evidence, compelled to belief in it, to the entire change of his spirit, his objects of faith, his purposes and aims in life, to the absolute renunciation of his dearest ambitions, his kin, his fame, his home—

can this man, I say, with all the splendid reason and reality that were in him, and the work he achieved, be explained as the child of delusion, the dupe of illiterate enthusiasts, who were themselves the dupes of their own excited fancies and morbid nerves? Were he so, he were a greater miracle in the region of the spirit than the Resurrection in the region of nature.

But now, turning from Paul, let us look at the other apostles. They share his certainty, his, indeed, being the creature of theirs; but it is not their words, but themselves, we wish to cite as witnesses, their testimony being strongest where it is unconscious and indirect. We know what they are in the Gospels, fishermen, like their class, ignorant, superstitious, weak, impulsive. Their ideas are Jewish; not as refined in the schools, but as vulgarized and conceived in the village. The only kingdom they expect is the ancient commonwealth restored. Their notions of the future world are the shadowiest; what is not realized here and in the old political forms they cannot understand. They hardly know that there is a great world beyond Judæa and Galilee, or know it only to hate the foreigner who has conquered, or despise the Gentile because he is no Jew. But now these men experience a twofold change: (1) they believe what before they had shewn no capacity even to conceive, that their crucified Master had risen from the dead, and (2) they become, because of this belief, the apostles of a new religion, the agents of the most splendid change that was ever worked in the faith and conduct of man. It was an altogether wonderful thing—the change, the exaltation of spirit was simply miraculous. We know what the fishermen on our own coasts are capable of; we know what these

Galilean fishermen have achieved. In their original state the latter had a narrower range of ideas, more limited ambitions, grosser notions of religion, of God and man than even the former; yet these Galileans were so transformed and inspired as to conceive and proceed to realize a scheme of conquest far sublimer than had ever dawned on the mind of Alexander or Cæsar. And what caused the change? If they themselves are to be believed, the Resurrection and the ideas it worked in them. If they had created the faith, they had remained unchanged; if it created them, the change is explicable, and finds an adequate cause. Without it they remain the greatest riddles in history; with it they and their achievements become alike natural. The Resurrection is a sufficient reason for the men: but without it the men are no sufficient reason for Christianity.

But there is another line of indirect evidence quite as significant as the last—the attitude of the Jews to the belief is quite as remarkable as the change marked by the belief in the apostles. The Jews hated Christianity even more than they had hated Christ, and scrupled at no means that promised its suppression. They were then, as now, an ubiquitous race, living in all lands, trading in all cities, a separate community, touching the Gentiles everywhere, mingling with them nowhere, yet remaining in their dispersion Jews still, bound to Jerusalem by subtlest affinities, familiar with her story, with all that concerned her present and her past. They had then, as now, a wonderful faculty for searching out profitable secrets, knew how to make their way into the heart of social mysteries, and how to use them for what they esteemed the best. Much of

the dislike they then awakened was due to this special gift of theirs, and their skill in working it so as to accomplish their own ends, without too much delicacy as to the means. Now it was to the Jews the apostles first went, and from the Jews their troubles came. They raised riots, fomented the ignorant passions of the Gentiles, persecuted the Christian preachers from city to city, poisoned the atmosphere around them with insidious slanders, and even dragged them before magistrates who cared nothing for the subtle points of Jewish law. But one thing, so far as can be discovered from the oldest literature, they never did—they never denied the reality of the Resurrection, or even questioned it. If they could have proved that Christ had not risen from the dead, his religion would have died before the proof. And if such proof was possible to any one, it was possible to them. The scene of the Resurrection had been their own capital; its rulers had been the authors of the death, and were certain to be most suspicious and watchful of the disciples in the days that followed their loss. The children of the Dispersion lived everywhere in communication with Jerusalem, and every feast would bring fanatics to the city determined to put down this new and spreading apostasy, each eagerly demanding of the chief priests how it was to be done. But here is the extraordinary matter—this adroitest, most dispersed, yet most concentrated, of peoples, urged by the strongest of human hates, willing to gratify it by means party passion can always justify, daintily leave untouched and unquestioned the creative and cardinal fact of the religion they abhor. How can this be explained? The fact was not concealed; the men who declared themselves its witnesses testified

everywhere concerning it, offered themselves for examination, asked that their narrative be compared with the events it professed to describe. Yet the men who heard their testimony, and were most interested in discrediting it, never attempted to do so, but allowed it to go throughout the world unchallenged and undenied. Why? In the attitude of Gamaliel there is a suspicion that the apostles may be right, that God may, after all, be on their side. Put his suspicion alongside the avoidance by the Jews everywhere of the main issue, an issue they had every opportunity and inducement to meet openly and directly, and does not the conclusion seem inevitable that the Resurrection was left unquestioned because it could not be disproved, and because discreet silence was at least better than a dangerous inquiry? So interpreted, the silence of the Jews is as significant as the speech of the Christians.

But now there is another point that must here be emphasized — the speech that was unchallenged by the Jews was most offensive to the Gentiles. For a resurrection from the dead was not a credible thing to the then world, did not harmonize with its prejudices and superstitions. Such a harmony has turned many a happy fancy into a trusted fact; but though the contrary has often been assumed, it did not exist here. To preach the Resurrection was not to make faith easier, but rather more difficult. Experience seemed to give it emphatic contradiction; no man had any associations that could explain or suggest it. The unheard of event was contrary to experience, was twin sister to the impossible. And so at first it was a burden weighing down the gospel rather than a wing favouring its flight. The attitude of the Sadducee

was typical; the very mention of the Resurrection raised his anger or his scorn. The Pharisees, indeed, believed in it, but it was under conditions and with limitations that would make them only the more utterly incredulous as to Christ's. His was solitary, unattended by a renovated earth and a restored Israel; an event altogether too spiritual in its nature and results to find a place among their gross ideas. When Paul named it to the Athenians, they greeted it with a mockery that brought his speech to a sudden and undesigned end.¹ Festus when he heard of it thought Paul mad.² The greatest intellectual difficulties of the primitive churches were connected with the belief, and what it involved. Indeed, so insuperable were these that Paul had to invoke the evidence and authority of the other apostles in its behalf. It is the one case in which he does so, and his doing so in this case alone shows the strength of the prejudices against which he had to contend. Now what does this signify? That only the absolute certainty as to the reality of the Resurrection can explain the persistence of the belief; that without the reality of the event the apostles could have been under no temptation either to imagine or stand by the belief. Take a parallel case—the crucifixion. It rests on no ampler evidence than the Resurrection; the one is no whit better authenticated than the other. Yet no man has ever questioned it. And why? Because it is so unlike what any one would consciously or unconsciously invent as the kind of death suffered by a person he loved as a Saviour and believed in as the Son of God. Yet it is hardly too much to say, the idea of the Resurrection is as

¹ Acts xvii. 31, 32.

² Ibid. xxvi. 24.

alien to the then reason of the world as the idea of the crucifixion was abhorrent; and so the tenacity with which the apostles held by their belief was due not to the favour with which it was received, but to the strength of their own convictions—the invincible consciousness that the Christ had risen and had, as risen, spoken to them and been with them.

These still remain but a fragment of our evidences. The power of the belief is made manifest by the place it occupied, the system that crystallized around it. All Christianity confesses the belief, runs back into it, and what is most ancient is here most strong. On this point institutions, customs, doctrines, hopes, and fears are alike unanimous and emphatic. Remove the Resurrection from primitive Christian theology and its speech, and they would cease to be coherent or intelligible. There is nothing older in Christianity than the Lord's day, nothing more universal than the Supper and Baptism; yet without the Resurrection, its ideas and associations, these are utterly inexplicable—without any historical source or significance. On it, too, hope lived—all the conceptions and reflections of what was to be grew out of it and stood clustered round it. Approach the question from any side, and it only the more appears that without the risen Christ the Church is without a source or a cause. If historical evidence is sufficient anywhere, it is here; for the written testimony of the evangelists is our weakest testimony, almost perishes before the mightier witnessing of those splendid facts that marked the birth of the new religion, the building of the City of God. If men object to it as a stupendous miracle, too immense a departure from the ways of Nature to be believed by men who

observe Nature and mark the operation of her uniform and inflexible laws, let us say to them, "Look above Nature ; there is a higher and diviner order. Nature is not an end, is only a means : she expresses her Maker's Mind and exists for her Maker's ends. What is necessary to his ends is according to his nature, though it may seem opposed to man's. Interpret the universe through the idea of God, place God and man in living relations to each other, let the conditions necessary to the realization of these relations be fairly conceived, and there will be the consciousness of an order sublimer than any Nature reveals ; an order which not only has room for the Resurrection, but demands it, to the end that eternal grace may reign through righteousness unto the glory of the Eternal."

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

THE WISDOM OF THE HEBREWS.

THIRD PART.

A GENERAL view of the principles of the Hebrew Wisdom was given in the First Paper, and some illustrations from the oldest literature of the Wisdom of the way in which these principles were applied in the Second. It remains now to look at some of the particular problems of the Wisdom, and after this to advert shortly to that highest generalization of it which appears in Proverbs (Chap. viii.), where, being abstracted from its empirical manifestation in the laws of life and providence, it was elevated into the region of transcendence and acquired a subsistence of its own, being personified as the counterpart of the Divine mind and fellow of Jehovah.

As the Wisdom aimed at detecting and exhibiting the operation of fixed principles in the world and life, it became practically a doctrine of Providence in a wide sense. In no nation were the principles and conditions of well-being and misfortune so clearly distinguished as among the Hebrews. The Lawgiver set out by laying before the people "blessing and cursing." Though the Theocracy was administered, as to its principles, in no way different from God's government of other nations, there was a difference in the swiftness with which these principles manifested themselves. When the nation sinned, defeat and subjection followed close upon the sin ; when other nations sinned, or when they still sin, subjection follows with equal certainty, though not with the same rapidity. When an individual offended, there was immediately, in the ceremonial disability that ensued, a punishment of his offence. Thus, that fundamental connexion of evil and suffering being extremely prominent in the Hebrew commonwealth, took possession of men's minds with a very firm hold. And no doubt this was intended. The Law was a ministration of death. Its purpose was to educate the people in the knowledge of sin and of retribution. In the theology of St. Paul the law stands not on the side of the "remedy," but on the side of the disease. It came in to aggravate the malady,—that the offence might abound. It had other uses, and this view of it is not meant to be exhaustive. But as an intermediate institution, coming in between the promise and actual redemption, this was one of its effects and purposes. It augmented the disease both in fact and in the consciousness of the mind struggling with its demands. It revealed both sin and its conse-

quences: "By the law is the knowledge of sin; when the commandment came, sin revived and I died." And the supernaturalness of God's conduct of the Theocracy under the covenant of Sinai merely or mainly brought out very plainly the principles of all moral government. God governs all states as He governed the Jewish state; the laws of his natural government do not differ from the laws of his supernatural government; but in the latter, their operation, being immediate, was very perceptible, while in his natural government, as they operate slowly, they often elude observation.

It was natural in this way, especially for a member of the Hebrew state, to apply the principle of retributive justice very stringently and universally. All evil he knew to be for sin, any evil he concluded must be for some sin. Where there was an evil, there must have been a sin to bring it forth. Evil was not an accident, nor was it a necessary outcome of the nature of things; it was an ever present parasite fastening upon the trunk of the tree of human life and bred by the condition of that tree: "Affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring out of the ground, but man is born unto trouble as the sparks fly upward" (Job v. 6). This stringent application of the Law was more natural in a state of society like that existing in the East than it would be with us. There society is simple, and its elements are detached from one another. The tribes live apart. They draw their subsistence from the soil in the most direct way. One class does not depend on another; there is no complex and intricate interweaving of relations as in modern society. Hence the incidence of a calamity

was generally direct ; it did not pass through several strata, affecting the lowest most severely, though it might be caused by the highest. The movements of life were all simultaneous, and a calamity was seen to fall generally where it was deserved. In this way, not in Israel only, but throughout the East, the principle of retributive righteousness was held very firmly : with the man who doeth well, it is well ; with the sinner, it is ill. And all evil is the direct effect of God's anger for sin.

It is probable that this general principle was one common to the Shemitic races before one of them, viz., Israel, became the "people of the Book." Revelation adopted the principle, and sanctioned it at first in its generality ; by and by individuals and the whole people were led into circumstances and passed through struggles that suggested the necessary modifications upon it. The moral ideas of the primitive Shemitic races afford a very attractive subject of investigation. Unfortunately the materials on which a judgment must be formed are very scanty. It is becoming apparent, however, that Israel had much in common with the other tribes surrounding her, and that they remained behind at stages of moral condition and opinion which she abandoned for others far in advance. Even in such an approach towards organized society as was made on the settlement in Canaan, this simple faith must have received rude shocks. In the happy days of the early monarchy, indeed, when the kingdom of God was everywhere prosperous, and heathen states on all sides bowed before it, the principle was receiving splendid illustration. But in later times, when great heathen monarchies rose in the East

and trampled the little state under their heel, the principle could not but come into danger of question. At first the deeper sense of sin might afford an explanation to reflecting minds : these calamities befel them because they had forsaken the Lord their King. But, in the long run, even repentance failed to secure restoration. The kingdom, which was still the kingdom of God, was hopelessly trodden down by the heathen oppressors. The Psalms and Prophets are filled with the complaints and the astonishment of pious men over this anomaly. In the fate that overtook the different classes of the people the failure of the principle was most signally manifested. It was the very cream of the nation that suffered the severest calamities. The lax and ethnicizing party, agreeing with their conquerors, or at least submitting to them, escaped suffering ; while the true theocratic-hearted men, whether those left at home, such as Jeremiah, or those carried into exile, like Daniel, were the victims of extreme hardships and indignity, both at the hands of their enemies and from their false brethren. It is probable that many of the Psalms which express complaints of the prosperous wicked, and suggest questionings as to the righteousness of Providence, belong to the era when the state was falling into decline. In the Book of Job, too, which is the Epic of the Wisdom, there are passages which show traces of great sufferings on the part of some classes of the people ; but, as the scene of the poem is laid among the tribes lying east of Palestine, the pictures of social misery may represent the condition of the subjugated races there, although the author being a genuine Hebrew, it is probable that something more than mere speculative

interest or a personal experience moved him to his great undertaking, and that his colours are partly borrowed from the national sorrows of his own day.

The principle of retributive justice is the fundamental principle of moral government. The assertion of it was therefore natural at all times, whether late or early in the history of the people. It is asserted with perfect roundness in the First Psalm, probably a late composition. Doubts regarding the principle would only be expressed when circumstances suggested them with such a force that they could not be repressed. When therefore we find a lengthy composition, like the middle Chapters of the Proverbs, asserting the principle without restriction, we infer that the composition is early and reflects a period of settled prosperity and reign of law. On the other hand, when we observe a great literary work like the Book of Job, formally devoted to the treatment of moral anomalies in Providence, we may conclude that the body of the state was beginning to be covered with sores, and that the composition is considerably later. It is less easy to determine the date of smaller pieces like the Psalms, in which such questions are moved. Some of these pieces are emotional and lyrical rather than didactic, and might be occasioned by any grave failure of the principle, though operating within a small area. Others, such as Psalm xlix., open with expressing a formal intention of treating the problem, and indicate that the difficulty was one which had begun to press on many minds.

The general principle, that it was well with the righteous and ill with the sinner, was seen to be broken in upon on two sides. The wicked were many times

observed to be prosperous, and on the other hand the righteous were plagued every day. The first side of the difficulty is treated in such Psalms as xvii., xxxvii., xlix., lxxiii. and others; the second side in the Book of Job.

The simplest resolution of the problem is, perhaps, that seen in Psalm xxxvii. There the condition of the perplexed mind is not very aggravated, and the relief administered is simple. The difficulty was felt; it seems was pretty widely felt. But the difficulty was simply a practical sore: it had not yet so lodged itself in the mind as to become a speculative trouble. The condition of society was such that many wicked men were rich and prosperous, and there were righteous men in distress. This state of things led to envy, to irritation on the part of the just; and the Psalm is directed towards calming the ruffled feelings of the pious. Relief is administered in the form of an advice oft repeated, backed up by a statement of the method of moral government. The advice is: "Fret not thyself because of evil doers, neither be thou envious against the workers of iniquity; cease from anger and be not wrathful; fret not thyself in any wise to do evil." The consideration urged in support of the advice is that the prosperity of the wicked is *brief*; it is an interruption to the general scope of things, speedily overcome by them, and the current flows on in its accustomed channels—"Fret not thyself because of evil doers, for they shall soon be cut down like the grass." "The wicked plotteth against the just, but the Lord laugheth at him, for he seeth *that his day is coming*." And on the other hand: "Trust in the Lord and do good, and thou shalt *inherit* the earth."

The Psalmist satisfies himself and others with affirming the general principle, and by saying that the exception to it is of short duration. It is a practical solution, sufficient when the evil has gone no further than to breed discontent. The difficulty that there is exception at all does not bulk largely in presence of the acknowledged brevity of its duration. There is no stretching out of the hand to grope after any principle, whether in God's general administration or in his particular treatment of the wicked, nor even in that direction in which peace was sometimes found—a profounder conception of what true felicity and prosperity was. The Psalmist does indeed refer to the joy that accompanies faith, but this joy is not held up as true felicity in contrast to the happiness of outward prosperity. It is rather touched on incidentally in course of an exhortation to keep the faith even amidst present confusions, because out of these the old moral order will speedily arise—"Delight thyself in the Lord, and he shall give thee the desires of thine heart." "A little that a righteous man hath is better than the riches of many wicked; for the arms of the wicked shall be broken." All turns upon the speed with which the current, hemmed or turned aside for a moment, sweeps away the obstacles and returns to fill again the old channels.

The doctrine of Psalm xxxvii. is that the triumphing of the wicked is for a moment: "Yet a little while and they shall not be." But the righteous shall be fed, shall dwell in the land and inherit the earth. "Bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days." Calamity comes upon the wicked man in the midst of his life. The Psalmist does not pursue his fate further,

nor does he emphasize particularly the manner of his death. Now this solution is of course true in particular cases. It is many times applicable. But it is obviously incapable of being made a general principle to explain and satisfy the mind on all cases. The friends of Job urged it as a universal principle against him. Job has hardly words to express his scorn of the infatuated self-hardening of the dogmatic mind against obvious facts, and his sense of the melancholy contrast which facts presented to traditional theories—"When I remember I am afraid, and trembling taketh hold on my flesh. Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, wax mighty in power?"

Obviously the observation of new facts demanded new explanations and further modifications of the theory. Wicked men might be seen who had grown hoary in their wickedness. Relief from such a spectacle was sought by dwelling on the manner of the wicked man's death. It was said that however long the ungodly might live, he would not depart from this world in peace, his end would be amidst terrible manifestations of the Divine displeasure. This is the position held in Psalm lxxiii. This Psalm forms an advance on xxxvii. in various ways. The Psalmist's mind is in a condition greatly more inflamed. The problem has passed out of the region of mere feeling and become a real speculative difficulty, what the writer calls an '*amal*, a trouble, so great as to threaten to confound the boundary lines of good and evil: "As for me, my feet were almost gone. . . . Behold these are the ungodly who prosper in the world. . . . Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain . . . for all the day long have I been plagued." The moral equilibrium of the Psalmist had

been disturbed by the spectacles that life presented, and he rocked to and fro between faith and disbelief. At last his mind returned to steadiness; and, in the Psalm, he surveys the path by which he had reached it. In the "sanctuaries of God" a light was shed upon the end of the wicked, and on his own side the consciousness of God's presence with him without change upheld him: "Surely thou didst set them in slippery places . . . how are they brought to destruction as in a moment . . . I am continually with thee. Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel and afterwards take me to glory." The "sanctuaries" or holy places of God do not appear to be material localities; they are the innermost circles, the furthest back principles of God's holy providence. The Psalmist was enabled to look through the confusions of a life, however long, and behind the brilliancy of a prosperity, however great; and behold terrors of God's displeasure gathering round the wicked man at last. This is a solution far in advance of that in Psalm xxxvii. It shifts the problem from this life to the edge of the grave. Psalm xxxvii. brought the wicked to destruction in the mid-time of his days, and left the godly inheriting the earth. Death, except as an event that cleared the ground of the wicked, did not enter into the question. In Psalm lxxiii. all turns upon death and its accompaniments, in the destiny both of the righteous and the ungodly. We must dismiss from our mind those inveterate ideas of death and the world beyond which are now ingrained into our habits of thinking, partly from heathen and partly from Christian sources, if we would understand the Old Testament mode of viewing such a subject. To the philosophic Greek death was a relief; the soul

escaped from her prison and spread her wings to soar unhindered in the sublimest regions. To the Christian to depart is to be with Christ, which is far better. To the Old Testament saint to die was to remain dead, not non-existent, but dead. To be dead was to be insensible to the fellowship of the living, whether man or God : " In Sheol who shall give thee thanks ? " A change in Sheol was not to be conceived, for Sheol was the realm of changeless silence, where the departed subsisted but did not live. There were not two worlds, one here, and another beyond ; the one a howling wilderness and vale of tears, the other a happy land where bliss immortal reigns. Something like the opposite of this was the conception that prevailed : the bliss and life were here, the gloom and apathy there. The afflicted suppliant in Psalm xxxix. begs for a brief respite, ere he departed, of happiness and light, for these would soon be no more possible : " Spare me that I may recover strength before I go hence and be no more, for I am a stranger with thee and a sojourner as all my fathers were." Life was a brief but happy visit and sojourn with God ; soon it came to an end, and joy died with it. It is true that this is not to be called the *doctrine* of Scripture. Sheol is no creation of revelation. Such views were rather national sentiments, which revelation found and raised its own fabric upon. Sheol was a creation of the religious imagination of the people, based on the sense of sin, and its dark and huge proportions were but projections of a haunted fancy working on the sights and circumstances of natural death. But Revelation waged no war against the fancy. It left Sheol yawning and dark, and gave relief to trembling faith in another way. It brought

both just and wicked to the brink; but the just it transported across the abyss to God. If there were two worlds, the one was not here and the other beyond; both were here, and what was beyond was but a prolongation of that which existed here, and which could be observed here, if not always in life, at least in the circumstances of death. This world was not one where merely tendencies could be detected, where there was an excess or preponderance in one direction, but so much which was adverse that principles struggled vainly to attain their goal. The tendencies reached results. The crisis or judgment worked itself out. Men's destinies were matured. And in the article of death they manifested themselves. The wicked were brought to destruction as in a moment,—and a veil of darkness is let fall upon their further destiny. The righteous is brought also to the brink of a Sheol where a gracious hand is held out to "take" him, and Sheol is overleapt. The fellowship with God is not broken in death, but continued. The phrase "afterward wilt take me to glory" might seem to imply more, that the fellowship was not only prolonged but perfected. This is possible. But the idea that the blessedness of the saint was greater after death than here would be a very remarkable one in the midst of other Old Testament ideas. If the translation *to* glory be adopted, the term "glory" probably refers to God Himself, and not to any new condition of the saint. The words might be rendered, *in* glory, or even, "after glory thou wilt take me," in which case the reference would be to the manner of the death or life of the just, in opposition to that of the wicked. And this would make the antithesis in the Psalm more exact.

The solution in Psalm lxxiii. is almost complete, and embraces all the elements. No doubt it has no explanation to offer of the fact that the ungodly may enjoy a lifetime's prosperity. But in the deeper analysis of life which the Psalmist is enabled to effect a great step toward this is made. And he is enabled, in the interests of the righteous at least, to dispose of death. Death is always in the Old Testament a secondary thing; it is an obstacle, a mystery, a cloud that hangs on the horizon and darkens the outflow of principles. The light of faith pierces and dissolves it, and the stream of life with God on this side flows on visible and unchecked beyond. The solution in Psalm xlix. is identical, although the lines drawn in lxxiii. are laid down there in deeper colours. Psalm lxxiii. pursues mainly the destiny of the just; Psalm xlix. hangs with an awful interest over the fate of the ungodly. But there is no real advance: "God will redeem my soul out of the hand of Sheol, for he will take me." But of the wicked it is said: "Like sheep they are set in Sheol; Death shepherds them." The life of the righteous with God is prolonged, and Sheol is over-leapt. The wicked sink into Sheol; they remain dead; but death, though not life, is still subsistence.

There is one point in the solution of Psalm lxxiii. which left room for further complications. The ungodly are represented as being delivered over to death amidst terrible external manifestations of God's anger; even on this side their destiny was declared. This was a solution no doubt true in many cases. It was a solution, too, in advance of former ones, and it became regarded as a finality. The traditional mind found rest in it, and shut its eyes. It was very hard in Old

Testament times to detach the spiritual relation to God from its material illustration, to hold fast to a spiritual truth which found no verification in the visible events of life. It was the very axiom of the Wisdom that principles and phenomena were in correspondence. And in laying down this axiom it was but expressing the grand principle of the Old Dispensation. In that Dispensation the general law was that all truths were embodied; they had also a material expression. But one of the tasks of the old economy was to drill holes in itself, to begin making breaches along the whole circumference of the material wall that bounded it—by the Law to die to the Law. And none were busier agents in these operations than the Wise. A psalm here and there, the complaint of a prophet like Habakkuk, are all the evidence that remains to us of processes of mind that must have been going on extensively among reflecting men. The author of the Book of Job uncovers fires that had been smouldering long in many hearts, and rakes them together, heaping on piles of fuel of his own upon the mass. The condition of Job differs from that of the Psalmists. Their problem was the prosperity of the wicked; or, if it was their own affliction, they either knew the cause of it, or it had not gone so far as to interrupt their fellowship with Heaven. Job's problem was the affliction of the just, an affliction unexplained by anything in his life; and as he saw in it proof of the anger of God, and believed, as his malady was mortal, that this anger would pursue him to the grave, this threw the solution of his problem out of this world altogether and into the realm beyond. It was *there* that he knew he would see God. But here he came into collision with the

principle of Psalm lxxiii., in which his immortal friends sought refuge against him. Step by step Job's mind reached to some apprehension of the meaning of his history. At least he threw to the winds one after another traditional solutions of it which satisfied his friends, and which, if the case had not been his own, would probably have satisfied him. Stripped and naked, tortured by disease, with not a shred of material verification to hang by, God even repudiating, as it seemed, his friendship, he planted his foot upon his own consciousness of fellowship with God, and stood unmoved; for he *knew* that his fellowship with God was also, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, God's fellowship with him. And when his friends pointed to his frame dissolving amidst the awful tokens of God's anger (which he admitted), and said it was ever so with the wicked, he called it false—false on both its sides; false that he, though so plagued, was wicked, and false that the wicked were at all times so plagued. The death of the wicked could be seen many times to be peaceful, and his memory cherished among men: "They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment (*i.e.*, in peace) go down to the grave. . . . He is borne away to the grave, and men keep watch over his tomb. The clods of the valley are sweet unto him, and all men draw after him, as there were innumerable before him. How then comfort ye me in vain, seeing in your answers there remaineth falsehood." One after another Job chased his adversaries out of the ancient strongholds. His results, however, as given in the body of the Book, are wholly negative. He destroys, in every one of its forms, the absoluteness of the principle of retributive justice. But the general principle

itself is still conserved in the Epilogue, and the positive contribution to the question is given in the Prologue. The principle is re-affirmed in Job's renewed prosperity, as it could not but be if the equilibrium of doubts and certainties was to be preserved, and the centre of gravity of human life not shifted from faith to scepticism: and an advance on the former doctrine, equal almost to a revolution, is made in the revelations of the heavenly Cabinet, where suffering is seen to be abstracted from the merits of the sufferer altogether, and raised to the place of a general force in the constitution of the universe, wielded by God for general ends like other forces, and affecting individuals not in their own cause, but in the interests of the whole.

In Proverbs x. and following Chapters Wisdom unveils her face to men without any thought of herself. The Wise Man, in whom her spirit had taken up its abode, pours it out with no formal thought of what he is doing. In the happy early times of the commonwealth, when peace and good order prevailed, and the moral life of the people was yet rigid and severe, Wisdom was silently giving effect to herself in all her principles, and every effort of her power was reflected in the heart of the Wise, and his lips expressed it, all consciousness of what he was doing being repressed in the fascination of his task. But in later days, when, amidst repeated revolutions, external authority was relaxed and social morality debauched, when brigand Murder stalked through the land or lurked in the thickets, and Adultery in the shape of the strange woman, with lubricity in her looks, and the harlot's attire upon her back, flitted about the streets, decoying

the youth to her haunts, these hideous shapes, impersonations of Folly, threw up by contrast before the Wise Man's eye another figure, chaste and beautiful, with the serenity of order on her face, and truth and religion in her eyes, the figure of Wisdom. The traits of this exquisite picture are borrowed from a hundred sources, from the political conditions of the time, from the usages of the religious teachers of the day, from all the ways of public life in the city, and the manners of the men and women of the age, good and bad ; yet not from these as superficial phenomena, playing before men's eyes like unsubstantial shadows that come and go, but all of them in their true meaning fragments and expressions of a hidden whole, the moral framework of the human economy, image of the mind of God, whose Agent and Fellow it is. This is the Wisdom of Chapters i.-ix., an abstract idealism of surprising depth and beauty.

These nine Chapters are all from one hand, though possibly, as some think, they may contain in some parts later amplifications, and the figure of Wisdom is the same throughout. The eighth Chapter, however, gathers all the scattered traits together ; and an outline of this Chapter, with a few additional remarks, is all that need be offered here.

First, in Verses 1-3, Wisdom is introduced as a public teacher, and the places are described where she takes her stand and speaks :

Doth not Wisdom cry,
And Understanding put forth her voice ?
She standeth in the top of high places, by the way,
In the meeting-places of the paths ;
Beside the gates, at the entry of the city,
At the coming in at the doors, she crieth.

The high places on the top of which Wisdom takes her stand are supposed to be the heights about the Temple, from which the crowds of worshippers could be addressed as they passed—a favourite position of the prophets in their public office. The crossways or meeting-places of the streets were naturally the throngest parts of the city; and the gates, where justice was dispensed and the public life and thought of men expressed themselves, were ever crowded with masses of people passing out and in at their narrow openings. There, where the people most did congregate, Wisdom takes her place and appeals to men.

Second, Verses 4-11, Wisdom herself speaks; she names those whom she desires to hear her, men in general, and particularly the unformed minds among them, and descants upon the rectitude and preciousness of that which she brings before them.

Unto you, O men, I call,
 And my voice is to the sons of men.
 O ye simple, understand wisdom,
 And ye fools be of an understanding heart.
 Hear, for I will speak of excellent things,
 And the opening of my mouth shall be right things.
 For my mouth shall speak truth,
 And wickedness is an abomination to my lips.
 Receive my instruction and not silver,
 And knowledge rather than choice gold;
 For wisdom is better than rubies,
 And all the things that may be desired are not to be
 compared unto her.

What Wisdom offers to men is Wisdom herself, true and precious. And this being the case, she passes on to a delineation of herself, the forms in which she appears, the good she procures; and ends with a history of her origin and her work from the beginning.

I Wisdom indwell in prudence,
And find out knowledge of witty inventions.
Counsel is mine and sound wisdom,
I am understanding,
I have power.
In me kings rule,
And princes decree justice.
In me princes are princes,
And nobles all the judges of the earth.

It is not said that Wisdom gives prudence, that she supplies counsel and power, that the king who has her rules well, but something much more than that. She indwells in prudence or subtilty of the loftier kind ; it is a form in which she expresses herself. She *is* understanding, kingship, judgment. The forms of intelligence express her. That society is organized, that intelligence and rule are exercised, that there are offices and officers dispensing right—these things are embodiments of her. Like a subtle element underlying all, Wisdom determines to a point in intelligence and mind ; she polarizes herself in kingship and social order ; she scintillates off in understanding and counsel and administration. She is the substratum of intelligence, and, of course, also of godliness ; for the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom, and all that is opposed to piety is the negation of her : “ Pride and arrogancy, and the evil way, and the froward mouth, do I hate ” (Verse 13).

Then, having said that she was not prudish or hard to win, as might be feared of one so beautiful, but ready to give herself to him who would embrace her—“ I love them that love me ”—and having spoken of the splendid dowry that she brings with her : “ Riches and honour are with me, yea, durable riches and righteousness ; ” her own image seems to fill her mind

wholly ; she forgets the crowds around her, and, in a reverie, soliloquizes on her past, when she was alone with God, the first of his works, or ever the earth was ; and when she was his workman in creation, all of which was but herself taking shape in the magical play of her power (Verses 22-31) ; till at last, opening her eyes, she again addresses the astonished throng : " Now therefore hearken unto me, O ye children, for blessed are they that keep my ways " (Verse 32).

The Lord possessed me as the beginning of his way,
 The first of his works long ago.
 I was set up from of old, from the beginning,
 Or ever the earth was.
 When there were no deeps I was brought forth,
 When there were no fountains laden with water.
 Before the mountains were sunk,
 Before the hills was I brought forth.
 While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields,
 Nor the highest part of the dust of the world.

When he set up the heavens I was there,
 When he drew a circle upon the face of the deep.
 When he made firm the skies above,
 As the fountains of the (upper) deep gushed wildly forth.
 When he gave to the sea his decree,
 That the waters should not pass his commandment,
 When he marked out the foundations of the earth.
 Then was I with him as his workman,
 And day by day was I (full of) delights,
 Playing before him at all times ;
 Playing in his habitable earth,
 And my delights were with the sons of men.

The first half of this passage, Verses 22-26, states that Wisdom was with God from the beginning ; she was brought forth before the hills, or ever the earth was. God possessed her, or gave her being, as the beginning of his way, *i.e.*, of his activity. The first movement of the Godhead outward was the giving subsistence to the Wisdom. The second half states that Wisdom

was present at creation, and that not as a spectator but as a workman, that the work was an intoxicating joy, that the self-realization of Wisdom in all the forms of creation was with the ease and conscious power of one playing before Jehovah; and that in his habitable earth and among the sons of men the play was most brilliant and the delight keenest.

The details of this most singular passage may be summed up in one or two final remarks.

1. Wisdom appears as a public teacher. This picture of Wisdom, as occupying all the prominent places by the ways, as taking her place in the crowded thoroughfares and at the thronging gates, and making her appeal to men, forcing herself on their attention, as she brings her own beautiful form before their eyes and greets them with her musical words and offers herself to them to be loved, is very charming. The picture could have been drawn only by combining many materials together, such as the public teaching of the prophets, the more private conversational instruction of the Wise, the judicial procedure of the public law at the gates, and the many lessons of social order and well-being which the thronging thoroughfares presented. These are the things that swell the voice of Wisdom; and the halo of beauty that surrounds her person, the serenity and the purity, the truth and goodwill to men, are in contrast to the disorder and the vice and the wretchedness that follow them, from which she would hold men back. She is the personification of everything that had a voice to speak to men, and impress upon them the principles of Divine order in the world. Her voice gathers into itself the many voices continually sounding in men's ears, the voice of

public life, of a well-ordered society, of revelation, or, in a word, of the whole course of things.

Distinctions might be drawn between these at other times, but, to the universalistic view of the Wise Man, they are all but elements of one whole.

2. If the picture of Wisdom the Teacher embraces all this, that which she teaches will be equally broad. The theme of Wisdom the Teacher is Wisdom herself—Wisdom the thing. There is such a thing. Within the sphere of life and the world there is a fixed order. In men's mind there are principles of thought and judgment. The order without and the principles in the mind correspond. Together they form one system, one framework upon which the world is built. Fragments of these inner principles, corresponding to forms of the external order, are called prudence and counsel: "I Wisdom indwell in prudence." Other fragments are called rule, kingship, judicial function: "In me kings are kings." And still other and the highest, the fear of the Lord and the hating of evil. But it is obvious that these things, though capable of being considered separately, make up together a unity which embraces the principles of ethics and religion and even of intelligence. And this, which is Wisdom, the objective thing, is the theme of Wisdom the preacher. In a word, the principles of the economy of the human race and the earth on which it is placed, form a well-ordered organism, an immaterial framework; but though immaterial it is not latent; it speaks with a thousand tongues of revelation and life, and what it speaks of in the ears of men is itself.

3. One more step remains to be taken. This Wisdom, this organic frame of principles now realized

in the human economy, had its origin in God ; and the organism existed with Him before it was realized in the actual creation. It was from the beginning. The first movement of the Divine Mind outward gave it birth. It was not so much a Divine conception as a scheme articulated and pliant, with a power inhering in it of effectuating itself, projected out of the Divine Mind. Hence it is idealized as having subsistence of its own beside Jehovah, and his purpose to realize it is regarded as a faculty of its own, a capacity within it to effectuate itself, which it does in creation. It is Jehovah's artificer in creation. In this work it plays before Him in the intoxication of delight. Its play is creation. As it moves in grace and power before Him, its exquisitely articulated limbs and frame bearing themselves with a Divine harmony, every movement embodies itself in some creative work. And there, where the Divine beauty and power of its movements were most conspicuous and its delight deepest, was in the habitable earth and with the children of men.

It would be strange if that portion of the Old Testament known as the literature of the Wisdom offered no contribution to the Christology of Scripture. Every portion of Scripture makes a contribution to this suitable to itself. The prophets, who are statesmen, furnish the idea of the kingdom of God and the Messiah, the Anointed, who is its King. The Psalms, which are private utterances of the believer, consecrate the idea of the Saint or Holy One, often afflicted, but staying himself on God, and delivered from death through his godly fear. The contribution which the Wisdom will make will partake of its own character, and consist of some idea universalistic or cosmical. And

this idea we have in the Wisdom of Proverbs. There can be no doubt that the conceptions of Wisdom just referred to entered into the Messianic consciousness of Israel and enriched it, and they are reproduced in the New Testament in connection with the Son. "The Word was with God." "All things were made by him." "In him do all things subsist."

A. B. DAVIDSON.

A NEW TESTAMENT ANTITHESIS.

Πνευματικός, Ψυχικός.

IF I may adapt to the Bible the reverse of a saying applied not long ago to a well-known English politician—science is not its *forte*, nor is omniscience its foible. One science alone it makes bold to grapple with, the science of the redemption of man from sin. Yet even here its science deals with practice rather than theory ; and he that looks for philosophical categories will as surely fail to find them as he that hunts for the classifications of geology. As with philosophy in general, so with psychology in particular. The three souls of Plato by which he sought to solve the problem of evil—the driver and his two steeds—the rational holding the reins of the courageous and the appetitive ; Aristotle's differentiation of the human soul from the souls of all other orders of animate existence, by its active and passive, its speculative and impressionable reason ; the eight subdivisions of the Stoics—the five senses, the faculties of speech and generation, and the governing part which dwelt in the breast, whence the voice came—all these are samples of an analysis which seems not to have interested the writers

of the Old and New Testaments. They all started with the same consciousness of the broad popular distinction—body and soul, the outer and the inner, the apparent and the real man: with this their formal analysis ended. The ethical and not the psychological is the native air of one and all, from Moses until John: their philosophy is the philosophy of plain men; their wisdom “uttereth her voice in the streets,” and knows nothing of the niceties of the schools.

And yet the antithesis at the head of this article suggests that the popular usage they followed seems to recognize such an opposition between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, *soul* and *spirit*, as, to all appearance, not only distinguishes them, but makes them separable—as separable as body and soul. The task I have set myself, therefore, is to seek for some *rationale* of this antithesis and seeming separation, some explanation of its origin and meaning.

Etymology will not help us much, though it is not altogether barren of suggestion. Both words are derived from roots signifying *to blow*; but while *ψυχή*, to judge from its connection with *ψῦχος*, *coolness*, and *ψύχω*, *I cool*, *I refresh*, denotes a *gentle* breath, *πνεῦμα* embraces every kind of air in motion, whether the breath of a man; the wind, that is, the breath of nature; or the breath, that is, the draught, of a fire. And in harmony with this distinction we find *ψυχή* representing in Homeric Greek the life or life principle which, like a soft breath, permeates the whole body, and which, on the death of the body, may escape not only through the mouth,¹ but also through a wound;² and likewise the spectre which, like an impalpable

¹ *Iliad* ix. 409.

² *Ibid.* xiv. 518.

breath, a body in form but not in substance, flits hither and thither amid the shadows of the under-world.¹ *Πνοιή* (*πνοή*), on the contrary—for *πνεῦμα* does not appear in this early Greek—stands for the hot breath of the race-horse as he pants towards the goal;² for the breath of Hephæstus, the god of fire;³ for the breeze that winnows the chaff from the wheat;⁴ and for the winds with whose speed fleet coursers can vie;⁵ while *πνέω*, the verb, describes the breathing of force and fury by warriors in the face of the foe.⁶ In the only passage where the verb *ψύχω* appears in Homer, *πνοιή* is found in the preceding clause with a difference of meaning that is easily discernible. The spear hurled by Hector at Achilles, Athene turned aside *with a breath*, *πνοιῇ*. But the comprehensive *πνοιή* might denote breath either soft or violent; hence Homer, desiring to exclude the latter, and thereby to bring out more emphatically the might of the goddess, adds, *ἡκα μάλα ψύξασα*, “breathing all gently.”⁷ In later classical Greek the usages are equally distinct, though each word is gathering new force. *Ψυχή* retains the sense of *life* and *life principle*, whether of man or of beast, but has advanced from the mere *life-breath* and *bodiless ghost* of Homer to the *soul* or *spirit in man*, which, with the *σῶμα*, *the body*, constitutes the whole man;⁸ according to the popular notion, dying with the body;⁹ according to the philosophers, akin to the divine,¹⁰ and continuing after death,¹¹ though in what form they do not profess to decide. It is now regarded as the seat of the emotions and appetites, and as the organ

¹ *Odyssey* xi. 601, *seq.*² *Iliad* xxiii. 380³ *Ibid.* xxi. 355.⁴ *Ibid.* xiii. 590.⁵ *Ibid.* xvi. 149.⁶ *Ibid.* xi. 508.⁷ *Ibid.* xx. 440.⁸ Xenophon, *Anabasis*, iii. 2. 20.⁹ Plato, *Phædo*, 70 A.¹⁰ Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iv. 3. 14.¹¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, 245 E.

of the thought ; “ that which gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body ; ” ¹ yet all the while hampered by the body as by a “ mass of evil,” and a “ source of endless trouble,” “ filling us full of loves and lusts and fears and fancies and all kinds of folly,” ² from which the soul will have no deliverance till the body is “ cleared away.” It would seem that, with such philosophers, the *ψυχὴ* is *quasi*-passive rather than directly active ; is rather the *life* which enables the appetites and thoughts to act, than that which immediately thinks for itself, and immediately prompts to action : the sphere in which the *νοῦς* and the *θυμός*, the *thought* and the *appetite*, realize themselves ; or, in the phrase of Aristotle, the *ἐντελέχεια* of the body, that by which the potentialities ultimately become actualities. With Aristotle, the only immortal part of man is the *active reason* which, coming from without as something divine, produces impressions through the *passive reason* ; and consequently he has left behind him an unsettled controversy whether he admits the *ψυχὴ*, the *individual, impressionable man*, to immortality. *Πνοή* and *πνεῦμα*, on the other hand (the latter form all but supplanting the *πνοή* in prose), besides retaining the sense of physical breath and wind, are found here and there representing, by a natural figure, whatever imperceptible influence carries away the inner man as with the force and suddenness and mystery of a gale ; or agitates it with the violent breathing, so to say, of an overpowering emotion, natural or inspired. Thus does Io bemoan herself that she is swept out of her course like a ship by a tumultuous “ gust of madness ” (*λίσσης πνεύματι*) ; ³ thus

¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, 400 A.

² Plato, *Phædo*, 66.

³ Æschylus, *Prometheus Vincit*, 884.

does Jocasta entreat Eteocles to stay the "blasts of his passion" (σχίσεν . . . θυμοῦ πνοάς);¹ and thus were the Bacchant women maddened by the "afflatus of the god" (θεοῦ πνοαῖσιν).² This sense of a *divine power inbreathed* has its earnest, no doubt, in the use of the verb ἐμπνέω when Homer tells how the god "inbreathed fierce ardour" (θάρσος ἐνέπνευσεν μέγα δαίμων)³ into Odysseus and his comrades for their attack upon the Cyclops; and how likewise the god inbreathed into the mind of Penelope the thought to weave the shroud for Laertes (φᾶρος . . . ἐνέπνευσε φρεσὶ δαίμων . . . ὑφαίνειν);⁴ and prepares us for the use of πνεῦμα to express the less tumultuous form of the divine *afflatus*, as conceived in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*—a θεῖον πνεῦμα [ἐν] τῇ ψυχῇ, bringing intelligence and knowledge; as well as for Plutarch's "sacred and divine spirit" (ἱερὸν καὶ δαιμόνιον πνεῦμα) dwelling in the Muses. But this is a late and as yet undeveloped sense of the word; and we shall be quite justified in affirming that πνεῦμα in *classical* Greek is purely *physiological*, with such rare tendency to metaphor as is natural to poetic diction. It will be seen, moreover, from what has been said, that energy and activity are specially characteristic of πνεῦμα.

The Biblical usage of the two words runs along the same lines, but goes further. The Hebrew *Nephesh*, which answers to ψυχή, has as its cognate verb *Naphash*, to refresh; and we think at once of the soft, cool air suggested to us by ψύχος. *Ruach*, the Hebrew equivalent of πνεῦμα, has two cognate verbs: *Ravach*, to be airy, and then, to refresh; and *Riach* or

¹ Euripides, *Phanissæ*, 454.² *Baccha*, 1094.³ *Odyssey* ix. 381.⁴ *Ibid.* xix. 138.

Ruach, to draw breath, to smell, and so, to be keen, of quick understanding, and, to take delight in. We cannot be far wrong, I think, in concluding from these hints that, in original idea, *Nephesh* was a less energetic word than *Ruach*, the difference being much the same as between $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$. And, so far as the words are not used interchangeably, the Biblical usage bears out this distinction. Out of the immense number of passages where *Nephesh* appears in the Old Testament, only one gives it the meaning of *breath in motion*, and that only in the poetical book of Job:¹ "His breath kindleth coals;" and even here it is just possible that stress may be laid on the consummate ease with which the leviathan exercises his power. Another exceptional passage (Isa. iii. 20), where the majority of critics accept the interpretation of "exhaled odour," would under these circumstances afford additional confirmation of the *gentleness* of *Nephesh*. *Ruach*, on the contrary, is the regular word for *breath in activity*; *N'shamah*, a much rarer word, being, apparently, a synonym at one time for *Ruach* as *breath*,² and, at another, for *Nephesh* as a *breathing being*;³ and usually translated in the Septuagint Version by $\pi\nu\omicron\eta$, more, it may be thought, for the sake of consistency than with a view to distinction. *Ruach*, moreover, is the constant expression in the Old Testament for the *wind*—whether the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ (with $\pi\nu\omicron\eta$) of the Septuagint, or the $\alpha\nu\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$ which, for special reasons, is, with one or two intelligible exceptions, preferred in the New Testament. The lines of separation in the Old Testament between the significations of *wind* and *breath* and *the source of life*

¹ Job xli. 21.² Compare Genesis ii. 7 and vi. 17.³ Compare Joshua x. 28 and 40 (LXX. $\epsilon\mu\pi\nu\epsilon\omicron\nu$ in both cases).

are at times very hard to trace, so suitably do the wind and the breath symbolize the invisible force which infuses and sustains life. In the vision concerning the dry bones, for example (Ezek. xxxvii.), the prophet, as the mouthpiece of God, declares that He will cause *breath* (LXX. *πνεῦμα*) to enter into them, and they shall live; and afterwards prophecies to the *wind* (*πνεῦμα*), saying, "Thus saith the Lord God: Come from the four winds (*πνεύματα*), O breath (*Ruach*—not translated in LXX.), and breathe upon these slain, that they may live." And the Old Testament writers can think of nothing better than this *πνεῦμα* whereby to denote the unseen yet all-powerful influence proceeding from God, independent, like the wind, of space and time; now mysteriously inspiring life, and now as mysteriously taking it away; sometimes brooding gently and creatively, like a soft breeze, upon the face of the primeval waters; sometimes blowing fiercely and destructively with the blast of a sweeping tempest. It is this *πνεῦμα* that God breathed into man as the breath of life;¹ and this, when God withdraws it, takes life in its train.² It is this that melts the winter ice;³ this, "the breath of God's lips," that "shall slay the wicked;"⁴ this by which "the channels of the sea appear, and the foundations of the world are discovered, at the rebuking of the Lord, at the blast of the breath of his nostrils."⁵

But in the New Testament the usual word for *wind*, as has been said above, is *ἄνεμος*; *πνεῦμα* and *πνοή* are used, each of them, only once in this sense; "the wind (*πνεῦμα*) blowing where it listeth," of which Jesus spoke

¹ Gen. ii. 7 compared with vi. 17, vii. 15.

³ Psa. cxlvii. 18.

⁴ Isa. xi. 4.

² Psa. civ. 29.

⁵ 2 Sam. xxii. 16.

to Nicodemus;¹ and the "rushing mighty wind (*πνοή*)" of the day of Pentecost;² and in these places, apparently, for the purpose of making vivid the parallel between the invisible unfettered power of the wind and of the Spirit of God. They are again used, each once, in the sense of *breath*—*πνεῦμα*, of the breath of destruction from God consuming "that wicked one" (2 Thess. ii. 8); and *πνοή*, of the breath of life when Paul tells the men of Athens that God "giveth to all life and *breath* and all things" (Acts xvii. 25). Of course if the substantive, *breath*, had been required elsewhere, they would probably have been pressed into service more frequently. But, on the whole, we may fairly maintain that *πνεῦμα* in the New Testament has risen more completely into the hyper-physical region; while *ψυχή* remains very much where it was, except that there is a far larger proportion of passages in which the deeper meaning of the *ego* is assigned to it. We shall best justify this rise in the usage of *πνεῦμα* by studying how it was attained.

The Hebrew references to the creation, with the Septuagint rendering of them, are not only consistent with the essential distinction between the two words, but are the key to the antithesis which is the main subject of our consideration. God breathed into the first man the *breath of life*, *πνεῦμα* or *πνοή ζωῆς*,³ and he became a *living soul*, *ψυχὴ ζῶσα*. Not that all the links are here, but they can be easily supplied. The *πνεῦμα ζωῆς*—the breath of life as an abstract state of being antithetical to death⁴—when applied to an individual, produces or results in *ψυχή*, that is, *individual life*.

¹ John iii. 8.² Acts ii. 2.³ Gen. ii. 7 compared with vi. 17.⁴ Deut. xxx. 19: "I have set before you life (*ζωήν*) and death."

Such individuals, accordingly, both man and beast, are spoken of as possessing $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$; ¹ and, by a step further, according to the analogy of our own tongue when we talk of a "young life," and of the sea as "teeming with life," $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ came to represent the *being possessing life*. Thus both the waters and the earth are bidden to bring forth "living souls;" in the one case, the fish and the fowl; in the other, "the cattle, and the creeping thing, and the beast of the earth:" ² and the Lord bade Joshua (Chap. xx. 3) appoint cities of refuge for "the slayer that killed any *person* ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$) unawares." This, then, is the force of the expression $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ $\zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$, in the story of the creation; and also of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, with or without $\zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$, in a multitude of other passages, chiefly in the Old Testament, even where the idea of *life* is not specially emphasized; for instance—"The *souls* of his (Jacob's) sons and his daughters were thirty and three" (Gen. xlv. 15); "Levy a tribute unto the Lord of the men of war which went out to battle: one *soul* ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$) of five hundred, both of the persons ($\alpha\upsilon\theta\rho\omega\pi\omega\nu$) and of the beeves, and of the asses and of the sheep" (Num. xxxi. 28); and similarly in the New Testament (Acts vii. 14): "Then sent Joseph and called his father Jacob to him, and all his kindred, threescore and fifteen souls." It is clearly in keeping with the *activity* of $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ that it should denote that which, when given, constitutes the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$; and likewise with the *passivity* of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, that it should be the constituted life in the individual, so passing on to signify the individual himself, which $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ nowhere does: furthermore,

¹ Thus of Rachel, Gen. xxxv. 18; of beasts, Levit. xxiv. 18; and compare Rev. viii. 9: "The creatures which were in the sea and had life ($\tau\alpha \epsilon\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$)."

² Gen. i. 20, 24. Compare in *N. T.* Rev. xvi. 3.

that $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ can be said to die, but $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ never. It may be remarked, in passing, that while both these words are applied to the brute creation,¹ this application is rare, and the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ of man are regarded as partaking of his general superiority. Thus the Psalmist affirms (xlix. 20): "Man that is in honour and abideth not is like the beasts that perish." The same assumption appears to be latent in Elihu's declaration: "It is a spirit ($\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$) in man, and the breath ($\pi\nu\omicron\eta$) of the Almighty that giveth them understanding." This partial hedge round $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ was due, *in a degree*, no doubt, to the account of the creation, where the communication of the life principle to man is made special and immediate by the phrase (Gen. i. 26), "Let us make man," instead of the phrase of *quasi*-delegation, "Let the waters—the earth—bring forth the living creature."

But another distinction is suggested by the same account: $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is directly allied with a material organisation. "The Lord God," we are told, "formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living soul." Thus the blood is taken to represent the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$: "The life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) of the flesh is in the blood" (Lev. xvii. 11.), the visible blood representing the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, as the invisible wind represents the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$. In the Old Testament man is not conceived of, *as man*, apart from a bodily organisation: so prominent was the *body* in thinking of the *man* that the *Nephesh* ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) could be said to die, and could even stand for a dead body,² yet only as

¹ Compare, for $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, Eccles. iii. 19: "The *spirit* of the beast that goeth downward;" and Psa. civ. 29, 30: "Thou takest away their breath ($\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$), they (all creatures) die . . . Thou sendest forth thy breath ($\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ —*A. V., spirit*), they are created, and thou renewest the face of the earth."

² Num. v. 2.

we ourselves speak of a "dead man," without for a moment meaning that the *man* was there. Neither in the New Testament is the *man* brought before us, even after death, as independent of the body, though the body after death is of a different order—a consistency due to the new light which has displaced the darkness and uncertainty of the old dispensation. It may be said, however, that in the Old Testament a $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is not unfrequently attributed to God; for instance, "The Lord of hosts hath sworn by his soul" (Jer. li. 14); and again (Lev. xxvi. 11), "My soul shall not abhor you." But this usage may be anthropomorphic, as seems to have been the opinion of some of the Seventy, if we may judge from their substitution of such words as "his arm" in the former passage: or it may be merely the Hebrew vivid idiom for the *self*, the *individual personality*, as was clearly the conception of others of the Seventy, and of the translators of the Authorized Version, $\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and "himself" often appearing as the Greek and English renderings respectively. Yet even if such a usage and such passages as Revelation vi. 9 ("I saw the souls of them that were slain") induce us to admit that $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ occasionally signifies nothing more than *life individualised*, without the connotation of material organisation according to our notion of it, this admission would strengthen the position which we care most to maintain—that throughout the Bible $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ are regarded as inextricably bound up together; $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$, the universal life principle, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, that life individualised: while it leaves practically unassailed the position that, in the human sphere, $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ is the life from God, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, that life in man; $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ keeping the organisation in the back-

ground, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ making that organisation prominent. In fact, in a constituted individuality $\piνεῦμα$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ are, strictly speaking, no more *séparable* than, say, an abstract principle and its concrete embodiment; for example, the principle of righteousness and righteousness in actuality. They may be distinguished: they cannot be disjoined.

But it is not the way of popular writing to trouble itself overmuch with distinctions of this kind: and hence $\piνεῦμα$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ are often interchanged without any distinction that can be fairly judged to be intentional. Thus (1) they are broadly equivalent in denoting the *life*: 1 Kings xix. 4, "Lord, take away my life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$);" Psalm civ. 29, "Thou takest away their breath ($\piνεῦμα$);" Matthew xxvii. 50, "Jesus yielded up the ghost ($\piνεῦμα$);" Acts xx. 10, "His life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) is in him." Yet the original idea of $\piνεῦμα$ is here again so far maintained that the Divine power is usually associated, more or less consciously, with what is said of the $\piνεῦμα$; ¹ and that $\piνεῦμα$ could not be used in such expressions as "flee for thy life;" nor could Jesus be said to give his $\piνεῦμα$ a ransom for many, though He could surrender his *spirit* to God. The active sense of the $\piνεῦμα$ as that which brings to life the more passive $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ can in many of the passages be established without violence. (2) They are both used in contradistinction to the body or its material: Micah vi. 7, "The fruit of my body (literally, *belly*) for the sin of my soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$);" Isaiah xxxi. 3, "Their horses flesh

¹ Compare Mead on *The Soul Here and Hereafter*, chap. iii. I may here take the opportunity of mentioning the names of other books to which I am indebted in the course of this Article: Laidlaw's *Bible Doctrine of Man*, Cremer's *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, Girdlestone's *Old Testament Synonyms*, Pfeleiderer's *Paulinism*, and Schmid's *Synonymik* have been found useful.

and not spirit (*πνεῦμα*);" Matthew x. 28, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul (*ψυχή*);" 1 Corinthians v. 3, "Absent in body, but present in spirit (*πνεῦμα*)." Yet here again *πνεῦμα* is the common antithesis, and *ψυχή* almost invariably bears the interpretation of that which gives the *πνεῦμα* constituted form, bodily or individual. (3) They are equivalent as the seat of yearning or emotion: Numbers xxi. 5, "Our soul (*ψυχή*) loatheth this light bread." Thus Jeremiah (ii. 24) speaks even of the "wild ass used to the wilderness that snuffeth up the wind in the greed of her soul (*ψυχή*)." So the *Ruach* of Ecclesiastes vii. 9, "Be not hasty in thy spirit," is paralleled by the *Nephesh* of Job iii. 20, "Life to the bitter in *soul*." And similarly in the New Testament: Acts xvii. 16, "His *spirit* was stirred in him," where the *πνεῦμα* cannot in fairness be made to differ (as though it were his *regenerated* seat of emotion) from the *ψυχή* of Acts xiv. 2, "The unbelieving Jews stirred up the Gentiles, and made their minds (literally, *souls*, *ψυχὰς*) evil affected towards the brethren." They appear to be identical in Luke i. 46, 47, "My *soul* doth magnify the Lord, and my *spirit* hath rejoiced in God my Saviour." The *spirit* of Jesus is said to be troubled in John xiii. 21; and his *soul*, Matt. xxvi. 38. Akin to this synonymity is the interchangeableness of the two words when reference is made to the moral entity, the inner man, the *ego*, the essence as distinguished from the mere outward appearance. Oriental vividness found satisfaction in employing *Nephesh* (*ψυχή*) in the place of the personal or reflexive pronoun; for example, in such expressions as one already quoted (Lev. xxvi. 11), "My soul shall not abhor you;" and again (Psa. xi. 1),

"How say ye to my soul, Flee as a bird?" We might quote the words from the *Magnificat*, given above, as furnishing an instance of *πνεῦμα* in much the same sense. *Nephesh* is used of the inner man at Proverbs xxiii. 7, "As he thinketh in his soul (A. V., *heart*) so is he;" and *Ruach* at Proverbs xvi. 2, "All the ways of a man are clean in his own eyes; but the Lord weigheth the spirits." Paul urges the Ephesian servants to "do the will of God from the soul (*ψυχῇ*);"¹ and hopes to hear of the Philippians that they "stand fast in one spirit (*πνεύματι*), with one soul (*ψυχῇ*) striving together for (or with) the faith of the gospel."² But in this connection also we discern a preference, now for one word, now for the other; for *ψυχῇ*, when there is a desire to express the yearning of the *physical* appetite or to depict the inner man as *possessed by* the emotion; for *πνεῦμα*, when the writer is dealing with intellectual operations or the religious character. It is never said, "Thy spirit," but "Thy soul longeth for flesh" (Deut. xii. 20); nor are we unprepared to find *Ruach* instead of *Nephesh* when Isaiah (Chap. lxvi. 2) is speaking of "a contrite spirit," and the Deuteronomist, of Joshua the son of Nun as "full of the *spirit* of wisdom."³ We at once recall the higher activity of *πνεῦμα* and its direct Divine derivation. (4) The *soul* and *spirit* are once more made equivalent as the subjects of renovation. The Psalmist who beseeches God to "renew a right *spirit* within" him, also declares the law of the Lord to be perfect, "restoring the *soul*;" Peter reminds those to whom he writes his first Epistle (Chap. i. 22) that they "have purified" their "souls;" and Paul adjures himself and the Corinthians (2 Cor. vii. 1),

¹ Ephes. vi. 6.² Phil. i. 27.³ Deut. xxxiv. 9.

"Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and *spirit*;" exhorting the Ephesians in like manner (Chap. iv. 23), "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." It is but natural that, as a sequel to this renovation, *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχὴ* should both be saved from eternal death; and that while James (Chap. v. 20) calls upon the "brethren" to "save the *soul*" of the erring sinner "from death," Paul should "judge to deliver" the incestuous one "unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the *spirit* may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. v. 5).

But while, in speaking of a constituted individuality, popular thought drew no fine distinctions between the *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχὴ*, the life principle and its individualisation, a tendency grew up with the later sacred writers, and especially with Paul, to oppose them to one another, in order to describe with emphasis the special circumstances of the individuality. This tendency, harmonising with the more active idea of *πνεῦμα*, arose from the original relations of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχὴ* in the popular anthropology. First in order came *πνεῦμα*, then *ψυχὴ*: first the invisible and immaterial divine; then the visible and material human, by means of and partaking of the divine. So *πνεῦμα* could easily come to be regarded as higher than *ψυχὴ*; and from this conception sprang certain usages found in the Old Testament, and a larger number, as the tendency developed itself more fully, in the New. (1) *Πνεῦμα*, as we have before remarked, never denotes an *individual life*. But we may sometimes desire to emphasize, not so much the individual life itself, as some aspect of it which we have specially in view; and hence arose that use of *πνεῦμα* which seems to signify an individual life, but

with the suggestion that the garb of humanity is not present or is not required : the emphasis being rather on the *mode* of existence than on the personality. Of this we have an instance in the *spirit* which passed before the face of Eliphaz ;¹ and in the *spirit* which the disciples thought they saw when Jesus suddenly stood in the midst of them after the resurrection. On this occasion He bade them handle Him and see ; “for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have.”² With the same idea the writer of the Hebrews (Chap. xii. 23) speaks of the “*spirits* of just men made perfect,” and the agencies that possessed the demoniacs are described as evil spirits.³ So when Jesus says, “God is a spirit,”⁴ He declares to us not the *personality* of God, but his nature, as when it is said, “God is love,” “God is light,” He recalls and interprets to us the thought of the old Revelation : “The heaven of heavens cannot contain thee ;” and presents to our view a Being absolutely free from all limitations of space and time. But God is an individual life all the same ; and such a description is no justification for a separation of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχὴ* in man.

(2) From the same desire for emphasis comes what we have already pointed out as the preference for *πνεῦμα* as the seat of the purely intellectual operations, the higher emotions, and the moral character generally ; that is, as the inner man in the deepest sense, the man at the fountain head of his being : a preference parallel with the force of *πνεῦμα* as the first principle of life. This is the “spirit in man” which Job makes the throne of his understanding (Chap. xxxii. 8) ; and this

¹ Job iv. 15.

² Luke xxiv. 39.

³ Luke viii. 2.

⁴ John iv. 24. See Westcott *in loco*.

is the *spirit* Paul is thinking of when he asks (1 Cor. ii. 11), "What man knoweth the things of man, save the *spirit* of man which is in him?"

(3) From the view of *πνεῦμα* as the breath of God, it is held to represent better than *ψυχή*—which recalls the earthly element also—the *God-like*; what in man corresponds to and is the point of contact with God. So, in the Old Testament, God is named the "God of the *spirits* of all flesh;"¹ in the New, He is opposed as "Father of *spirits*" to the "fathers of our flesh:"² and Paul declares that "the *spirit* (of adoption) bears witness with *our spirit* that we are children of God"³ This "God in us," communicated at the creation, when we were made *ψυχαὶ* in God's image, has never absolutely departed from man; at any rate, there is no evidence in Scripture for its withdrawal: "it is for the perversion, not for the non-possession of it, that sinners are blamed." Sin did away with the normal operation of man's spirit, so that it was as good as dead; but, in the literal sense, it no more died than the *ψυχή* which individualised it: it is no more dead than the *ψυχή*, just as it is no more, in itself, holy than the *ψυχή*.⁴

(4) Accordingly no better word than *πνεῦμα* could be found to represent the "God in us" of the *new* creation—the Holy Spirit, creating man afresh. Here we have a higher application both of the essential activity of *πνεῦμα* and of the creation history and phraseology. This Spirit, in the Old Testament, was scarcely more, it would appear, as "the Spirit of God," than an undefined influence "poured out," according to the sensuous image, upon those to whom was given the prophetic

¹ Num. xvi. 22.

² Heb. xii. 9.

³ Rom. viii. 16.

⁴ See 2 Cor. vii. 1, and 1 Cor. vii. 34.

spirit of revelation; and promised to be poured out upon all men when the days of the Messiah should come.¹ The outpouring of this Messianic πνεῦμα appears, in the New Testament, at the day of Pentecost,² and in the supernatural gifts and miraculous effects which were from time to time the evidences and characteristics of God's "power towards them that believed." But side by side with this idea of the Messianic outpouring grew up another idea, an offshoot from it, but soon to overshadow it—that of the inward sanctifying power of the Spirit of God upon the whole nature of the believer. And what had been an undefined influence in the old dispensation, became a distinct personality in the new. For Jesus associates the Holy Spirit, as a third Person, with the Father and the Son;³ calls him the Comforter,⁴ and One that shall not speak "of himself," but shall speak "whatsoever he shall hear."⁵ And just as at the first creation the breath of life produced a physically living ψυχή, so in the second the Holy Spirit, the breath of God, reanimates the morally dead ψυχή by his personal contact. Our spirits are renewed, our "souls are saved," by becoming individualisations of the universal, personal, renovating power: we have the "communion of the Holy Ghost,"⁶ God has given us of his Spirit.⁷ With graphic vividness He is depicted as dwelling in us,⁸ yet not so as to produce in Paul any consciousness of pantheistic confusion: for the Apostle still worships God "with *his* spirit"⁹—a spirit, however, that is no longer in ignorance, enmity, or isolation. The spirit naturally be-

¹ Joel ii. 28.² Acts ii. 17.³ Matt. xxviii. 19.⁴ John xv. 26.⁵ Ibid. xvi. 13.⁶ 2 Cor. xiii. 14.⁷ 1 John iv. 13.⁸ 1 Cor. iii. 16.⁹ Rom. i. 9.

longing to man *this* Spirit does not displace or repress: we have still a spirit which can be disturbed,"¹ refreshed,² cleansed from defilement,³ kept pure,⁴ and rescued from destruction⁵—freed and protected from all evil, prompted and adapted to all good, by the Holy Spirit working upon it. He co-exists with our spirits, bearing testimony against their fears,⁶ helping their infirmities,⁷ and making intercession for them when they know not what to pray for as they ought. But such indwelling, such communion, such working of the Holy Spirit upon the human spirit, producing in it a gradual approximation to Himself, naturally causes, at times, an apparent abolition of all distinction between them; as, for instance, in the case of "the spirit" which, contrasted with the mortal body of the Christian, is "life because of righteousness,"⁸ life, of course, only from its unity with the Holy Spirit; and in the case of the "holy spirit" which is one of a list of Christian virtues at 2 Corinthians vi. 6, "In pureness, in knowledge, in long-suffering, in kindness, in a holy spirit, in love unfeigned,"—a spirit holy, of course, only on the ground of its renewal by the Spirit of God. From this stage it was not far for Paul to make *πνεῦμα* stand alone, as he so often does, without further qualification, for the life principle of the believer; to all appearance ignoring the natural *πνεῦμα*, or relegating it, with the more passive *ψυχή*, to the purely human sphere.

And this brings us to the antithesis at the head of the article—an antithesis found in several passages, as, for example, in the verse, "But the natural (*ψυχικὸς*) man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God . . .

¹ 2 Cor. ii. 13.³ Ibid. vii. 1.⁵ 1 Cor. v. 5.⁷ Ibid. viii. 26.² Ibid. vii. 13.⁴ 1 Cor. vii. 34.⁶ Rom. viii. 16.⁸ Ibid. viii. 10.

because they are spiritually (*πνευματικῶς*) discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). What has been said will, it is hoped, have prepared the way for the explanation of this seeming dichotomy. Just as the problem of evil led Plato to conceive of higher and lower souls, so the religious consciousness of Paul and his fellow Christians—starting with a knowledge of God on the one side and sin on the other; with the *πνεῦμα* of the first creation as proceeding from God, and the *ψυχὴ* as that *πνεῦμα* constituted in material man; and, lastly, with the God-given *πνεῦμα* of the new creation—found itself constrained to express by the help of *ψυχὴ* and *πνεῦμα* respectively, the distinction between the actuality of man's natural sinful life, and its noble destiny as conceived and now rendered possible by God. This partial antagonism, in idea, of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχὴ*, took occasionally with the Christian writers a *quasi*-ontological form, as if there were really two souls: not that *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχὴ* were literally separable, or that *πνεῦμα* was holy and *ψυχὴ* unholy, any more than a man's soul can be holier than the man: but that the association of the two terms in history afforded standing-ground for a division which was really ethical and only apparently ontological. By means of *πνευματικός*, then, the opposite to the natural and earthly is emphasized: by means of *ψυχικός*, the opposite to the Divine—the side of the constituted life, in and by itself, the earth-born, and so the depraved. The same explanation will cover the words of Jude when he describes those who separate themselves as *ψυχικοί*, "natural, not having the *πνεῦμα*:"¹ a phrase which is far from meaning, not having, psychologically,

¹ Jude 19.

a *πνεῦμα* at all; for this idea would be contrary to all Biblical usage; but rather, not having what the *πνεῦμα* had now come to represent: the life principle of the new creation, individualised in the regenerated *ψυχή*.

The words of Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. 45 are an eschatological application of the same idea, and must be explained in close connection with the earthly and heavenly bodies of Verse 44: "The first man Adam became a living soul (*ψυχὴ ζῶσα*), the last Adam became a quickening spirit (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*)."

There is no contrast here between the *ψυχὴ* and the *πνεῦμα* of Adam, nor any implication that he was destitute of a *πνεῦμα*. The contrast is between Adam and Christ, in respect of the natural and supra-natural. By *ψυχὴ* Paul emphasizes Adam as material, earthly, created, perishable—the first link in a chain of "living souls" with bodies doomed to perish: by *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* he emphasizes what Christ had become, partly in consequence of his heavenly origin (Verse 47), partly in consequence of what this supra-natural origin had rendered possible—the creative act of God by which the "last Adam" rose superior to death and was constituted with a heavenly and imperishable body; thus acquiring power to be the first link in the chain of a new humanity, endowed by Him with immortal life in bodies heavenly and imperishable like his own. But, in reference to the new humanity, the spiritual body (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*) is but the organ of the regenerated *ψυχή*, that individualisation of the regenerated *πνεῦμα*: the "new creature" (*καὶνὴ κτίσις*) possessing it is a constituted life, a "living soul" in the new creation.

In the face of the general usage, an isolated passage like 1 Thessalonians v. 23, or like Hebrews iv. 12—

passages in which the constitution of man appears to be divided into three parts, body, soul, and spirit,—must rather be outweighed by such general usage than allowed to outweigh it. And when we remember how common a thing it was for the Hebrews and Easterns generally to emphasize their ideas by the cumulation of expressions not radically different, such for, instance, as *heart and soul and mind*,¹ or *soul, heart, and flesh*,² we feel that it would be unfair to deduce any philosophical trichotomy from such passages as these. If any intentional distinction is to be admitted between the *spirit and soul* of the Thessalonian Epistle, the phrase may possibly be explained as a way of classifying the *inner* life and the *individual* life ; but this involves no *separation* between *individual* and *inner*. And in the passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews, the division of *soul and spirit* by the Spirit of God, is no more separative than that of the “joints” *from* “the marrow,” or that of the “thoughts” *from* the “intents of the heart.”

To sum up in one word, πνεῦμα and ψυχὴ are not used by the Biblical writers to denote two separable elements in man's nature, but rather the soul under different aspects, namely, *from God*, and *in man* ; and the specially Pauline πνεῦμα is ψυχὴ raised to its highest aspect, that of the ψυχὴ renewed by the restoring πνεῦμα of God. Accordingly, the antithesis, πνευματικός and ψυχικός, would seem to have arisen not from an actual dualism of πνεῦμα and ψυχή, but from a differentiation the seed of which was sown in the story of man's creation, and fostered and matured during the process of his redemption.

JOHN MASSIE.

¹ Matt. xxii. 37.

² Psa. lxxxiv. 2.

INDEX.

The Dean of Peterborough.

Ecclesiastes ii. 12-26 70

Rev. Joseph Agar Beet.

Before the Feast of the Passover.—A Reply 82

Rev. A. B. Davidson, D.D.

The "Wisdom" of the Hebrews.

Second Part 381

Third Part 436

Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, D.D.

Studies in the Life of Christ.

15. The Betrayer 47

16. The Chief Priests.—The Trial 258

17. The Crucifixion 356

18. The Resurrection 405

Rev. Canon Farrar, D.D.

Wresting the Scriptures.

First Part 23

Second Part 173

Rev. George Findlay, B.A.

PAGE

On Colossians ii. 22, 23 ... 289

Professor John Massie, M.A.

New Testament Words denoting "Care" ... 104

A New Testament Antithesis (*Πνευματικός, Ψυχικός*) ... 459**Rev. George Matheson, D.D.**

The Outer and the Inner Glory ... 89

M. W. Moggridge, M.A.

Lost Gospels ... 325

Rev. James Morison, D.D.

Grace, Philologically Viewed ... 86

Rev. E. H. Plumptre, D.D.

Note on "The Author of Ecclesiastes" ... 88

Rev. W. Sanday, D.D.The Value of the Patristic Writings for the Criticism and
Exegesis of the Bible.

III. Exegesis

1. Chrysostom ... 123

2. Jerome ... 217

3. Augustine ... 304

Editor.

The Book of Job.

VIII. The Theophany ... I

1. First Divine Remonstrance ... 143

2. Second Divine Remonstrance ... 199

IX. The Epilogue ... 245

The Conversion of Sarah ... 345

Biblical Note.

PAGE

St. John iii. 8	237
-----------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Brief Notices of Books.

Godet on the Romans	171
---------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Cambridge School Bible.							
-------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Farrar on St. Luke	171
--------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Maclaren on the Life of David, &c.	172
------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

The Centenary Bible	239
---------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Legge's Religions of China	242
----------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Pressensé's Contemporary Portraits	243
------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Leathes's Warburton Lectures	244
------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Clarke's Metrical Version of Job	400
----------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Whedon's Commentary on the New Testament.	Vol. V.	404
---	---------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

INDEX OF SCRIPTURES.

	PAGE		PAGE
Genesis xviii. 1-15 345	Ecclesiastes ii. 12-26 70
Job xxxviii. 1-xlii. 6. 1		
xxxviii. 11-xl. 5. 143	St. John iii. 8 237
xl. 6-xlii. 6 199	xiii. 1 82
xlii. 7-17 245	Colossians ii. 22, 23 289
Psalms xix. 7-9 89	Hebrews xl. 11 345